


UNIV. OF
TORONTO
LIBRARY



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

~~Relig
H.~~

THE
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XII




ISSUED QUARTERLY BY
THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

155931
19/6/20

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1919

211 71
11



The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, consisting of Professors William W. Fenn, Henry W. Foote and Frederic Palmer.

BR
1
H47
v.12

12.10
21.10

CONTENTS FOR JANUARY, 1919

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON PROTESTANT MISSIONS	<i>James L. Barton</i>	1
CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY	<i>Arthur Cushman McGiffert</i>	36
THE PEACE-MAKERS	<i>Francis Greenwood Peabody</i>	51
SEEKERS AFTER GOD	<i>Durant Drake</i>	67
LORD ACTON'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY	<i>Crane Brinton</i>	84
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		113

CONTENTS FOR APRIL, 1919

MULTIPLICITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER	<i>J. Loewenberg</i>	137
THE SEMINARY OF TOMORROW	<i>William Adams Brown</i>	165
THE CAUSES OF PRE-MILLENARIANISM	<i>Francis J. McConnell</i>	179
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN ACTS, AND THE "CITY OF GOD"	<i>F. J. Foakes-Jackson</i>	193
SOME OLD UNPUBLISHED LETTERS	<i>Edited by Preserved Smith</i>	201
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		219

CONTENTS FOR JULY, 1919

THE VALIDITY OF NON-EPISCOPAL ORDINATION	<i>George Hodges</i>	249
THE FIRST EUROPEAN CONGRESS	<i>Ephraim Emerton</i>	275
SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY	<i>James Bissett Pratt</i>	294
IS THE DESIGN ARGUMENT DEAD?	<i>William Hallock Johnson</i>	315
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION	<i>Edward Farwell Hayward</i>	329
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		343

CONTENTS FOR OCTOBER, 1919

ISAAC WATTS	<i>Frederic Palmer</i>	371
THE REASONABLE APPEAL OF THE BOOK OF REVELATION	<i>James Hardy Ropes</i>	404
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MYSTICISM AND THE DIVINE IMMANENCE	<i>H. C. Ackerman</i>	427
THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF CONSCIENCE AND MORAL PRINCIPLE	<i>Robert James Hutcheon</i>	435
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		452

INDEX OF AUTHORS

ACKERMAN, H. C.	The Psychology of Mysticism and the Divine Immanence	427
BARTON, JAMES L.	The Effect of the War on Protestant Missions	1
BRINTON, CRANE	Lord Acton's Philosophy of History . . .	84
BROWN, WILLIAM ADAMS . . .	The Seminary of Tomorrow	165
DRAKE, DURANT	Seekers after God	67
EMERTON, EPHRAIM	The First European Congress	275
FOAKES-JACKSON, F. J.	The Kingdom of God in Acts, and the "City of God"	193
HAYWARD, EDWARD FARWELL .	The Reconstruction of Religion	329
HODGES, GEORGE	The Validity of Non-Episcopal Ordination	249
HUTCHEON, ROBERT JAMES . .	The Nature and Validity of Conscience and Moral Principle	435
JOHNSON, WILLIAM HALLOCK .	Is the Design Argument Dead ?	315
LOEWENBERG, J.	Multiplicity and the Social Order	137
MCCONNELL, FRANCIS J. . . .	The Causes of Pre-Millenarianism	179
MCGIFFERT, ARTHUR CUSHMAN	Christianity and Democracy	36
PALMER, FREDERIC	Isaac Watts	371
PEABODY, FRANCIS GREENWOOD	The Peace-Makers	51
PRATT, JAMES BISSETT	Some Psychological Aspects of the Belief in Immortality	294
ROPES, JAMES HARDY	The Reasonable Appeal of the Book of Revelation	404
SMITH, PRESERVED	Some Old Unpublished Letters	201

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XII

JANUARY, 1919

NUMBER 1

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON PROTESTANT MISSIONS

JAMES L. BARTON

BOSTON

One would be indeed presumptuous to predict the effect of this war upon foreign missionary operations. Indeed, to report fully the present effect of this world war upon the work of the various foreign missionary societies of the world is an impossible task. Missionary leaders are, however, attempting to estimate the significance of the present bearing of war conditions, while few would be so bold as to suggest even what the future may be.

That foreign missionaries and their operations are seriously and fundamentally affected all will agree. It could hardly be otherwise when nearly every country in which foreign missionaries and their institutions are located is under the flag of one of the belligerent powers, and much mission territory is actually within the zone of war or of active military preparations. Within the war zone are the mission fields of the Balkan Peninsula, all of the Turkish Empire, Syria, Arabia, Egypt, Persia, all of the former German colonies in Africa, and the islands of the Pacific held by Germany at the outbreak of the war, while North Africa, Ceylon, India, Burmah, Siam, British South Africa, and Portuguese East and West Africa are upon the borderland of war or of direct

preparation for war. Beyond these areas all that remains of Africa, all of China, Japan, extensive sections of South America, and the Philippine Islands, as well as other lesser territories, are under a flag of one of the Allies and so are within the war field and subject to special war regulations. We can mention here but few of the conditions which have especially confronted foreign missionary enterprises during the last four years, some of which have been fundamental to future work, while others are only incidental and will quickly pass when war conditions cease.

I. EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

The first missionary areas to be seriously disturbed were the four German colonies in Africa and the German possessions in the Pacific Islands. These colonies and the Islands were the field of Protestant missionary operations, largely of British, American, and German missionaries. The Allies at once made attack upon these colonies and, in practically every instance, the missionary areas were invaded and the mission stations were occupied by one party or the other and made the base of military activities. Great hardship was suffered by some of the missionaries, especially the British, when invaded by the Germans, although the German missionaries make fully as strong complaint against their treatment at the hands of British and French invaders. The German missions were more depleted since German missionaries of military age were called upon to join the fighting forces and, in some fields, nearly the entire German male missionary body was transferred to the ranks and the mission work was left without much male supervision. The native Christians too were seriously involved. A British war vessel visited a station of one of the American Mission Boards with direction to take on board the

American missionaries. After due deliberation the missionaries replied, that as they were at the place of duty and opportunity, they had unanimously decided to remain in spite of the friendly offer of the Admiral to carry them to a place of safety. The Admiral removed his hat and replied, "Many a man today wears the Victoria Cross for acts of heroism far less worthy than that which you exhibit." While the missionaries suffered necessarily many hardships, no violent deaths have been reported, and after the colonies had been entirely overcome by the Allies, the work settled down to more normal conditions.

In the Balkan Peninsula, an area fought over since 1912 more than any other section of the world, mission work has been very little disturbed. There are mission stations in the Balkan Peninsula that have been under four different flags in the last six years. Monastir, for instance, was under the Turkish flag in 1912. This flag was replaced by the Bulgarian in the first Balkan war and that by the Serbian flag in the second Balkan war in 1913 and now by the French flag. None of the parties taking possession of the country have materially interfered with missionary work. The Bulgarian government was wholly friendly. The Serbian government was somewhat suspicious but not hostile.

Turkey has differed from all others connected with the war because it has experienced atrocities such as the world has seldom before witnessed, while at the same time it has been the field of military operations of the first order. The war has raged in the west about the Dardanelles, in the southeast in Syria and Mesopotamia, and in the northeast along the Russian and Persian border. From twenty-five to thirty per cent of the missionaries who were there at the outbreak of the war have remained. About five per cent of those who remained have died during this war period, most of them

from typhus, typhoid, and cholera. The character of the work was materially changed owing to the unprecedented conditions.

The Persian situation has differed little from the Turkish except that Persia has been outside of the real war zone, although the northern section of the country has been fought over by Russian, Turkish, and Allied troops and there have been many local disturbances which have at times threatened the life of the missionaries. Irresponsible mobs have taken possession of some mission stations, as at Tabriz, where the Presbyterian Hospital was sacked together with the American Consulate.

The missionary enterprise throughout the world has suffered seriously from the loss of man-power. Many missionaries, recognizing as paramount the call of their country, have withdrawn temporarily from missionary service and taken up some form of war work. Some of the Mission Boards in Great Britain and Canada have lost in this way more than fifty per cent of their male missionaries of war age. So far as reported, the American missionary societies have not lost that number, but the Mission Boards have taken the position that they would throw no obstacle in the way of any missionary who wished to enter military service. The number of new appointees has necessarily been reduced. From twenty to thirty is the age when most missionaries are appointed, and, while theological students and ordained men are exempt from the draft, there were many who did not wish to claim this exemption. Many Mission Boards are sending out for educational, industrial, and medical work men who are not ordained and who thus would not be exempt. It is an interesting fact that some of these missionaries have been given their release from military service on the ground that the service they contemplated rendering in the mission field was calculated to aid

materially in winning the war. There have been many interesting cases of this character, showing the breadth of the Exemption Boards in their recognition of the work of the foreign missionaries as international agencies working in the interests of international brotherhood and good understanding.

The German missions have probably suffered more from a loss of man-power than any others, because a larger percentage of their missionaries were bound by military regulations to take their place in the ranks whenever their country called for their services. It has already been stated that in the German colonies in Africa a large number of the German missionaries joined the military forces. This was true of many who were at home on furlough and of others who were deported from their mission fields early in the war. At the same time, it was impossible for the Mission Boards in Germany to communicate with their mission fields, so that missionaries even past the military age who were caught at their home-base could not return and, in fact, their return was forbidden in all cases where their mission territory came under the flag of a country at war with Germany. The effect therefore of the war upon the man-power and support of German missions has been disastrous. This condition has attracted the attention of the British and American missionary societies, and considerable sums of money have been raised, both in Great Britain and the United States, to conserve the German work, and the Government of India has been most liberal in its treatment of these missions.

The financial loss of the missions has been great, caused by the increased cost of nearly all commodities everywhere. No part of the world is free from the apparently universal advance in the price of foodstuffs, labor, and of wearing apparel. This has compelled the increase of the annual allowance for the support of missionaries.

At the same time, the cost of transportation, both of the missionary and his supplies, has more than doubled, and to this is to be added the increase of cost of exchange, brought about chiefly by the rise in the price of silver. As an illustration, the year before the war exchange in China went as high as \$2.15 in silver for one dollar gold. Since the war began the price has been falling rapidly so that it has reached, according to latest reports, the unprecedented figure of a little better than one dollar silver for one dollar gold. As all payments in China are made in silver, this item alone has nearly doubled the expenditure of missionary funds in that country in order to maintain the work upon its former basis.

The movement of missionaries has been severely hampered by war conditions. Necessarily the Government has been compelled to put new and stringent restrictions upon the issuing of passports since the passport privilege has been abused by representatives of the Central Powers. In addition to this, Great Britain, because of her disastrous experience with German missionaries, put restrictions upon the entrance of missionaries from countries other than Great Britain into British possessions. For instance, if a Mission Board wishes to send a missionary into India, whether he is a new appointee or a veteran returning to his field of labor, application for permission must be made through the British Embassy at Washington. This application properly vouched for is sent to India through England and, after investigation in India as well as in the United States, if nothing appears against the candidate, permission for going to India is granted. A passport cannot be secured from the United States government until this permission is obtained. This has caused much delay and has also excluded from British colonies many missionaries of German descent. Other difficulties have appeared in the form of limited facilities for travel. Steamship lines

have been reduced in number, until it has become almost impossible to secure passage for a missionary or missionary family to cross either the Atlantic or the Pacific without waiting for several months. The northern Atlantic has been closed to missionary travel, but the southern Atlantic still remains open, while there have been no restrictions upon the Pacific except such as are caused by lack of passenger service.

II. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON MISSION WORK IN TURKEY AND PERSIA

The most striking illustration of the effect of the war upon mission work in Turkey will be discussed under the head of "The Effect of the War on the Mohammedan World." At the outbreak of the war Turkey was occupied as a mission field principally by the Presbyterian Board of Missions, carrying on extensive work in Syria and Palestine, and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, conducting work across Asia Minor, through Armenia and Kurdistan and down into northern Syria. This work was established about a century ago, and out of it had grown not only a large number of churches but an extensive medical work and educational institutions of national and international repute. When missionaries entered the country there was not a vestige of modern education to be found throughout the land. It was inevitable that men and women trained in our best American colleges and universities should there lay the foundation for a thorough education for all classes. The Armenians were the first to respond, followed by the Bulgarians of the western part of the country and of Macedonia, and then the Greeks, the Mohammedans coming last. Besides the large number of hospitals under American missionary physicians of the highest standing, there have grown up

a long list of notable colleges, like the Syrian Protestant College at Beirût, Euphrates College at Harpût, Robert College at Constantinople, the American College for Girls at Constantinople, the International College at Smyrna, Anatolia College at Marsovan, Aintab College at Aintab, St. Paul's Institute at Tarsus, Central Turkey College for Girls at Marash, and last and perhaps least the American College at Van, just beginning its career as a college at the beginning of the war. In addition to these colleges were several times their number of preparatory schools and academies, much more widely distributed throughout the country. At the outbreak of the war, in these higher intermediate and primary schools in Turkey, directly under the control and direction of Americans, most of whom were missionaries, there were nearly thirty thousand of the best and brightest young men and women of Turkey receiving a modern education.

There was some work carried on by British societies in Mesopotamia and in the vicinity of Constantinople, and German missionaries, for some fifteen years previous to the outbreak of the war, had been carrying on limited missionary operations. The Germans had been strengthening their missions continuously during the entire period, they having begun there after the massacres of Armenians in 1895-6 and the friendly alliance created by the visit of the Kaiser to Abdul Hamid in 1898. All this work had been established under what are known in the diplomatic world as concessions and capitulations. Turkey was loath to make treaties with western Powers, it being contrary to the dignity and rights of the Caliph of Islam, the Sultan of Turkey, thus to bind himself. Concessions were made which theoretically, at least upon the part of the Sultan, might be abrogated at will. Under these concessions foreigners were allowed to come into the country, missionary work was especially recog-

nized, and more or less foreign business had been built up between Turkey and the western nations. Missionary, medical, educational, and charitable institutions which had been founded during the last sixty years, had been established under privileges granted by these concessions and capitulations.

Within a month after the war began and before Turkey had actually joined the belligerents, the capitulations were abrogated by an official proclamation which diplomatically and legally left no standing whatever for any foreign institution within Turkey. There were no laws and no treaties by which foreign property and foreigners themselves could claim protection. The proclamation of abrogation demanded that all foreigners and all foreign property should come at once under Turkish law, and that foreigners should have no right of appeal to their consuls or ambassadors. If these conditions had been immediately and strictly carried out, it would have caused the destruction of all missionary work. The American ambassador, joining with all of the other ambassadors in Turkey, including the German, made strenuous protest against such a step on the part of Turkey, claiming, as they had a right to claim, that the capitulations and concessions were virtually treaties and that they could not be abrogated without the consent of all parties concerned. The decree of abrogation was not carried out in all details. Missionaries did appeal to their consuls and to their ambassadors. While local officials in some of the interior stations overstepped their rights, breaking the seal of American consuls and taking possession of American schools, the central Government gradually yielded to the arguments of the ambassadors and issued a series of regulations which were afterward materially modified, so that missionary work was not vitally interfered with. Much credit is due to Ambassador Morgenthau for his strenuous and effective protest

with the Turkish officials against any such drastic treatment of American interests in Turkey. At the time the order of abrogation was issued there were from eight to ten million dollars' worth of property in Turkey owned by American missionaries and American educational institutions. This was in the form of educational, medical, printing, industrial, and religious plants with their buildings and equipment, including the residences of Americans engaged in the conduct of the different forms of work. Back of these plants there was a total of investment of not less than forty millions of dollars covering nearly a century of endeavor in the country.

Attention was very soon turned from controversy over the abolition of the capitulations to the atrocities which Turkey, under the leadership of Germany, began to perpetrate, first against the Armenians and later upon Syrians and Greeks. This attack upon the Armenians, who comprised the larger part of the student and teaching force and working Christian body in Asiatic Turkey, struck a direct blow at the educational and missionary work. Native professors in American colleges, teachers, pastors, leaders, and students in the educational institutions were seized by the thousands, some of them horribly tortured, many put to death, while others were sent into exile down into Syria and northern Arabia. The story of these atrocities is too well known to require repetition here. The effect upon educational work in the interior of Turkey was paralyzing, as in the College at Aintab, Euphrates College at Harpût, and the College at Van. Nearly every Armenian teacher was at once eliminated and the older students either taken into the army, exiled, or killed.

The missionaries remained on the ground and used their influence as far as they were able to counteract the disastrous effect of this atrocious attack. They were recognized as the defenders of the Christian populations

against the Government measure of extermination. Relief funds were furnished them from the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief in the United States, and from that time to this large numbers of them have given a greater part of their time and strength to the carrying out of measures of relief, by the aid of over \$5,000,000 of funds provided from America.

After the first attack against American institutions and their native constituencies, a constantly increasing number of Mohammedan officials seemed to begin to realize something of the heinousness of their acts and so consequently to withdraw their opposition. They began to afford the missionaries a measure of coöperation; for instance, the Syrian Protestant College at Beirût received much help from Djemal Pasha, a former member of the Young Turk Cabinet and later commander of the Fourth Turkish Army Corps that was operating against Egypt and the Allied forces in Syria. Through him, in the face of difficult food conditions, supplies were secured and the College was able to carry on its work with a larger number of students than it has had before in its history. This increase of students was partly due to the closing of British and French schools at Beirût, and also to the feeling on the part of many parents that the safest place for their children was in the American school. This same condition prevailed also in Constantinople, and Robert College and the American College for Girls have been overwhelmed with students in spite of the increased cost of living. According to latest reports Robert College had more than fifty per cent increase in its student body, as did the American College for Girls, and Talaat Pasha, then Grand Vizier, was giving much assistance in obtaining fuel and food. The International College in Smyrna, although its president is a British subject, has continued its work uninterruptedly. It has been compelled to

reduce the number of students it could accept owing to its shortened teaching force and limited finances, but the president reports this last year to be one of the most encouraging and promising in the history of the College. Institutions in the interior have not fared so well. Anatolia College at Marsovan lost most of its faculty and its student body. Only the Greeks remained after the first onslaught on the College. Nearly a year before the breaking of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the United States the entire missionary force at Marsovan was removed by the government under military order, but later four members of the station were allowed to return and the work for girls was resumed, but the boys' college has remained closed. Euphrates College at Harpût remained open, although no work of college grade was carried on after the first attack. This work was suspended when diplomatic relations were broken with the United States.

It has been impossible for the last two years to send out of the country any detailed reports of the progress of the work, but between one and two hundred Americans, missionaries and teachers and physicians, have remained in the country, continuing the educational and medical work as far as possible but devoting themselves primarily to acting as agents for reaching with measures of relief the starving, stricken, exiled peoples of that country. These have remained in spite of the urgent demand of Ambassador Elkus, at the time when diplomatic relations with the United States were broken, that they all should withdraw from the country. The State Department even demanded that all Americans should come out, but this large company of men and women, in spite of the possibility that the United States might soon be at war with Turkey, decided to stay where, they declared, they believed they could render the largest service to humanity and the world. They were conscious

of the fact that should they withdraw, these suffering scores of thousands of people would be left without aid and at the mercy of any one who wished to attack them.

Many have died during this war period, of disease incident 'to the country. Of the missionaries of the American Board alone seven have died of typhus, and possibly eight. The death of seven others who were not physically strong was undoubtedly hastened by the severe strain upon them. One, Mrs. G. C. Raynolds, died through an accident incurred on the flight of the missionaries from Van preceding its re-capture by the Turks. Two suffered probably a violent death, although the case of Mr. George P. Knapp, a graduate of Harvard University in the class of 1887, might have been a case of typhus. The truth will undoubtedly remain a secret. Two Presbyterian missionaries in Syria died, one of typhus and the other of cholera.

In Persia the situation has been somewhat similar to that in Turkey, although Persia has not been within the actual western war zone. Its northern territory has been overrun by both Turkish and Russian troops, and the Kurdish element got out of control and added to the terror of the situation. Six of the Persian Presbyterian missionaries died of typhus and cholera, but most of them are there on the ground today, administering relief as far as they are able to the starving population of more than one million souls. In both Turkey and Persia the fact that missionaries have remained at their posts of service in the midst of peril from disease and in many cases from violence, when it was fully known to the authorities and to the Mohammedan populations that they not only had the privilege of withdrawing to their homeland but were even ordered by their government to do so, has had a mighty influence on the thinking of the Mohammedans. This example of missionary

heroism and devotion, never surpassed in the history of Christian missions, is leading to most serious thought on the part of Moslems. They recognize in this act a vast difference between Islam and Christianity, and while they may reject the preaching of the missionaries and declare impracticable many of the demands of the gospel of Christ, they cannot deny the fact that these Christian missionaries coming to their country in the name of the Christ have exhibited Him with mighty power in the lives of sacrifice and peril they have lived and in the heroic deaths they have died. Through these conditions a message of surpassing power and influence has been delivered and is still being delivered to the Moslem populations of these two great Mohammedan countries.

III. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD

There is reason for referring to Mohammedanism as the "Mohammedan world," although followers of Mohammed are widely scattered among many different peoples, speaking various tongues and occupying but a mere fragment of the world's surface under Mohammedan governments. Nevertheless, the unity that has prevailed among Mohammedans in creed, practice, ideals, and expectations, no matter what their language or nationality, has given ground at least for the expression. Also the Mohammedans have presented an organized, unified resistance to the Christian approach to such an extent that it has seemed like the resistance of a single body united with one purpose. This resistance has been so persistent that the Christian approach to the Mohammedans has made but little general progress in the past and the Christianization of the Mohammedans has been almost the despair of missionary organizations. Moham-

medanism, in extending itself among pagan peoples, as in Africa, and in propagating its faith among the non-Moslem populations among which Mohammedans have dwelt, has made much use of the argument that Mohammedanism is a unit, undivided, with a single ideal and purpose, more unified than any other religion and ultimately bound through its unity of creed and effort to win the entire world.

This was the state of affairs at the outbreak of the war, and it was a condition that Germany made deep plans to use in prosecuting the war. There is evidence to show that it was Germany's purpose to fire the Mohammedan world with a mighty *jihad* that would paralyze civilization. The well-known effort inaugurated through the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Sultan of Turkey acting as the Caliph of Islam, has passed into history. Its failure was a surprise to the entire world, bringing consternation to Germany. The alliance of Turkey with so-called Christian Germany and Austria has estranged Turkey, as the only existing Mohammedan government of recognized significance, from the other great national bodies of Islam. India, Egypt, the North African states, and other Mohammedan countries, repudiated the alliance and refused to join in a holy war under Turkey's leadership. The result has been the dismemberment of Mohammedanism as a centralized religious force. Never since the day of Mohammed has the Mohammedan world been so disrupted, disorganized, and destitute of religious leadership. After the shock of the refusal of the Mohammedans to respond to the call for a holy war, the next great cleavage thrust into the very centre of Mohammedanism was the disaffection of the Arabian tribes, their repudiation of Turkey and their affiliation with the Allies. The chief significance of the separation of Arabia from Turkey lies in the fact that the sacred places of Islam—Mecca and Medina—are located in

Arabia, and the Sultan of Turkey for centuries has been recognized as the keeper and protector of these sacred shrines.

As the direct result of this endeavor of Turkey under German leadership to precipitate a holy war, we find that Mohammedanism has lost its Caliph and is now without an accepted religious head. The Mohammedans of India, Egypt, and, in fact, nearly all parts of the world, have either tacitly or officially repudiated the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph of Islam, a position which he has held for four centuries or more. This leaves Mohammedans without a recognized leader, while the Mohammedans of India and Egypt have declared their loyalty to Great Britain, thus breaking the centralized political power of Mohammedanism, in addition to its disrupted religious solidarity.

Arabia, under the leadership of the Sherif of Mecca, has officially and religiously rejected the Sultan as the Caliph and has assumed absolute control of the sacred shrines of Islam. The Sherif has set himself up as the King of the Hedjaz and the legitimate and proper protector of Mecca and Medina. In his proclamation to the Mohammedan world he severely condemns the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph of Islam for the action taken in calling a holy war in conjunction with Germany. To the present time no Mohammedan country or Mohammedan leader has come forward as the defender of the Sultan or his claim upon the Caliphate.

There is no agreement among the Mohammedans upon a Caliph. The law of Mohammedanism would seem to demand that the Caliph shall be the ruler of an independent Mohammedan country, as he is supposed to be not only the religious but the political head of his people. At the present time the only ruler of what may be called an independent Mohammedan kingdom is the Sherif of Mecca, self-proclaimed as the King of the Hedjaz, two

small provinces in Arabia upon the Red Sea but in which are located Mecca and Medina. Whether or not the Mohammedans will recognize the King of the Hedjaz as the Caliph remains to be seen, but apart from him there seems to be no available candidate.

Thus it is apparent that the organic religious and political unity of the Mohammedan world has been shattered, so that no longer can Moslems present a united front in opposition to Christianity or of any other religion, nor can they exercise political power for intimidating Mohammedans who are inclined to turn away from their ancestral faith and consider the contents and claims of Christianity. Already there are indications of a new sense of liberty and freedom in some countries, which is but a part of the movement so prevalent in the world today from autocracy toward democracy. It indicates a desire and a purpose on the part of many Mohammedans at least to exercise their own judgment and to demand liberty of action in religious matters.

This state of affairs would seem to open the door of approach for the Christian teacher and preacher more favorably than it has ever been open since the days of Mohammed. Mohammedans are beginning to realize that their solidarity is broken, that their hope of universal Mohammedan rule over the world is shattered forever. Intelligent Mohammedans are recognizing the fact that Mohammedanism does not contain those elements of strength which furnish an adequate religious motive and ideal for any society, much less for a State. This has brought to them a sense of discouragement and in many places almost of despair for the future of their faith. There are many indications that large groups of Mohammedans are ready to inquire sincerely and earnestly into the principles of Christianity and what it promises to its followers. There has never been a time since Christianity came into open conflict with Islam when conditions

seemed so favorable for a wise, judicious, united approach to the Mohammedan world with the message of Christianity. There are no people who need more the gospel of sanitation, of industry, of brotherhood, of intelligence, of sacrifice, and of consecration than do the Mohammedans. The task is a colossal one, involving the approach to fully one-seventh of this world's population, dwelling largely within or near the tropics, prejudiced and fanatical. It is too great for any one communion to undertake; it is too important to be undertaken by all communions acting separately. There are many who feel and believe that through this war and its effect upon Mohammedanism as well as upon Christianity at home, the time has come for a united effort on the part of the Christian world to approach the Mohammedan world in a way that will win their confidence and gradually their coöperation and ultimately their allegiance. The most fundamental effect of this war upon the non-Christian world is that of its influence upon Mohammedanism, constituting a new challenge to the Christian Church.

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS MOHAMMEDANISM

In German colonies in Africa at the outbreak of the war there were less than two million Mohammedans. Apart from these colonies German territory had practically no Mohammedan population. The Christians of Germany were deeply interested in Mohammedan problems and in missionary endeavor to reach the people of that faith. In 1910 a German Colonial Congress was held in Hamburg in which the Moslem peril in East Africa was seriously discussed. After the discussion the Congress adopted the following resolution:

"Since the progress of Islam in our colonies is accompanied by grave perils, this Colonial Congress recommends a thorough study

EFFECT OF THE WAR ON PROTESTANT MISSIONS 19

of Moslem propagandism. The Congress is thoroughly convinced that everything which favors the progress of Islam and hinders the progress of Christianity should be avoided, and especially commends the cultural efforts of missionary education and hospital work to the support of the Colonial Government. We also recognize in the Moslem peril an urgent challenge to German Christianity to occupy the regions threatened by Islam with missionary effort."

It is an interesting fact that in this conference there were Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Socialistic leaders. The clear-cut utterance of the resolution above quoted does not tally well with the fact that for the last twenty years the Kaiser has made no utterance, so far as records show, that would in any way offend the most fanatical Mohammedan. When the war began it was evident that Germany was putting much reliance upon her relations with Turkey as *the* central Mohammedan power. The German Government went so far as to plan with Turkey for calling a holy war. Germany placed much dependence upon the uprising of the two hundred and thirty millions of Mohammedans in a real alliance with Germany, thus striking a fatal blow at Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, each of whom had large Mohammedan populations under its flag. England alone ruled over ninety-one millions of Mohammedans, of which sixty-seven millions were in India.

Soon after the alliance between Germany and Turkey was established, Christian leaders in Germany began to show a different attitude toward Mohammedanism, as for instance, Professor Friedrich Delitzsch of Berlin; who, as early as the spring of 1915, in an address to a Berlin audience said:

"Islam, so far from being a barren and retrogressive faith, leaves the door wide open to religious, moral, and social progress, and therefore no German Christian need be ashamed of an alliance which, begun in time of war, will be cemented and bear worthy fruit in times of peace."

In a lecture delivered in the spring of the same year, Professor Wilhelm Hermann of Marburg said:

"We must be convinced that they [the Turks] understand us and we them. Were this not the case, our alliance would be a false and unworthy one. As Christians we can understand and reverence their religious convictions, and our future lies along the same road as theirs."

After discussing the alliance of Germany with Islam, at about the same period Professor Troeltsch said:

"Islam is thereby recognized as one of the great acknowledged religious world powers which can no longer be a missionary objective, but must be left, just as in the Christian world, to its own inner religious development. It is unlikely that this result will ever be reversed, and it will affect the treatment of the Moslem problem in our Colonial possessions. For all that, Christianity is of course not invalidated in the territories occupied by the white race, to which, apart from the Christian communities in our colonies, it seems bound to confine itself, though it is limited as regards its world mission. It seems to be conclusively established that humanity is distributed into distinct spheres of religious life, free henceforth to stimulate one another religiously but each bound to fulfil its own destiny. This will astonish or alarm no one who has already come to this conviction on general principles from a study of the history of religion, but it is now beginning to be universally evident from the course of historical events."

These quotations are sufficient to show the trend of thought among many of the religious leaders, but they do not represent the sentiment of all the Christian people of Germany. *Missions-Magazin*, of which Herr F. Würz is editor, took up the discussion, maintaining strongly that the German Government could make no alliance with a religion, and that the Christian people of Germany, in order to maintain loyalty to their country, were not to assume that Mohammedans do not need Christianity. In the midst of this discussion Herr Würz says:

"Our own share in the gospel of Christ may well be at stake, if, in the political alliance with the Mohammedan world, we lightly

esteem the incomparable treasure with which we have been endowed by God. That would mean, not the end of the world mission of Christianity, but certainly the end of our world mission on behalf of Christianity. It may be difficult for us when, as a natural consequence of political alliance, the consensus of public opinion is friendly toward Islam, to maintain our clear Christian consciousness with regard to that faith. But if we do, we may bring blessing to the Mohammedan world with which we are now outwardly so closely associated."

Professor Julius Richter of Berlin, editor of the *Allgemeine Missions Zeitschrift*, takes up the discussion, but not with the same clearness and emphasis as Herr Würz. In 1915 there was an assembly of the German Evangelical Missionary Committee to discuss this important question. Every German Evangelical Missionary Society was represented. Bishop Hennig, a member of the Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Missionary Conference, presided. One of the most important questions discussed was, "What Missions may do in order to protect the home Churches from a wrong valuation of Islam." So far as is known, no resolutions were passed; but in reporting this Conference in the *Evangelisches Missions-Magazin* of June, 1916, Herr Schlunk of Hamburg, among other things, said:

"Wide circles of the German people not only stand in actual danger of placing an incorrect valuation upon the religion of Mohammed but they have already fundamentally fallen prey to this danger. Through a determined admiration of Islam they become equally determined to forget their own Christian position and believe that they are in this way fulfilling their obligation to the German cause. If one demands, however, that the Ottoman kingdom should be absolutely excluded from the sphere of missions, he seeks thereby to cut the vital nerve of all missionary work and to bring into question the essential superiority of Christianity to the non-Christian religions."

This question is still under discussion in Germany, but not so prominently as in the first year of the war. It

will remain to be seen whether, when the war is over, the Christians of Germany will have reached the conclusion that the Mohammedan world is outside of the sphere of their missionary activity. It is not improbable also that Great Britain may feel herself to be under special obligations to Mohammedans and to such a degree that there will be a tendency to put restriction upon missionary work among and for Mohammedans under the British flag. The fact that she rules over such a vast Mohammedan population and that the Mohammedans exert such a dominant influence, especially in India and Egypt, will undoubtedly lead many statesmen of Great Britain to raise the question as to whether Christian missionaries should not be excluded from undertaking any direct religious work for Mohammedans in these countries at least, if not in all other countries where Mohammedans are found in any considerable number. Such an attitude can be taken only under the mistaken supposition that Christian missionaries are a disturbing element when working among Moslems. Missionary Societies and Boards are eagerly watching the trend of events as they affect the relations of Moslems to the great missionary movement.

V. ENLARGED VISION OF MISSIONS IN RELATION TO THE STATE

The war is having a marked effect not only upon the administrative officers and missionaries of foreign mission organizations but also upon the constituency at large, by way of giving them all a new conception of the place of foreign missions in establishing, throughout Asia and in Africa, a civilization in harmony with the twentieth-century Christian ideals. The old conception that the foreign missionary went out to teach pagan peoples a creed in order to save them from the wrath to come, had

already become enlarged, during the last generation of missionary endeavor, to a more balanced conception of the sociological value of Christianity. Christian missionaries have been for the last two decades attempting scientifically to apply the principles of the gospel of Christ and the teachings of the New Testament to the society of the East, and this effort has not been without a large degree of success. The war, however, has brought to the front a new and enlarged phase of the missionary enterprise hardly dreamed of before, but now becoming important in the light of present-day questions. The missionaries and missionary administrators are recognizing that the gospel is not simply for the individual and for society, but that it is a gospel suited to the needs of the State. We are learning the same lessons also in the West. The principles that lie at the foundation of the most stupendous alliance of nations the world has ever seen are the principles taught in the New Testament. These are justice and righteousness in national administration, the right of the individual and of the small nation to live and to enjoy a large degree of liberty without fear or favor, the principle that the stronger nations are under God the natural protectors of the weaker nations. These principles are now at the front in the discussion of war questions and especially of questions looking to a permanent peace yet to be established. The discussion has already passed beyond that of the value of the principles of the gospel in the organization and conduct of the affairs of a nation, to international relations where nation deals with nation, so affecting the permanent peace of the world. This conception of international Christianity was perhaps thrust for the first time into diplomatic circles by our own Secretary, John Hay, when the great powers of Europe set about to partition China. He in the name of the United States Government protested against such partitioning. This protest

raised a storm of opposition among his fellow diplomats, on the ground that diplomacy as between nations must remain always and forever purely selfish. The statement was made that if the United States wished a portion of China, she should put in her claim and defend it, but if she did not, she had no right to lift her voice in the interests of the integrity of China for China's sake. It was maintained that such an attitude was unknown in international diplomacy. Secretary Hay held his position and saved China from dismemberment. The principle, however, did not seem to reach the inner consciousness of the national life of the world until the outbreak of the present war. The last two years have revealed a marvellous advance in the thinking of the civilized world upon the sisterhood of nations. The world is rapidly learning that when one nation suffers all suffer, that when one is prosperous all are prosperous in a proportionate degree. We are learning that no nation or country on earth can remain backward intellectually, morally, or nationally, and not to a degree become a dead weight and even a menace to the other nations of the world. This at once brings the whole subject up to the very door of the foreign missionary enterprise.

There are two illustrations now prominently before the world which may be given as concrete examples of the point under consideration.

A few years ago China, the oldest autocracy on the face of the earth, with enormous although undeveloped wealth at her disposal, and with a population twice in excess of that of any other nation, decided to throw off her autocracy, depose her Emperor, and establish a constitutional government. This decision was not made hastily, but followed extended discussions and long deliberation. When the decision was reached it seemed to carry with it practically the entire population of that great empire, and China quietly and unostentatiously

swung out from the number of hereditary monarchies into the circle of democracies. A constitution was adopted, a President was elected by the people, parliament assembled, laws were made for the government of the new republic, and all without any untoward disturbance. It is true there were riots in some parts of the empire, as there have always been since China has been known to the Western world, but no more. Foreign relations were not disturbed, foreign commerce was not interfered with, foreigners dwelling in the country did not regard their lives in peril or their property in jeopardy. For half a dozen years China has moved forward under a democratic form of government and only recently has elected a new President, without disturbance and apparently to the entire satisfaction of all of the people. As the great war developed, China, believing in democracy as the form of government best suited to her particular genius, joined the Allies, and at once became a force in winning this war for world justice, righteousness, brotherhood, and human freedom. Her men by the hundreds of thousands have gone to France and are there assisting to the limit of their power in the cause of her allies, and she was ready to furnish still larger forces for the achievement of victory.

Another and a more recent illustration of a movement in the same direction is that of Russia. She too decided to depose her time-honored monarch and become a democratic nation. This step was taken as one of the immediate results of the war. The Czar was dethroned amid scenes of riot and bloodshed, and almost immediately the greater part of the Russian Empire was thrown into disorder and anarchy reigned from Vladivostok to the North Sea. Russia withdrew from the war as a positive force in aid of the cause of the Allies and became an ally of the Central Powers. Foreign trade was paralyzed throughout the land. The lives of foreigners were im-

perilled and their property destroyed; no life was secure; law and order were abandoned and anarchy ruled. Russia became not only no help to the Allies but became a menace to the world.

One cannot examine these two illustrations of recent events in the national life of two countries which comprise together fully one-third of the world's total population, without raising the question as to what has made the difference between these two great nations, moving from an absolute monarchy to a democracy in the same general period. We at first might say that it was due largely to the religious and fundamental ideals of the two nations. We must remember, however, that China has always been classed as a pagan nation. Her people are largely Confucianists, Buddhists, and Taoists. These religions inculcate gentleness of action and friendliness of spirit. At the same time we must remember that Russia was a Christian country, controlled by a national Christian Church conspicuous among the churches of the world, with magnificent cathedrals and a great, far-reaching, powerful church organization. It is impossible to find in these two religious principles the reason why the fundamental change was made, in one instance in quietness and peace and in the other in riots and disorder.

If we go back for a century and look into the history of these two countries, we find that Christian missionaries entered China at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Bible was translated into the languages of the people; Christian institutions were established; schools were opened and Western learning was introduced, until gradually Western educational institutions, from the kindergarten to the college and university, stretched across China from south to north and from the east to the most remote province of the west. Chinese young men of the most daring spirit and of the broadest intellect soon

found their way to the West and took extensive courses of study in the best institutions of America and England. Preceding the adoption of the constitution by China, she adopted the system of Western learning which had been introduced into her borders by the missionaries. It became the education of the Government. Through this Western learning, in which constitutional government and modern history as well as the principles of Christianity were systematically and thoroughly taught, China saw a new light. Then when she began to long for a larger liberty in the making of her own laws and the administration of her own affairs, it was but natural that the country should turn to the young men who had been educated in mission institutions and in colleges and universities in the West, to assume places of leadership. These men had the confidence of the Chinese. The people were ready in a large degree to follow their leadership, and so when word went forth that China was to change her monarchy to a democracy these students of the West and of the constitutional governments of the world were called upon to prepare a constitution which when prepared was accepted, and China became free.

With Russia it was different. While the Bible in Russia was freely printed and freely distributed, there was no liberty given to the people to study constitutional government and modern history. No missionaries were allowed to enter the great Russian Empire and establish modern Christian schools upon the modern Christian basis. Russian students who had studied these great subjects abroad were not allowed to return, and if perchance any did reënter the country, their lives were in peril and in multitudes of cases their liberty was taken from them on the mere supposition that they were supporters of the doctrine of the rights of the people to have a voice in the making and execution of their own laws.

When Russia took the important step towards a democracy she had no leaders of adequate training and of safe ideals. Those who did assume control had been trained in the school of socialism and anarchy, into which the principles of justice and righteousness and brotherhood had not entered.

It does not require a great stretch of the imagination to picture what might have been the result had Russia at the beginning of the eighteenth century permitted American missionaries, men and women of the highest intellectual and spiritual equipment, with lofty ideals taught by the gospel of Christ, to enter her empire and establish there great outstanding modern educational and religious institutions. Then when her hour of crisis came she would have had men and women of moral and intellectual strength and of recognized leadership to lead Russia safely over the bar into the harbor of peace. I do not believe it is presumptuous to say that one of the outstanding differences between these two countries, in the method and results of their throwing off their monarchy and establishing a constitutional, democratic form of government, is due in large part, if not entirely, to the fact that Christian missionaries were given so large opportunity in China to promote those lofty ideals taught by Christ Himself and His disciples and to build them into institutions that have already become a part of China's national, social, and intellectual life, and that if they had had the same privileges in Russia for the same period, the outcome in Russia would have been wholly different from what it is today. Facts of this character are convincing the missionary leaders that the horizon of their vision must be enlarged to include a message to the nations as well as to the individual and to society. Much of the teaching in the New Testament, in the light of present history, not only can be interpreted in terms of the nation but we are rapidly learning that anything

short of such an interpretation is a clear misreading of the purpose and order of God.

VI. WORLD DEMOCRACY AND MISSIONS

The last twelve years have recorded a rapid advance among the nations of the world from an autocratic to a democratic form of government. By democratic form of government we mean a government in which the people have a voice in deciding to what laws they shall be subject, the method by which these shall be executed, and by whom. President Wilson has given to the world the declaration that this war is now being fought to make the world safe for democracy. Twenty years ago but a small proportion of the world's population lived under a democratic form of government. The monarchy was the rule. A hundred years ago democracies were not only the exception but they were looked upon by most of the world as an experiment in government destined to disaster. Today more than twenty nations are joined together in a mighty alliance for the protection of democracy or, in other words, for the protection of the rule and rights of the people as against the divine right of kings.

There have been many instances in history where an autocracy has gone wrong. History is full of the records of kings deposed and their successors installed often by violence, the only remedy the people had for protection against a rule that was unjust and intolerable. This was remotely an expression of the spirit of democracy, but, however that may be, it was a remedy by which an autocrat gone wrong might be prevented from working evil in the world. It was the only recognized and known method of reform for an impossible autocrat. On the other hand, a democracy is the rule of the people. It is the people themselves, the majority under leadership, who decide what form the democracy shall take, who

shall guide it and under what laws. The success of a democracy depends upon the steadiness and intelligence of the people and upon their being actuated and inspired by the right ideals. It is not sufficient that the people shall have ideals. Germany was as thoroughly actuated by ideals as any country on the face of the earth at the outbreak of the war. These ideals had been taught to all her citizens from their youth up and had become a part of their inmost thinking; but the ideals were low, unworthy an intelligent people, and, when carried into action, became a menace to the world. We have found that when an autocracy goes wrong there is a remedy, but when a democracy goes wrong, it becomes a curse to itself and the world. While President Wilson announced that this war is being fought to make the world safe for democracy, undoubtedly if he were to express his thought on the subject at the present time, he would say it was to make democracy safe for itself and for the world.

The entire world is moving with startling rapidity toward a democratic form of government. While Japan maintains a monarchy, nevertheless the people of Japan have a large voice and strong influence in shaping Japan's national life. She has a constitutional government, a parliament elected by the people, and while the Emperor rules in Japan, nevertheless he would indeed be a brave and bold Emperor who would take any step that would run athwart the will and wishes of the people of Japan. In the Japanese press-discussions upon government plans for internal development or affecting relations with the outside nations, one sees nothing as to the opinion of the Emperor upon the subject. Japan has already reached that stage where the voice of the people is heard with authority and where the people's will is becoming the supreme will of the nation.

We have already referred to China where that vast population, having thrown off the rule of the aristocracy,

now come under a government of self-rule and self-determination. No words can be found to describe adequately the significance of China democratized, or what she may become with her resources of men and material wealth developed and her relations to the Far East, touching as she does upon one side the great Russia and the waters that connect Japan with India and, on the other side, bordering upon the Pacific Ocean over against the United States. China's place in world progress is one of portent far beyond the power of any prophet now to foresee.

Coming further west we find India with some 325,000,000 of people who have been for more than half a century controlled in most part by England. Among this number there are 67,000,000 Mohammedans, in some respects the most virile of the country. English rule has been benevolent, aiming at the development of the Indian people and their preparation for a measure of self-government. India's millions watched with profound interest the conflict between Russia and Japan, since they had been brought up to believe that the Asiatic races were naturally subject to the white races of the West. When Russia was defeated, India got a new conception of the possibility of independence for the Asiatic. She began to demand from England a larger measure of self-government and self-expression, which was freely granted. The present war, however, has carried India an enormous stride forward in self-consciousness and in her desire for home rule. She has furnished more than a million men to Great Britain to fight the war of the West for democracy. She was ready to furnish more men; but at the same time she has obtained a new conception of the possibilities that lie before India in the line of self-government. Demands have been made on Great Britain that a larger measure of home rule shall be given India, and these demands are receiving favorable consideration, and India will

soon be making her own laws and choosing those who shall execute them. India, which only fifty years ago seemed nationally helpless and incapable of self-government because of the lack of training and of dissensions among the various races making up her diverse population, is now uniting, the Hindu and the Mohammedan alike demanding that she have a share and a large share in the mighty democratic movement of the age. England has already promised India a large part at least of that for which she is asking.

We will not refer again to Russia, with its 180,000,000 already broken away from its autocratic government and old traditions and feeling its way blindly toward some form of self-government that shall recognize the rights of the people and grant them power of self-expression.

We will not prolong the list, but there are other smaller peoples moving in the same direction and countries that retain their monarch but shorn largely of power to rule because of the insistence of the people themselves upon a larger measure of self-rule. We have here named four countries which possess about two-thirds of the entire population of this world, all of which, within the last decade, have moved with startling rapidity away from an autocratic government into a form of democracy. If the movement of all these peoples is actuated by the proper ideals and the laws that they make are based upon the principles of justice, righteousness, and brotherhood, the world will move on speedily and steadily toward that happy day when nations shall dwell together in unity. But what will be the result to the world if these thousand million of the world's population or any important portion of them should come into a democratic form of government with ideals which will be a menace not only to their own populations but a curse to the rest of the world? Under such conditions we can turn only to the God of nations and devoutly call upon Him to have mercy

upon the world gone wrong and headed for self-destruction. It is fundamentally imperative, therefore, that these nations moving toward democracy should be inspired with ideals which will guarantee safety for themselves, their people, their immediate neighbors, and for the remoter nations that must deal with them in international relations.

What safeguard, therefore, can be thrown about this mighty, almost universal, democratic movement, so as to turn a possible curse into the greatest of blessings? There will always remain the influence which goes out from the Christian method of dealing with Eastern races, but such influences must necessarily be limited. The Christian merchant from the West can exert a strong, helpful influence upon these people of the East, but this influence is hampered by the fact that he goes to the East for personal gain. There are those who claim that education will make these nations safe; that if Japan, China, India, and Russia will only adopt modern education, build up great colleges and universities, put a high premium upon modern scholarship, introduce all the modern sciences, teach history and all that goes with it, this will make these coming Eastern democratic countries safe for the world. There is no denying the fact that a modern education has the greatest value, which cannot be overlooked when we consider those forces that must be brought to bear upon the East in this critical period of their history. At the same time we cannot forget, and must not, that Germany at the outbreak of this great war was called the best-educated nation on the face of the earth. Neither can we escape from the fact that because of her education in every department of science and history, Germany's menace to the world has been vastly greater than it otherwise would have been. Education has not saved Germany from bringing upon the world the greatest war of history accompanied by atro-

cities surpassing those perpetrated by the worst African tribes or the savages of the South Seas, forcing the world to make the greatest sacrifice ever made in any equal period of the world's history. Modern education without those ideals that must lie at the base of a safe and just and righteous government as taught by Jesus and his apostles and handed down through the universal Church from age to age, can never make safe a nation or a democracy.

We come then to the inevitable conclusion that it is only the living Church of Christ, reaching out into these great countries of the East through its multiform missionary agencies and establishing there Christian institutions of every character and grade, that we can implant in the hearts of their leaders who make the laws, shape the government, and establish international relationships, those principles of righteousness which will make them a blessing and not a curse to the world. This is putting upon the Church and the great missionary cause a stupendous and overwhelming responsibility, and yet it is one that they cannot evade. It is a responsibility that never was dreamed of a generation ago, but one that now with all its force thrusts itself to the front. To meet this responsibility the Church at home must rally its forces to the last man and the last woman and its resources to the last dollar that it may fulfil its sacred and world-embracing mission. This conflict is now ended, with the one mighty menace to human liberty crushed, and now the Church must take up its task, greater and more enduring even than the one for which the Allies fought, namely, to make, through the power of the universal gospel committed to it, the emerging democracies of the nations safe for themselves and for the world.

This is the task of the Church revealed to it by this war. The fact that foreign missions are the only agencies through which the Church can influence the ideals, ambi-

tions, thought, and life of the great nations and coming races of Africa and the East for justice, righteousness, and fraternity, removes them from the inferior position in which they have hitherto been classed, and gives them a place among the most important world-shaping agencies. The most potent energy today operating for international fraternity and world peace is the force that acts through modern foreign missions.

CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY¹

ARTHUR CUSHMAN McGIFFERT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK

Whatever the outcome of the war, it has already rendered the world an immense service in defining with unexampled clearness and on a hitherto unmatched scale an ethical issue of the profoundest and most far-reaching significance. I do not mean the old issue raised by every war since the time of Christ—whether war is ever right and to engage in it ever Christian. That question is largely academic and in existing circumstances of altogether minor importance. In a situation like the present, Christian men as well as other men will fight, and fight with a good conscience, whatever may be said as to the abstract right or wrong of war, or as to its consonance with Christian principles. It would be easy to show that to identify Christianity with pacifism, as many devout and eager Christians are doing, is profoundly to misinterpret it and to lose sight altogether of its great controlling principles. But I am concerned this morning with another matter altogether—the fundamental moral issue raised by this particular war and Christianity's relation to that issue. I refer—to put it in a single phrase—to the issue between autocracy and democracy.

It is a mistake to regard this as a political issue merely, an issue with which Christianity has nothing to do. It is easy to regard it thus, for during the past fifteen hundred years Christian governments have been more

¹ Address given at the annual Commencement of Andover Theological Seminary, June 11, 1918.

frequently autocratic than democratic, and devout Christians have not only lived as contentedly in autocratic as in democratic states, but have even ruled with as good a conscience in the one as in the other.

But the events of the past four years have abundantly shown that the traditional neutrality of Christians and the Christian Church has been misplaced, that the issue between autocracy and democracy is a moral, not only a political issue, and that Christianity is profoundly concerned in it, as it is in all moral issues. The transfer of the age-long struggle between autocracy and democracy from the field of politics to the field of morals is, I take it, the most significant consequence of these four years of war.

The war did not begin as a contest between autocracy and democracy, any more than our Civil War began as a struggle over slavery. But as the Emancipation Proclamation made explicit an issue that had been involved from the outset, so the course of recent events, interpreted for the world at large by President Wilson, has made explicit an issue that was really already there, and has changed the war from a mere conflict between nations to a conflict between ideas. The South always insisted that the question of slavery was an economic, not a moral question, but the conscience of the North read it in moral terms and the North's victory put it permanently into the moral realm. We may in the past have believed that the question between autocracy and democracy is exclusively political, but it has now become to us and to our allies a moral question, and its moral character will not be again forgotten.

The recognition of the moral character of the issue between autocracy and democracy is due in no small part to Germany's unscrupulousness in the choice of means for the attainment of her ends. It is a profound remark that "the end does not justify the means but

is judged by the means." What autocracy is has been borne in upon the consciousness of the world by Germany's flouting of all moral considerations in her conduct of the war. The end must be unholy for which such means seem fit.

Brought under the inspection of the moral sense of the world at large, as it has not been before, autocracy, we are everywhere coming to see, like its twin sister imperialism, is not accidentally but essentially immoral, immoral not simply when it commits atrocities such as Germany has been committing, but immoral even when on its best behavior. The basis of all morality is mutuality. Autocracy is fundamentally evil because it denies to others rights and responsibilities which it arrogates to itself. Its motive may be wholly bad — the mere selfish and brutal will to power — or its motive may conceivably be good. The autocrat may interest himself in the welfare and happiness of those he rules and may believe them happier because he rules them. But the viciousness of autocracy is not thereby relieved. Whether exercised for good or evil ends it violates the cardinal principle of morality: it treats men as machines instead of persons, as things to be manipulated and controlled instead of free beings gifted with the privilege of choosing for themselves even to their own hurt. However much the autocrat may protest his consideration for his subjects, and his desire for their welfare, his attitude toward them is profoundly cynical.

With disregard for the rights of others is naturally associated contempt for their opinions and principles, and it is no accident that autocratic Germany in the present war shows scant respect for the moral judgments of the world at large. It is not Germany but autocracy that is betraying its true character in acting thus.

The subject upon which I wish to speak today is Christianity and Democracy. From the Christian point

of view the cardinal vice of autocracy is its denial of genuine human brotherhood — of the kinship and equality and liberty that brotherhood involves. To enslave another man is as unchristian as to destroy him. To count him an underling is as unchristian as to count him an enemy. This we have not always realized; under the stress of the present crisis we are beginning to realize it now.

Christianity began with a marked emphasis on love for others, and throughout Christian history love has remained a fundamental Christian virtue. To be sure its range was early narrowed, and love for the brethren usurped the place of love for all men. It was also crowded into a subordinate place by the growing emphasis on purity and unworldliness, so that in course of time the ideal Christian came to be the uncompromising ascetic rather than the loving and helpful neighbor and friend. But even so love remained a cardinal virtue and ever and anon its preëminence was reasserted. We live in an age when it has established itself as the supreme expression of Christian character, when to treat all men as brothers is recognized as the Christian's chief duty.

But unfortunately an essential element in brotherhood has been commonly overlooked. The love for which the early Christians stood was love between equals, not between superiors and inferiors. This explains in part the confinement of Christian love to the Christian brethren. They were on an equality of privilege and responsibility not shared by others and not affected by differences in worldly rank and possessions. As the circle of Christian brotherhood widened with the nominal conversion of the Roman world, this notion of Christian brotherhood, equalizing all the inequalities of life, became more and more of a fiction. To show a man Christian love now too often meant to assume not an essential equality between him and you but an essential inequality, enabling

you to exercise the congenial and condescending virtue of charity. Charity indeed came to seem peculiarly Christian just because of the lack of mutuality in it. On such a basis, of course, so long as it is benevolent, despotism is as Christian as democracy. Indeed, the benevolent despot, like the benevolent millionaire, has a larger and more splendid opportunity for Christian service than the ordinary man.

You recognize in this an attitude still common in democratic America as well as in autocratic Germany. Where it prevails, the Christian character of political as well as of economic autocracy passes unquestioned. So long as the Kaiser treats his people benevolently and gives them a good government, he is acting the part of a Christian prince, is acting all the more Christianly because he is doing it of his own free will and not under the compulsion of a constitution. So long as a powerful State controls and governs a weaker people in such a way as to insure their comfort and promote their prosperity, it is acting the part of a Christian State even though it has never secured the consent of the governed. Similarly, so long as an employer is kind to his employees — building model cottages, providing free lunches, giving frequent bonuses, and the like — he is acting the part of a Christian employer, even though he joins with others of his class in perpetuating the bondage of the wage-earner and in hindering the growth of economic freedom.

In modern times there has been a dawning suspicion that this attitude is immoral. But the suspicion has been hitherto confined largely to social radicals and reformers. Only now with the new emphasis on democracy and the growing apprehension of its meaning has the suspicion begun to penetrate the mind of the world at large, including the Christian Church. There is in it the promise of a revolution, social as well as political, of unexampled magnitude.

It is the barbarity and ruthlessness of Germany that has shocked the moral sentiment of the world and the Church, but the shock is awakening us to a realization of the essential evil of all autocracy and imperialism, economic as well as political, benevolent as well as cruel. It is not surprising that public opinion everywhere outside Germany has instinctively revolted against Bernhardi's brutal declaration that "the notion that a weak nation has the same right to live as a powerful nation is a presumptuous encroachment on the natural law of development." The significant thing is that the same public opinion is revolting not merely against the anti-Christian principle that the stronger nation has a right to crush the weaker, but against the farther principle, whose anti-Christian character has not hitherto been realized, that the stronger nation has the right to control the weaker. In other days, so long as the control was based, or claimed to be based, upon regard for the weaker nation's good, we commonly assumed, in our blindness, that whatever might be thought of it politically it was at any rate consonant with Christian principles and to be tolerated by the Christian Church. But now public opinion in all the countries of the Entente is going further even than the most sensitive Christian conscience formerly went, and is refusing to be satisfied with anything less than democracy within the nations and among the nations, with anything less than freedom and independence both for individuals and states. The political consequences of this steadily growing refusal we can begin faintly to imagine, the significance of it for Christian ethics we can already clearly see.

In other days the Church would have defined Christian brotherhood solely in terms of benevolence. Now the Church is learning to define it also in terms of democracy, is learning that it is not real brotherhood unless there be in it liberty as well as love. This is the great lesson of

the present war for Christianity. It did not need to be taught that the unselfish service of others is the very essence of Christian virtue. That it had long known, even though the practice of it might leave much to be desired. But the lesson of democracy it had never really learned, since it forgot it in the old days of Roman imperialism. It behooves it now so to learn the lesson that it may not be again forgotten. Christians must put an end to their old habit of dubbing all kindliness Christian, and must refrain from giving that august name to anything that falls short of the full measure of the genuine Christian principle. They must demand that Christian brotherhood express itself in justice as well as in kindliness, a justice that guards the rights and liberties of all men and nations, and assures to all the opportunity for self-expression, self-control, and a share in the duties and responsibilities of the whole human family. "Do ye unto others as ye would that others should do unto you," if it means anything at all, can mean no less than this.

Christian opinion usually follows the prevailing opinion of the world at large. Seldom, to its shame be it said, has the Church ventured upon new paths until common sentiment has pronounced them safe. In the present case we are witnessing the same phenomenon over again. Autocracy is falling under general condemnation and democracy is coming to seem alone righteous. Already there are signs that the Church too is awakening to the lesson of the hour and will soon pronounce unchristian what the world is already pronouncing immoral.

Among the cherished privileges rendered dubious by genuine democracy is the right of an individual or of a nation to count itself peculiarly called to the service of others. Once we should have recognized this without question as admirable and eminently Christian. But Germany's attitude has given us pause. Whether or not

they truly represent her, at any rate many of her writers have pictured her in the present struggle as obeying a divine call to serve the world by imposing her culture upon others less favored than herself. Her superior gifts and endowments, they claim, lay upon her the duty of spreading by any means her higher civilization far beyond her own borders. We are reminded in this of the attitude of many another nation, including our own, toward one and another primitive people. There is much in such an attitude that is praiseworthy, but as exhibited today by Germany it is exciting universal execration. It is not simply the conceit of it that offends the rest of the world, nor even altogether the violence of the means employed, but the violation of the very fundamentals of human intercourse — respect for others and regard for the integrity of their persons and ideals. Again Germany is teaching us all a lesson and pointing a warning. We are beginning to realize that the conquest of the world for the world's good is as unrighteous as the conquest of the world for the world's destruction.

The whole notion of chosen nations is beginning to be looked upon with suspicion. We long ago repudiated the old doctrine of election to special privilege, but we have widely cherished in its place the doctrine of election to special service. But this too, we are now discovering, may encroach dangerously upon democracy and human brotherhood. The danger lies not in assuming a call to service, but such a call as violates the independence of others and puts them beneath us. Even the good of the world is bought too dear at such a price. Democracy is consistent only with the recognition of a universal call. Every man and every nation have their place in the brotherhood of man and in the commonwealth of nations. All are called to serve, each in his own way, and like the several gifts described by the apostle Paul in the twelfth chapter of I Corinthians,

each is essential to the perfection of the whole and is to be held in honor by all.

What I have just been saying inevitably raises the question as to the bearing of all this on education. Does not education mean that we are called to serve the young and immature by imposing upon them the convictions and ideals that are the fruit of our greater experience and wisdom? To state the question is to answer it. Democracy in education means not to impose upon others what we have and to make of them what we are, but so to influence them that they shall work out their own salvation, creating their own characters and developing their own convictions and ideals in the light of the achievements of the race. Not only to give them a knowledge of the past and the present, but also to inspire in them a personality which shall make them masters of that knowledge, not its slaves — this is the duty and the privilege of the wise teacher. Such an attitude — and it is the deliberate attitude of all modern educators — is consistent with the most thoroughgoing democracy; any other attitude consorts only with autocracy.

And may not the same be said of the great work of foreign missions? Too often in the past it has been carried on in a spirit of presumption and bigotry that has elicited in heathen peoples a condemnation and contempt like that we feel for Germany today. But fortunately we are learning the lesson of democracy here as everywhere else. We are growing more becomingly modest and more broadly sympathetic. We are discovering that we can learn from non-christian peoples as well as they from us, that if we are called to serve them, they are called to serve us, and we are realizing that the ideal is not that they shall submissively accept from us what we have to offer, but that they and we together shall work out in the light of our common experiences

something better, something more profoundly and largely human, and — may I not say? — more profoundly and largely Christian, than anything we have hitherto known.

Christianity, as I have said, is learning a lesson from democracy. But it also has, in its turn, a lesson to teach democracy. Democracy means liberty, but liberty is dangerous unless it be permeated with the spirit of service. We have become accustomed, particularly in America, to think of liberty as a good in itself. But whether it be good or bad depends upon the use to which it is put. Liberty is opportunity, and opportunity ill employed is but the fruitful source of evil. Democracy may well be worse in its results than autocracy, if it mean only liberty for universal selfishness. Often indeed it is unlovely enough — quarrelsome, divisive, jealous of other's gifts, eager to get instead of to give, to exploit instead of to serve. If this were what democracy necessarily meant, we might well prefer autocracy. But democracy means this only if its dominating spirit be the spirit of selfishness, and this of all things it dare not be.

Autocracy and selfishness naturally belong together. Democracy requires a soul of another sort. It may well be that democracy, like autocracy, has ordinarily been born of self-interest; that it has sprung commonly from nothing higher than men's desire to protect themselves against the encroachments of their fellows. But a selfish democracy is in a constant state of unstable equilibrium. If every one is thinking only of his own weal, as soon as he grows strong he will instinctively seek to establish himself at the expense of others, and in a society where strong men abound, while the forms of democracy may continue to be observed, its spirit is certain to be progressively violated. We call ourselves a democratic nation, but we are well aware that even here in America democracy is sorely limited. Within the borders of this

commonwealth of ours flourish all sorts of autocracies born of selfishness and greed.

It is this kind of thing that has led many to advocate, in the interest of democracy, the desperate expedient of an enforced equality of fortune and of status for everybody. Strong men are not to be allowed to exercise their strength, because they thereby imperil the rights and encroach upon the privileges of others. Society must be levelled down to the poorest and most inefficient. Much of our modern social radicalism takes this position, and because of it democracy is discredited in many quarters. If this be what democracy means, we may well doubt whether human progress lies along the democratic path. But this is not what democracy means. Its watchword is not bare equality but liberty, and liberty makes room for the largest variety. The classic picture of an ideal democracy is drawn in the twelfth chapter of I Corinthians, to which I have already referred: "There are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit." I should like to quote the whole of the chapter, it is so full of suggestion for the theme I am dealing with. Variety of gifts, but respect for others than one's own; the higher and the lower, the greater and the less, yet all alike honorable; "that there may be no schism in the body, but that the members may have the same care one for another." To distrust democracy and to fancy that it is to be preserved only by enforced and deadening equality is to adopt a counsel of despair. Much better it is to render it secure by endowing it with a spirit congenial to its nature, the spirit of genuine brotherhood.

Democracy is voluntary and depends on mutual goodwill. In the last resort autocracy maintains itself, whether or no, by the power of coercion. But democracy has no such refuge. Its tendency is centrifugal. It lacks the external cohesion of autocracy, and, unless

it be held together by the inner bond of regard for others' good, it is bound to go to pieces.

Is it not then doomed, and are not they right who claim that autocracy is the only permanently practicable form of society? It is well that we should face this issue squarely. We are in the habit of saying that democracy demands intelligence, that it does not work well among immature and ignorant peoples. But we have failed to see that it demands also unselfishness. If it be true that it is impossible to make men unselfish, just as if it be true that it is impossible to make them intelligent, we may as well admit at once that democracy is a failure.

But it is not true. Far from perfect as the world is, it is everywhere blest both under autocracy and under democracy with those who live for others' good as well as for their own. In them is the real hope of democracy. Democracy need not wait until all men are unselfish, any more than public order must wait until all men are orderly. If every one were dishonest and murderous, there could be no public order, but the mass of men being what they are, it is easy to exercise control over the few that need it. Democracy is safe, even though it be not perfect, so long as there is enough unselfishness in it to counteract the disintegrating forces of mere self-interest.

To promote the spirit of unselfishness — this is the specific duty of Christianity, and thus it is that Christianity is called to serve democracy. To Christianize it through and through, to make it human instead of mechanical, to put love and sympathy and the desire to serve in place of indifference and jealousy and greed of personal gain and power. This is Christianity's great duty to the democracy of today and tomorrow. A genuine Christian democracy will emphasize duties and responsibilities rather than rights, what a man owes rather than what is owed him, what he can give rather than what he can get. It will mean interdependence

rather than independence and coöperation rather than competition.

Democracy is often criticised as inefficient. Of course it is inefficient if it means each man for himself. This is complete atomism, and atomism can accomplish nothing. Control is far more efficient, for it enforces unity of purpose and of plan, without which little is ever done. But a genuinely coöperative democracy is the most efficient form of society conceivable. For real coöperation there is room only where there is liberty. Free coöperation for a common end — there is no other power so mighty as this.

But again is this possible? That is the great question for democracy. If it be not, it is well for us clearly to recognize that in the long run there is nothing for the world but autocracy. The more clearly and the more widely this is recognized, the more likely we are to develop the only kind of democracy that can endure. Whether we can compass it, time alone will show. At any rate it is the only state of society worthy to be called the Kingdom of God on earth and the only one worthy to be made the object of Christian faith and effort.

To democratize Christianity and to Christianize democracy — this is the twofold duty facing Christians of today and tomorrow. Of all their duties none is more imperative and more pressing.

I have been speaking only of the ethical problems involved in Christianity and democracy; but it is natural in this place and on an occasion like the present to think also of the theological problems involved. I can speak of only one: What does the reading of Christianity in terms of democracy and of democracy in terms of Christianity mean for our interpretation of God?

It is evident, if we are to have a God consonant with the ethical ideal I have been insisting on — and this we must have or religion will be in lamentable case in these

days of a growing democracy — the two elements, liberty and service, must both be rooted in His character and play their part in His purpose for the world. Our God must not be an irresponsible autocrat to whom men are but puppets and for whose glory they exist. He must be a God to whom their persons are sacred and their liberties too precious to be invaded. Not to dominate and coerce them must be His desire, or to subject them to His omnipotent will, but to lead them into the full liberty of sons of God and to elicit in them that spirit of mutual sympathy and service that shall make of human society a genuine brotherhood. Worship and sacrifice must be less to Him than a free community of purpose and of effort for promoting this supreme end. He must permit us to share with him in the responsibility and in the dignity of the common task. Without the coöperation of men, if He be the God men need, His holy purposes must go unachieved and His holy will remain frustrated. Benevolent, of course, He must be, but benevolent despotism becomes God no more than man. He must be a God who counts it more to serve than to rule. Service of others we count the highest expression of goodness, and we cannot be content with anything less good in God. It is a sound instinct that has led men to recognize Christ as divine, divine not because of his power but because of his love, not because of his resurrection but because of his death. If we are to believe in God at all, it must be in a God like Christ.

The old Church-father, Tertullian, once said that he would rather have a bad God than a weak God. But to us power must be subordinate to character and have worth only as it ministers to it. If we seek power above character or independently of character in God, it is because we are philosophers instead of Christians; or if not that, it is because we desire God to do our work for us, or to guarantee its being done whether we and

others bear our part or not. Such an attitude befits only those whose trust is in autocracy and to whom democracy seems but a broken reed.

Above all we need a God who shall represent to us our highest ideals and through faith in whom their divineness may be assured, a God in worshipping whom we are at the summit of moral devotion and achievement, and in serving whom we best serve our fellows and contribute most efficiently to the building of a true Christian democracy here on earth. Our faith in God means at least two things: that the sacred object of our hope and prayer and effort is divine, and that being divine it will ultimately prevail. Not that God will make it prevail by the exercise of divine power. Rather that, being divine, it will increasingly gather to itself the devotion and the sacrifice of the worshippers of God and the lovers of their brethren, and will make them strong to conquer and achieve. Faith in God divorced from faith in man is no faith for the Christian of today. Not faith in God instead of faith in man, not faith in God because of our despair of man, but faith in God because we believe in man and are confident that he will not be disobedient to the heavenly vision when once his eyes are opened to it.

THE PEACE-MAKERS

FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

When the momentous news of an armistice in the world-war stirred vociferous multitudes to turbulent rejoicing, they were thrilled by the one overwhelming thought that peace at last had come. The war was at an end, and it must be the last of wars. A huge wave of grateful surprise surged up from the common level of national life and broke into a foam of high emotion. The thought of millions flashed across the sea by the wireless telegraphy of the spirit to those who on land and water and in the air had borne the part of America in the great adventure; and this message of thanksgiving could find no better words than the ancient Beatitude: "Blessed are the Peace-Makers, for they shall be called the children of God."

As the tumult and the shouting die, however, one is led to ask himself whether there was not something premature in this unmeasured self-congratulation. Was the war over when the fighting was done? Was the cessation of bloodshed, however longed-for and welcome, the assurance of an epoch of peace? Were there not enemies still left to meet, and battles to win, as threatening as on the plains of Flanders or the mountains of Italy? Should not one recall Milton's great words in his sonnet to Cromwell:

"Much remains

To conquer still; Peace hath her victories
No less renowned than war; new foes arise,
Threatening to bind our souls"?

No sooner was the armistice secure than it was succeeded by further and bewildering problems of national and international readjustment; and the sense of finality which had suddenly possessed the popular mind was succeeded by a sobering sense of continuity and comprehensiveness. The work of the Peace-Makers, instead of being completed, was seen to be just begun. The new issues which confronted the nations might be less tragic than the decisions of war, but they were likely to be far more subtle and beset by more insidious perils. The celebration of an armistice was indeed justifiably jubilant, and in millions of homes there was fervent thanksgiving that young men were to be no longer food for shrapnel and bombs; but this conclusion was after all only the beginning of a vast process of conciliation, and the festival was one of anticipation rather than of achievement, of hope rather than of peace.

When one turns with these chastening reflections to the Beatitude which sprang to one's lips as the message of the hour, he finds this larger and saner view of the problem of peace-making impressively anticipated. For who were these blessed, or happy, people who, according to the teaching of Jesus, should be called the children of God? They were not, it must be noticed, the Peace-Lovers, or the Peace-Talkers (*ἐιρηνικοί*); they were the Peace-Makers (*ἐιρηνοποιοί*), the constructive agents of tranquillity, the efficient contributors to security, the "mediators of peace" (Stier), or "they that work peace" (Alford). Here is quite another kind of blessing from that of peace itself. The Peace-Makers are not merely peaceable. They are not merely celebrating an armistice in war, but committed to a continuous and creative task. They are not rejoicing in the world as it is but rebuilding the world as it ought to be. They are not concerned with congratulation but with construction. That is what makes them "children of God," or gives them "the

rank of sons of God" (Moffatt). They are having a part in God's creative work. They are the people who, accepting the world as it is, with all its crudity, brutality, and even horror, propose to make a world which has the right to stay. It is a curious fact that the version of the Sermon on the Mount which each German child, under a militaristic system of religious education, must commit to memory, perpetuates a misinterpretation of the Beatitude. "Blessed," he repeats, "are the peaceable," or "those who are inclined to peace" ("Selig sind die Friedfertigen"); as though a sentiment were commended rather than a task enjoined; as though the blessing of Jesus might be claimed for pious declarations rather than reserved for creative actions. A leading commentator, himself a German, corrects the translation. "Not the Peace-Lovers," he says, "but the Peace-Builders, inherit the promise" ("Nicht die Friedfertigen, sondern die Friedestifter." Meyer).

In fact, when one proceeds from a single phrase of Jesus Christ to recall the dominating purpose of his ministry, it becomes evident that he was far less concerned with the maintenance of external peace than many of his followers and expositors have been inclined to infer. Peace is by no means a conspicuous word in the Synoptic Gospels. It is recorded indeed that the angels sang of peace on earth, but that blessing was conditional upon good-will among men. It is written again that the new teacher should "guide our feet into the way of peace," but that prediction was, first of all, of a way which must be followed before the end could be reached. The great words of the gospel are Righteousness, Love, Life. "Seek first the Kingdom of God and His Righteousness"; "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbor as thyself"; "I am come that they may have life." These were the antecedent conditions of peace. Given these, peace would follow; lacking these, peace

would be a mockery and sham. Peace, in a word, was not so much a cause to defend as a consequence to anticipate. It was not to be had for the asking or even for the praying; it had to be made; and that task of peace-making might involve struggle, delay, even defeat.

When one reviews still further the experience of Jesus himself it becomes evident that this creative task was his fundamental aim. For the obvious fact confronts us that Jesus never promised to his followers a world of unbroken peace, and that if he had done so his own experience would have refuted his teaching. Never was a career less peaceful than his, from the day when he fought with temptation in the wilderness to the day when he surrendered himself upon the cross. The Christ of the Gospels was not the non-combative, resigned, anæmic figure which Hebrew tradition and Christian art have conspired to create, but on the contrary the heroic, unflinching, sacrificial Master, whose word was with power and whose symbol of leadership was not a crown but a cross. The same Teacher of whom it was said, "The Lord of peace give you peace always by all means," said of himself, "Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay, but rather division"; and again, "I came not to send peace but a sword"; and yet again, "I am come to send fire on the earth."

Nor is this constructive doctrine an isolated teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. On the contrary, the same praise of peace, not as a cause but as a consequence, and the same summons to the creative task of peace-making, is heard both in the earlier Scripture and in the later books of the New Testament. "The work of righteousness," says the Prophet Isaiah, "shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance." Not peace first, that is to say, and as the effect of peace

a righteous world; but righteousness first and as the effect of righteousness — to be achieved as all effective righteousness has to be won, by victory over unrighteousness — a peace that is quiet and assured! “The righteous,” the same Prophet adds a little later, “. . . shall enter into peace.” Peace, in other words, is a quiet room of which righteousness holds the key. One turns the lock of duty, and enters by that door into peace. Not less impressive are the ancient condemnations of a way of life which reverses this moral chronology, and sets peace before righteousness. Such are they, the Prophet Jeremiah says, who are “given to covetousness . . . saying, Peace, peace, when there is no peace.” Such is the disappointment of those who have “sinned against the Lord . . . and looked for peace, but no good came.” “They shall seek peace,” says Ezekiel, “and there shall be none.” Such are “the prophets that make my people err, that bite with their teeth, and cry peace.” All these promoters of pacifism were engaged in fruitless enterprises, because they were crying for peace, or seeking peace, while tolerating covetousness, or sinning against the Lord, or biting with their teeth. The Prophet Isaiah sums up this doctrine of moral sequence: “There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked.”

When one turns, on the other hand, from the Gospels to the Epistles of the New Testament, the same teaching of peace as the effect of righteousness is heard, like an echo of the Beatitude. “Peace,” the Apostle Paul writes, “will be rendered of God to every man that worketh good.” “Follow after the things that make for peace.” Peace, Paul says again, is the fruit of sacrifice. “Having made peace (*εἰρηνηποιήσας*) through the blood of his cross.” “The fruit of righteousness,” says James, “is sown in peace of them that make peace.” It is, in other words, not primarily peace which is to be sought, but the things that make for peace, the goodness that

worketh peace, the peace that is the fruit of righteousness. The teaching of Jesus seems to have so wrought itself into the instincts of his followers that they habitually thought, not first of peace itself, but of the making of peace through the more arduous and aggressive process of making a better world. "We look," says the Epistle of Peter, "for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. Wherefore, seeing that ye look for such things, be diligent that ye may be found of Him in peace." To look for peace might be to miss finding the new heavens and the new earth; but to look diligently for the things wherein dwelleth righteousness might be to be found of Him in peace.

Such then seems to be a consistent Biblical teaching, which finds its complete expression in the Beatitude of the Peace-Makers. A tranquillized and stable world is not to descend out of heaven like the New Jerusalem of the Book of Revelation; it must be built up out of the material of the world as it is on the foundation of personal and social righteousness. Peace, like happiness, is most likely to be reached when it is not directly sought. It is a by-product of conduct, a consequence of character. To secure it is not an achievement of armies or diplomatists alone. It is a comprehensive and continuous task of political reintegration, of social regeneration, and of moral restoration; and the blessing of Jesus is for those who, confronted by this vast problem of reconstruction, proceed to make out of a shattered world a social order which has the right to permanence.

Who then at such a time, are the Peace-Makers? Who are these sons of God, who, after this cyclonic desolation and unprecedented disaster, are laying the foundations of stability? They are, of course, first of all, those who have fought for a righteous cause. The first step toward rebuilding a world is to rid that world of treacherous foundations and toppling ambitions. The

ground must be cleared before the building can begin. The first task of the Peace-Maker in a just war is to bring that war to a just close. The historian Tacitus — himself a Roman — in describing the Roman conduct of war, puts into the mouth of the British Prince, Calgacus, this terrific indictment: "Plundering, butchery, pillaging, they call by the false name of world-power; and where they make a desert they call it peace" ("Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant" — Agricola, Ch. 30). The words might have been written of the German legions which on the same fair fields of Gaul made a desert while they talked of peace. From that illusion of peace by subjugation and terrorism the world is happily set free. The Peace-Makers must be, not those who make a desert, but those before whom the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose.

And that is what has made these fighting Peace-Makers happy. It is an extraordinary fact that through these long, hard years those who have been most deeply involved in the tragedy of the time have found themselves lifted into an unanticipated exhilaration and joy! "Happy are the Peace-Makers," says the Beatitude; and that consciousness of having even the humblest part in the making of a world fit to live in has given to millions of gallant youths, not only the power to endure, but a strange contentment and peace of mind. This is the wonderful note which we have heard in messages from the front. An American boy writes to his mother: "This is a dirty, nasty job. There are rats at my feet and shrapnel at my head; but I would not be anywhere else or doing anything else for all the world." An American aviator, dashed to the ground on two successive days, writes in his diary, "These last weeks are the first time I have ever lived." Happy indeed are they who have thus passed from boyishness, or aimlessness,

or selfishness, to the supreme discovery of a man's work to do for something far greater than himself; from the life of pleasure-makers, or dream-makers, to the life of Peace-Makers. Out of the fire of the time they have snatched their blessing. Theirs is the Beatitude of the Sons of God.

We hear it sometimes prophesied that the tension of war is likely to be succeeded by a period of moral laxity and social degeneration; and it has been intimated that this was the experience of the United States after the Civil War. But was the outcome of that fratricidal conflict, on the whole, one of national reaction and decline? Many instances no doubt there were of public scandal and private demoralization; but was not the *morale* of the country as a whole definitely quickened by the experience of war? Slavery no longer tolerated; specie-payments quickly restored; and an unprecedented expansion of philanthropy and public service — these results of the war between the States were not marks of national degeneration. Unscrupulous adventurers from the North, it is true, invaded the South after the war; but in far greater numbers and with vastly greater resources there marched southward another army of teachers and missionaries, to fortify the white race in their struggle for existence and to train the black race for citizenship. The same general effect is likely, we may hope, to be the outcome of the present crisis. It may indeed happen that the sudden release from discipline and the exhilaration of home-coming will, in many instances, involve loss of restraint. But is it not far more probable that the total effect of this vast and tragic experience — this real descent into Hell which these young men have made — will be a sobering and chastening of character and a lifting of their view and duty above the level on which they had before habitually lived? This, we may confidently believe, is to be one of the

great mitigations of the vast calamity — that it has given to millions of youths a new range of thought, a new vision of service, a new respect for discipline, a new consent to loyalty and sacrifice, which may be forthwith applied to the service and redemption of a waiting world. May it not happen indeed that these youths, bringing back with them their fresh maturity and solemn experience, will come as missionaries of a new social order to the belated stay-at-homes of an unchanged world? Happy indeed will be such Peace-Makers if they shall bring with them, not only the strength to fight and kill, but the not less needed strength to confirm our courage and to reconstruct our world! It is that happiness of a conscious coöperation with the Divine purpose which may give to each such young soldier the title of a son of God.

Next to the fighters in the great army of the Peace-Makers come the counsellors. The destroyers of a bad world prepare the way for the master-builders of a new world. And what a summons is here for sagacity, for integrity, for magnanimity! Never in human history was a Divine judgment so sternly visited on ambition, cruelty, and faithlessness; and never was such a need of wisdom and disinterestedness in those who sit in judgment. Convicted the guilty must be, but without rancor; punished, but without bitterness; controlled, but by those who are themselves self-controlled. Peace will not be made until these preliminaries of peace restore the hope of the stricken world. The end of war is not in sight until victory is crowned with the same generous desires which have inspired the free offering of treasure and blood. Happy will be those Peace-Makers who thus rebuild the framework of the world; and happy this favored nation if the great words of our Chief Magistrate shall be confirmed by the will of the people. "The present and all that it holds," said President Wilson, in

announcing to Congress the terms of armistice, "belongs to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their governments; the future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by sheer power of example and of friendly helpfulness."

So far we seem likely to be brought on the way to peace-making. And yet, beyond all the achievements of armies and navies and statesmen, lie the momentous problems of personal and private life, awaiting in their unprecedented complexity the generous service of the Peace-Makers. Among the many grave uncertainties of the immediate future, one thing seems certain — that the world will be of a different kind from that in which we have thus far lived. The vast transformation of industrial life which we are already witnessing; the growth in power and self-respect of the wage-earning majority; the extension of governmental control beyond the most sanguine dreams of revolutionists, and with scarcely a murmur of dissent; the increasing indifference to those details of religious opinion which have created the sects, and at the same time the deepening sense of a Divine purpose in the world, and the emergence from terrific experiences of suffering and sacrifice of a simplified religious faith — all these undisputable signs of the time point to a new era which calls for a new habit of mind and a new spirit of service. "There is no question," the Bishop of Oxford has lately said, "that the whole of our conception of civilization, the fabric of our civilization — national, international, commercial, and to a very

large extent religious, and almost more than all educational — had been built up on a basis of selfishness; and it has collapsed” (*The Hope for Society*, 1918, p. 16). But suppose that this new world were to be met by the old habit and spirit — of industrial contention, of partisan politics, of sectarian religion! What kind of peace would ensue? Would there not be another war to fight, perhaps more disastrous and prolonged than that from which we are just emerging? Is not the fearful Nemesis of anarchy which Russia and Germany are at this moment enduring, the inevitable reaction from autocratic control; and does it not have its solemn lessons for those nations which are now celebrating peace? When the Devil of the battlefield is cast out, may not seven other evil spirits invade an unprepared and complacent world — the devils of rapacious capital, of unscrupulous labor, of class conflict, of political partisanship, of social laxity, and of religious intolerance, and the last state of civilization be worse than the first? “The future of mankind,” John Stuart Mill once said, “will be gravely imperilled if great questions are left to be fought out between ignorant change and ignorant opposition to change.” What a call is here to the Peace-Makers, in their own vocations and within the circle of their own capacity, to establish on the ruins of an earlier world a social order which has the right to permanence!

Here, for example, are the threatening conditions of our industrial life, which have in them the possibilities of a war, more embittered, prolonged, and destructive than even the present conflict. What shall prevent that clash of interests which threatens to divide the forces of production into implacable foes? Peace in industry is not to be suddenly attained. It has to be made — through prolonged negotiation, through patient experimentation, through fraternal coöperation. Nothing in business affairs is more depressing today than to see an

employer or a corporation taken by surprise when industrial war is suddenly declared, and proposing to meet it by a patched-up, improvised, or insincere peace. It is as when in ancient Israel men were "given to covetousness, saying 'Peace, peace,' when there is no peace." And nothing, on the other hand, is more reassuring than any well-considered, forward-looking, declaration of principles — be it of a Labor Party or an employing corporation — any step, however hesitatingly taken, undisguised in intention and based on mutual confidence, in which peace is to be the effect of righteousness, a consequence of the things which make for peace. Such is the new opportunity offered to the Peace-Makers of the industrial world; and as they work out with discernment and good faith the Divine purpose for the future, they have won their right to the title of the sons of God. "The political mind," a discerning student of the times has recently said, "the legal mind, the historical mind, the religious mind — each will have its own contribution to make to the problem before us — that of diverting the life of nations from the path of strife to the path of coöperation. But in addition to these we shall need another and perhaps greater contribution from the trained *business mind* of the community. . . . To industry will fall the task of restoring prosperity to a well-nigh ruined world. May we not say, therefore, that it holds the key to the problem?" (L. P. Jacks. *Hibbert Journal*. October, 1918. P. 38.)

Nor is the war of industry the only field of operation for the Peace-Makers. Each undertaking which may secure a healthier or a happier world; each judicious campaign against disease, idleness, crime, or drink; each constructive enterprise for sanitation, education, or recreation; each step in the conservation of those men or women of tomorrow who are children today; each comprehensive movement of religious fellowship, caring less

for conformity than for consecration, less for the salvation of one's self than for the sanctifying of one's self for others' sakes — each such task of foresight and insight, undertaken without delay, has its place in the great work of peace-making. And here again is the reason why these self-effacing lives, concerned with all these varied forms of social service, are finding themselves, not only very busy, but, in a new and unanticipated way, happy in their work. They have come to understand the paradox of Christianity. They have found themselves in losing themselves. They are working righteousness and finding peace. They are learning the meaning of the Beatitude, "Happy are the Peace-Makers."

There remains, however, one further aspect of this law of peace-making which brings us still nearer to the heart of Christ. For after all has been said of peace as something to be made, it still remains true that not every one, even with the most eager desire, is qualified to be a Peace-Maker. A nation, as we are forced at this moment to recognize, cannot be a trusted instrument of peace so long as in its national character it does not seek the things which make for peace. A government which has tolerated piracy, poison, and plunder, and has broken with equal indifference the laws of God and man, cannot without repentance and delay, claim the blessing of the Peace-Makers. Its aims must inevitably be scrutinized and its motives suspected. Its Peace Offensive will seem likely to lead to an offensive peace. The only nation which can make peace is one whose hands are clean and whose motives are pure. Righteousness not only, as the Book of Proverbs says, "exalteth a people," but it alone gives to that people the right to become Peace-Makers.

All this which at this very moment is proving so true of nations is not less true of individuals. Only he can

give who has. Only he can lend a hand who has an honest hand to lend. Only he can control others who has self-control. The reason why Jesus Christ has become to the world a messenger of peace is not that his life was peaceful, but that through the stormy vicissitudes of his sacrificial career he possessed that peace which he promised to bestow. "My peace I give unto you," he said, but in the same sentence added, "In the world ye shall have tribulation." It was not peace of circumstances which he offered, but peace of mind. The control of circumstances through antecedent self-control made his life, though one of continuous conflict, seem to his followers the life of a Prince of Peace. He did not have peace—he made it; and that making of peace through suffering made him, as the Beatitude says, the Son of God.

It must be the same with the Peace-Makers of the modern world. Not every employer can establish peace with his wage-earners. They are quick with suspicion, sensitive to affront, conscious of power. Confidence cannot be suddenly grafted on a stock of distrust. Industrial peace must be a growth, not a makeshift. It is the effect of righteousness, the gradually ripening fruit of fraternalism. The primary obstruction to industrial peace is not created by the inevitable conditions of the world of trade, but by misunderstandings, distrust, greed, stupidity. If an embittered class-conflict in industry is not to follow the war of nations, the Peace-Makers of the business world—both employers and employed—must not only lay their plans, but also search their own hearts, without delay. It is the same with the social service of the time. Not everyone who wants to help the poor or save the children or lift the fallen, can have the blessedness of efficiency. Leadership is the corollary of life. "When he putteth forth his sheep," it was written of Jesus, "he goeth before, and the sheep follow, for they

know his voice." A genuine and sympathetic life does not have to drive; it *draws*. The sheep know the tone of the voice, and follow. The Peace-Possessor becomes the Peace-Maker.

It is the same with the reconstruction of religion which now awaits the world. We talk much of the Christian unity which is to supplant the lamentable divisions of the Church; and movements and combinations multiply to indicate that the theological Peace-Makers are at work. It must not be forgotten, however, that these well-intentioned enterprises will succeed, not through the nice adjustment of conflicting claims, or the surrender of some truth for the sake of more peace, but through the deliverance of minds from small issues and the recognition of the simplicity which is in Christ. If in these deliberations any taint is perceptible of ecclesiastical ambition, or self-interested diplomacy, or denominational profiteering; if, as in international affairs, the rights of small Powers are ignored and the good of the world identified with the expansion of a single authority, then the end must be like a Prussian victory — not peace, but an armed truce; not unity, but revolution. The ecclesiastics may make a desert and call it peace. The Peace-Makers of the Christian Church, like the heirs of the same promise in politics and trade and social service, must be first of all obedient to the heavenly vision of a comprehensive and fraternal faith.

It is, then, with a certain sense of surprise that one is led back — even in these days which seem so absorbed in external events — to the undiminished authority of the life within. The chief difficulty in making peace with the Teutonic Powers is simply that we cannot trust them. The chief hindrance of peace in industry is simply the sense of wrong. The chief limitation of social service is in proposing to accomplish by machinery what can be done only by life. The first obstruction to religious

unity is in the undertaking of a great task by small people. Blessed indeed are the Peace-Makers, but they cannot be those whose motives are improvised or self-interested or half-hearted. The rank of the Sons of God is reserved for those who have something of the perseverance and wisdom of God. "The wisdom that is from above," said the Apostle James, "is first pure, then peaceable." Not peaceableness first, but purity; not safety first, but service; not an untroubled world, but an unclouded heart — that is the spiritual chronology of a Christian experience. It may not have been an accident that the Beatitude of the Pure in Heart immediately precedes the Beatitude of the Peace-Makers. The pure in heart, it is written, "see God," even amid the tragedies of war and the not less solemn problems of reconstruction; and that capacity for vision of the Eternal Purpose qualifies them for the further title of Sons of God, which is bestowed upon the Peace-Makers.

SEEKERS AFTER GOD

DURANT DRAKE

VASSAR COLLEGE

"In evil times men turn their minds more anxiously to religion." Thus wrote that hearty atheist, Lucretius, amidst the alarums of those far-off, uneasy, Roman days. Equally true is the saying of the still more desperate years through which the world has lately been passing. Even before the torrent of war broke, in the confused and restless prelude of the opening century, many hands were outstretched, many hearts yearning for a new vision of God. For God, or for something to take His place, something to give an ultimate meaning to life, an ideal dimension, an underglow of purpose and a deep tide of peace —

"Round our restlessness His rest."

This noteworthy revival of the search for God sharply differentiates itself from the apologetics and exhortations that preceded it during generations of a regnant Christian tradition. Formerly the concept "God" was taken to be clear and definite enough, and the search was for proofs of His existence. Such a book as Clarke's *The Christian Conception of God*, with its complacent elaboration of God's attributes, could regard as obvious heresies the conceptions that are now most astir in the world, and devote the bulk of its five hundred pages to the various lines of supposed proof that the God of orthodox dogma, with His omniscience, omnipotence, aseity, and what not, exists. Now, however, the vast theological library which this volume illustrates (rather more readably than the ruck of them) is, for progressive

thinkers, simply shelved. The question has become, not, Can we believe in this cut-and-dried conception of mediæval and modern orthodoxy, but rather, Is there *any* conception of God that we can accept? In other words, the God-idea has become fluid again, the God of the future is in the making. And this emancipation from the fixity of the conception that had become traditional has led many thinkers who would never have concerned themselves seriously with the God of popular belief, to look afresh at this, perhaps the greatest of human conceptions, and to seek to mould it into a form more consonant with man's maturer experience and more serviceable for his spiritual life.

Matthew Arnold is perhaps as much as any one to be thanked for this unprecedented plasticity of the God idea. With untiring reiteration and serene patience under a storm of abuse, he protested against "our mechanical and materializing theology, with its insane license of affirmation about God . . . just as if he were a man in the next street!" In America, Emerson and, more lately, William James did a great deal to shake up inherited conceptions. The title of a recent volume, *The Enlarging Conception of God*,¹ is significant. But it is still true that "our conception of the universe has grown faster than our thought of God has grown."²

Matthew Arnold's definition of God as "the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness"—and for all good, as he parenthetically admits—was an attempt to rescue the God-idea from dogmatic theology and make it an empirical conception which the most convinced rationalist might accept—nay, must accept, because the Power, whatever its ultimate and inner nature, is incontestably here in the world. The Huxleys and the Cliffords, many of the leaders of thought in the

¹ H. A. Youtz, *The Enlarging Conception of God*. The Macmillan Co., 1914.

² W. H. P. Faunce, *What does Christianity Mean?* F. H. Revell Co., 1912.

Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic world, clinging to their intellectual integrity at whatever cost of odium and personal loss, were openly disavowing belief in God; while in Latin Europe the belief, outside of the Catholic Church, was already obsolescent. Is there less intellectual conscience in the twentieth century, less conviction of the truths of evolution and the presence of "law" in the world? On the contrary, these beliefs, then daring, have now become commonplaces. If there is less avowed atheism today (and certainly atheism is less blatant, if perhaps more widespread), it is because it seems now rather needless to be an atheist. There are so many conceptions of God afloat that any one at all widely read can scarcely fail to find one suited to his mental outlook and convictions.

Even among the socialist masses, generally taken to be atheistic, there is not so much denial of God as denial of the church-conceptions of God. Thus Mr. Blatchford, the editor of the London *Clarion*, in a book circulated widely among Socialists,³ expresses in plain and vigorous words his disbelief in "the Bible God," in a personal God, in an omnipotent God, but does not say there is *no* sort of God. There is here none but a negative side to the modern movement; but one feels that the ejection of the "orthodox" conception leaves clear room for the preaching of the naturalistic God of contemporary thought. It would not be surprising if, under the impulse of post-bellum readjustment, such a God were to be espoused by some eloquent revivalist and accepted by millions of spiritually famished men and women who have left forever the old dogmas and (unless, indeed, it show greater signs of openness to the critical spirit than at present) the Christian Church.

The present writer conducted in 1912 a questionnaire among college graduates in this country, investigating

³ Robert Blatchford, *God and My Neighbor*. Chicago, Chas. H. Kerr Co., 1911.

among other matters, their belief in God. The results⁴ showed that of the several hundred who replied, some 34 per cent. believed firmly in "a personal God," 23 per cent. firmly disbelieved, and the rest were more or less uncertain. Slightly more than 50 per cent. were convinced of the omnipotence of God. But very few (about 1 per cent.) rejected the belief in God *in toto*. Professor Leuba's recent more elaborate investigation⁵ gives, among many other interesting statistical results, the following: Among college *students* (*my* questionees were graduates of a dozen years' standing), 56 per cent. of the men believed in a personal God, and 82 per cent. of the women. Another part of the inquiry, addressed to American scientists, historians, etc., stated the belief about which this information was desired as follows: "I believe in a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer. By 'answer,' I do not mean the subjective, psychological effect of prayer." The men addressed were divided into those of lesser and those of greater eminence, using as a criterion the stars in *American Men of Science*. Of the men "of lesser eminence," 48 per cent. affirmed the above belief; of the men "of greater eminence," 32 per cent. Some special classes, sociologists and psychologists, show considerably less acceptance of the belief, the "greater" psychologists falling as low as 13.2 per cent.

What is noteworthy in these data is not merely the apparent waning of this particular conception of God as education and scientific training advance, but also the great number of addressees who went out of their way to explain that they did believe in *some* conception of God. With many the conception is very indefinite, with others it is fairly clear-cut; but with few is it purely traditional. It is this educated public that furnishes the readers of the rich literature dealing with God that

⁴ See *The Independent*, vol. 75, p. 755.

⁵ J. H. Leuba, *The Belief in God and Immortality*. Sherman, French, & Co., Boston, 1916.

has sprung up so thickly since the dawning of our present century.

For certain types of mind pantheism will doubtless always be alluring. Many of Emerson's utterances had a pantheistic ring, as when, standing on the summit of Greylock, he ejaculated: "God! It's all God!" His friend Carlyle was more thoroughly pantheistic — and not afraid of the term, as his reply to Sterling's accusation witnesses: "Pantheism! Pantheism! What does it matter, it's religion." Coming to our own day, the veteran and beloved John Burroughs equates the terms "God" and "Nature." "We must get rid of the great moral governor or head director. He is a fiction of our own brains. We must recognize only Nature, the All; call it God if we will, but divest it of all anthropological conceptions. . . . Here is this vast congeries of vital forces which we call Nature . . . the sum and synthesis of all powers and qualities, infinite and incomprehensible. This is all the God we can know, and this we cannot help but know." ⁶

Similarly, ex-President Eliot, in his famous address on *The Religion of the Future*,⁷ declares that "the new thought of God will be its most characteristic element." "The Infinite Spirit pervades the universe, just as the spirit of a man pervades his body, and acts, consciously or unconsciously, in every atom of it." It is "one omnipresent, eternal Energy, informing and inspiring the whole creation at every instant of time and throughout the infinite spaces." This neo-pantheism is widespread enough to induce one of our leading publishing houses to reprint Seeley's *Natural Religion*, a treatise once famous but lately out of print. This little book combines the most explicit frankness with literary charm

⁶ John Burroughs, *The Light of Day*. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1901.

⁷ Delivered at the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July 22, 1909, and subsequently printed in the *Atlantic Monthly* and in pamphlet form.

in an unusual degree, and remains perhaps the clearest popular exposition of the pantheistic conception.⁸ Dr. Campbell's "new" theology seems to be of much the same type.⁹

It may be questioned whether the Absolute of the late Professor Royce should be regarded as a pantheistic conception, for the philosophic approach, highly technical and elaborate, gives it very different connotations. But certainly his Absolute was the One inclusive Reality, a Reality all-perfect, super-personal, transcending time and space, and certainly it gathered about itself the atmosphere of the Christian God. In his last great work,¹⁰ Royce struck into rather a new vein, and defined God in a way far more in accord with the now dominant tendency, as "the spirit of the beloved community."

Professor Hocking, whose debt to this master is evident and acknowledged, declares that pantheism is, like all our human conceptions, too poor, too inadequate to the truth. With the fervor of a mystic, he describes God as One and Ineffable, union of all contradictions, ground of all reality. But for the non-philosophic mind, dazed by mysticism and metaphysics alike, such statements as "God is that which does whatever Substance is found to do"¹¹ will suffice to classify the writer, for practical purposes, with the pantheists; for this practical purpose, at least, that his God, being omnipotent and omnipresent, has to answer for the evil as well as the good in the world.

This is, of course, the insistent dissatisfaction with Absolutes and deifications of Nature. From the time of John Stuart Mill (to go no farther back), whose forcible essay on *Nature*, and whose sensational refusal to worship an omnipotent God even if he were to be damned

⁸ Sir John R. Seeley, *Natural Religion*. The Macmillan Co., 1916.

⁹ R. J. Campbell, *The New Theology*. The Macmillan Co., 1907.

¹⁰ Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.

¹¹ W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. Yale University Press, 1912.

therefor, paved the way for his rather hesitating belief in a limited God, to the present day, pantheisms of every stripe have had to meet objection not only from the orthodox, but, on the other side, from those whose horror of evil prevents their tolerating a God who includes (however he may "transcend") evil in his being or as his expression or creation.

Mill was an earnest seeker after God, and so was Richard Jefferies, whose *Story of My Heart*¹² is one of the most beautiful books in our language. To be sure, Jefferies passionately repudiates belief in God: "How can I adequately express my contempt for the assertion that all things occur for the best, for a wise and beneficent end, and are ordered by a humane intelligence! It is the most utter falsehood and a crime against the human race. . . . Human suffering is so great, so endless, so awful that I can hardly write of it." But this is clearly a denial merely of the omnipotence of God; while in Jefferies' constantly reiterated longing for "something higher than Deity," and indeed in the mysticism and "soul-thirst" which pervades the book, we see what most of us would call the search for a more tenable conception of God, certainly not at all a satisfied atheism. Mr. Hobhouse has recently phrased more calmly what Jefferies and many others have felt: "The moral indifference of nature forces itself upon us; and it becomes evident that the real as such is not spiritual nor the creation of anything that is purely spiritual, just, or good, in the human sense. The spiritual is an *element in Reality*."¹³

Christian orthodoxy has never been clear or consistent upon this point; it has striven to reconcile the comfortable conviction that

"God's in His heaven,
All's right with the world,"

¹² Longmans, Green, & Co., ninth impression, 1906.

¹³ L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.

with the moral conviction that evil is evil and must, with God's help, be fought and cast out. The conception of Satan, taken over from the Persian religion, has prevented Christianity from becoming a clear-cut monotheism, as Mohammedanism has been; many Christian writings depict their God as a striving God, not unlike the Ahura-Mazda of Zoroaster, or the finite God of William James,¹⁴ whose success is dependent in part upon our faithfulness.

Lately Mr. Wells has advertised this conception to an audience wider than James (in spite of the latter's enormously superior scholarship and brilliance of style) could reach. It is interesting to note that in an earlier book¹⁵ he refrained from applying the term "God" to his conception, on the ground that "the run of people even nowadays mean something more and something different when they say 'God.'" In *Anticipations*¹⁶ he had used the term freely, but with no positive definition, contenting himself "with denying the self-contradictory absurdities of an obstinately anthropomorphic theology, as, for example, that God is an omniscient mind. This is the last vestige of that barbaric theology which regarded God as a vigorous but uncertain old gentleman with a beard and an inordinate lust for praise and propitiation." At last, however, Mr. Wells has succeeded in formulating his conception of God, and has written, as we all know, a whole book to expound it.¹⁷

Mr. Wells is worth reading, in spite of defects of scholarship and occasional intemperance of language, because of his clearness and candor, his contagious enthusiasm and assurance, and because, as in so many other matters,

¹⁴ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1902.

¹⁵ H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*. Harper & Brothers, 1908.

¹⁶ Harper & Brothers, 1901.

¹⁷ H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*. The Macmillan Co., 1917.

his mind is a faithful index of the movement of one of the main currents, perhaps *the* main current, of contemporary thought. It is easy to offer objections to his view, as the denominational papers have naturally done, and as, from the opposite, atheistic, point of view Mr. Archer so quickly and cleverly did.¹⁸ But Mr. Wells will survive this cross-fire, and his vigorous little book is having a very considerable influence.

We find it here distinctly asserted that God is not the creator of the universe, but "comes, we know not whence, into the conflict of life. He works in men and through men. . . . He is the undying human memory, the increasing human will." This is reminiscent of earlier expressions by a scholarly American writer,¹⁹ who had defined "God" as "our own ideal life," "the finer life that lives potentially in ourselves," "the deeper, more comprehensive self in all men that is urging to realization."

Is this Platonism? Is it the conception, so eloquently presented by T. H. Green,²⁰ of God as "our unrealized ideal of a Best," the name a symbol for that perfection which eludes us in earthly things, but which we must ever love and follow? Certainly we get the true Platonic note in Tagore's "When the soul seeks God she seeks her final escape from this incessant gathering and heaping and never coming to an end. It is not an additional object that she seeks, but it is the permanent in all that is impermanent, the highest abiding joy unifying all enjoyments."²¹ We find it again in the writings of that master-preacher, Dr. George A. Gordon, who speaks of God as "the meaning, beauty, spirit, and power of our whole experience. . . . God as the perfect good or

¹⁸ William Archer, *God and Mr. Wells*. New York, Knopf, 1917.

¹⁹ H. A. Overstreet, *Hibbert Journal*, vol. 11, p. 394; vol. 13, p. 155, and *Forum*, vol. 52, p. 499 (1913 and 1914).

²⁰ T. H. Green, *The Witness of God*. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1897.

²¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *Sadhana*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.

satisfaction moves the universe. . . . He moves the rational spirit of man through love of the highest, and thus draws the soul to Himself." And again, he speaks of "the good, that is only another name for God."²² These are almost the words of Professor Bousset, who frankly declares that "the Christian belief regards God and moral good as one."²³

Such utterances seem almost as unmistakable as Emerson's "I, the imperfect, adore my own perfect." God seems relegated to the realm of the ideal, which, though the one reality to Plato, is sharply contrasted with the real by contemporary philosophy and common sense. But after all, we must not press a single aspect of these writers' thought. Pantheism, Dualism, Platonism — these labels do injustice to the many-sidedness, the synthetic power — or is it a loose eclecticism? — of modern thought.

Christian theology has always been synthetic, as in the doctrine of the Trinity, which insists that God, although One, is *both* the Father *and* the Son *and* the Holy Ghost. Moreover, this ancient dogma, in spite of Biblical criticism and the spread of a rationalistic spirit, persists. It is worth asking whether, though a scrutiny of the historic causes that produced it scarcely recommends it to us, it be not, after all, based upon a threefold human experience.

God the Father is the Pantheist's God: "The word God is a symbol to designate the universe in its ideal-achieving capacity."²⁴ But for the average Christian, God the Son has been far more real. That is, he has found God not so much in the heavens that declare His glory, as in this spiritual leader whose name our Church bears. So Dr. Lyman Abbott, who writes to a wide

²² George A. Gordon, *Aspects of the Infinite Mystery*. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.

²³ W. Bousset, *The Faith of a Modern Protestant*. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913.

²⁴ G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*. University of Chicago Press, 1909.

audience and typifies the liberal spirit in the American Church, confesses that the old God of theology is an idol, and that its place has been taken for him "by the God who has been revealed to me in the earthly life and character of Jesus of Nazareth."²⁵ And a chapter dealing with Christ in one of Dean Hodges' recent books²⁶ bears the title, *The Supreme Disclosure of God*.

But it is God the Holy Spirit that is most ardently preached by the new prophets. Among them there is none who writes with more charm and tenderness than that intrepid soldier, Sir Francis Younghusband. The first leader of white men to penetrate into the forbidden city of Lhasa, he is now leader in the spiritual adventure. In two not very large volumes he gives us of his experience and his personality, and therewith much food for thought.²⁷ "We are realizing nowadays," he says, "that the old guardian God of our childhood never existed. . . . What then is to take his place? . . . We are abandoning the idea of God the Father, and we are realizing the idea of God the Holy Spirit. We are giving up the idea that the Kingdom of God is in Heaven, and we are finding that the Kingdom of God is *within* us. We are relinquishing the old idea of an external God, above, apart, and separate from ourselves; and we are taking on the new idea of an internal spirit working within us — a constraining, immanent influence, a vital, propelling impulse vibrating through us all, expressing itself and fulfilling its purpose through us, and uniting us together in one vast spiritual unity."

Now Mr. Wells, though a sort of super-democrat in his political thinking, and in spite of his recent hints that the British monarchy may have outgrown its usefulness, nevertheless speaks of God as King. Other

²⁵ The Outlook, vol. 117, p. 193 (1917).

²⁶ George Hodges, *Everyman's Religion*. The Macmillan Co., 1911.

²⁷ Sir Francis Younghusband, *Within*. London, Williams & Norgate, 1912; *Mutual Influence, A Re-View of Religion*. New York, Duffield & Co., 1915.

voices, however, like that of Younghusband, are proclaiming the doom of that conception of divine autocracy. Professor Overstreet, for example, declares that as political theory has advanced from the conception of the sovereign as an arbitrary ruler to the view that the ruler represents the will of the ruled, so theology must develop "from the view that God is the individual person in whose princely hands lies the sovereignty of the universe, to the view, more nearly consistent with the spirit of democracy, that God is the Common Will of all living creatures." Prominent among exponents of this view was Walter Rauschenbusch, whose premature death is a grief to us all. In his last volume, he wrote,²⁸ "Those whose religious life has been influenced by the social gospel are instinctively out of sympathy with autocratic conceptions of God."

Is "Father," then, a fitting title for God? The naturalistic thinkers of the past generation — such as Emerson, Carlyle, Seeley, Arnold — thought so, and, at least occasionally, made use of it. Not a few today, however, are, like Younghusband, abandoning even that. Mr. Wells insists, with glowing rhetoric, that God is Youth, and regards as obsolete the "patriarchal phase" of religion. Mr. Overstreet had already insisted that the God of loving protection, the Parent God, must be supplanted by the God that is our own inner ideal life. And Professor Adler, a prophet, as we all know, of the deepest spiritual fervor, had even earlier declared not only that it is "an anomaly for men who, in the realm of politics, regard king-worship as a thing of the past, to preserve king-worship in religion," but further, that the metaphor "Heavenly Father" no longer represents truly the conception which is possible to us.²⁹

²⁸ Walter Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*. The Macmillan Co., 1917.

²⁹ Felix Adler, *The Religion of Duty*. New York, McClure, Phillips & Co., 1905.

Mr. Bernard Shaw, who, in that delightful play *Androcles and the Lion*, showed his ability to appreciate the Christian spirit, tells us in its preface that "Jesus declared that the reality behind the popular belief in God was a creative spirit in ourselves, called by him the Heavenly Father, and by us Evolution, Élan Vital, Life Force, and other names." One may question Mr. Shaw's scholarship and taste in ascribing his own point of view to the Galilean, and his equation of terms is doubtless too indiscriminate; but it is suggestive of the attempts being made on all hands to find scientific equivalents for hallowed terms and doctrines, to discover their empirical foundation.

This is the clearest impression made upon a spectator of the confused and groping quest of these contemporary pilgrims. They are looking for what the present writer called in a recent volume ³⁰ "The God of Experience." They are seeking so to formulate and "explain their use of the term 'God' as to make the denial of His reality impossible." ³¹ Mr. Wells speaks for many when he says that "modern religion bases its knowledge of God and its account of God entirely upon experience. It has encountered God. It does not argue about God. It relates." Doubtless there is much that experience cannot tell us, or has not told us, about God, as about everything else, that we should like to know. But is it not a valuable achievement to be able to assure the coming generation that the term represents not a mere unevindenced fable or superstition but a solid reality found in normal human experience?

Is this reality what our forebears meant by the name "God"? Or must we, if scrupulous, find a new term for our altered conception? As to this, no one has spoken more to the point than that earnest lover of truth, so

³⁰ Durant Drake, *Problems of Religion*. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.

³¹ H. B. Mitchell, *Talks on Religion*. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1908.

maligned in his day, and not yet sufficiently appreciated, Ernest Renan.³² "The word 'God,'" he wrote, "being in possession of the respect of humanity, having a long prescription, and having been employed in noble poetry, its suppression would put humanity off the track. Although it is not very unequivocal, as the scholastics say, it corresponds to an idea sufficiently definite. . . . Tell the simple to live a life of aspiration after truth and beauty, and these words will have no meaning for them. Tell them to love God, not to offend God, and they will understand you marvellously well."

Many contemporaries are voicing the same feeling. To quote but one, that exquisite essayist and poet, Mr. Le Gallienne, protested some years ago against the tendency of modern thinkers to describe the ultimate Reality by "some cold and clumsy circumlocution, to speak of the great Unknown and Unknowable, of the Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, or maybe simply of Nature: all phrases which fail to include the most essential quality of the conception they attempt to express, namely, its awful and mysterious majesty. It cannot be doubted that the one English word for that conception must ever be — God."³³

It is natural for the scrupulous to feel that, to avoid ambiguity, an altered concept should have a new name. This was doubtless what the professor in the story had in mind when he began his lecture with the words: "There are those who say there is a God; there are those who say there is no God. Gentlemen, the truth lies between them."

Ambiguous the word "God" hopelessly is. But what is the core of meaning that persists through all fluctuations? Is Dr. Coit right in saying in a remarkable recent

³² Ernest Renan, *Intolerance in Scepticism*, in *The Poetry of the Celtic Races and Other Studies*.

³³ Richard Le Gallienne, *The Religion of a Literary Man*. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.

volume ³⁴ that "to ask, Is there a God? is to ask whether there be in very fact any source from which supreme blessings will be gained if one attends steadfastly and reverently to it"? However this may be, any conception that has had such a checkered history might well suffer, one would suppose, a few more changes. No one except the uncritical adherents of traditional dogma believes today in such a God as the ancient Jews worshipped; it is doubtful if many *really* believe in the grim potter-God of St. Paul. Mature thought must — though often with a passing sadness of heart, and always with utmost reverence for the thought and faith of the past — put away childish things. It is impossible that the great truths which science has revealed in the past nineteen centuries should not profoundly have altered our view of the ultimate realities from that of the naïve and prescientific believers of the primitive Christian gospel. And we must remember that Christian theology, as it eventually crystallized, is more Greek than Hebraic. Perhaps our modern God-ideas have really (as Mr. Shaw evidently feels) more of the spirit of the Master's teaching than the Hellenic subtleties of the Nicene creed — or even of the Fourth Gospel.

Certainly contemporary scholarship is doing much to revise our understanding of primitive Christianity. For example, Professor Bowen has conclusively shown in a volume which is one of the best fruits of American Biblical scholarship,³⁵ that the view of the resurrection found even in the Synoptic Gospels differs sharply from that of the earliest apostolic tradition. And another of our leading New Testament scholars, Professor Kirsopp Lake of Harvard, points out ³⁶ that the phrase "a personal God" "scarcely belongs to the great period of forma-

³⁴ Stanton Coit, *The Soul of America*. The Macmillan Co., 1914.

³⁵ C. R. Bowen, *The Resurrection in the New Testament*. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911.

³⁶ In the *New Republic*, June 9, 1917.

tive Christian theology." "In popular language personality means anthropomorphic individuality. . . . To believe that God has this kind of personality is not orthodox; it is not even heretical; it is merely heathenism of an inferior type." If this be true, it gives point to Dr. Moberly's admonition,³⁷ "Revise your conception of personality."

What matters, however, in the last analysis, is not how close our conception may approach, or how far it may veer, from the thought of earlier days; not even whether we are to use the term "God" or not; what is vital is that we should retain the sense of the worth and meaning of life which that sacred word connotes. Of the men of the future Mr. Lowes Dickinson writes,³⁸ "It may be a personal God that they conceive, it may be a 'tendency in the universe'; it may be something which they prefer to call 'Earth' or 'Nature'; it may be an 'Absolute'; but, in any case, it is something not themselves and greater than themselves, something which, by its mere existence, makes everything supremely worth while, overrides and subsumes Evil, intensifies and makes omnipresent Good, and concentrates and satisfies in itself those ideal impulses that otherwise would be tortured and broken about an imperfect self."

The immediate influence of the war is, on the whole, to deepen conventional conceptions of God. This is no time for any but a few detached thinkers to analyze coolly, to balance probabilities, to formulate new *aperçus*. Most men now must lean hard on what they already have. But after the war, when reconstruction is vigorous in every field, whither shall our masters lead us in this dearest of all quests?

Professor Coe, one of our keenest contemporary students of religion, assures us that "the thought of God

³⁷ W. H. Moberly, in *Foundations*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.

³⁸ G. Lowes Dickinson, *Religion, A Criticism and a Forecast*. New York, McClure, Phillips, & Co., 1905.

may, indeed, undergo yet many transformations, but in one form or another it will be continually renewed as an expression of the depth and the height of social aspiration.”³⁹ Is he a true prophet? Certainly there is no more interesting question for the future to answer. Are we going to abandon religion in the ardor of our new tasks? Are we to turn with renewed zeal to religion but free it more and more from theolatriy? Or are we perhaps at the verge of a great new vision of God, which shall lead us into ways that it hath not yet entered into our hearts to conceive?

³⁹ George A. Coe, *Psychology of Religion*. University of Chicago Press, 1916.

LORD ACTON'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY¹

CRANE BRINTON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

"I have never had any contemporaries," said Lord Acton toward the close of his life; and, in the main, he was right. His broad cosmopolitanism made him impatient of English insularity. His belief in the necessity of freedom of conscience alienated him, in spirit if not in form, from the church of his birth. His insistence upon the absolute validity of the moral law as the final measure of all things isolated him in the midst of a century which seemed largely to have concluded that morality and success are synonymous. Certain it is that his own age did not estimate him over highly. At his death in 1902 there were not a few who asserted that for all his depth of erudition, Acton had contributed nothing to the sum of human knowledge. He had been an omnivorous reader and possessed a greater knowledge of the sources of modern history than any other man of his day. Yet all this store of learning had been of no avail to the world, for Acton had written nothing. At his death, a lecture in English, a letter in German, were all that represented Acton on the shelves of the library of his own university, Cambridge. Even today, after his lectures, his letters, and his periodical writings have been collected and edited, his output remains small: two volumes of lectures, three of letters, two of historical essays contributed to the reviews of his time. Yet in spite of the scantiness of his written work, Acton must be numbered among the great historians of the last century. Great-

¹ Copyright, 1919, by Crane Brinton.

ness is not susceptible to quantitative analysis. A historian's influence is not to be measured by the number of volumes in octavo he brings forth. Acton's few pages are sufficient to define his attitude toward history. His life shows how intimate for him was the bond between a knowledge of the past and a reasoned course of conduct in the present. What is important for the world in Acton is not the extent of his writings, but the depth of his thinking. We are interested, not so much in his broad erudition as in the living core of his thought, his philosophy of history.

John Acton was born in Naples on the tenth of January, 1834. His father, Sir Richard Acton, came from an old family of English country squires which had kept to the Catholic faith. His mother was a Dalberg, a member of a distinguished South German family. John was educated first at Oscott, one of the leading Catholic colleges in England, and then at Munich under Döllinger. Acton is thus marked off from the majority of his countrymen by his religion and his cosmopolitanism. It is precisely these factors that determined his outlook on life, that served most to forge his character. He was a sincere Catholic. To this he owed his moral austerity, his sense of the gravity of history and its ethical import. The German element in Acton shows itself in a scientific thoroughness of research, in a fund of scholarship not wholly free from a sort of unwieldy bulkiness. He is at bottom, however, an Englishman. His ideal of liberty is determined by an English respect for law and custom, an English recognition of the principle of growth in political institutions. He had none of the blindly doctrinaire idealism of the continental liberal; rather, he follows the tradition of the Whigs. The cosmopolitan character of his interests, however, lifted him above the pettiness of partisan standards. His Whiggism is never the Whiggism of a Macaulay. Acton strives to draw

from every historic occurrence its universal application, its truth; and this truth is an absolute, a principle whose distortion is crime.

Acton's attitude toward history is thus blocked out in the circumstances of his birth and education. For those who would understand his position as a historian his later life marks but two important events — his struggle with ultramontaniam and his professorship at Cambridge. On his return to England from Germany, Acton edited successively the *Rambler* and the *Home and Foreign Review*, journals through which, as some one has said, he set out "to convert the world to a synthesis of learning, liberalism, and Catholicism." Such ideals soon brought him into conflict with Rome. His journals were officially condemned and he was forced to suspend their publication. His long struggle with ultramontaniam culminated in the utter defeat of the Liberal Catholics at the Vatican Council of 1870. After the declaration of papal infallibility by the council, Acton withdrew from open ecclesiastical controversy. Believing, however, that the decree of infallibility might be so mildly interpreted as to rob it of its dangers, he never took the decisive step of withdrawing from the Catholic communion. The conflict, however, had left a permanent impression upon him. It confirmed his conviction that absolute power, whether in church or in state, is an evil not to be endured; it gave him a motive for a searching inquiry into the past of his church, an inquiry which served to strengthen his hatred for religious persecution in all its forms.

The next twenty years of Acton's life were passed in diligent reading in preparation for his projected *History of Liberty*. He welcomed his appointment as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge in 1895 as an opportunity to carry out his plan. The *Cambridge Modern History*, as Acton originally conceived it, was but a fragment of a greater work which was to trace the

slow progress of the human race toward freedom. But the task was too gigantic even for a scholar of Acton's calibre; and Acton himself pursued his passion for absolute certainty of evidence so far that most of his time was spent in investigation, and little left for creative work. Acton died with the *History of Liberty* still unwritten. His Cambridge years, however, were by no means barren. In these few short years his personality stamped itself upon the historical thought of the university; and the two volumes of his lectures on modern history and on the French Revolution give us in their full ripeness the sum of his historical judgments.

History was not to Acton a mere academic pursuit. With that view of history which considers it, beneath the dry light of science, as a series of phenomena capable of detachment from the present, susceptible to separate analysis, he had no sympathy. Still less did he consider history a mere form of literary exposition. The one justification for the study of history was to Acton its value as a guide in the affairs of the every-day world. The present is what it is because of what the past has been. Human development has been a continuous chain of cause and effect. Any course of action in the present must be based upon a knowledge of the way in which things we now do are hedged in, limited by what men have done before us. History thus becomes a great mentor, a schoolmaster of action.

Acton does not mean by this that we are to become blind worshippers of the past. He dislikes that type of conservatism which obstinately faces backward to glue its eyes on the days of old as much as he does that doctrinaire revolutionism of the French which would abolish history. History is a valuable guide, not only because it serves to delimit our field of action, but because it allows us to profit by the errors of our predecessors. As Acton says, "If the Past has been a burden, a knowledge

of the Past is the safest and surest emancipation." Moreover, a knowledge of history prevents us from confusing what is transitory and unimportant with the things that really count; it forces us to fasten on abiding issues. Only through historical insight can we separate in the maze of present-day politics selfish interests from social principles. In the highest sense, history is to Acton a philosophy. It is the sum of man's achievement; its proper interpretation affords the key to his destiny.

To Acton, then, "history, the record of truths revealed by experience, is eminently practical, as an instrument of action and a power that goes to the making of the future." But to achieve this function it must not take the shape of a mass of uncoördinated details. The great bulk of historical data must be given an orderly shape, must be interpreted. The historian cannot, however, be content with the mere winnowing of patiently acquired data. He must appraise the place of events in the scheme of things. He must not read his own prejudices into events, nor must he seek in history an orderly system in which every item can be properly pigeon-holed. Acton gave an excellent summary of his own historical method in reply to a correspondent who had quoted Vinet's "*Il faut que l'historien ait un parti; amour de vérité abstraite, chimère.*" "Oui et non," wrote Acton. "Oui, l'historien doit avoir un parti . . . mais il doit faire aussi la part de ce qui est incertain, du côté faible, de la vertu, du talent et du mérite des malfaiteurs. En l'histoire, tout est porté, limité, interprété par une masse d'antécédents qui ne souffrent pas une désignation exclusive."

Acton believed that history could be rendered truly significant only by testing the conformity of its content with two fundamental principles: first, the right of every man to freedom of conscience; second, the unfailing authority of the moral law. These principles are not injected into the mass of historic detail in some esoteric

manner, like the Kantian categories into the world of sensation. They are not metaphysical absolutes applied to history, not *a priori* rules to rationalize historic data. They are rather truths which result from a historic induction; they are to be inferred from a study of the course of history. Once recognized and applied to the course of events, these principles serve to give meaning to separate phenomena, as the laws of modern science serve to bring various physical activities into orderly connection. History thus gives us the account of the gradual and painful progress of the race toward freedom and morality. A given historical event, once every fact of evidence which can be known about it has been discovered by an impartial investigation, must be judged by its part in this upward progress, by its contribution to ethical freedom. The absolute paramountcy of these standards of freedom and morality was to Acton the lesson of history. That others, starting with a similar basis of historic evidence, should draw from it a teaching as diametrically opposed to his as "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht" merely proved to him how strong were the forces of evil in this world. Acton was profoundly convinced of his own rightness. His conception of the significance of history is undoubtedly the reflection of his character. However much he may seek for objectivity of judgment, however much he may wish events themselves to mould his generalizations, we cannot but feel that in the end he is interpreting things in terms of his own personality. Hence there appears in his standards of historic judgment a certain rigidity, a certain absoluteness, which removes them, in a way, from subjection to that historic growth which produced them. In brief, Acton does not wholly succeed in making history a true induction; there remains in his categories of freedom and morality a suggestion of fixity and immutability which divorces them from the every-day world.

All this will appear more clearly in an examination of the precise nature of these standards.

Acton's definition of liberty has become famous. "By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes to be his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion." Surely it is an ideal which does not lack in force of aspiration. Freedom of conscience is to Acton the highest ideal of human progress. Liberty, in this sense, is not a means of attaining a better political system; it is in itself the highest end of all political effort. It is just because liberty is the goal of the race that it forms a criterion for the judgment of history. Though this definition of liberty is perhaps a counsel of perfection, Acton does not mean it to be purely Utopian in character. Liberty is something which operates here among us. It has never been completely realized; it has been subject to violation and abuse by those who did not understand it. But it has persisted, and all history records its increasing sway over the minds and action of men.

Acton defines liberty in terms of the individual will; but that does not mean that the individual is free to act at his own caprice. Acton realizes that absolute freedom, like absolute despotism, is an impossibility. No man can have complete control over another, even over his slave, for the slave always has the alternative of suicide. Similarly, no man can be unqualifiedly free as long as another human being exists and has relations with him. Acton saw the full truth of Aristotle's statement that man is a social animal. Hence he saw that an individual's liberty is always contingent upon the liberty of others. Freedom is in a sense merely the harmonious functioning of all parts of the social order. Because he considered social progress as necessarily evolutionary, Acton made respect for law and tradition an important factor in true freedom. Nothing is to be

achieved by seeking to wipe out all that mankind has done and then attempting to make over the world completely. Such a process is impossible, and founded upon a false reasoning, which seeks to remove man from his social and historical background and consider him as an abstract entity. In his respect for law and order, his doctrine of the gradual evolution of institutions, his dislike for the political theory of the French Revolution, Acton is a lineal descendant of Burke. His notion of liberty is essentially English, a less partisan, less selfish, and less insular form of the doctrines of 1688.

The surest test for the existence of liberty in a society is for Acton the amount of security enjoyed by minorities. In the Oriental despotism there are no minorities — and no freedom. It is through the existence of a variety of opinion within a state, such as is afforded by the freedom of minorities, that men's minds are kept open to the possibility of progress. Acton is at base an individualist, and he has no respect for authority apart from knowledge. He dreaded an absolute power in the state as the possible — nay, the inevitable — enthronement of error. Only by a recognition of the rights of minorities can there prevail that open-mindedness essential to the reign of truth. From the very fact that he founds his whole philosophy on the duty of the individual to base his conduct on the dictates of his conscience, Acton denies the right of the state to absorb completely the personality of its citizens. The Hegelian concept of the good of the state as the highest goal of human endeavor is to him as dangerous as the blunter absolutism of the Roman Empire. Modern democracy, in so far as it stands for the tyranny of the majority, is equally harmful to true liberty. For what assurance have we that the majority will be right? True liberty can exist only when the state is recognized as possessing a limited competence. The state cannot, for instance, transgress upon the domain of

religious bodies, unless the practice of those bodies prove injurious to the welfare of society as a whole. Each one of these bodies has a life, a purpose, a will, just as does the state. Where their purposes do not conflict with the higher end of the state, the law of freedom forbids the state to interfere with them. This is the real significance of the security of minorities. It means that no power stifles the free play of conscience, that within the state various other social groups may work out in freedom their contribution to the good of humanity.

Recognition of the evolutionary character of social progress, respect for law and order and our whole historic inheritance, security of minorities — all this is for Acton implicit in the definition of liberty as freedom of conscience. Because he was a man of profound religious conviction, Acton could base everything on the individual's sense of right and wrong. If a man is truly moral — and for Acton morality is not purely intuitional with the individual, but a reasoned obedience to a perfectly definite code of laws — he will make his liberty founded upon an appreciation of his obligations to society. Liberty of conscience does not imply a state of anarchy where each one will go his own way regardless of his fellows. On the contrary, its perfect realization would mean the attainment of that mean between anarchy and despotism which is the aim of political endeavor. Freedom of conscience would attain this result because it would subject all to the moral law; and the moral law is a given norm, uniform and unchanging, recognizable by all. Ideally, all consciences are thus guided by the same force. This conception of the moral law is the key to Acton's thought. Once the precise meaning he gives to morality is known, and his philosophy of history becomes clear.

The value of a historical event in moulding our conduct is measured by its ethical teaching. It is the

office of the historian to see that everything that has occurred in the past is appraised for its moral content. He must see to it that no shams live to perpetuate themselves. He must first of all investigate thoroughly the facts of a given case. But his function is not merely one of research; he must judge. He has as the basis of his judgments the moral law, perfect and unalterable. "Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity." Acton is able to conceive of the moral law as absolute because, for him, ethics is a religion. Christianity meant to him primarily the Golden Rule, and for its more strictly theological aspects he cared little. He once wrote to Creighton: "You would imply that Christianity is a mere system of metaphysics which borrowed some ethics from elsewhere. It is rather a system of ethics which borrowed its metaphysics elsewhere." Since the moral law is thus a matter of religion and finds its source in inspiration, Acton is able to give it a character of fixity and oneness.

With all the austere majesty in which Acton clothes his ethics, the good life yet remains something we can all recognize, strive for, and in a measure obtain. Only the most opinionated of pragmatists can accuse him of having failed to give us a system of ethics which will get down into the dirt of every-day life and help clean up that dirt. Acton's moral code is simple. "It is the common, even vulgar code that I appeal to," he once said. The distinction between good and bad does not involve fine-spun philosophical arguments. It is to a certain extent intuitional. We can all agree on certain things that are good and others that are bad. For Acton, the Christian code of morals summed up all that was best in human nature. It formed an eternal truth of religion and just for that reason it was eminently practical, something that could be a real part of our lives. Acton believed

that he had found the heart of the moral law in the principle that human life is a sacred gift, and that it must be treated as sacred. It is the greatest of crimes to take human life without reason. Around this central principle Acton groups the rest of his ethical teachings, as a whole very simple, and summed up in the teachings of Christ.

With this conception of the nature of morality and its function in the interpretation of history, Acton was naturally bitterly opposed to many of the tendencies of his age. He combated with all his strength the notion that history shows that the capable is always the moral, and that therefore what has been has of necessity been right. Viewed in the light of a superior law of right and wrong, history shows countless incidents in which wrong has triumphed, but remained wrong. It is the duty of the historian, in Acton's mind, to point out these incidents, to hold them up for condemnation, to exhibit them as errors to avoid. Wrong is in itself a thing of evil, even though it may be victorious. The distinction between good and evil is based upon a law which is prior, superior to the happenings of the day; it does not consist in the result of those happenings. Acton's view of the moral law likewise caused him to condemn the inclination to excuse the sins of a period as due to the "spirit of the time." Different ages cannot have different moral standards; what is wrong in one age must be wrong in another, for the moral law is timeless.

Acton would not for a moment admit the possibility of a divorce between politics and ethics. Statesman and private citizen are alike subject to the demands of morality. Indeed, the transgressions of the statesman are the more serious, for they affect the policy of whole peoples. "I cannot accept the canon that we are to judge Pope or King unlike other men, with a favorable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption,

it is the other way, against the holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. . . . The inflexible integrity of the moral code is to me the secret of the authority, the dignity, the utility of history." The activities of states are in Acton's view equally bound by the demands of morality. He saw clearly the danger to civilization which lies in the doctrine that the state is above all restraint, that only the dictates of its own convenience or advantage govern its relation with other states.

History, then, is a practical guide to action, the lesson taught us by the experience of the race. It is easily intelligible because through its complicated course run two inseparable truths: the right of every man to give unhindered obedience to the voice of his conscience, and the eternally binding force of that unalterable moral law which governs his conscience. In broad outlines, this is Acton's historical philosophy. It will gain in meaning if we consider its application to specific historical problems.

Acton's estimate of our Civil War is an illustration at once of the strength and weakness of his attitude toward history. The American state, he says, was founded on the federative principle; that is, certain smaller bodies surrendered to a larger one created by their own union definite rights, while each contracting body retained other definite rights for itself. Through the effectiveness of this distribution of power, America prospered for several generations. Gradually, however, the Jeffersonian idea that the will of the majority is law and that no one can have rights over against the majority began to take root. Opposed to his was the theory that the principles of law and order and morality are superior to the popular will, and that minorities too have positive rights. Those who held to the first view naturally supported the power

of the federal government over the states, for through the federal government could best be secured that uniformity which was the goal of democratic absolutism. The other party maintained the doctrine of states' rights. The North and South went to war not because of slavery — this was but the match that kindled the fire — but because absolute power and restrictions upon its exercise cannot exist together. The whole position of the South is "a repudiation of the doctrine that men can enforce no rights, and that the majority can do no wrong."

Acton's main thesis, that the American government has been tending toward a deification of the will of the majority and that the Civil War was a great step toward centralization, is undoubtedly correct. The victory of the North was primarily a blow at the doctrine of states' rights. Just here, however, can be distinguished the limitations of a historical method which, like Acton's, judges everything by wholly inelastic standards. He picks out some one aspect of things which best serves him to set off or expound his standards and neglects other equally important aspects. His desire to make the moral lesson of history clear cut causes him to oversimplify the content of historic fact. He admitted that in history no sharpness of outline must be sought, that everything is qualified, limited. But in his own work he failed to carry out this method. Granted that on the whole the political philosophy of the North can be embodied in the statement that the will of the majority is law; might not the temporary ascendancy of this doctrine be less damaging to the good of America and persistence of freedom than that of the theory that the union is merely one of convenience? In other words, if Northern centralization tended to tyranny, did not Southern particularism tend to anarchy? Acton, as a true liberal, ought surely to have looked with apprehension at the narrow utilitarianism which lay behind the doctrines of nullifi-

cation and secession. Moreover had Acton applied completely his own principle, that a historical event is to be judged by its moral effect, his conclusion must have been different. A community which subjects some of its members to bodily enslavement is obviously transgressing the spirit of Christian morals. The effect of the institution of slavery upon a people is to render it callous to human rights and to introduce the very principle of absolute power which was the chief object of Acton's hatred. It would seem that in regard to the Civil War the problem is this: given the circumstances of the case, which would prove less disastrous to the attainment of ethical good, the Northern doctrine of the divine right of the majority or the Southern institution of slavery, coupled with the Southern doctrine of secession? Viewed in the light of the consequences which are implied in the opposing principles, moral justification must be given the North. Had Acton been less intent on finding in the federal victory a regrettable success of Jeffersonian democracy over true liberalism, he must have seen that there were elements of right and wrong on both sides, and that the final result must be measured by the balance of ethical values.

Acton lived in the midst of the period which witnessed the rise of nationalism and the unification of Italy and Germany. His attitude on the nationalist movement affords an excellent example of how he sought to apply a knowledge of history to the solution of the problems of his own day. Furthermore, his conclusions have a living value as bearing upon a problem which confronts us imperatively at this moment. His essay on "Nationality," published in 1862, soon after the virtual completion of Italian unity under Cavour, embodies the practical application of his philosophy to contemporary problems.

Acton finds the source of the national movement, like that of the liberal movement, in a protest against the

abuses of the old régime. Nationalism, as the feeling of "a community which imposes upon its members a consistent similarity of character, interest, and opinion," had been throughout history a normal characteristic of many European race groups. The absolutist dynasties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had waged wars and cut up kingdoms wholly for their own selfish interests, without considering the character and interests of the population. This state of affairs came to a head in the partitions of Poland, and it was these partitions which awoke the Polish people to a sense that they were really one and united them against their oppressors. Then came the French Revolution, and the doctrine of nationalism was grafted upon its other precepts. The state was brought into being to register the general will. But the general will is one and all-compelling, and the state must therefore be one and absolute. The logical application of Rousseau's doctrines meant the unlimited power of the state as expressed through popular sovereignty. If the state is to be one, it cannot permit the existence of community interests within it; hence, racial, lingual, provincial, and national differences within it must be abolished. Several nationalities cannot form a state, for state and nation must be coextensive. In pursuance of this theory the Convention proceeded to attempt to eradicate all traces of local differences in France and sought to make of France a perfect ethnographic unit. This spirit is characteristic of the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century. They are not so much movements for national liberty as for national unity. Harsh intolerance of other races inhabiting the same state is an invariable accompaniment. In many cases the dominant race forcibly imposes its language and civilization on the weaker ones. Acton lived to see this practice in its worst form in the Magyarization of Hungary and the Germanization of Alsace-Lorraine and Posen.

The evil results of this theory of nationality, continues Acton, are many. The perfect nation-state is an ideal entity, an abstraction, a body founded without regard for historic growth and racial diversity. It shares the doctrinaire character of the other tenets of the Jacobin Revolution. Put to the test of contact with the world, such a theory leads to absolutism of the worst kind. There is nothing between the individual and the state, and there can thus be no guarantee of private rights. Acton's own words on the subject are well worth quoting: "Whenever a single definite object is made the supreme end of the state, be it the advantage of a class, the safety or power of the country, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the support of any speculative idea, the state becomes for the time inevitably absolute. Liberty alone demands for its realization the limitation of public authority."

In contrast to this theory Acton brings forward another theory of nationality, based not on national unity, but on national union. It is quite obvious that the aspirations of every European nationality to sovereign statehood cannot be realized. Sufficient testimony to this fact is afforded by the mixture of races in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. Moreover, even if nation and state might always be coextensive, such a condition would not be desirable. The existence of several national groups under one government forms a positive guarantee of liberty. These groups resist the tendencies of centralization and absolutism in the state; they form associations which help give expression to diverse interests, make political life richer by preventing dire uniformity, insure progress through healthy rivalry, balance group interests for the good of the whole.

For still another reason state and nation ought not to coincide. Patriotic attachment to one's racial nation is largely physical, primitive, while allegiance to the

political nation is ethical. The first is founded upon instincts which, like love of family, are primarily selfish. Race feeling is merely an extension of tribal feeling, and is based on the instinct of self-preservation. Only in the political order is self-preservation transformed into a higher moral purpose which may involve self-sacrifice, for the state is organized for public interests which transcend those of private individuals. In no case, however, must the individual allow love for his nation or obedience to his state to transcend every moral consideration. Here, as everywhere, the individual must appeal to his conscience. "The man who prefers his country before every other duty shows the same spirit as the man who surrenders every right to the state. They both deny that right is superior to authority."

State and nation, then, are fundamentally different, and the only guarantee of true liberty is the existence of several nationalities in federal organization under one government. The theory that nation and state must be one inevitably leads to absolutism and to this extent it is a retrograde step in history. It has, however, successfully carried out its function, the destruction of the old régime. The democratic movement alone, without the aid of nationalist enthusiasm, could never have accomplished this end. Moreover, the nationalist theory marks the culmination and hence the exhaustion of the revolutionary principle. It aims neither at liberty, as did the early French revolutionists, nor at prosperity, as did the socialists of 1848. It sacrifices everything to the sterile purpose of national interests. The individual will is submerged in the collective will, which is guided, not by law and reason, but by the mere accident of race. In this very excess the nationalist theory carries the germ of its own dissolution.

Acton's treatment of nationalism thus brings out very clearly how his theory of liberty is one of balance of

interests, how much it is a protest against sweeping denials of historic forces in favor of a single doctrine. His conclusions on the historical purport of the movement seem borne out by the course of recent events. That national feeling can become the invaluable auxiliary of state despotism of the worst kind is shown in the rise of the German Empire. The present war is largely the outcome of the doctrine of the absolute nation-state, supreme within its own borders, bound in its relations to other states by no law, because itself above all law. Acton's own theory of nationalism is of value in its bearing upon the reconstruction which must follow the war. It is becoming increasingly evident that the only possible solution of the national difficulties in Europe is the recognition of an authority higher than national interests. A really federative organization in which each nationality would possess self-government and local independence seems the only way out of the complicated racial tangles of eastern and central Europe.

Acton's political philosophy is, as we have seen, basically individualistic, in that he believes that every man must appeal to his own conscience for the ultimate sanction for all action. The conscience of mankind is determined by a common ethical inheritance, by a distinction between right and wrong which is clear and valid in all cases. Along with this insistence upon absolute freedom of conscience Acton maintains that deep respect for the forces of law and historic tradition which forms the essence of Whiggism. Obviously, we have here a form of the eternal antithesis — liberty and authority. Shall the individual always obey the dictates of his conscience, or shall he sometimes, aware of the futility of protest, find it expedient to yield to an authority which he knows to be wrong? Given his belief in the supremacy of the moral law, Acton could but answer that right alone is expedient. The difficulty here arises that most of us

take our ethics upon authority and that for the average man no such sharp division exists between the two as Acton would create. It has been the function of the church to disseminate its ethical teachings among its members. The Christian believer looks to his church for his moral standards — that is, he bases his ethics on authority. The church then has a peculiarly sacred position as guardian of public morality. The slightest deviation from right on the part of the clergy may thus prove most detrimental to the good of the community. Evil committed by the clergy can least of all be condoned, for it is the most penetrating of all evil. The general principles of morality are eternal and immutable, superior to narrow sectarian interests. If the governing powers of any church violate the moral law, the individual who is truly moral will refuse to abide by their action. This is precisely the conclusion to which Acton is led. It might be urged against him that, in view of the lofty purpose of the church, some slight debasement of the moral coin might be countenanced if only good resulted in the end. If opposition to a course not strictly moral would lead to disruption of the church and its failure to carry out its mission, would it not be better to acquiesce in the wrong, especially if it may be glossed over and its consequences minimized? Briefly, the problem is this: Given a moral code which absolutely separates right and wrong, can the commission of a wrong be justified on the ground that it will lead to a greater right? Acton's relations to his own church serve as his final answer to this, the crucial problem of his philosophy.

Acton's faith in his religion was profound and unquestioning; it was not for that reason narrow and intolerant. He once wrote of himself as a man "who started in life believing himself a sincere Catholic and a sincere Liberal; who therefore renounced everything in Catholicism that was not compatible with liberty and

everything in Politics that was not compatible with Catholicism." It was no light task. As Acton viewed the historic career of the Catholic Church, he could not but see that many of her acts were wholly incompatible with his own convictions. We have seen that his religion was primarily an ethical system. In so far as those who controlled the policy of the Catholic Church violated those ethical precepts upon which the Catholic religion is founded, Acton would repudiate their acts. If the body of the Church consented to the immoral acts of its rulers, it had ceased to be perfectly Catholic. In other words, Catholicity and the policy of the Catholic Church have not been identical save when church policy has been in accordance with that moral law which forms the heart of the Catholic faith.

Acton found that the history of his church disclosed many offences against the principle of liberty and the moral law. Church organization made the pope an absolute sovereign. But absolutism in the church is open to the same objections which make absolutism in the state intolerable. It is bound to lead to arbitrariness, subjects the ruler to the temptations of misuse of power, and affords no guarantee that the moral law will be respected. It becomes inevitably immoral. The history of the papacy bears this out. The boundless and unattainable claims of Boniface were the result of lack of limitation on papal power. Luther came largely as a protest against papal tyranny and misgovernment. On the other hand, it is not sufficient that the Conciliar movement attempted the limitation of papal absolutism to gain Acton's approval for the movement. He finds the Councils imbued with purely worldly motives. They wished to restrict the papacy partly for their own aggrandizement, partly in the interests of the secular states of Europe. Gerson and the rest of the reformers were first of all promoting their own selfish ends. Then too, the Councils carried out

a vigorous policy of persecution. To Acton, the burning of Hus alone suffices to condemn the whole Conciliar movement.

Religious persecution, along with papal absolutism, have been the chief crimes of the Church against liberty. Persecution is always a useless thing, for belief is a spiritual force, and can never come from the outside, from sheer physical pressure. Moreover, persecution is immoral not only because it reacts upon the persecutor and makes him careless of law, brutal, bigoted, but because it may result in the suppression of truth. Toleration is vindicated by the fact that truth can never suffer in open conflict with falsity. Give truth free rein and it will by its very nature emerge victorious. Falsity, however, must always depend not on moral but on physical force. The danger in persecution lies in the fact that it may be employed on the side of the false. Indeed, as soon as any great and good principle enlists the aid of persecution it falsifies itself. Liberty of conscience is the only guarantee for the triumph of moral principles in the life of a community. When the Catholic Church made use of persecution to stamp out heresy it was acting contrary to the spirit of Catholicism.

The most serious offence of the rulers of the Church has been their failure to adhere to the moral law. The stamping out of heresy, the extension of papal influence in European courts, papal acquisition of worldly wealth, all were achieved by methods distinctly at variance with the Golden Rule. Jesuit possibilism, which comes down in practice to the profession that the end justifies the means, seemed to Acton the highest degree of immorality. If the means is immoral, it incorporates itself in the end attained, and taints that end. He has best expressed this attitude in a letter written in German: "Die Unsittlichkeit besteht darin, dass man glaubt, die Sünde höre auf, Sünde zu sein, wenn sie für die Zwecke der

Kirche begangen wird. Raub ist nicht Raub, Lüge nicht Lüge, Mord nicht Mord, wenn sie durch religiöse Autoritäten oder Interessen sanktionirt wird. . . . Eine solche Lehre is nicht Irrtum, sondern Sünde, nicht gefährlich, sondern tödlich. . . . Solche Männer scheinen mir nur fluchwürdig im höchsten Grad, mehr als die gemeinen Verbrecher, weil sie die Religion selbst verwenden, um die Seelen zu verderben."

It is obvious that the Catholic Church has contravened the moral law as Acton understood it. Acton did not hesitate to apply the unfailing canon of morality to church history with even more rigor than to secular history. His essay on "The Massacre of St. Bartholomew" is an unanswerable indictment of religious persecution. The loftiness of the papal position, the greatness of the principles at stake, did not cause him to soften a whit the severity of his judgments upon the popes. Much of the error of centuries past still encumbered the Church as he found it. Acton determined to obliterate that error, to liberalize the Church and to bring it back to true Catholicism. Within the Church, however, the current was flowing in quite the opposite direction. The Ultramontanes were fast gaining for the pope an even more complete absolutism, and were turning the Church away from the life and thought of the time, back to the days of the Schoolmen. The Syllabus of 1864 came as a challenge to all who hoped to reconcile the Church with the progress of the century and to make it a living force for moral improvement. Acton accepted the challenge and put all his strength into the struggle. The declaration of papal infallibility shattered once and for all his hopes of liberalizing the Church. The pope's word was to be supreme and unquestioned. But was not this, judged by Acton's canons, immoral? Must not the man who is truly moral repudiate the decree? Acquiescence here would mean the worst of sins, the putting of authority

above right. It would seem that Acton, like Döllinger, Tyrrell, and Lamennais, must turn away, as a true Catholic, from a church which had ceased to be Catholic. Some years before, Acton had written in answer to the question, "Is it better to renounce the papacy out of horror for its acts or to condone the acts out of reverence for the papacy?" that only the former alternative was possible. Yet now, at the moment of crisis, he did not hesitate to accept the latter.

We have seen how he accepted defeat, remained faithful to the papacy, and strove to minimize the danger of the doctrine of infallibility. It is precisely in this act that his own ethical system breaks down. His choice was simple. The inexorable force of the moral law condemned the papal stand. Acton himself had repeatedly insisted that the true Catholic must maintain the moral law unsullied, that the clergy cease to be God's ministers when they do wrong. He did not, however, choose to repudiate the action of the pope. The reason is simple. Acton must have felt that the disruption of the Church meant a greater moral loss than the admission of papal infallibility. Against the absolutist evil a campaign of education and enlightenment could make real headway. The decree itself, moreover, was so qualified as to deprive it of most of its sting. On the other hand, active opposition meant a schism in the ranks of the Church, the weakening and perhaps the destruction of its power for good. Acton's faith was bound up in the Catholic Church, as such, and he never lost sight of the sacredness of its mission of universality. Better incur a temporary loss of part of its moral strength than wholly abandon that mission. The commission of a wrong may be justified on the ground that it will lead to a greater right. Acton had thus introduced into his moral life that very principle of relativity which he had so sternly rejected from his ethical theory.

As a whole, Acton's philosophy of history is relatively free from complexity and subtlety. It stands out clear-cut, embodied in the cardinal principles of liberty and morality. This simplicity makes it more readily understood, and at the same time more susceptible to critical attack than a system more broadened by qualification. Three general criticisms suggest themselves in an estimate of the value of Acton's work as a historian.

In the first place, it is not always clear that Acton maintains an attitude of impartiality in his judgments of history. It is true that he did not desire impartiality in the sense of scientific aloofness; he did, however, insist on the impartiality of the judge who administers the moral law. "In judging men and things," he said, "ethics go before dogma, politics, or nationality. The ethics of history cannot be denominational." Yet in the greatest crisis of his own life he put dogma before ethics, and we cannot but feel that a man who in private life preferred Catholic unity to moral consistency must have seen history through glasses tinted, if ever so slightly, with doctrinal prejudice. Acton is assuredly harsh enough with sinners in his own church. The man who could write of the popes of the Inquisition that "they were not only wholesale assassins, but they made the principle of assassination a law of the Christian Church and a condition of salvation," was certainly no papal apologist. Save in a vague feeling that the Middle Ages, when one faith ruled all Europe, were a sort of Golden Age, Acton's bias does not appear in his treatment of his own church. When it comes to the services of Protestant statesmen, however, he fails to give the full meed of credit. William the Silent is to him a selfish adventurer, a man who turned lightly from Catholicism to Lutheranism and from Lutheranism to Calvinism as the interest of the moment dictated; in William's case, assassination was almost justifiable. This seems a narrow estimate of a man who

did so much for European liberty and religious toleration as did William. Similarly, Acton's dislike for Cavour is occasioned at bottom by the attacks of the Piedmontese minister upon the Catholic Church. Even his use of the word "infidel" as applied to Protestants, though perhaps natural enough from a Catholic pen, sounds harsh and discordant from a man who held as sacred the principle of toleration.

Moreover, Acton's desire to bring everything under his standards of historical judgment caused him, as in his estimate of the American Civil War, to pick out only the element of a situation which best fitted into those standards. He tends toward sweeping condemnations and equally unrestrained praises. There is a failure to recognize the diversity of life, the nature of the purposes and cross-purposes which actuate man. The mass of historic data is treated as though it can be sorted out into definite piles, the good and the bad. Acton wishes to maintain a definitely scientific attitude toward history in the sense that it must be a true induction. As a matter of fact, he tends to categorize the matter of history, and falls into that very *a priorism* he seeks to avoid.

In the second place, Acton's insistence upon the place of law and tradition at times borders upon an unthinking veneration of what has already grown up. He desires above all things to avoid the futilities and impracticalities of the French Revolution. He accordingly tends to subject everything to the test of conformity with English Whiggism, without considering whether the circumstances of the case made such a conformity desirable. Authority and tradition are emphasized to such an extent as to outweigh the other term in the balance, the ideals and demands of the present. We have a feeling that Acton's liberty after all would only transfer the individual from the authority of external political power to that of a historically determined conscience. There is a lack

of growth in the system. In our anxiety to subject revolution, we seem to have thrown evolution too by the board.

Lastly, this same fixity appears in Acton's ethics. The moral law is given out *en bloc*, as something rigid and immutable. It is the eternal Right which is set up in contrast with mere Authority. Now a more realistic view of morality would see in it the product of social life, a set of rules which man has worked out for himself in his social experience. If this is so, morality has grown and will grow in the future. If the main outlines of the moral law seem permanently established, it is only because man's experience has since the earliest time centred around a few fundamental principles which have proved indispensable guides in life. "Honesty is the best policy" gives expression to one of these principles which have become part of our moral tradition. Around this core there is, so to speak, a margin of morality which is not static, but shifting, growing. The moral law has not had the same content throughout the ages. Primitive man had of necessity views upon the sacredness of human life very different from those of Acton. Bodily slavery is now, among Christian nations, held to be an immoral thing; yet Plato based his ideal state upon the institution of slavery. In other words, our notions of what is right and what is wrong depend upon the specific problems we have to solve, upon all the varied factors of our environment.

In solving these problems, however, we must bring to our aid precisely those results of historic experience which have hardened into the moral law. We must not seek to cut ourselves loose from prevailing notions of right and wrong, to overturn completely the moral law. We cannot, if we would, divorce the present from the past. It was Acton's great service to recall to us, alike in politics and in ethics, the existence of this heritage of past cen-

turies in the shape of the abiding principles which must govern our conduct. In ethics, even more than in politics, he errs by making these principles not abiding, but eternal; not general, but absolute.

Acton's relations with his church show that even he could not apply this austere moral code to his life, and that he could not label everything as specifically and solely good or bad. In the confusion and turmoil of life, we must denominate as good that which seems most likely to result in right; and that right we must identify with harmony, with success. But it is not success in the vulgar sense of mere prevailing, becoming accepted. It is rather a success in conformity with those principles which form our moral inheritance. It is a harmony which developes out of past conflicts through compromises and readjustments governed by the moral law. To Acton, however, the moral law is a static absolute. For this very reason, his system does not at bottom contain that spirit of meliorism which actuated his life, and which caused him to turn to the study of history. The moral law is perfect, and for that very reason we have no way of attaching ourselves to it, no assurance of ethical progress.

Acton's whole philosophy of history thus tends, in the last analysis, toward the setness of a completed system in which there is no room for growth. The great problem of all thinking and all action seems to be the achievement of a proper mean. The problem is everywhere and pervades all problems. We must respect historic rights; yet the exaggeration of this duty leads to Chinese ancestor-worship. We must provide for progress, we must change outworn things; yet the exaggeration of this principle leads straight to the excesses of the Jacobin. In ethics we perceive the same dependence on past standards and the same desire to create new ones. Success can only come through a balance of forces. Acton

errs in overemphasizing the element of permanence; his moral law becomes not so much our guide as our jailer.

As a matter of fact, Acton never hunted down his ideas to their logical conclusion. His life shows an appreciation of the evolutionary character of change, a recognition of the place of the novel in the order of things. It is only a matter of emphasis that permits us to believe that he held rather more with things established than with things that are seeking to establish themselves, rather more with the past than with the present — in short, that if he was a liberal, he was a very conservative one indeed.

In spite of this implied attitude of conservatism, Acton's salient ideas are essentially forward-looking. It is because he had something to teach the world that his name will live. His influence was not confined to his written work. Small in volume though this proved to be, it contains the kernel of his thought and serves to render it accessible to the world. His most potent influence has been felt through the men who studied under him at Cambridge. Though only a few college generations came in contact with him, these few sufficed to take up the thread of his thought and carry it on. That from among his former pupils a considerable school of historians has arisen bears evidence to his power as a teacher. These men look at the world from different points of view. In many cases, they have profoundly modified Acton's teachings. To his fundamental idea, upon which rests the value of his contribution to the world, they have faithfully adhered.

"We have no thread through the enormous intricacies of modern politics except the idea of progress toward more perfect and assured freedom and the divine right of free men." This is the lesson which Acton sought to teach. It is easy to pass into rhapsodic emptiness over

this "divine right of free men." As Acton has said, men have throughout history included under liberty many and conflicting ideals. Yet if history is to mean anything beyond the purposeless conflict of blind desires or the equally purposeless game which the Absolute of Hegel chooses to play with itself, it must be interpreted as the gradual advancement of the individual to the complete and untrammelled expression of his moral self. It was Acton's service that he never ceased to insist upon the true meaning of history in an age which seemed to have forgotten it. The minds of men have not always been proof against the subtle poison of the doctrine that "*Der Gang der Weltgeschichte steht ausserhalb der Tugend, des Lasters, und der Gerechtigkeit.*" The discoveries of Darwin, misunderstood and misapplied, served the nineteenth century as proof of the fact that success alone counts, no matter how attained. Against that dangerous philosophy which, from the Sophists to Nietzsche, has asserted that might is right, Acton maintained that there is a right beyond the mere exigencies of the moment, that there is a jural principle of ethics by which we may judge an action, and that it is the mission of history to teach that principle. "I exhort you," he said to his pupils at Cambridge, "never to debase the moral currency, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong." He could have no finer epitaph.

BOOK REVIEWS

EARLY BABYLONIAN LETTERS FROM LARSA. HENRY FREDERICK LUTZ, Ph.D.
(Yale Oriental Series, Babylonian Texts, Vol. II). Yale University Press.
1917. Pp. 41. Pl. lvii. \$5.00.

Through the effort and discriminating judgment of Professor A. T. Clay, Yale University has acquired what is probably to be regarded as the most interesting collection of Babylonian tablets in this country. The philological and archæological material of the Babylonian Collection is being published in the Yale Oriental Series, the initial volume of which was issued by Professor Clay in 1915. The second volume is by one of Professor Clay's pupils, and contains the autographed text of one hundred and fifty-two early letters from Larsa, accompanied by two plates of half-tone reproductions, an introduction, and the usual name-lists.

The evidence presented by Dr. Lutz is convincing that these letters came from the mounds of Senkereh, the modern site of the ancient Larsa (Ellasar), and that they were written during the first dynasty of Babylon, although in only a few cases is it possible to determine the reign to which they belong. Ancient letters owe their preservation to the fact that they formed part of royal or temple archives, and their contents are usually of a business or official character. These letters are for the most part business communications which do not add much that is new to the known data of legal and business contracts. This is, however, far from denying the worth of such publications, for they justify themselves on the linguistic and economic side. It is a matter of considerable interest to find the name Abraham written out fully for the first time in cuneiform, *A-ba-ra-ḥa-am*. The antiquity of the name was placed beyond dispute when Professor Ungnad found the name *Ab(am)râma* in contract tablets from Dilbat, dated in the reign of Ammizaduga, the fourth successor of Hammurabi. In the Karnak list of places conquered by Sheshonk I, the contemporary of Rehoboam, the Field of Abram is mentioned, and an official under Esarhaddon (677 B.C.) bears the name *Abi-râmu*. Dr. Lutz maintains — in the writer's opinion correctly — that *A-ba-ra-ma*, *A-ba-am-ra-ma*, *A-ba-am-ra-am*, and *A-ba-ra-ḥa-am* stand for one and the same name; that these are

foreign renderings of a West Semitic name אַבְרָהָם, which was re-introduced in the West in its Babylonian form, subject to the usual variation in foreign names, including the orthography with ה. It goes without saying that the word-play of Genesis 17 5 has no philological basis. So far as we know, the name was from the beginning a personal name and there is no evidence that there ever was a tribe Abram or Abraham. This discovery of the personal name in Babylonia during the first dynasty of Babylon is obviously not a corroboration of the statement that the particular person called Abraham lived in Ur and migrated to Canaan (Genesis 11 28, 31).

The admirable transliteration and translation of thirty-three selected texts is welcome to the student and general reader alike, and we hope that Dr. Lutz will be able to carry out his original plan of translating all of the letters contained in this volume. A few errors — some of them merely typographical — may be listed. On page 8, no. 106: 4 is transliterated ^{il} Šamaš ù ^{il} Marduk li-ba-al-li-tu-ku-nu-ti, "may Shamash and Marduk preserve your life." Inasmuch as the letter is addressed to two persons, the plural pronoun *kunûti* is to be expected, but the cuneiform text on plate XXXIX has the singular pronoun *ka*. Has Dr. Lutz unconsciously corrected a grammatical error on the part of the original writer, or has he himself made one in copying? On page 12, no. 25: 5 is transliterated *aš-šum di-nim ša Ilu-šu-i-bi-[su]*. No break is indicated in the text of this line on plate X, which reads: *aš-šum di-nim ša Ilu-šu-i-bi-i arad^{il} Sin*. A collation of the text might well reveal *šu* instead of *i*, as the same name in line 13 indicates. The name occurs in no. 83: 5 with the title *barû* (diviner) instead of *arad Sin*. On page 26, line 8 of no. 1, *aš-šum te-e-mi-im ša um-ma at-ta-a-ma* has been entirely omitted from the transliteration, and in the translation it is enclosed in parentheses! The numbering of the lines follows the transliteration rather than the cuneiform text, and therefore falls short by one line. In line 19 (numbered 18) *ša-a-ti* has been omitted in the transliteration but appears in parentheses in the translation. On page 28 (no. 32: 8) we would suggest that the character transliterated *mana* — it is written *ma* — might perhaps be *šiglu* (compare 12: 8). In that case the redemption price would be within the known limits of the price of a male slave, instead of being "exorbitantly high."

The copies of the tablets are exceedingly well executed, and we look forward with interest to the contributions that are to be expected from this scholar.

MARY I. HUSSEY.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HEBREW PEOPLE. LAURA H. WILD. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. Pp. xii, 311. \$1.50.

This handy volume will serve the purpose of a manual for many people who need an easy introduction to the genius, content, and abiding significance of the Bible. The fields of ethnology, comparative religion, geography, sociology, and history, are drawn upon in good proportion and the author's wide reading has been sifted and compacted in a really interesting way. The preparation of the book follows apparently the author's experience in introducing the subject of early Hebrew culture to her undergraduate charges. In Part V we find but twenty pages devoted to the great subjects of the teachings of the Old Testament prophets, of Jesus, and of Paul. This is probably to be taken as a prospectus merely of another volume to follow the present one.

One of the notable and commendable points of the book is the sustained enthusiasm with which the variegated data are recalled and articulated. What is really a study of origins of the folk and phenomena of the Old Testament period may well help to an intelligent appreciation of that Levantine collection of writings, the Bible.

Such interest revealed and evoked is the main justification of this book. It ought to bring good results in many a group of students. Its success will not be affected by occasional slips, such as that on page 18, line 22, which popular English dictionaries like Webster's and the Standard will correct quickly enough for the pupils, or the wrong spelling of the name of the poet Vergil on pages 69 and 93. Such trustfulness as is shown on page 15 — "an inscription on a monument tells the truth" — is perhaps more dangerous. Professor A. T. Olmstead is showing by his painstaking studies that what we need is not so much Higher Criticism and the Monuments as Higher Criticism of the Monuments.

The author will by her suggestion of wide reading lead students to differ from her on certain points of interpretation, and will, like any good teacher, rejoice in the difference. The reviewer feels grateful whenever a competent teacher turns note-books into handy volumes of narrative or reference suitable for the rapid reading which the more eager students ought to do in quantity.

ELIHU GRANT.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WANG YANG-MING. TRANSLATED FROM THE CHINESE by F. G. HENKE. With an Introduction by J. H. Tufts. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1916. Pp. xix, 512. \$2.50.

MODERN MOVEMENTS AMONG MOSLEMS. SAMUEL G. WILSON. F. H. Revell Co. 1916. Pp. x, 305. \$1.50.

The Neoconfucian philosophy of China and Japan has for the most part taken its origin and direction from Chu Hi (died 1200 A.D.); but the later school of Wang Yang-ming (died 1529) has not been without influence in either country. Outside the small circle of professed sinologues the teachings of the latter have been little known, and all students of Oriental philosophy are the more indebted to Professor Henke for making them accessible in the present volume, which contains a translation of a biography of Wang Yang-ming, three books of "Instructions for Practical Life," a record of various discourses, and a collection of letters in answer to inquiries.

Professor Henke classifies Chu Hi as a realist, Wang Yang-ming as an idealist of the monistic type, who thought that nothing exists independent of and apart from mind. "The intuitive faculty," "intuitive knowledge," are words that recur on almost every page. "Nature" is another great word. "There is but one nature and no other. Referring to its substance, it is called heaven; considered as ruler or lord, it is called Shang-ti (God); viewed as functioning, it is called fate; as given to men, it is called disposition; as controlling the body, it is called mind. Manifested by mind, when one meets parents, it is called filial piety; when one meets the prince, it is called loyalty. Proceeding from this on, the category is inexhaustible, but it is all one nature, even as there is but one man (generic sense)."

Of mere erudition Wang Yang-ming has a poor opinion: "The food which has been eaten must be digested; for if it collects in the stomach, it causes dyspepsia. How can it under such circumstances become muscle? Later scholars read extensively and know much, but what they have read and know remains undigested. They all have dyspepsia."

The translation has evidently been made with care and reads very well.

So many absurd people have declaimed that Mohammedanism has never changed and can never change that the author of the second book above mentioned expects some of his readers to be surprised at the very title, *Modern Movements among Moslems*; and doubtless his exhibition of the multiplicity and variety of these move-

ments will be to many both novel and illuminating. Dr. Wilson was for more than thirty years a missionary in Persia, and writes about that country from his own observation. His information about other parts of the Moslem world is compiled from many and heterogeneous sources — exclusively, so far as appears, in English — without much critical discrimination, and is communicated in a fashion that frequently resembles leaves from a note-book more than anything else.

Modernity in any religion has to be set against a background of history, not only to show wherein it is new, but how it came to be at all. In history Dr. Wilson is sadly weak, especially in the history of Moslem theology. Al-Ashari is as outstanding a name as Athanasius; his relation to the Mutazilites and his position as one of the founders of an orthodox system of dogma are matters of elementary knowledge. The Mutazilites themselves — a kind of ethical rationalists — are one of the most interesting phenomena in the history of Islam; the influence of their way of thinking upon Shiite theology has been considerable, and in recent times the Moslem rationalists in India claim to inherit from them. In the latter connection the author touches incidentally on the subject. Two sentences are enough to prove that he has no knowledge either of the nature and significance of the Mutazilite movement or of the work of al-Ashari. In the former he sees the influence of Persian thought; of the latter he writes: "Al Askari (*sic*), and so in the index), using as his weapon the dialectic of Aristotle and teaching Greek logic to the orthodox, gave them the victory and established rigid legalism and traditionalism in Islam." Stanley Lane-Poole and Geden are quoted as authorities for this, but the fault is not theirs. This is a glaring example, but it is by no means a solitary one.

Even with the Koran the author seems to have a somewhat superficial acquaintance. He quotes as a "saying of the Koran" the words, "I desired to be known, therefore I created the world," which sound as little like Mohammed's God as can be imagined. The argument on page 85 about Sura 9, verses 5 and 29, erroneously assumes that the verses form part of the same deliverance because they stand in the same Sura.

It is an affectation to write Arabic words in English as a modern Persian pronounces them, but that might pass if they were consistently written on any system. In one place we read, "*La illa ill Allah*," in another, "*La illah ill' Allah*." Both are grammatical monstrosities easier to credit to an English ear than a Persian mouth. Now we have "Jaffar" and then again "Jafar." Some of the strange

spelling is probably to be attributed to negligent proof-reading; for example, Almohayes, Wofing, *responsa prudentum*, Kaimal Pasha, *Frangi mahab*, and the like. What to say of Ittahad, Ali Allahis, I do not know.

GEORGE FOOT MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND HERESY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. F. W. BUSSELL.
Robert Scott, London. 1918. Pp. xiv, 878. 21s.

One's first query in regard to this exceedingly thick book is how, under present conditions in England, the author and the publisher could command the paper needed for the volume and the labor required to set it up. The book might well have waited till the war was over, and even longer. One also queries why the author chose his title, since only the last two hundred and fifty pages deal with the Middle Ages, or at least with those of western Europe. The previous six hundred and odd pages have been given to "Hindustan and the Religions of Further Asia" (pp. 11-300); to "Islam: its Sects and Philosophy" (pp. 300-508); and to "Greek Thought and Chaldeism: the Nearer East and Christian Heresy" (pp. 509-644). The work is thus a survey of the chief religions of the world.

The author has read many books and studied long. Whether he has any synoptical enlightenment of his own to contribute or the ability to give form and soul to his stupendous chaos of material, is another question, to which we fear the answer cannot be in the affirmative. An informing mind throughout the work is far to seek; nor do we find the author's style pregnant, or his method and presentation calculated to hold the reader's attention; neither is his comment particularly wise.

We say this much of the first six hundred and fifty pages. The author seems to grow weary as he enters upon the nominal subject of his labors. "Authority and Free Thought in the Middle Ages" is the title of the last general division. The heading of his first paragraph, in heavy type — "Gregory I as Starting Point for Western Development" — seems to preclude the idea that the prior four-fifths of the work have any explanatory value for what is now to be "briefly reviewed." "The period to be now briefly reviewed is held to extend from Gregory I (c. 600) to the catastrophe of the Papacy under Boniface VIII; though a glance may be given at the issues and developments in a yet later age, and we may have to include (for some purposes) the period ending with the settlement of the

Turks in Europe (1453)." Such is the wandering statement. We note that the following section treats of St. Augustine and Pelagius! Some of the paragraph-headings are naïve enough: "Erigena conveys Greek learning into the West;" *whence* is not indicated.

There is little more to be said. In the next two hundred pages the writer continues vainly endeavoring to assort his materials. The last sentence in the text (p. 806), which immediately precedes some seventy pages of "Supplementary Essays" in fine print, is enigmatical and portentous: "The remaining chapters of this book aim at tracing the evolution of modern State-sovereignty and the collapse of the idealistic standards and moral convictions to which the Middle Age has always (at least in theory) clung. They will be little more than a commentary or a paraphrase of texts or statements already familiar in these pages." Is it possible that a shortage of paper and type alone prevented another volume?

HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR.

NEW YORK.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MYSTICISM. CHARLES MORRIS ADDISON.
E. P. Dutton & Co. 1918. Pp. x, 216. \$1.50.

Dr. Addison has written a sane, modest, and useful book. It is sane, because he refuses to dwell upon the extravagances of mysticism, barely mentioning ecstasy and keeping silence about levitation and such-like phenomena, but representing mysticism as continuous with well-recognized elements of mental life in general and the religious life in particular; It is modest, because he does not write as one who has attained, but rather as one who is on his way to a goal which is divined through the testimony of more advanced pilgrims and of which he too has caught encouraging glimpses. It is useful, in that he emphasizes the way rather than the goal, dealing more with the practice than the theory, with the science only as it bears upon the art of mysticism. In the present revival of interest in the subject, the tendency is to expound and defend the theory instead of promoting the practice, although the mystics themselves are unanimous that one must practically apprehend before he can theoretically comprehend the experiences which they relate.

So far as theory goes, the teaching of the book is perfectly simple. Man, every man, has longings which God alone can satisfy. To receive this satisfaction, he has a spiritual sense variously named by the mystics as *spark*, *scintilla*, *apex mentis*, *synteresis*, known to

theologians as faith, to philosophers as insight or intuition; but this, like all other senses, needs cultivation for its proper functioning. How then shall it be cultivated? At this point we pass from theory to practice, and here the author's chief word is Contemplation. When the desire for God becomes strong enough to induce us to fix our minds upon Him, to think of Him with prolonged and steady concentration, then one is in the mystic's way, headed and hearted towards the mystic's goal. There is also a most suggestive plea for spaces of silence both in private devotion and in the worship of the church. There is a wide-spread notion that in public worship "something must be doing all the time," that moments are wasted, and worse than wasted, which are not fully occupied by the choir, the clergyman, or the brethren; but the Friends know better, and so do all who have tried a more excellent way in which time is given to stop and think. One recalls the description of a church service attributed to Dr. Burton of Hartford, in which after much utterance from the pulpit and much "ballooning by the choir," there came at last "silence, and the restored presence of God."

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS. Vol. I, The Development of Dogmas during the Patristic Age, 100-869. Rev. BERNARD J. OTTEN, S.J. B. Herder, St. Louis. 1917. Pp. xiv, 523. \$2.00.

This is a really interesting book. Its frankness, its clearness of statement, its freedom alike from controversial bitterness and pietistic unction, commend it not only to the faithful Catholic for whom it is primarily intended but to the Protestant reader as well. Its character as a Manual for students is well maintained throughout. It does not pretend to give detailed discussion of specific points, but aims rather, first to state with precision and with the certainty derived from infallible authority the Catholic position on the most important topics of the Christian faith, and then to show how this position has been defined from age to age.

The use of the plural word "dogmas" characterizes at once the author's attitude toward his subject. It is not a body of thought carried on by successive generations of freely thinking men with which he is concerned, but a series of propositions based upon a superhuman revelation and handed down through the medium of an "infallible teaching authority." How then can there be a history

of dogmas? If by "history" we mean anything more than a mere list of statements about what has happened, what room is there in this definition of dogmas for any real historical process? Our author anticipates this inquiry and answers it immediately by drawing a distinction between revealed truths as "objectively permanent and immutable," while "their subjective apprehension and outward expression admit(s) of progress."

And not only is progress in dogma possible, but "development" as well. Indeed one feels that Professor Otten is particularly anxious to set this word free from its Catholic *tabu*. He uses it in his title and employs it continually as if to relieve his Church and himself from the reproach of a too rigid conservatism. He even recognizes a certain merit in "heresies" as contributing to the ever more complete enunciation of the truths contained in the primary and objective revelation. His own function he conceives to be to show how the "original deposit entered into Christian consciousness in later ages."

From such a beginning it is evident that in stating the views of Christian theologians from one age to another no vital relation is implied between these views and the movement of human thought in general which we call philosophy. Dogmas are a separate and special treasure confided to a specially constituted guardianship and to be preserved at all costs from outward contamination. The "subjective" element has rights only in so far as it confines itself within prescribed limits. No matter how absurd or foolish or impossible a "dogma" may be, the individual has no right to oppose it so long as the "infallible teaching authority" sees fit to let it stand on the list of accepted truths, or even on occasion deliberately to place it there. If he is tempted beyond the line of authorization, he becomes a "heretic," and that is of itself a condemnation.

The learning of our author is shown chiefly in his ability to quote proof-texts from the recognized authorities in the line of patristic succession. Beyond this he does not go and needs not to go; for the public to which he addresses himself this piling up of human authorities is enough. The principle that no amount of evidence can prove an impossibility has no place in this peculiar intellectual world. Yet it is refreshing to note certain consequences of this method. On the most critical points there is a solid consistency and definiteness in the use of language which disarms hostile comment from the start. With Fr. Otten a miracle is a miracle and therewith — *basta!* Here is no talk of "luminous surprises" or any other of the juggling devices by which ingenious theologians have sought

to obscure the clear line between the world of miracle and the world of law. Not merely is "the miraculous" a reality but miracles as well, and the Church is there to define and authenticate them.

This principle once established, there is no difficulty in maintaining any specific dogma, as, for example, the doctrines of Purgatory, resurrection of the body, intercession of saints, the veneration of Mary. The obvious fact that we have no knowledge whatever on which to build belief in the physical phenomena involved in these several highly important dogmatic propositions can have no effect upon minds prepared in advance by training in the docile acceptance of the "infallible teaching authority."

But while Fr. Otten raises no question as to such specific dogmas as these, it should in all fairness be pointed out that he is careful to show the varieties of opinion which were expressed about them in the period before their "definition" by the Church. Those who opposed them were, of course, in error, for their "objective truth" was as true before definition as afterward; only this error was due to the delay of the "subjective apprehension" in grasping the particular mystery involved, and was, therefore, pardonable. This readiness to show both sides of the process is still more marked in the more highly speculative subjects, such as the doctrines of the Trinity and the problems of Free Will and Grace. Our author's attitude on this matter is well stated by him in one of his illuminating little introductions, that to Chapter XXIX. He reminds his readers that, in spite of all controversy, the teaching of the Church was not "vague and uncertain" even before "she was called upon to give a final definition." He compares religious controversies in the history of dogmas to the wars described in the history of nations as "abnormal accidents," as "manifestations of passion rather than of reason, or at best a manifestation of reason misguided in its quest after truth."

Put this view of doctrinal controversy, not to say this conception of history, together with the statement immediately following, that the christological decisions of eastern councils were all "dictated" by the popes, and we have a complete presentation of Fr. Otten's qualification for his task. His work is frank, clear, and consistent, and for these reasons valuable to the student.

EPHRAIM EMERTON.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A DEFENCE OF IDEALISM. SOME QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. MAY SINCLAIR. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. xxii, 355. \$2.00.

Plato's philosopher among kings plays no more unusual rôle than this novelist among philosophers. But disappointment is in store for any reader who takes up Miss Sinclair's book in the hope of finding a "metaphysics made easy." He will discover no simplified, superficial re-wording of other people's conclusions but rather an independent and critical study of fundamental doctrines. Miss Sinclair reaches her own position by way of a criticism of "the pansychism of Samuel Butler," of "vitalism" as emphasized in the teaching of Bergson, of "pragmatism and humanism," of "neo-realism," and of "the new mysticism."

She starts out with the statement (p. 1) that "the plain man is supposed . . . to be sure that whatever else he is or isn't, he is himself," and is thus led to inquire "what we mean by Individuality, by Personal Identity, and by a Self." There follows a long exposition of Butler's doctrine, largely irrelevant to the main purpose of the book and somewhat uncritical in its adoption of Butler's conception of heredity, but abounding in valuable comment and comparison. One may note, in particular, Miss Sinclair's comparison of Butler to the psychoanalysts in their common emphasis on the "Will-to-live and to-make-live," and her suggestive re-statements of the results of psychoanalysis, which she precedes by the observation (p. 4): "Granting . . . that we know what we mean by the Unconscious . . . I see no reason why it should overflow with things hideous and repulsive any more than with beautiful and attractive things." Her enumeration of the significant conceptions of psychoanalysis follows: "Only three conceptions more or less coherent: a conception of the Will-to-live, valid as far as it goes but vague, and bound up with a conception of the Unconscious worse than vague, . . . a conception of Sublimation, by which this Will-to-live perpetually transcends itself and is made manifest in higher and higher and more and more complex forms of life, . . . a conception of the Individual as a being of immense importance, seeing that just those forces within and without him which arrest and retard his individuality are backward forces" (p. 9). In spite, however, of Miss Sinclair's interest in Butler, her conclusion (p. 13) that "the Unconscious resolves itself into a negative abstraction" of course involves her in strong opposition to him in his denial of personal identity to the individual. She argues (p. 33) that "not the simplest fact of consciousness, not the simplest operation of building up a primordial germ-cell, is possible without the presupposition of personal identity."

There is room to question Miss Sinclair's confident classification (p. 56) of Bergson as a metaphysical dualist—in truth, she herself later questions it. But her criticism of him is keen and in the main discriminating. It culminates in the assertion (p. 63) that Bergson has gone wrong in that “he has put Pure Time before the Self. He has given to Time that special form of continuity, the duration that belongs only to a self.”

At this point, led by these introductory studies to the discovery of self as basal fact, Miss Sinclair devotes a chapter to the consideration, under McDougall's guidance, of “some ultimate questions of psychology.” This chapter is mainly concerned with the issue between parallelism and interactionism, and the author concludes that McDougall “has justified the hypothesis of a self or soul” and that he has vindicated interactionism. But this, Miss Sinclair points out, leaves the metaphysician with the problem on his hands of explaining interaction. In her fourth chapter she proceeds to consider the rival explanations of the philosophers. She argues briefly against materialism on the ground (p. 113) that the materialist “must either admit that consciousness does not come altogether into his net, or he must break his own sacred law of the conservation of energy”; against the doctrine of the “underlying Unknown and Unknowable” on the ground (p. 115) that its upholders “have to assume it to be knowable and indeed known in order to prove that it is there at all”; and finally, against the very different theory of “objective idealism,” by which apparently she means a pluralistic, intellectualistic, and relatively impersonal form of idealism, a theory which conceives the universe as a system of percepts and ideas. The teaching of the objective idealist is thus summarized (p. 121): “He has cut the Thing-in-itself very cleverly out of the problem, and packed all Reality into states of consciousness; not my states or your states, but all the states of all the consciousness there is; so that the sum of Reality will be simply the sum of the states. . . . But Totality, the sum of all states, must be more real than any one state or any number of states; so that his Reality is purely quantitative, and every lapse of consciousness, no matter whose or what — and these lapses are constantly occurring — will be a *dead loss of reality to the Universe.*”

All this is, however, in a way preliminary to Miss Sinclair's main purpose. The vital philosophical issue is, she believes, that which divides pluralistic neo-realism from idealism of the monistic and personalistic type. For a brief chapter's length she pauses to brush aside pragmatism and humanism with decisive though with regretful

hand. For though she abhors "William James's way of thinking," she "adores his way of writing" (p. vii). "To be just to pragmatism and humanism," she concludes (p. 148), "they have deserved well of philosophy in reminding it of things it is apt to forget; little things like Will and action and moral conduct." But she concludes that pragmatism "is a method and not a philosophy," and might well have argued the point even had she not confined her attention to one group only of the pragmatists.

Incomparably the most important part of the book, in the mind not only of the present reviewer but of the author, is the long and critical discussion of neo-realism. Miss Sinclair is profoundly, perhaps inordinately, impressed with the importance of this youngest and most vociferous claimant to metaphysical honor. She agrees (p. 153) with those who concede to the new realism a "deadly force." And she attributes this force mainly to the "method of Mr. Bertrand Russell's 'atomistic logic'" as applied "to the universe without and to the universe within." To the neo-realists she yields two points: first, that by their conception of space and time as continuous they cut out the ground from under Kant's old idealistic argument from the antinomies; second, that "all the qualities of matter are in the same boat; there is no difference between primary and secondary qualities" (p. 175). But she elaborates her suspicion (pp. 225 ff.) that the doctrine of space as absolute continuity involves its own antinomies; and against neo-realism she urges with great skill and vigor the following considerations:

First, in flat opposition to its own pretensions, it flies in the face of science and common sense (p. 216 *et al.*). "It divides what for science and the plain man's sense were never yet divided. It joins what for them were never yet joined. It talks about irreducibles and undefinables where science and the plain man see palpable unities and relations. It gives to the abstractions of its own logic a reality as august and far more permanent than the solar system." In other words, neo-realism is palpably untrue to experience in its attempt to reduce perceived objects to mathematical or logical reals. "Mind is not more different from matter than mathematical points are from a point perceived in an extended surface" (p. 214).

The realist, in the second place, undermines his own theory by his treatment of hallucination and image as real in the sense in which perceived objects are real. "Take hallucinations of the lesser sort, the temporary distortions . . . of perception . . . of a real outside object. These . . . are due to some . . . maladjustment of the apparatus (the medium) — easily corrected, the new realist says,

by . . . reference to the real object" (p. 219). But "if the distortion of the medium can make one perceive the real object as if it were distorted . . . it is clear that his perception of objects . . . is not precisely . . . immediate. How can he then be sure — as cock-sure as the realist is — that he is perceiving a reality and not an appearance?" (p. 220).

Neo-realism, furthermore, discloses an inherent inconsistency (pp. 220 ff.) in admitting the subjectivity of certain "tertiary qualities . . . the æsthetic feelings . . . the passions and emotions." For we do not find "the tertiary qualities, which it admits to be subjective, divided off from the secondary or objective ones as sharply as we should expect."

Finally and impressively Miss Sinclair argues that "universals" which the neo-realist reinstates "are a priceless haul for the idealist. . . . If realists *will* revive Plato," she adds, "they must abide by the consequences of the resurrection" (p. 231). "What, in Heaven's name," she cries, "are realities defined as independent of any and every thought, of any and every consciousness, doing in a process of thinking which is nothing if not conscious?" Another difficulty for the neo-realist is found in the fact that "there is a universal of every actual . . . and of every possible proposition." For since "the number of propositions is infinite," and since "for every true proposition there is a false proposition that denies its truth . . . therefore there will be an . . . infinite number of universals standing for an infinite number of lies" (p. 234). Miss Sinclair does "not see how reality can be claimed for these objects of conception if reality has any meaning" (p. 235).

The multiplied proofs of the inner inconsistency of neo-realism, its most formidable rival, leaves monism, or the doctrine of the "real Absolute," in possession of the field. Miss Sinclair unequivocally sets forth this form of monism — the conclusion "that the ultimate reality of things and the ultimate reality of consciousness is one; and that this one reality is Spirit" (p. 295) — as the hypothesis most in keeping with the facts. She devotes a chapter, full of interesting but largely irrelevant detail, to the distinction of this reasoned monism from mysticism in its varied forms. In her concluding pages she re-states and re-emphasizes the main features of her conception of the "infinite Spirit" or "Self" which "*is* all relations and all terms and is more than the sum of all terms and relations" (p. 210). This doctrine, she insists, though it meets the realist's dilemma by providing a distinction between true and false, does not rob a single fact of "its own peculiar and relative reality"

(p. 305). "Existence remains as full-blooded and gorgeously colored, as variegated and multitudinous, as everlastingly . . . surprising" as ever (p. 309). The "multiplicity and change" which realism finds in the universe, monism also finds (p. 306); but it argues (p. 306 f.) that there cannot be "multiplicity without something that multiplies itself, or change without something that persists throughout change." Finally, this doctrine of "one infinite Spirit" conceives a plurality of finite selves "held together by one Real Self . . . without loss to the integrity of one finite item of the finite complex, without rupture to the unity of the one Self" (p. 338). The psychological possibility that "the selfhood of the finite selves" can be maintained "in and through their fusion with the infinite Self" is shown, Miss Sinclair believes, in certain "forms of dream-consciousness" (pp. 335 ff.).

The readers of this notice will already have realized that the writer of it closely agrees with Miss Sinclair in her essential position and cordially respects the strength and the skill of her argument. This agreement and respect do not however blind the reviewer to certain defects in the book. Some of these are purely formal: the staccato movement of the paragraphs, the wearisome vivacity of style and phraseology, and the unaccountable lack of an index. Other criticisms concern Miss Sinclair's choice and neglect of authorities. When she says simply that where she has "touched on General Psychology" she has "invariably followed Mr. McDougall as the best available authority," the sincerest admirer of Mr. McDougall may be pardoned not only for smiling a little at her insularity but for remembering that she need not have left the sanctuary of British psychology to consult also Stout and (more to her special advantage) Ward. When she disavows (p. 202 *et al.*) Bradley's argument to the Absolute from the impossibility of the infinite regress, one wishes that she had cited the Supplementary Essay of Royce's "The World and the Individual," First Series. And one wishes even more eagerly that her brilliant (though rather mystical) speculation (p. 338) on the whirl of appearances into reality by an increase in "the pace of the rhythm of time" had been strengthened and perhaps sobered by a study of Royce's conception of the differing time-spans, as distinguishing selves of different orders.¹ The mention of Bradley suggests also the comment that Miss Sinclair might have made the distinction, necessary to idealism of the monistic type, between lesser reality and ultimate reality, without retaining Bradley's misleading "appearance" as the unvaried contrasting term to "reality."

¹ The World and the Individual, Series II, Lecture V, pp. 228 ff.

A more significant comment may be made on Miss Sinclair's superficial reference (p. 289) to the contrast between the Absolute and God. Truly, philosophy is not religion, and the object of the one is not necessarily identical with that of the other. Yet reasoned thinking may supplement personal feeling or loyalty; and nothing forbids the religious attitude toward the Absolute, conceived in Miss Sinclair's terms as Self or Spirit. A final comment has to do with Miss Sinclair's teaching about the self. As the preceding summary has shown, this is a concept basal both to Miss Sinclair's doctrine and to her method. Reality, in her view, is a Self manifested in selves; and the argument for this conclusion throughout makes appeal to every man's experience of himself. It is to be regretted, therefore, that at the outset of Chapter III, Miss Sinclair presents so needlessly confused an account of that "ultimate fact," as she later (p. 297) truly calls it, the self. For though "irreducible," the self is not therefore indescribable. And it must be added that, as Miss Sinclair proceeds, her conception of self gains definiteness and precision as that of a unifying, changing, persisting perceiver, imaginer, thinker, feeler, or willer. There is danger, however, in her reiterated assertions that the self is a "pure" self (p. 318), a self "over and above its own experience" (p. 317). Miss Sinclair may mean no more by these statements than that the self is "more than the sum of its states" (p. 297), that it is no mere impersonal "totality" of experiences, memories, feelings, and the like, regarded without reference to any self. She runs the risk, however, by the words "pure" and "beyond" and "over" of being interpreted as if she subscribed to the outlawed doctrine of soul-substance, non-conscious self. For though one cannot too emphatically assert the existence of a self that is not a mere "percept" or "feeling," one must insist with equal fervor that the only real self is a self who is conscious, a perceiving, thinking, feeling, or willing self.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

A REALISTIC UNIVERSE. An Introduction to Metaphysics. JOHN E. BOODIN. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. xxii, 412.

In a previous work, *Truth and Reality*, Professor Boodin had already described himself as a "rabid realist." Truly enough, he is a realist as tested by the one point of doctrine on which all realists agree, namely, that neither the existence nor the qualities of objects

depend upon or are constituted by their being apprehended by a mind. But beyond this point Professor Boodin's realism parts company with that of all other realists known to me. Though, like them, he describes his book as "an attempt to apply scientific method to philosophical problems," he does not employ the logico-analytic method of mathematics which, if we are to believe Mr. Bertrand Russell, is the only truly scientific method and the only salvation of philosophy. So far from atomizing the universe into ultimate simples, Professor Boodin describes the "neutral entities" of his fellow-realists as survivals of an antiquated metaphysics, and insists that things always occur in concrete empirical contexts, and that we must study them by "taking account of the whole situation." Thus, the entry of a thing into a "cognitive context," that is, its becoming an object of "interest" to a mind, makes, for him, a most important difference to the thing, which thereby acquires "significance or meaning." Clearly, Professor Boodin's realism is so little "rabid" that he will very likely be accused by his fiercer fellow-realists of having dressed up the old idealistic donkey in the skin of the neo-realistic lion.

As a matter of fact, it is not easy to discover why Professor Boodin calls his method "scientific." Is it because he talks in terms of "energy-systems" and incorporates much scientific theory in his metaphysical edifice? Or is he merely following the strange fashion which leads so many modern philosophers into aping the gestures and accents of science? Or, lastly, does he mean no more than that to be scientific is to be "empirical and critical"? At any rate, if he is right — and I believe him to be right — in regarding philosophers as "men who can think in terms of the whole," then philosophy has nothing to learn from science. For science is simply not "empirical" enough in this sense. Scientists never think in terms of the whole, nor do they ever use the whole range of experience. They work with specific concepts on selected groups of data. *A fortiori*, if Professor Boodin is right in saying that philosophy "exists in part for ennobling life" ("the function of both art and metaphysics is to idealize life"), it is not easy to see in what way the procedure of the sciences offers any model whatever for philosophy. Is it not high time that philosophers acquired the courage to preach what, anyhow, they practise, namely, that philosophy has its own method and does not need to live on the crumbs that fall from the table of science?

In addition to being scientific, Professor Boodin is also "pragmatic." Sometimes he appears to mean no more by this than

making one's intuitions and beliefs clear and consistent. If so, we are all glad enough to be pragmatists of this sort, and to welcome an old friend under a new name when we read of the "pragmatic postulate . . . that reality is what it manifests itself to be in its varying contexts." But when we read elsewhere that pragmatism requires us to judge the nature of reality "by the consequences to the realization of human purposes," and, hardly less vaguely, that "philosophies must do justice to our whole human nature; they must satisfy our emotional and volitional nature, as well as our intellectual," we feel bound to enter a *caveat* that philosophy has no business to satisfy any demands of our nature until it has first interpreted what they mean and by arduous and searching criticism given to them the form in which alone they deserve to be satisfied. Else our so-called ideals will shelter nothing but foolishness and self-will. What, I think, Professor Boodin means is that no philosophy can hope to stand which declares moral and æsthetic experience to have no foundation in the nature of things, and religion to be a mere whim and superstition. Still, when he talks of metaphysics as "idealizing," and as building "air castles for the spirit, as we build houses for the body, to keep out the blast and cold of an unfriendly and fickle cosmic weather," I feel that he comes altogether too near the dangerous doctrine of protective make-believe. He looks like running away from the problem whether the cosmic weather is "really" fickle and unfriendly; that is, whether for one who can think in terms of the whole, the universe, even with actual evil and misfortune in it, does not after all embody the eternal values. He is too fond of the phrase "taking things at their face-value," where I should have thought that the first lesson to be learned from the great thinkers whom Professor Boodin too acknowledges as his masters, is that first appearances are not to be trusted in philosophy.

Five "ultimate and generic concepts" characterize Professor Boodin's universe. They are energy, consciousness, space, time, and form. In a finely imaginative first chapter he describes these five pillars of the world of his philosophic vision with the eloquence of a prose-poem. In a strictly technical last chapter he presents the same vision in the austere severity of a learned terminology. The general impression which one carries away is of a universe of energy-systems in spatio-temporal relations. Space conditions "translation" or "free mobility." Time conditions "transformation," that is, change, growth, decay; the flux-aspect of reality, which, notwithstanding relative identity and stability, yields ever the different and the novel. Energy-systems are of different sorts and types, material,

mental, social; and some presuppose others. Energy is the "stuff character" of the universe, what gives it "being." But with the evolution of a certain type of energy-system, there is added, as (so to speak) a free gift by grace of the universe, the "light of consciousness," a neutral awareness without variety, color, or direction of its own but illuminating all else in the world which without this light would have no significance or value. What, lastly, of form? Form is the principle of direction and organization in the "world of stuff and process." "Energy moulded into form, form expressed in energy — the perfect life." Form inheres in process, and shapes it "not by production but by elimination." It is selective; it conditions survival. In our consciousness it appears as the ideals which we ever seek to realize and to find realized in the world. In these ideals we become conscious of "the law of the whole." Ought is "the consciousness of the form-character of the universe." "The untiring search of our mind for order, faulty and stumbling though it is in execution, is somehow a reflex of the world of which mind is the conscious expression." By this concept of directive form, Professor Boodin claims to "make purposive significance possible without stopping the universe," and thus to escape "between the Scylla of materialism and the Charybdis of static idealism." It must, by the way, always remain a puzzle how Professor Boodin, in a book dedicated "to my friend and teacher Josiah Royce," can write, in the manner of William James' "moral holiday" argument, of the absolute as fit only for "tired souls, who want rest above all other things." What, one wonders helplessly, was it in the life and teaching of Royce that suggested so ludicrous a travesty of his strenuous and manly thinking?

About Professor Boodin's way of fitting religion and God into his universe I am not very clear. From his emphasis on time, activity, and ideals one expects him, like James, to be a meliorist. Yet in his account of religion I seem to catch the voice of the mystic rather than the meliorist. "In our religious loyalty we feel that our ideals are concretely realized. Religion . . . adds the sense of completeness, of unification, and of conservation to our finite ideal strivings. . . . The end of life is to transcend finality, in the sense of abstract ideals with their sense of obligation, and to reach spontaneity — unity of form and content, perfect activity. . . . This living unity we worship as God."

Philosopher-wise, I seem to have used most of my space for critical growls at a few things with which I disagree, and to have said over-little of the countless good things in this book. The chapters on

the existence and knowledge of things seem to me excellent throughout. The theory that consciousness is distinct from mind, which latter is an "energy-system," is very original and ingenious, and deserves a much fuller and more technical discussion than I can give it here. The same is true of the contents of the chapters on space and time. Incidentally, I noted some striking observations on immortality, individual and social. Altogether Professor Boodin has written a book of exceptional interest and value, accurate and ample in scholarship, rich and varied in range, original in its total vision of the world. It is much to be hoped that the distractions of the war will not rob it of the audience whose attention it will generously reward.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF EDWARD EVERETT HALE. EDWARD E. HALE, JR.
2 vols. Little, Brown, & Co. 1917. Vol. I, pp. 390; Vol. II, pp. 442.
\$5.00.

This biography should have appeared at least a half-dozen years ago in order to meet the public's interest at its flood tide. Dr. Hale died in 1909, and this volume bears the date 1917. In those eight intervening years many of his associates have died, and the world has moved on, forgetfully, so that the book will not receive so wide a reading as it deserves.

The two volumes are interesting chiefly because the subject himself was an interesting personality. His life extended through a period of eighty-seven years, and the records which he left — letters, diaries, books, and magazine articles — furnished abundant material of a most readable sort for the hand of his son and biographer.

Readable as the book is, however, specially to those who knew Dr. Hale in person, it could have been made much more attractive and expository if its author had not almost wholly eliminated incidents and anecdotes. He has held, quite conventionally, to the epistolary method. But he might have interspersed, among the letters, some of the scores of interesting and illuminating anecdotes which his father's friends could have contributed, and the book would thereby have been greatly enriched. Such material does accomplish much toward the revealing of a man's character. Indeed, this was Dr. Hale's own belief. On page 57 of Volume II he is quoted as saying that a good way to write a biography would be for a hundred friends to write one incident, each, of the man. This method the son did not approve; and the result is that the book

leaves in shadow a considerable segment of Dr. Hale's circle of life. Perhaps the author-son held, all too consistently, to the purpose which he sets forth in his preface. "To try to criticise and estimate him has seemed no proper part of my work," he declares. That is an unfortunate and unfruitful position for a biographer to take. The result of it is that the book seriously lacks warmth and color. There is never a line of enthusiasm for the eminent and brilliant father. All the adjectives and adverbs of description from cover to cover are in the positive degree, never a superlative. Perhaps a great man is great neither to his valet nor his son. Whatever the explanation of the neutral tints which characterize the book, the disappointing fact is that this biography falls short of the adequate exposition of a great American's mind and heart, much as the uncouth bronze effigy in the Public Garden in Boston falls short of expressing his physical appearance.

The many-sidedness of Dr. Hale's nature was one of his most marked characteristics. This fact was brought out at a Browning meeting in Boston several years ago when the presiding officer introduced him with these words: "There are several Dr. Hales in this country. There is Dr. Hale the preacher and pastor, Dr. Hale the reformer, Dr. Hale the man of letters, Dr. Hale the philanthropist, Dr. Hale the historian, and others. Today I have the honor of introducing to you Dr. Hale the Browning scholar." This many-sidedness was sometimes adduced against Dr. Hale as evidence of his superficiality. But such criticism was itself superficial. Dr. Hale's genius lay in his wonderful capacity for entering into many diverse kinds of human activity, and in several of these he took rank among the best. Everybody knows that he wrote that splendid story, *The Man Without a Country*; but not so many know, in these days of war-and-peace debates, that he saw, years ago, that some form of arbitration or judicial procedure was the natural substitute for warfare. More than this, he saw and wrote and preached that war was the thing to be attacked rather than peace advocated. For war is a definite concrete evil; whereas peace is merely the absence of that evil, with the whole world engaged in its undisturbed occupations. A subtle distinction, but grasped by Dr. Hale many years ago. When the titles of Dr. Hale's numerous books are looked over, one sees that here was a man of wide range of interest, striking originality, and tireless activity. He was far removed from the specialist type, yet his knowledge of many subjects carried him much beyond the average man of the university graduate type. It was said of him sometimes that "he scattered too much." But

that was his genius. His mind was keen and originative, and to whatever subject he applied it, it took him at once far out beyond mediocrity. In no subject did he stand absolutely at the top, but in a large number he became really eminent.

He possessed a keen dramatic sense in some directions, but lacked it in others. For example, his delivery of his sermons was individual and effective and excellent from the viewpoint of technique. He knew what he was doing and did it well. But in his stories, on the contrary, he seems to have had little technique. His fertile mind sprouted all kinds of ideas, and his one aim seemed to be to express himself with directness and simplicity, though without much regard for the reader's attitude. He once set forth, in his paper on *How to Do It*, some rules for writing. They were, "Know what you want to say, and say it; use your own daily language; leave out fine passages; choose the short word rather than the long, and the fewer words the better." These sententious instructions are quite too meagre and general to be of much practical value to the beginner. In the main he followed these rules in his own writing, but had he not been endowed richly with invention and literary skill, the world would never have given him the attention which it did give.

Similar to these rules for writing were his rules for talking. "Tell the truth; do not talk about your own affairs; confess ignorance; talk to the person who is talking to you; never underrate your interlocutor; and be short." Again it may be said that Dr. Hale followed his own rules here laid down. But the rare charm which his conversation had — and often it was monologue — was by no means due to these rules, but to his human sympathy, his unerring sense of values in construction, and his grace of intonation. His speaking, both public and private, showed a far deeper knowledge of the art of vocal expression than his few meagre rules gave hint of. Moreover, he developed a unique personal style. And that is the legitimate aim of every artist, whatever his form of art. Those persons who were fortunate enough to hear him read that incomparable sequence of drollery, his story, *My Double and How he Undid Me*, may have been deceived into thinking that it was all as simple and easy as it sounded. But it was really comedy of a high order.

The writer, and probably many other admirers of Dr. Hale, was struck often by the contrast between his sadness of countenance and his unfailing fountain of humor. He looked like a veritable "man of sorrows," but he roused happy smiles and laughter wherever

he went. The same contrast was exemplified in the case of Abraham Lincoln. In truth both those great men felt deeply the burden of the world's woe, and the counteracting saving force in their lives was their keen sense of humor. Yet in both of them the humor was not a thing apart from life but was an expression of some deep insight into human problems, and often was suggestive of their solution.

In these days, when definitions of the word "citizenship" are being made and unmade, it is good to touch anew the life of this eminent and loyal citizen. He was radical in many ways, but politically he often showed himself unexpectedly conservative. Always, however, in reforms or statesmanship or in his own chosen profession, he was constructive, stimulating, and inclined to the spirit rather than the letter. In brief, it may be said of him by one who knew and admired him, and it will be re-affirmed by thousands of similar persons, that he accepted his great gift of leadership as a real stewardship, and gave himself, in season and out of season, in public and in private, to the service of his fellow-men. In the words of Tennyson, when speaking of that other knightly soul, King Arthur, "He had power on this dark world to lighten it, and power on this dead world to make it live."

BRADLEY GILMAN.

PALO ALTO, CAL.

THE HEART OF THE PURITAN. Selections from Letters and Journals. ELIZABETH D. HANSCOM. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. xiv, 281. \$1.50.

Lord Rosebery said, "The Puritan was a practical mystic, the most formidable and terrible of all combinations"; and Macaulay rounded out the portrait: "The Puritan prostrated himself in the dust before his Maker, but he set his foot upon the neck of his king. The intensity of his feelings on one subject made him tranquil on every other. Death had lost its terrors and pleasure its charms."

While this is true of the great moments of the Puritan's life, there were with him, as with all of us, many moments of less importance, in which this Samson would be like any other man. Professor Hanscom believes the heart can be distinctly felt throbbing in him; and she has brought together here, from a century and a half of New England history, selections from letters and journals which cast a flood of light upon the ordinary life of our Puritan forefathers — their dress, the furniture of their homes, their educational methods, trade, courtship, travel, amusements — for they had them — private

meditations, and public duty. A nobler instance of the last it would be hard to find than the public apology made by Samuel Sewall, who had been judge in the witchcraft trials at Salem, and who, four years afterwards, became convinced of the awful mistake that had been committed, and humbled himself in the meeting-house before God and the congregation (p. 247). The flirtation of "the young Gentlewoman of incomparable Accomplishments," whom Dr. Cotton Mather did not marry (p. 64 ff.), shows that hearts were designing and susceptible then as now.

Professor Hanscom has chosen her snap-shots well, and has appropriately prefaced them with a frontispiece taken from St. Gaudens' superb statue of Deacon Chapin as the ideal Puritan. The book should help to a better understanding of the Puritans and their history.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XII

APRIL, 1919

NUMBER 2

MULTIPLICITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER¹

J. LOEWENBERG

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

It is generally assumed that in fighting Germany we were fighting a specific doctrine of life. Many crusaders are now in search of the doctrine which has brought on this iniquitous war. To hunt down the German philosophy has become a favorite indoor sport. But what is the result? The result threatens to blur all distinctions. The adjective "German" now connotes everything and denotes nothing. If, for instance, the national *differentia* of both German philosophy and German politics be Egotism, as has been maintained, many doctrines having their origins outside the boundaries of Germany would have to be defined as "German." Again, if Germany's national trait be "Absolutism" in logic and morals (and this too has been seriously held), what shall we do with Belgium? Shall we call her German because in defiance of all consequences she remained *absolutely* true to her duty? Not Germany but Belgium is the nation that acted in conformity with Kant's Categorical Imperative. If it is true that America's national philosophy is pragmatism, then the "masters" of Germany are entitled to American citizenship. It is

¹ An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 22, 1918.

Germany who has rejected absolute standards of right and wrong, or truth and error. Her official documents, are they not essays in applied pragmatism? In them we shall find exemplified the pragmatic notions of truth and goodness. Only in a world in which truth is fluent and changing can yesterday's sacred pledge become today's "scrap of paper." And who knows whether today's treaty of peace will not become *spurlos versenkt* tomorrow! It would take but little mental agility to link the crimes of Germany not only with pragmatism but with any and every philosophy.

The truth is that philosophies are not essentially national, nor are nations essentially philosophical. Philosophic attitudes are general. They can be correlated with national tendencies in but a very superficial and arbitrary way. Idealism, for instance, is an attitude which finds voice among all nations, in all ages. The same holds of materialism, realism, empiricism, rationalism, mysticism, and all the other definable views. To establish a definite one-to-one correspondence between nations and philosophic systems is to mutilate the facts of history. Nations as well as philosophic doctrines grow and change, acting and reacting upon one another. A system of ideas which may be said to predominate in a nation at one period is at another eschewed by it. The ruling philosophy of one people soon gains mastery over another. The fortunes of Platonism come here to mind. A more recent instance is the pilgrimage of Hegel's philosophy. The type of idealism to which Hegel gave expression became the dominant philosophy in England and America not long after its collapse in Germany. And the intimate relation between pragmatism and the Greek Sophists is another instructive example. Shall we, in the manner of the Germans, speak of *unser* Protagoras, or shall we count Mr. John Dewey among the Greeks?

I am intentionally indulging in these vagaries to show how slippery is the field of *Rassenlehre* and *National-Kultur*. It comes perilously near being the home of the sophist and the partisan. Unrestrained imagination masquerading as "science," what can it not prove? There is no "race" or "nation" which could not be selected as the protagonist of all nobility or all baseness. Houston Stewart Chamberlain's book (*Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*) should serve as a terrible example. As Josiah Royce remarks: "When men marshal all the resources of their science to prove that their own race-prejudices are infallible, I can feel no confidence in what they imagine to be the result of Science."² We also agree with him that "no race of men . . . can lay claim to a fixed and hereditary type of mental life such as we can now know with exactness to be unchangeable."³ There is nothing in the inherent nature of one race or nation which makes it immune from the vices or the crimes of another. In our eagerness to be different from the Germans we are in danger of becoming like them in emulating the superficial and capricious methods of their race-theorists. Let us leave it to them to inoculate philosophy with a racial or national "culture."

The issues of philosophy are too grave for facile theories. So are the issues of the war. The war is a struggle of general ideas of which there are exponents in every nation and some of which come to predominate now in this, now in that country. Racial and national conflicts themselves may be interpreted in terms of a deeper opposition. There are after all but a few fundamental problems, towards which there are but a limited number of ultimate attitudes. One such problem, of which the war of nations is only one instance, is the problem of multiplicity. And this problem is as general as it is

² Race Questions and Other American Problems. New York. 1908. P. 9.

³ Ibid. P. 47.

fundamental. It is everywhere forced upon us. We have but to open our eyes to see it reflected in a thousand shapes. Nature with its manifoldness exhibits it; the inner life with its diversity of moods, passions, and motives discloses it; the social order with its variety of institutions, forces, laws, interests, and claims bares it; the world with its many lands, races, nations, states, cultures, and creeds displays it. The world is everywhere multiple and diverse. This is the universal situation. And it is this situation which creates our significant problems, practical as well as theoretical. The problem of individual ethics is the problem of choice. In a world in which there is possible but one course of action, no moral perplexity can exist. There is a problem of social morality because there are many of us. Were there but one individual, no social questions would arise. And in a world made up of one nation only, there would be no international disputes. The problems of science have meaning because many and various and complex phenomena call for interpretation. Without a multiplicity and diversity of facts to reduce to law and order, science itself would evaporate. And philosophy — what is it but an effort to reconstruct the meaning of a world in which many antitheses and contradictions seem to prevail? The work of philosophy consists in formulating the many problems of life and of reality and in appraising the validity of opposed solutions.

Thus fundamental and universal is the problem of multiplicity. It is a problem of experience as well as one of reflection. It enters every domain of life and of reality. Were multiplicity to vanish, nothing would remain. Without its aid no problem could be articulated. It is important, therefore, to sketch the attitudes which may be assumed towards the world so essentially multiple. And in terms of these attitudes, which I wish to describe in a fashion deliberately unconventional and untechnical,

the problems of the Social Order will appear in a new light.

One attitude towards the fact of multiplicity may be called the collectionistic. As the word implies, it consists in viewing the world as a collection. The world is made up of a number of things, distinct and often antagonistic in their nature. They just happen to be together. Heterogeneous and incongruous in essence, such a world resists our efforts to unify and harmonize its colliding parts. All the tragedies of life as well as its comedies have their source in a universe whose constituent elements or forces are, in the words of William James, "multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed." Warfare in such a world is not only natural but inevitable. Collision is the order of the day. The inner life with its antagonistic instincts, passions, and purposes, illustrates it. Nature everywhere is a struggle of contending creatures. Life is a play of hostile forces in which the equilibrium is frequently upset. It is absurd to look for stability and fixity in a world so essentially heterogeneous. Anything may happen in a pluralistic universe. Chance often shapes the course of man's life. A petty incident may decide the fate of nations. This will affect different temperaments differently. To Thomas Hardy, to take a literary instance, the world because of its incongruities is essentially tragic. Life is subject to the irrational collision of circumstances. No man can control the convergence of facts that may bring about his ruin. But life's collisions, so intensely tragic to Hardy, are for George Meredith, as well as for Anatole France, a source of intellectual delight, zest for the "Comic Spirit." But whether tragic or comic, collectionism is a universal view, of which philosophy and literature contain various expressions.

Another and a quite different attitude is the mystic's. The mystic admits that to our unscrutinized experience

the world presents itself as a collection of heterogeneous and incongruous parts. But he questions the verdict of uncritical experience. How do we know that our universe is pluralistic? No doubt our sensory and reflective knowledge so avers. We look, and what we see are diversities; we reflect, and what we achieve are complexities. But our eyes may be blind, our reason dull. Not the universe but our vision of it may be distorted. That reality is other than our ordinary experience of it has always been the mystic's contention.

"I found Him not in world or sun
Or eagle's wing or insect's eye,
Nor through the questions men may try,
The petty cobwebs we have spun."

To an experience trained to eschew the ways of sense and of reflection, which are both deceptive, reality is revealed in its true light. It stands forth as a transcendent unity, one and whole, uncompounded and indivisible. Deeper than discord is unity, deeper than difference is identity, deeper than contrast is uniformity. Multiplicity is appearance. So reports the mystic. His argument does not here concern us. But his faith will be seen to have a bearing far from innocuous upon the social questions of the day.

Thus antithetical are the two views of multiplicity. For collectionism the real nature of the world is heterogeneity, for mysticism it is homogeneity. A third view is exhibited by romanticism. Restricted to the problem of multiplicity, romanticism seems a compound of collectionism and mysticism. At its root is a double evaluation of all things. To the romanticist everything is at once grotesque and symbolic. Everything is hideous, but everything is also a source of mysterious beauty. The worth of things resides not in their intrinsic reality but in their power to suggest hidden meanings and mystic splendors. The romanticist gazes upon the world through

disparate eyes. He at once recoils from it and clings to it. He rejects the world as an independent order, having a dignity and stability of its own, but he passionately loves it as a symbolic expression of his longing and desire. "The everlasting universe of things," so Shelley in *Mont Blanc* expresses the romantic view of multiplicity,

"The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,
Now dark, now glittering, now reflecting gloom,
Now lending splendor. . . ."

This quotation is typical. All things are now dark, now glittering. Between these two extremes the romanticists constantly fluctuate. Theirs is a "double vision" of life. To Byron, in *Manfred*, the world is

"A wandering mass of shapeless flame,
A pathless comet, and a curse,
The menace of the universe;
Still rolling on with innate force,
Without a sphere, without a course,
A bright deformity on high,
The monster of the upper sky."

And yet how beautiful is the same world in another mood! "Beautiful," cries Manfred,

"How beautiful is all this visible world!
How glorious in its action and in itself!"

In this double evaluation of the world, voiced by every romantic poet, we have the key to all romanticism. From it may be derived almost all the romantic conceptions of life and of art.⁴ But of this nothing can here be said. Our concern is with the connection between the problems of the Social Order and the romanticists' "double vision." This connection we shall soon note.

Yet a fourth attitude towards multiplicity remains to be suggested. It is the classic attitude. For classicism

⁴ Cf. the writer's *Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato*, in *The Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1917. Vol. X, No. 3, pp. 215-236.

multiplicities are crude material to be fashioned into significant wholes. Discord is inevitable where there is no controlling purpose. Chaos reigns without significant organization. But the world of things is plastic. It can be moulded. Confusion may be made to submit to order. This is seen in art and in science, where inchoate masses are cozened into form and law. To bring multiplicities under form and law — this is the ideal which dominates classicism. This is the essence of classic life and art. Multiplicities and diversities seemingly opaque and stubborn yield to the genius of organization and become transformed into harmonious structures, such as works of art, well-ordered souls, well-regulated cities and States. And in such orderly structures the constituent parts do not lose their unique character. On the contrary, the whole presupposes for its very unity and harmony a variety and complexity of parts. This distinguishes classic from mystic unity. The former is compounded of multiplicity, the latter is conceived in opposition to it. Without distinct and various parts, but ordered and controlled by a central purpose or principle, there can be no whole, as classicism views it. This is exemplified in Plato's well-ordered State, as well as in Greek tragedy or sculpture. The essence of personality, as taught by both Plato and Aristotle, consists in such organic union. And, despite the mystic and romantic tendencies in Plato, the Greek's universe is a cosmos. "Philosophers tell us," says Plato in the *Gorgias*, "that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and the universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule." In the classic notion of a whole composed of various yet interdependent parts, equality and difference are singularly combined. The different parts are equally constitutive of the whole. Equality does not mean mystic homogeneity, nor is

difference the same as incongruity. Save for the equal coöperation of the different parts there would be no whole; and the parts achieve individuality and significance only by thus being coöperating members. Plato's *Republic* may again be cited as instance. But it is the structure of the whole Greek view of life, at the root of which is the notion of organic unity. The harmonious adjustment everywhere of whole and part, of unity and plurality, of equality and diversity — this is classicism.

So much for a general sketch of four possible attitudes towards multiplicity, in terms of which many types of plurality may be interpreted. The inner life of man, for instance, may be viewed as a manifold of incongruous elements, as "a heap or collection" — so Hume expressed it — "of different perceptions"; or it may be identified with a solitary uncompounded and unchanging soul, substance, spirit, monad, or self; or it may be severed, as in Goethe's *Faust* and Byron's *Manfred* and Victor Hugo's *Mahomet* and certain religious and ethical doctrines, into two discordant lives — a higher and a lower, a nobler and a baser; or it may be fashioned and woven into an ordered, balanced, and harmonious personality.

And the State, in its legal or political sense, may it not be considered in the light of these distinctions? "Deeply convinced," says Maitland in his introduction to *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, by Otto Gierke, "deeply convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are the only 'real' and 'natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which places State and Man upon one level."⁵ The history of Political Theory might well be conceived as a struggle of our four ways of viewing multiplicity. Is the State a compound of single units — "a sum of presently existing individuals bound together by the operation of their own wills"⁶ — a collection of "contract-bound men"? Is the State

⁵ *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. P. xi.

⁶ *Ibid.* P. xxiii.

an independent spirit, a sort of mystic entity, a transcendent unity, and therefore beyond good and evil? Is the State a "juristic" person, a *persona ficta*, but as such possessing "symbolic" and not "real" personality? Or is the State a group-person, with a group-will, acting as a living organism? And since "it wills and acts by the men who are its organs, as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth, and hand,"⁷ must we not attribute to it genuine personality that is subject to moral evaluation?

In these questions are bound up the momentous issues of the day. Legal and political ideas of supreme significance for the peace of the world are here forced into opposition. Is the State logically prior to Law, or is Law logically prior to the State? Is the will of the State ultimate, or is there an authority, legal or moral, which ranks superior to the will of the State? Is or is not the State capable of criminal acts? These questions cannot be answered without determining the character and the reality of the State. As a mere collection of detached individuals it is irresponsible; as a mystic being, existing as a sort of Platonic Idea, the State transcends the moral judgments which bind human individuals; as a "fictitious" or "symbolic" or "hieroglyphic" personality which is and is not an individual, the State again eludes responsibility. Truly romantic is this "double evaluation" of the group. As *persona ficta* the State has all the privileges with none of the responsibilities of a person. But if the State is neither a collective name, nor a transcendent Idea, nor a fiction or symbol, but a person in the ethical sense, or an organized individuality, as Plato conceived his Republic, then the State can sin as do individuals, and is subject to the same moral restrictions as are its individual members. "That ancient saying," remarks Maitland, "... which bids the body politic fear no pains in another world represents profound beliefs.

⁷ Political Theories of the Middle Age. P. xxvi.

Notwithstanding all that we may say of 'national sins' and 'the national conscience' and the like, a tacit inference is drawn from immunity (real or supposed) to impeccability, and, until they are convinced that . . . States can sin, many people will refuse to admit that a State is a thoroughly real Person with a real will."⁸ The culpability or non-culpability of the State — the burning question with regard to Germany's invasion of Belgium — stands or falls with the philosophical definition of its reality. We are here face to face with a profound issue, significant alike for metaphysics and legal and political theory. It is perhaps the most central issue of the war. Collectionism, mysticism, romanticism, and classicism in political theory have been engaged in combat. Which theory will win? The moral view of the State, the view that places State and Man upon the same level, will be in the ascendant if Germany is forced to repudiate and to reverse her official judgment that "necessity knows no law." Only then will the State emerge as an ethical individuality in Plato's sense, and in the sense of recent writers, such as Gierke and Maitland. Only on the theory that the State is an ethical "group-person" can legal and moral restrictions be placed upon it. Legal and moral responsibility of the State is thus bound up with the definition of its real nature.

To discuss the problem of the State in detail would require more learning than I possess in political or legal theory. It is here mentioned merely to suggest that the issues which centre around the State would gain in coherence and philosophic significance could they be viewed in connection with the more general problem of multiplicity. The problem of the State is essentially a problem in multiplicity. And the four attitudes towards it have their legal and political expressions.

⁸ Political Theories of the Middle Age. P. xl.

But let us pass to the vexing question of nationalism, now so much in the foreground of the world's attention, and see whether our four attitudes are applicable to it. What is nationalism? No word is today more vague and yet more potent. For things that are "national" men lay down their lives. Men die that the "nation" shall not perish. For the sake of "national" honor and "national" existence individuals repudiate their own honor and waste their own existence. In some hearts national feeling burns with a religious glow. Our age has witnessed an outburst of national emotions comparable in intensity and depth with that of the religious passions of the past. The psychologist and the historian and the economist tell us *how* all this came about. The rise and the growth of national consciousness can undoubtedly be "explained." We know that there are causes, of an economic, historical, and psychological nature. But "causes" merely confront us with the same fact in new forms. A cause of a fact is the same fact connected with another fact. It is not the explanation but the meaning of the fact we wish to grasp. What meaning, what significance, what value has nationalism? Here we face a question which admits of a variety of answers. And no light matter is here at stake. Nothing less than war or peace, anarchy or civilization, may result from the answer which men give, in terms of conviction or of action, to the question of nationalism.

I make no pretence to understand the meaning of nationalism. I am only interested in some of its logical implications. A nation immediately presents itself to our minds as a certain unity in plurality. One national spirit is supposed to bind together a multiplicity and diversity of individuals. Men and women sundered from one another by almost impassable gaps constitute a single nation. Unlike in physical and mental characteristics, unlike in personal heredity and training, unlike in

religious belief and practice, unlike in moral and intellectual ideals, unlike in purpose and in thought, yet they all possess a common nationality. Different and heterogeneous in every other respect, in nationality they are identical and homogeneous. Here indeed is the ancient problem of the One and the Many with a vengeance! And let it not be said that this is mere dialectical jargon, "vicious intellectualism," a Socratic puzzle of universal and particular, of identity and difference. Social and practical consequences of grave importance lie concealed in this puzzle. One rule of life accrues from emphasizing the individual differences of men and women, and quite another results from insisting upon their national similarities.

There are some who hold that what differentiates men is deeper than what unites them. The world is a world of individuals. And individuals are qualitatively distinct. Individuals *qua* individuals are incommensurable. To give them group-marks, to tag them with national labels, is to blot out their individual distinction. There is among men a natural and inevitable distance. To emphasize what they have in common is to do violence to their inner nature. There are many forms of this type of individualism, of which Nietzsche's is perhaps the most familiar. "The individual," says Nietzsche, "is something quite new, and capable of creating new things. He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valuation of his actions in himself, because he has to give an individual meaning even to traditional words and notions."⁹ This is a typical expression. Individuality is uniqueness. Individuality is difference. The "pathos of distance" is a universal fact. No likeness of language or of other social habits and activities can obliterate it. National values, forming as they do

⁹ The Will to Power; trans. by Anthony M. Ludovici. 1900. P. 215.

the basis of a collective life and thus being inimical to individual ideals, would seem to belong to those values that demand revaluation. Zarathustra thus voices his contempt for the State: "The State, I call it, where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the bad; the State, where all lose themselves, the good and the bad; the State, where the slow suicide of all is called 'life.'" ¹⁰ "And whither shall I now ascend with my longing," asks Zarathustra. "From all mountains do I look out for fatherlands and motherlands. But a home have I found nowhere; unsettled am I in all cities, and decamping at all gates. Alien to me, and a mockery are the present-day men . . . , and exiled am I from fatherlands and motherlands. Thus do I love only my children's land, the undiscovered in the remotest sea; for it do I bid my sails search and search." ¹¹ The individualist is homeless. National values are social values, and as such to be surpassed. "Mankind! . . ." cries Nietzsche in a well-known passage entitled *We Homeless Ones*, "no, we do not love mankind! On the other hand, however, we are not nearly 'German' enough . . . to advocate nationalism and race-hatred. . . . We prefer much rather to live on mountains, apart and 'out of season,' in past or coming centuries. . . . We homeless ones are too diverse and mixed in race and descent as 'modern men.' . . . We are, in a word — and it shall be our word of honor! — good Europeans." ¹² Thus wrote the man alleged by some to be responsible for the German war! "This artificial nationalism," writes Nietzsche in another place, "is . . . dangerous . . . for it is essentially an unnatural condition. . . . It is first of all the interests of certain princely dynasties, and then of certain commercial and social classes, which impel to this nationalism; once we

¹⁰ Thus Spake Zarathustra; trans. by Thomas Common. I, XI.

¹¹ Ibid. II, XXXVI.

¹² Joyful Wisdom; trans. by Thomas Common. Sec. 377.

have recognized this fact, we should just fearlessly style ourselves good Europeans.”¹³ In a world that is a collection of diverse and mixed and heterogeneous individuals there can be no room for racial or national *units*. Artificial for Nietzsche are all racial and national boundaries. Nothing is final or unchanging in a fluent and pluralistic world. Not national but individual types contend for mastery in his collectionistic universe. In Nietzsche — the collectionistic individualist *par excellence* — we have thus a negation of nationalism. The great exemplars of mankind are human and not national or racial representatives. They owe allegiance to no particular fatherland or motherland. The ultimate abolition of national frontiers seems a natural consequence of Nietzsche’s doctrine. The Superman — the goal of all life — would be endowed with human or superhuman traits peculiar to no single race or nation.¹⁴

Extremes often meet. A view which in every respect is the very antithesis of Nietzsche’s shares his anti-nationalism. It is represented by many Socialists today. “A radical clergyman in New York City,” so Mr. John Spargo relates in his article on *Socialism and Internationalism*, “obsessed after the manner of his profession by a passion for symbolism, places all the flags of civilized nations in an iron pot over a fire and ‘melts’ them. He then pretends to draw from the pot a red flag, symbolic of international Socialism, and unfurls it to the breeze amid the cheers and plaudits of the hypnotized followers. This much-exploited ceremonial was intended to symbolize the passing of nations, and their replacement by a world-organization undisturbed by the lingual and cultural distinctions which divide the world into na-

¹³ Human, All Too Human; trans. by Helen Zimmern. Sec. 475.

¹⁴ On Nietzsche’s anti-nationalism, consult Nietzsche the Thinker, by William M. Salter, New York, 1917; Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany, by Herbert Leslie Stewart, London, 1915; and the article on Nietzsche by Havelock Ellis in Vol. IX of *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Ed. by J. Hastings.

tional groups.”¹⁵ Thus the “plebeian herd” vie with the “masters of the world” in renouncing national allegiance. It is rather ironical that Nietzsche’s Herren and Sklaven should share at least one ideal. Zarathustra is homeless. And Nietzsche himself prefers to be identified with those that are *heimatlos*. Now Marx in his *Communist Manifesto* long ago declared, “*Die Arbeiter haben kein Vaterland.*” But how different are the motives of the “herd” from those of the “masters”! Nietzsche’s anti-nationalism is the expression of a collectionistic view of the world. Inequality, diversity, heterogeneity are of its very core. Change is the essence of life, militant individualism its moral law. Only thus can arise new and more powerful exemplars of mankind. A militant mysticism, on the other hand, seems to lie at the root of anti-national socialism. Its aim is equality. Its ideal is homogeneity. Its purpose is uniformity. “Marx argued with force,” to quote Mr. Spargo once more, “that the development of international industry and commerce tends ever to bring about identity of industrial processes and consequently ‘uniformity in modes of life.’ This, he prophesied, would lead inevitably to the disappearance of national peculiarities and contrasts, of national feeling and patriotism.” Just as the philosophic and religious mystic aims to reduce our pluralistic universe to an identity of substance, to a unity undisturbed by difference or distinction, to a uniformity untroubled by competing and changing elements, so the industrial mystic, if I may so call the revolutionary socialist, seeks after a social substance that is identical, homogeneous, and uniform. From such a social substance all distinction of rank and caste must be eliminated, all discrimination of classes removed, the contrast of capital and labor abolished. All inequalities — political, economic, social, religious, racial, national — must be

¹⁵ *Atlantic Monthly* for September, 1917. Pp. 300-312.

forever eradicated. Far deeper than the multiplicity, diversity, and variety of human types and classes and groups is human solidarity. Human solidarity — this is the passionate ideal which dominates the “class-conscious” worker. But it is an ideal whose fulfilment depends upon the extinction of the other classes. Relentless class-struggle is therefore an inevitable condition.

“C’est la lutte finale!
Marchons tous, et demain
L’Internationale
Sera le genre humain!”

The class-war has the significance of a holy war. It is viewed as a struggle between Humanity and its enemies. But *one* class truly represents “the people.” Not until the men and the groups that are not “the people” are crushed, not until the levelling of classes is accomplished, will peace reign on earth. Class differences are inimical to human solidarity and must be ruthlessly abolished. And here we see once more the analogy between the proletarian and the philosophic mystic, not only in the result but in the method of obtaining it. The speculative mystic institutes a reign of terror in his inner life. To his goal leads a “negative way.” Before the One Reality can become revealed to the unique and luminous vision of the mystic, the cognitive impediments of sense and of reason must first be removed. There can be no peace with one or the other dominating. Sense and reason which corrupt and debase reality must be pitilessly extirpated. But this reign of terror will be followed by the peace that passeth understanding. All strife will give way to perfect stillness and harmony. Nirvana will open its portals. All will be well. And so with the proletarian mystic. The One Social Substance cannot be compounded of its present elements. The ideal of human solidarity requires a purgative process. The

regeneration of society demands its complete revolution. No compromise with the enemy! Capitalism must be exterminated. The bourgeoisie must be abolished. "Vested interests" and the parties and the factions and the policies representing them must be uprooted. But all this is the "negative way" of the Proletarian Revolution. All this is preliminary to the final stage of social perfection, of universal *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. Thus, through a *via negativa*, shall we enter the social Nirvana. And no flippancy is intended in noting the analogy between the function of the mystic syllable *Om* and that of the guillotine of the Social Revolution. They both serve to suppress the revolt of sense and of reason.

The two types of anti-nationalism here suggested are to be interpreted as ideals in terms of which the present corrupt social order is to be reformed. They involve endless warfare. Being radical and revolutionary, they demand a complete revision of the established values, and in my mind they are correlated with philosophic collectionism and mysticism. But two different views of nationalism may now be distinguished on the basis of the romantic and the classic interpretations of multiplicity. At the root of romanticism I find a double standard of values. From one point of view things are symbolic or representative of a higher order; from another they are grotesque or sordid or corrupt. The oscillation between the symbolic and the grotesque, between the superior and the inferior, I regard as the very *differentia* of romanticism. Applied to nationalism we find it exemplified when, as some one has well said, "the members of each nation believe their national civilization to be Civilization."¹⁶ Thus the exclusive nationalism of one's own country is regarded as spiritual and ennobling, that of the foreigner narrow and selfish. Difference in national

¹⁶Quoted by E. Barker in *Political Thought in England*. Home Univ. Lib. P. 22.

civilization or culture is interpreted in terms of inequality. One's own national culture is regarded as different because of its inherent superiority. There is but one true civilization, one genuine culture, and *one* nation most perfectly embodies it. This is the voice of Chauvinism. And it is Chauvinism which leads one to a double or romantic evaluation of the same national ambitions or purposes. The commercial enterprises of the foreign nation, for instance, are the adventures of "shop-keepers"; those of one's own are expressive of an ideal mission, of a deep desire to save mankind through a superior efficiency and organization. From the German point of view the British merchants are predatory exploiters; the Germans are the knights-errant of *Kultur*.

While no country is immune from this romantic nationalism or Chauvinism, while it has its prophets and poets in France and in England and in the United States, it seems to have taken root more deeply in modern Germany than in any other land. The romantic words of her ruler are now "classic": "The trident must pass into our hands" — "We are the salt of the earth" — "The German nation alone has been called upon to defend, cultivate, and develop great ideas" — "Our German nation shall be the rock of granite on which the Almighty will finish the work of civilizing the world. Then shall be fulfilled the words of the poet: 'German character shall save the world.'" ¹⁷ But these arrogant and imprudent utterances of William II are the harsh echoes of like sentiments voiced by Sybel, Giesebrecht, Treitschke, Droyesen, Häusser, and others.¹⁸ "The Prussian School of historians," says J. A. Cramb, "has written the history of Germany as the exposition of a single divine idea — the movement towards unity under

¹⁷ Quoted by J. Holland Rose in *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 166.

¹⁸ Cf. *Germany and England*, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914. Pp. 32 ff.

Prussia, not of a new empire, but of a new phase of empire.”¹⁹ But why should Germany aspire to unchallenged world-supremacy? Treitschke’s answer is a perfect expression of romantic nationalism. “What nation,” asks Treitschke, “will impose its will on the other enfeebled and decadent peoples? Will it not be Germany’s mission to ensure the peace of the world? Russia, that immense Colossus with feet of clay, will be absorbed in its domestic and economic difficulties. England, stronger in appearance than in reality, will doubtless see her colonies break loose and exhaust themselves in fruitless struggles. France, given over to internal dissensions and the strife of parties, will sink into hopeless decadence. As to Italy, she will have her work cut out to ensure a crust to her children. The future belongs to Germany, to which Austria will attach herself if she wishes to survive.”²⁰ Such is the language of Chauvinism. The day of the other nations is over. Their race is run. “Enfeebled and decadent,” they must be surpassed. It is Germany’s mission to assume control over the destinies of the world. A recent volume, *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg* (1915),²¹ contains articles by leading German scholars concerning their nation’s position as *Weltmacht*. Here we have a most unblushing exhibition of a “double standard”—the essence of romantic nationalism. Germany is depicted as standing for all that is spiritual, pure, and noble; her enemies for all that is material, gross, and selfish. I have no time for extended quotations. A few specimens must suffice. “We believe,” says no less a person than Professor Ernst Troeltsch, “that we are the people who are striving for the true and genuine progress of mankind, which does

¹⁹ Cf. Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914. P. 34.

²⁰ Germany, France, Russia, and Islam (Eng. Ed.). P. 17. (Quoted by J. Holland Rose in op. cit. P. 163.)

²¹ Translated by W. W. Whitelock, under the title *Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War* (New York, 1916), from which the quotations are taken.

violence to none and brings freedom to all";²² whereas on the side of Germany's enemies, "the whole situation is merely the exploitation of the Russian desire for war for the benefit of France's dream of revenge and England's longing for commercial world-supremacy."²³ "Englishmen will learn," asserts Professor Hermann Schumacher, "that there are higher forces in national life than cold-blooded desire for gain."²⁴ "The longing of the German people," so he continues, "is only to gain a freer field for the exercise of the powers given to them by God, for their own benefit as well as for the benefit of mankind. . . . Germany feels herself to be the protagonist of civilized mankind."²⁵ "We are not only fighting," avers Professor Otto Hintze, "for our own power and independence, . . . but for the freedom of all nations."²⁶ England, however, contends Professor Erich Marcks, "is fighting for a universality of power, which in reality is the narrowest and the most selfish which the modern world has seen."²⁷ Professor Friedrich Meinecke draws the contrast between his nation and its enemies thus: "We do not think nor act more harshly or more arbitrarily than others, but we do think more straightforwardly and more truthfully than the others. Here is a difference between our way of thinking and theirs."²⁸ "We are . . . the nation," concludes in all earnestness Professor Gustav von Schmoller, "capable of doing most for the advancement of international law and international arbitration."²⁹ But what of Belgium? The sublimest expression in modern history of national self-

²² *The Spirit of German Kultur*, in op. cit. P. 88.

²³ *Ibid.* P. 67.

²⁴ *Germany's International Economic Position*, in op. cit. P. 140.

²⁵ *Ibid.* P. 140.

²⁶ *Meaning of the War*, in op. cit. P. 622.

²⁷ *England's Policy of Force*, in op. cit. P. 317.

²⁸ *Kultur Policy of Power and Militarism*, in op. cit. P. 577.

²⁹ *The Origin and Nature of German Institutions*, in op. cit. P. 217.

sacrifice for an ideal elicits this from the pen of Professor Karl Hampe: "There is a strong touch of antique tragedy in Belgium's fate, for which the Belgians have to thank the perverted policy of their ruling classes."³⁰

From these remarkable essays enough quotations have been selected to show the essentially romantic spirit pervading modern Germany in her nationalism. The alien nations are inferior, unspiritual, sordid, corrupt, perverse, swayed by base motives, possessed by tyranny and lust, warring for ignoble aims; Germany alone is "the protagonist of civilized mankind," the symbol of spiritual perfection, striving for genuine progress, struggling for true independence and freedom, fighting for the supremacy of a superior civilization. The spread of Germanism — since Germanism is thus identified with all that is noble, good, and beautiful — becomes then a sacred duty. Violence and force are but means justified by the ideal end. For a "chosen" people there are higher duties than those imposed by law and morality. A nation elected to save the world must not be measured by the same standard to which "inferior" nations are bound. A "double standard" is inevitable. "Necessity knows no law" simply means the necessity of the superior nation or race in fulfilling its world-mission. "To Treitschke, as to Mazzini," says Mr. Ernest Barker, "'nation is mission'; but to Treitschke the mission of a nation is the extension of national culture, and — since power is the vehicle of culture — the extension of national power."³¹ From this point of view nationalism is essentially aggressive. Competition of national powers and national "missions" must in the end lead to friction. Friction leads to strife. Strife, such as the present, leads to an assault upon civilization by the very nations who claim to be its self-elected champions.

³⁰ Belgium and the Great Powers, in op. cit. P. 379.

³¹ Political Thought in England, Home Univ. Lib. P. 239.

The danger of romantic nationalism lies in the assumption that difference is inequality. Difference in national culture is interpreted as difference in kind and in value. The alien nation is different and peculiar and *therefore* on another level. Individual distinction and mental isolation from the other nation is the Chauvinist's ideal. Nietzsche's "pathos of distance" is transferred from individual persons to individual nations. In its national rather than in its individual exemplars lies, according to the Chauvinist, the goal of mankind. Civilization is identified with but one national form. It is the chosen people that has a monopoly of genuine culture. The result is a diversity of national cultures contending for mastery. Here is a new collectionism in which the antagonistic units are not individuals but nations. In a world peopled with national "souls," each conscious of its unique genius and its special mission, international rivalry and strife is a normal condition. Each nation will struggle for a dominating position. Each nation will claim a sovereign place for its superior culture. Each nation will seek to carve out its "manifest destiny." Bernhardi's *Weltmacht oder Niedergang* — world-power or ruin — would seem the only alternative for nations living in a world of competing nationalities. The history of the past with its wars and its woes is the history of national collectionism, each member more or less swayed by romantic nationalism.

The escape from national collectionism and romantic nationalism seems to lie in two opposite directions. Internationalism based upon the negation of national differences and distinctions is one alternative. The other is internationalism founded on the organization and co-ordination of national diversities. The two forms of negative internationalism already considered — that of radical individualism and that of revolutionary socialism — insisting as they do on a complete revision of the

present order, lead to endless individual or class warfare. National distinction is to be eliminated either by widening the distance between individuals or by pressing them into a uniform mould. In either case, the process is one of violence. Social pluralism inaugurates strife among individuals; social monism institutes the struggle of classes; and war remains the law of life. From this intolerable situation the ideal of organization offers itself as an escape. Disorganized groups are bound to collide as do disorganized individuals. But, like individuals, nations may be made to yield to rational organization. It is a pity that the term organization now shares with that of efficiency a certain odium. But it is absurd to condemn a principle because of the mechanical and predatory use made of it. What is needed is more rather than less organization, organization of the classic type, organization that is rational and free. An organization of free nations should do for the individual groups what a democratic and well-ordered community does for its individual members — the substitution of coöperation for aggression. The classic ideal of organization, exemplified in Plato's *Republic* but extended and applied to national units, will give rise to a new internationalism. This new internationalism will not require nations to melt, to blend, or to fuse their different characteristics. On the contrary, whatever unity or distinction, historical or psychological, national cultures may be said to possess will be preserved in a democratic society of nations. It is of the essence of democracy that difference in political, social, and religious ideas does not constitute inequality or inferiority. A whole of the classic or democratic type (I use the adjectives in this connection as synonymous) has a singular logical structure. It combines heterogeneity and equality. The heterogeneous elements of an organized whole are not mutually antagonistic, nor does their equality of action preclude difference in individual

constitution. Synthesis of diversity and unity — this is the distinguishing mark of an organization. What Kant said of an organism may be applied to any organized whole. "An organism," says Kant, "is an assemblage of active and differing parts such that each is both end and means to the whole and to every other part."

There is no time to show how Kant's definition of an organism expresses with perfect precision the classic ideal of life and of art. Nor is there time to show in detail how this ideal, applied to international organization, is at the basis of his essay on *Perpetual Peace*, in which "he proposed as the chief step towards peace a Federation of free States. They must be Republics, i.e., they must be States endowed with really representative institutions — which would rule out all forms of Bonapartism with their modern equivalent, Kaiserism. These free States would form definite compacts one with the other, thus laying the foundation for a system of International Law, binding on all, and thereby substituting the reign of right for merely national aims. Just as individuals had by degrees consented to give up something of their entire liberty so as to secure order, similarly (he urged) it ought to be possible to substitute some measure of international control for that extreme ideal of national liberty which often led to war."³² "The social relations between the various peoples of the world," observes Kant — and how accurately does his observation apply to the case of Belgium! — "in the narrower or wider circles, have now advanced everywhere so far that a violation of Right in one place of the earth is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a Cosmo-political Right of the Whole Human Race is no phantastic or overstrained mode of representing Right."³³ A state of peace, according to him, "cannot be founded or secured without

³² Summarized by J. Holland Rose in *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 179.

³³ *Perpetual Peace*; trans. by W. Hastie. Pp. 103-104.

a compact of the Nations with each other. Hence there must be a . . . Pacific Federation. . . . This Federation will not aim at the acquisition of any of the political powers of a State. . . . For States viewed in relation to each other there can be only one way . . . of emerging from [the] lawless condition which contains nothing but occasions of war. . . . Reason . . . [must] drive them to give up their savage and lawless freedom, to accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and thus to form an ever-growing State of Nations, such as would at last embrace all the Nations of the earth.”³⁴ “It was a German thinker,” remarks the English historian Rose, “who in 1795 pointed towards peace, while France headed towards wider conquests — and Bonapartism.”³⁵

The internationalism of Kant — internationalism based upon the organization or federation of different but equally free peoples — has its modern champion in the President of the United States. President Wilson has in a number of his messages to Congress voiced with eloquence and force the need of international organization. Only a few passages can here be cited. On April 2, 1917, President Wilson, speaking for our nation, declared, “A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.” In his message of December 4, 1917, he again speaks of a “partnership of nations,” which he insists must be a “partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments.” In such a partnership the different nationalities should have equal rights. This is emphasized in his letter to the Pope, August 27, 1917. Thus: “Peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments — the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful — their equal rights to freedom and security and self-government.” The same

³⁴ *Perpetual Peace*; trans. by W. Hastie. Pp. 97-100.

³⁵ *Nationality in Modern History*. New York, 1916. P. 183.

idea recurs in the message of January 8, 1918: "We wish her [Germany] only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world — the new world in which we now live — instead of a place of mastery. . . . It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak." "What is at stake now," our President reiterated on February 11, 1918, "is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice, no mere peace of shreds and patches. . . . Without that new order the world will be without peace, and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development." The similarity of these utterances with those of Kant is too obvious to require comment. Both President Wilson and Kant aim at a "perpetual peace," and both point to the same method of bringing it about. Here then is an escape from national collectionism and romantic nationalism. It lies in the creation of a "new international order," in the formation on equal terms of a "league," a "partnership," a "concert," of different democratic peoples. It is Josiah Royce's conception of the Great Community translated in terms of constructive statesmanship. And this Great Community will henceforth be the champion of our common civilization. Civilization will cease to be the monopoly of single and "chosen" nations. It will become the united effort of organized humanity, the common fruit of a Social Order that is a World-Order.

Is this a mere ideal? It is, if by ideal is meant a goal still distant to which our personal and national activities should be directed. It may be very difficult to attain. But in this sense all other modes of changing the present order are ideals and difficult to attain. Militant individualism is an ideal; the supermen who shall inherit

the earth are not yet in sight. The Nirvana of the Proletarian Revolution is an ideal; the capitalists and the bourgeois are still at large. Riotous and romantic nationalism is an ideal; there still are strong and self-conscious nations unsubdued. The ideal of a society of nations is no more than the other ideals difficult of attainment. And it commends itself because it seeks to substitute peace for the sword, coöperation for violence, civilization for barbarism.

The present struggle is to my mind a struggle of the four ideals which this Essay has endeavored to suggest. One may not connect them as I do with the general attitudes towards the problem of multiplicity. He may prefer to describe them in more conventional ways. But the ideals themselves — name them what you will — one cannot fail to recognize. Individualism, militant or pacific, has everywhere its vociferous or sullen representatives; Revolutionary Socialism is now asserting itself with grim determination; Lawless Nationalism is still undefeated. But among the Allied Peoples, now intimately united for the defense of civilization, a new ideal makes itself heard with increasing definiteness, the ideal of an organized humanity, of an international community. Which ideal will prevail? No one can foretell. But the President has spoken for our nation. We are fighting that the ideal of a new international order *shall* prevail.

THE SEMINARY OF TOMORROW

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

It may be objected to our title that it begs the most important question at issue. Who knows whether tomorrow there will be any seminary? In the stern competition that is before us no institution can hope to survive which does not prove itself indispensable. What right have we to assume that the seminary will be found in this class?

This leads to a more fundamental question still, namely, the question of the future of the church. The seminary exists to train ministers. Its future is therefore wrapped up in the future of the church that it serves. The question whether the seminary is to continue to hold its central place in our educational system is the question whether the church is to continue to hold its central place in the life of mankind. To answer this question we must take one step further and raise the question of the future of religion. Is religion in the future, as in the past, to prove itself one of the major interests of mankind, something which deserves the central place in time, in thought, in money, in personal consecration and sacrifice, which it has held in the past? If it is, then the church will continue and with the church the seminary, for the church is simply the application to the field of religion of the principles of organization which are involved in the nature of society itself.

I think we are safe in taking it for granted that whatever else we may succeed in dispensing with in the period of reconstruction after the war, it will not be religion.

In this time of crisis, as so often in the past, religion has demonstrated again its perennial vitality. We see that it is not something imposed upon man from without as a result of precept and doctrine, whether human or divine, but is rooted in the nature of man himself. Religion is the cry of the heart for some firm basis for faith in a world where all things are shaking. If there is any one thing which the war may be said to have proved, it is this.

Religion then, we may take it for granted, will last, and with religion its institutions, the church and the seminary. But will this religion still be Christianity, understanding by this word the religion of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ? In the new world which will face us after the war can we still make a case for the principles of him who has taught us to believe that God is love, that He saves by sacrifice, that His purpose is brotherhood, that the law of His Kingdom is ministry?

Whether this will be so or not will depend in no small part upon the seminary of tomorrow. It will depend upon what we who are teachers teach about the religion we call Christianity, and how we teach it.

There was a time not so many years ago when the lot of a teacher, at least in this country, was not an enviable one. In the competition of the professions he seemed to have been left behind. The great rewards went to other callings — the law, business, engineering, commerce. Teaching — and in this I include the ministry — was regarded as an easy job, something that might be turned over to the men who were not robust enough to fight their way to the front in the real battle of life. The scientist indeed, especially in the field of the physical sciences, was respected because he could do things that were practical, like inventing wireless, or devising aëroplanes and submarines. But today we are not so sure that science pure and simple is so beneficent a thing as

we had once supposed. We have learned that power alone is morally neutral, and the greater it is, the more harm it will do unless it is guided aright.

And so we are coming to a new understanding of the significance of the teacher's work. What is it that explains the gigantic power of the Germans in the war? How comes it that their people have been so united in support of a cause that seems to us so abominable? It is because of the character of the teaching which they have had. For a generation their minds have been shaped to this very end, and all the resources of university and school and church have been bent to the one task of making loyalty to the State appear the supreme virtue. It is not the armies of Germany alone that we have been fighting, but her philosophy, and it is with philosophy that the teacher has to do.

If then we are to gain the complete victory we desire, it will not be enough to have defeated the armies of Germany in the field. We must conquer her philosophy. We must show that the ideal in which we believe and for which we have been fighting is rooted more deeply in human nature, makes an appeal more profound and satisfying to human need, and offers a broader scope to human aspiration than its rival. We must not stop with *saying* that democracy is a better form of social organization than autocracy. We must show wherein and for what reason this is true.

This gives the seminary its unique opportunity. For the seminary is the teacher of teachers. In its classrooms are to be formed the ideals which must inspire the leaders of the next generation, as they go out to interpret the Christian Gospel to the men and women who must live their lives under the new conditions which are now confronting us after the war.

If we take our present system of ministerial training as a whole we find that there are two main evils from

which it suffers. The first is denominationalism, and the second, intellectualism. By denominationalism I mean the spirit which identifies Christianity with the form of religion represented in one's own communion. It must be confessed that this spirit has in the past dominated the teaching of far too many seminaries. The student is indeed reminded of the existence of other branches of the Christian church and given some information as to their history, but his teacher makes little effort to interpret their significance as they appear to those who look at them from the inside. They are presented as erroneous or, at most, inadequate forms of Christianity which it is sufficient to treat as the Levite treated the man who had fallen among thieves. We may bow to them and pass by on the other side.

By intellectualism I mean the disposition to think of Christianity primarily as a series of beliefs, or at least of practices and experiences which follow upon the acceptance of such beliefs. We have been accustomed to think of Christianity as a deposit of doctrine which has come down to us from the past, and must be transmitted to the future unchanged, rather than as a living spiritual movement which is to be judged by its effects upon the life of its adherents as a whole. In both these respects the seminary reflects the church at large. People think of a denomination as a group of men banded together to propagate a type of belief, and this conception of the function of a denomination is one of the chief reasons which explains the failure of the church to command the whole-hearted allegiance of many thoughtful men.

It is not my purpose here to criticize denominational Christianity. As good Protestants we may believe that in the providence of God each of the great historic churches has fulfilled a necessary function and is the custodian today of precious and indispensable truth. One may believe that he is the best Christian, in the

broad and catholic understanding of Christianity, who is most familiar with and who most highly values those historic forms in which the universal gospel has been brought to him in his own inner life. But such sympathetic understanding of historic Christianity is quite a different thing from denominationalism in the sense in which we are speaking about it now. By denominationalism in this sense is meant a narrow view of life, a view that is content to think of God and of Jesus Christ in those particular forms and ways of working that are nearest and most congenial to the individual Christian, and to ignore those wider activities and interests which are dear to other Christians. Denominationalism in this sense is by no means confined to conservatives. There is a narrowness of liberalism which differs little, if at all, from the narrowness of the most reactionary conservative. It is no uncommon thing to find students, and for that matter, teachers, who, having gained a new conception of the Bible as the result of modern critical studies, have henceforth little interest in or respect for men who have found their way to Christ by the older ways; men who believe that in the interest of some vague thing which they call modern thought or the scientific spirit, they can throw overboard the historic forms of the past and set up some brand new form of Christianity of their own in their place. Such an attitude is twin brother to the denominational spirit and, like it, is a foe against which we must contend in the interests of the seminary of tomorrow.

This narrow conception of the function of the teacher of religion has its roots in an intellectualistic philosophy, a philosophy which identifies religion primarily with belief. Here too I would not be misunderstood. As good Protestants we must recognize that belief has a most important part to play in religion. It makes a difference what a man thinks about God; but belief, even in this

highest of spheres, is after all not primary but secondary. God and Christ, sin and salvation, the church and the Kingdom of God, are realities which we come to know by living, that is to say, through sentiment and action and all those many-sided vital processes which we sum up together under the name of experience. And just as men differ in their theories of the State and of the school who may yet share the common life of citizens and engage together in the quest of knowledge, so there is a bond of union between Christians which persists in spite of their differing philosophies. This fact has been too little recognized in our theological teaching and has not had the formative influence which it should have in shaping our curriculum.

As a result we see a reaction against current methods of seminary instruction which takes two different forms. One is a reëmphasis upon feeling in religion. We see this in great revival movements like the Billy Sunday campaign. Here men are brought together under conditions which appeal primarily to the emotions, and the function of the teacher in religion is reduced to a minimum. The other reaction is in the direction of practice, and may be typified by the Young Men's Christian Association. In the Young Men's Christian Association, as it is functioning today in the army, we see a practical agency of the highest efficiency, bringing together men of very different antecedents and varieties of training, and combining them in various helpful practical activities of social and moral character. All this is done in the name of religion, and no one who has followed the work of the Association closely can fail to rejoice in the beneficent influence it is exerting. But when we study the type of religion which is presented in the Association-program, we find that it is often one-sided and inadequate. The church as an institution is not made prominent. The differences of conviction which divide the different Chris-

tian communions are ignored, and the appeal is made to a practical religion of fellowship and helpfulness, which, so far as it goes, is admirable, but which lacks the theoretical foundation which is necessary to a healthy and robust intellectual life.

We face, then, two alternatives, neither of which holds out large promise for the future. On the one hand, we may perpetuate the old denominational intellectualistic type of religious instruction; on the other, we may substitute a vague inarticulate Christianity of sentiment or of practical expediency, which has lost its consciousness of the historic past from which it has come. Neither of these offers us a hopeful outlook. Between the two there must be some other and better way.

We may take as our point of departure three propositions, which I think we may safely assume to have been demonstrated by the experience of the last three years. They are not new. We had already come to recognize them to a very considerable extent, but the war has brought them clearly into the foreground of consciousness. First, the religion of the future must be to a greater extent than it has been in the past a religion for the whole man, a religion, that is to say, which takes into account not simply what a man believes but what he feels and what he does. We have been learning to our surprise — shall I say, to our dismay? — how large a part sentiment plays in the determination of conduct. We are the creatures of our likes and of our dislikes. Our sense of honor and our sense of pride, our sense of loyalty and our revulsion against what we conceive to be mean, all that side of our nature which expresses itself in feelings of satisfaction or of disapproval, we now see to be a potent factor in determining what we shall do. We must apply this insight to religion. We must think of religion as man's emotional reaction to the great unseen realities by which he is surrounded, the response of his spirit to

deep-seated needs rooted in his very nature. We must not confine religion to that part of it which is precipitated in our formal creeds or expressed in our definite acts of worship. We must widen and deepen the foundation on which we build for the future.

Secondly, within this common realm of experience we note differences of type which persist. The difference between Roman Catholic and Protestant springs at once to mind. In the past we have thought of this too largely in terms of right and wrong belief. We have contrasted Protestantism with its emphasis upon Bible texts with Catholicism as the religion which has substituted for this human traditions; and there is truth in this contrast, no doubt. But we are coming to see that it is not the whole truth. In Catholic and Protestant we have to do with different types of the religious life itself. Catholic religious experience is in general of the mystical type; Protestant religious experience, of the ethical type. This is a contrast which is not confined to Christianity but is found in other religions as well, and is likely to persist as long as religion lasts because it is rooted in human nature. So within Protestantism we find other persisting types. There is the extreme individualist, who insists upon the right of the soul to direct access to God and feels the intrusion of any intermediary a disturbing factor; and there is the man of artistic temperament, to whom form and ritual and sacrament are the natural means of approach to the Divine. There is the man who emphasizes the permanent element in religion and rejoices in the stability which it brings; and there is the one who, like Professor Hocking, thinks of religion as essentially creative and values it because it is continually bringing new things to pass. We cannot expect that any one of these types will completely supersede the other. Somehow the religion of the future must make place for them all.

But, thirdly, side by side with this recognition of difference we find a great longing for unity, a feeling that somehow Christianity is a larger and more comprehensive thing than our own cross-section of it, however dear to us that may be. We find men of all schools and of all churches feeling after something better and bigger and more enduring than anything that they have known in the past, and we are sure that somehow the religion of the future must give us this.

This situation sets the seminary of tomorrow its task. We must teach Christianity and our own particular form of it to men who are living in a world like this, with longings and aspirations and desires and convictions such as these.

This does not mean that we are to surrender our own convictions. It does not mean that we are to teach an indefinite, inarticulate, formless religion. Quite the contrary. It is our function to make our religion definite, to provide the solid basis of thought that shall direct our sentiments to useful ends and cause them to issue in fruitful acts. But our thinking must be done in the light of this larger environment and with a spirit of sympathy broader and more inclusive than has characterized much of our teaching in the past.

This conviction will determine our attitude toward the other great religions which dispute the field with Christianity. As Christians it will be our first business to define what is the distinctive thing that Christianity has to offer them; but we shall think of them not as mere perversions, areas of black on a map otherwise pure white, but as ways in which the religious nature of man has been feeling its way after the truth. We shall present Christ as the answer to their needs, supplying that which they lack, correcting their defects, opening for them possibilities of new development along lines for which their own past has fitted them, as our past has

been fitting us for new experiences and development of our own.

It will affect our attitude toward the varieties of the Christian experience. We shall not try to make all men agree with us, but we shall try to carry the spirit of Christ into our own living and thinking to such an extent that we shall be able to recognize that spirit when it manifests itself in men of a different type. We shall eagerly reach across the barriers which now divide us to find some common bond of unity, and we shall find that bond where all true Christians must find it, in the person and the work and the spirit of Jesus Christ.

So in like manner of those more technical differences which divide us into schools. We shall not be less zealous to promote our own type of philosophy. We shall wish to help others to the explanation and interpretation of the Christian facts which we have found most helpful to ourselves, but we shall be careful to distinguish between the interpretation and the facts. We shall be quick to recognize that those who do not agree with our theory may yet share our experience and work with us for the great end we have in common.

In the light of such considerations we must approach the problem of the seminary curriculum. More even than it has been in the past the seminary of the future must be a training school for ministers, men, that is to say, who have given themselves to a definite task. All that we do must be shaped to this end. No study must be admitted to the curriculum, no matter how attractive it may be, that cannot be shown to have some direct bearing on the minister's task. And conversely, no study must be omitted from the curriculum, however great the tax it may make on time and energy, which can be shown to be necessary for ministerial efficiency.

Next, we must train men for a specialized ministry. If a man is going to be a minister of a particular denomina-

tion, he ought to know the conditions of successful service in that denomination. He ought to know the history of his church, its organization, its missionary activities, and whatever else goes to make up the life of the denomination as a whole. The Presbyterian must know the history of Presbyterianism, the Methodist of Methodism, the Episcopalian of his own communion, and so on. Again, the minister must be trained for the special field in which he is going to work. If he is to work in a country parish, he must have one kind of training; if his work is to be among immigrants, he will need another. If his field is a pastorate in an industrial community, or if he is specializing in religious education, or if he plans to be a foreign missionary, in each case we must see that he knows the things that are essential to success in that field.

But with all our interest in this specialized training we must be careful never to lose sight of the things we have in common. At the core of all the separate studies of the curriculum there is a body of common knowledge which every minister must possess. It is the knowledge of the Christian religion. What does it mean to be a Christian? Who and what is the God whom Christians worship? Wherein consists the Christian revelation? What shall we think of Christ, of the sin from which he came to deliver us, of the salvation he mediates, of the life to which we look forward here and hereafter? What is the church of which we are ministers, not in the narrow denominational meaning of that term, as Baptist or Presbyterian, but in its unity as the Church of Christ, of which these lesser branches are parts? What is the place which each holds in the unity of Christ's body, and how can we who minister in any one of the parts coöperate most effectively with our brothers who serve in the others? These and such as these are the questions which those of us must face who are working out the curriculum for the seminary of tomorrow.

For one thing this will mean that Systematic Theology will recover again its central place in the organism of theological study. But it will be taught in a different way. It will become the study which defines the nature of the gospel for a world that is seeking unity through variety. That old discipline that used to be called Symbolics, whose function it was to compare the creeds of the different churches, will be taken down from the shelf and revived in a new form. In the seminary of tomorrow it will be just as much the business of the Baptist to know what Presbyterians and Episcopalians—I will not say *believe*, but *value and revere*, as it will be for him to know the history and traditions of his own communion. So history will be studied not simply from the past forward, but from the present back. We shall ask ourselves what history can tell us as to the origin and significance of the chief contemporary forms of the living religion with which we have to do. And the Bible will become a new study as we think of it not simply as the record of God's revelation in the past given once for all, but as the source of a continuing inspiration through which from generation to generation Christians have renewed their contact with the divine, and in which men of different types of Christian experience have alike found food for their souls. Thus in all our study the practical purpose of gaining sympathetic understanding with our fellow Christians for the purpose of effective coöperation will be dominant, and many a subject which in the past has seemed trite and profitless because devoid of practical bearing, will come at last to its own.

So to conceive of theological education is not to lower our intellectual standards. There is in many quarters a false opposition between science and practice, as though a man knew things better the farther removed he was from the sphere of their application. This is a view for which experience affords no justification. On

the contrary, we shall find that the practical interest, if properly guided and controlled, will bear large fruit for science in research and its resulting theory.

Of the application of these principles in detail this is not the place to speak. It will, of course, be necessary to distinguish between different types of institutions to which the problem presents itself in different ways. The seminary at a distance from a great university, teaching a constituency of students most if not all of whom are going into a single church, will necessarily solve its problem differently from an institution in close affiliation with a great university, to which students of many communions come for their theological training. But in spite of these differences, the task is essentially the same, and it should be possible to work out a plan of coöperation between seminaries that will enable each group to coöperate helpfully with the others.

What has been said about the ideal of seminary instruction applies in substance to the work of the church as a whole. Protestantism has always stood for the teaching function of the minister. Its strength consists in the fact that it trusts the layman to form his own judgment in matters of religion and refuses to regard the ministry as a separate and isolated caste. But this means that Protestantism stands or falls with its ability to instruct the people at large in the meaning of the religion they profess. For this reason one of the most disturbing symptoms of the last generation has been the decline of the teaching office of the minister. It is not too much to say that in very large measure Protestantism has surrendered to Roman Catholicism that very function to which it owes its own existence. It is not the Protestant but the Catholic who is today teaching the layman the meaning of the religion which he professes. Go into the larger Catholic churches today and you will find for sale at the door little tracts which explain, in simple language

that the layman can understand, the meaning of the church and its institutions. But a man might attend many a Protestant church for years and remain as ignorant of what Protestantism means as when he first found his way to the church door. The war with its resulting revelation of our disunion has recalled us to the perils of this situation. We must see to it that in the future the laymen of our churches are better instructed. As Protestants we stand for the rights of the individual in religion. We have rejected an implicit faith; we believe that each man must stand on his own feet in the presence of God and be able to give an intelligent reason for his belief. This fundamental tenet of our Protestantism we must restore to the central place from which it has been for the time dethroned.

It will not be easy to do. Let us not deceive ourselves on this point. To build a unified church on the basis of autocracy is not hard. It has been done again and again. To build a unified church on the basis of freedom requires a degree of intelligence and discipline to which as yet few of our churches have attained. It is the same problem which faces us in religion as in democracy itself. How can we who accept the principle of free determination as the supreme law of the State succeed in uniting men of different races and ideals in a single community of free peoples? Somehow it must be done unless all our struggle and sacrifice is to be in vain. But we shall not succeed in doing it in the State unless we succeed in doing it in the church, and to show how this can be done will be the supreme office of the seminary of tomorrow.

THE CAUSES OF PRE-MILLENARIANISM

FRANCIS J. McCONNELL

DENVER, COL.

The spread of pre-millennial and kindred views — by which we mean the scriptural thousand years of peace following the more or less early return of Christ in physical manifestation — is an unmistakable fact of present-day religious thinking. Some of the causes of the pre-millennial revival are incidental and can be dismissed in a word. For example, some pre-millenarianism is the after-effect of the powerful personality of Dwight L. Moody. Mr. Moody was one of the greatest personal forces for righteousness of his time; and some of the movements which resulted from his influence — like the Student Volunteer Movement — were at their beginning considerably colored by the Moody theology. Again, as a plain matter-of-fact, pre-millenarianism has made an appeal to not a few rich men who have given their money to carefully planned propaganda. Furthermore the Great War has raised in many minds the question as to whether the world is not indeed standing at Armageddon. The writer of this article found in France in the winter of 1917-18 a considerable group of American soldiers who had been led to study the Book of Revelation for light on the question as to when the war would end — many of the soldiers, be it said, fearing that it was written down in the Sacred Book that the war would end in February, 1918, before America could have her full chance.

But there are other and more serious grounds for pre-millenarianism. It is clear that we can adequately deal

with a religious phenomenon only by learning its causes. The biblical scholar answers the pre-millennial reasonings with crushing argument, but the pre-millennial view lives on. In fact, it has been with the Church from the beginning. More can be accomplished by asking why it exists and what it aims at and what are the secrets of its power than by any number of critical demolitions. A view which has to be demolished so often becomes something of a problem in the study of theological survivals.

The most obvious reason for the tenacity of pre-millennial views is, of course, the literalistic method of interpreting the Scriptures, or of taking the thought forms of one age as binding for all ages. The fault here is very largely with Christian teachers who may not think of themselves as at all literalistic. In spite of the fact that most of the trained men in the pulpits of the Church today accept the principles and methods of scientific Bible study, many of them make no application of these principles in their preaching. The preaching is pre-eminently practical rather than theological or even biblical. The Church for centuries has taken at least a partially literal view of the Book of Revelation — especially as regards a physical second coming of Christ. The working preacher has accepted the commonplaces of scientific biblical study — the documentary hypothesis as explaining the origin of various scriptural books, the rearrangement of scriptural dates which has come with more exact historical research, the theory of the synoptic problem. But busy as he is with swarms of details in his church-work he has never tried to get at the spiritual content of the various biblical apocalyptic conceptions. The actual result is that in the mind of his people — and sometimes in his own mind — these linger along with at least a semi-literalistic suggestiveness. At the other extreme is the minister who throws himself so heartily

into eschatological study that he makes even the thought of Jesus so eschatological as to leave Jesus no message of abiding and perennial worth. Apart from the deliverances of extremists, however, the biblical eschatology — especially of Jesus — should in these days be made the subject of the study of the working preacher; not to encounter present-day pre-millenarianism with critical refutations but to discover the spiritual content at which the pre-millenarian may be half-consciously aiming. To condemn the pre-millenarian movement as the activity of literally minded fanatics gets us nowhere. The only path to successful dealing with the movement is to show that the scientific handling of the Scriptures can preserve and even make more forceful the spiritual ideals at which Scripture apocalyptic aims.

There is nothing in the most rigid orthodoxy to forbid the recognition of eschatological factors in the thought of Jesus. Any Christological theory must make provision for the truth that Jesus lived the life of his time, and used the ideas of his day to set on high his revelation. The only real question of debate is as to the extent to which Jesus spoke in eschatological terms. Very few would today go as far as Schweitzer in *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* and make the thought of Jesus eschatological and nothing else. Schweitzer—who, by the way, is not a German but an Alsatian and not a scholastic recluse but a devoted medical missionary—says himself that the only way to make a theory effective is to push it to its extreme development; and Schweitzer's work appears as if it had been carried through on this principle. The best balanced thought of today seems to incline to the view that the eschatological element in the Gospels is not at all exclusive or even determinative, but that on the other hand it is not to be cast aside as mere husk of a passing phase of Jewish thought. It contains in itself some features of lasting value.

To begin with, it is hardly fair to charge millennial views with being pessimistic. More than once the pre-millennialists' doctrine that the sooner things get hopelessly bad the sooner Christ will come, has been caricatured in the jibe, "The world is getting worse, thank the Lord!" And sometimes it does seem as if the holder of these views were willing to keep his hands off so that things might speedily get worse. But with regard to the mass of believers in the Lord's speedy coming in the flesh this is only caricature. Logically if things must get worse before they can be better, the correct attitude might be just to permit them to get worse. Practically, the pre-millennialist is a human being, quite as warm in his human contacts as the rest of us, and quite as likely to help a fellow human being in distress. One of the fiercest opponents of social service in America — an opponent because he believes that social service delays the quick consummation of evil which will make necessary our Lord's return — is himself a most successful superintendent of an organization of orphanages! But, logical inconsistency to one side, a pre-millennialist whose views are to be taken at all seriously cannot be called a pessimist. All the holders of biblical apocalyptic views have been alike in their belief in a good time coming. So great has been the practical effectiveness of this optimism that Dr. A. B. Davidson used to say that the great preachers from biblical times down to our day have been men of great expectations. Now there must be unremitting emphasis upon the futility of tying great expectations up with the details of Jewish or early church apocalyptic, but there must also be some way of holding fast the expectations. A scholar whose exegetical studies have dried up all his enthusiasms is not the best agent to counteract the fallacies in the pre-millennialist's new order just below the horizon. It will hardly suffice to lay stress on belief in the immediate, spiritual Christ as

contrasted with Christ-to-come, if the belief in the immediate Christ opens up no fountains of enthusiasm. It is an interesting fact that the non-millennialists who get along best with the most earnest pre-millenarians are those of manifestly intense religious experience. One religious leader of considerable prominence has succeeded beyond belief in winning the support of the most radical pre-millennialists, even though his avowed belief is itself radically against the belief of his friends. The secret is the leader's obviously genuine and enthusiastic devotion to the spirit of Christ.

Holders of apocalyptic views in all periods of the life of the Church have been believers in "other-worldliness." They have been profoundly dissatisfied with the earthly system of things. They have been able to see no way of remedy except by the total substitution of the present system by another through direct act of God himself. Their "other world" has not so much been a far-off heaven as a transformation of the present physical system. This view of the desperate nature of the existing system is greatly reënforced in times of widespread calamity or war. Now the advantage of the pre-millennialist comes partly out of his facing the facts of the present system. His optimism is the optimism of belief in a God mighty to deliver. There is, on the other hand, a good deal of optimism in the non-millennial camp that is hopelessly shallow. It consists just in looking the other way when the problem of evil is up. Suppose we glance at this question from the physical side. There is probably in every Christian's eschatology a belief that in the final consummation of things an ideal physical state will be the accompaniment of and setting for an ideal spiritual condition. The present physical state is far from ideal. All we can say of it is that it is capable of immense improvement but that improvement is within limits. Masses of mankind give themselves up to fatal-

ism because they feel the futility of trying to deal with the more elemental physical forces. While the improvement is being made, individuals die by the hundred thousand. The whole trend of the physical universe as we see it is toward ultimate dissolution. The doctrine of the divine immanence does not help us much if the divine is limited to the outworking of the present forces. In fact a doctrine of divine immanence which puts God in all things without giving us an adequate basis for trust in Him may make the cosmical situation more depressing. The sincere pre-millennialist has a solution for all this, no matter how crassly literalistic it may seem to us. The only way to meet the pre-millennialist is not merely to preach the vast change for the better which can be made in the present order of things but to emphasize anew the Christian conception that the Divine Force is not shut in to the workings of the present system. There is a sense in which the Church would benefit by a return to emphasis on the transcendence of God — transcendence conceived not indeed in the old sense of distance from and exaltation above earthly affairs, but transcendence thought of as existence beyond the limitations set by the forces which we see at work. As an illustration a little beside the mark, think of the new interest in and demand for belief in immortality created by the Great War. Men will not believe that this life is all, as they see the very flower of the youth of earth hurled to death by the million through devotion to a noble cause. So the non-millennialist will have to hold fast to an order above this or beyond it or here though invisible, if he is to deal with the problem with which the millennial views are trying to deal. But there is a vast difference between a view which would practically call for catastrophic annihilation of the present order and the substitution of another order, and a view which maintains that the seen does not exhaust the real, that

an enlarging grasp of reality might put the present system into its proper place as but one factor of divine activity. There can be no question that the practical ignoring of larger reaches of the divine power and wisdom and love by concentrating ourselves upon the immediate work-a-day task without much question as to anything beyond that task, makes for a revival of crude literalism in religious thinking.

The views against which we are contending, however, in their present-day forms concern themselves more with social than with physical conditions. Their pessimism is as to the power of man to achieve a worthy social result without the direct and miraculous power of the returning Christ. Here again the conventional church-attendant, and preacher, for that matter, is too easy-going in his optimism. The human mind has, if anything, wrought greater results in dealing with nature than with human nature. The race has gained a tolerable measure of control over famine and pestilence but has not yet learned to control itself. No form of social organization yet devised is certain of final success. We are indeed reaching out after world-democracy; but democracy rests not upon self-evident right of the people to rule but upon the fact that every other sort of government has failed. We turn to democracy as a last resort. But what if that fails? We raise this question just to suggest how much of a case can be made by those who are hopeless as to the present state of society. It is significant that the more radical type of socialists believe that the present social order can be improved only by a revolutionary overturning through a "general strike," or some such method. In their passionate enthusiasm for the immediate relief to come through sudden revolution the socialists have many points of similarity with the pre-millennialists: both bear witness to the deep-seated faults of the existing system, and both despair of slow-

moving processes of growth or evolution. Let us not make light of this despair. At the close of the most dreadful war in history, with some economists clamoring for our taking up the old industrial processes just where we dropped them, and some statesmen calling for a return to the old system of competitive and armed nationalism, it ought to be easy to understand the spirit which prompts the socialist to believe that the only hope is a revolution which will overthrow the system from below, or the pre-millennialist to cherish the hope that a divine intervention will overthrow the system from above.

One of the best checks to the spread of pre-millenarianism is an openness to the spirit of radical social reconstruction. The charge that the pre-millennialist is not interested in social reform is misleading. He is not interested simply because he has no faith in the methods proposed. For him the system is so bad that no agencies now at work can make substantial improvement. The author of this article is not by any means a socialist, but one does not have to be a socialist to see the very grave evils in the present system. The inequalities in the distribution of wealth alone bring the industrial order under most serious question. Now to confront the pre-millennialist who believes that the system is so evil that only God Himself can put it to rights and that by apocalyptic transformation, with the merely remedial program of many Christian leaders, is to trifle with the problem. Relief measures are good enough as mere relief, but the social order is in need of conversion. The Church must never allow herself to come to the place where she busies herself merely with schemes of social reorganization as such; but the Gospel is not fully preached until it produces the atmosphere out of which social transformation comes. To meet this situation by any sort of apology for the present order, or by reminding the people that by

gradual processes of evolution the world is getting better, is to play directly into the hands of the believers in the literal fulfilment of biblical apocalyptic. For the serious believer in such apocalyptic — and it is only the serious believer that we are considering — has at least faced the fact of the unideal nature of the present social order. The most far-reaching suggestion of social reconstruction now seriously before the attention of the world is the program of the British Labor party — a program which dares think of reconstruction in terms which embrace the whole world. It has been said that one element of strength in the British Labor party comes from the fact that the party has thrown open its larger assemblies and even its inner circles to the leaders of the churches in England. Be that as it may, there can be no gainsaying the increased power which will come to the churches of England from courageously facing the evils of the present industrial and international order and from determinedly proposing to try out thoroughgoing remedies. It is a matter for congratulation that the churches everywhere are beginning to see how deeply rooted are the faults of the world in which we live, and how heroic must be the measures of redemption. This is not to raise the cry of the alarmist. We are simply dealing with the problem of inadequate and distorted religious views; and we are trying to show that we must not allow such views to outdo us in seriousness of grasp on the world situation. Much of the so-called pessimism of apocalyptic views comes as a reaction from the smug complacency in the presence of social evils which sometimes passes as Christian optimism.

Another feature of apocalyptic views which has always made them attractive to many devout minds has been the place which they have assigned to God as the Judge of nations. The very fact that the believers in a literal fulfilment of apocalyptic prophecy say as much as they do

about God as Judge serves to keep in the forefront of religious thinking a moral and spiritual element of which we sometimes lose sight. The constant reference to law and force in abstract terms tends to make the ordinary, busy members of the Church think of the large national and international affairs as moving along in impersonal fashion. The thought of the leaders of the Church has long since clearly grasped the truth that a law is nothing in itself but a statement of method; that the God of the Scriptures can be conceived of as working in such manner that laws are but compendious descriptions of his never-ceasing deed. But the idea needs constant repetition and reënforcement. Men seldom lose their hold on the divine through sudden shock. Their faith rather wears out or oozes away because of the constant pressure of apparently impersonal and opaque facts. The very fact that the literalist says so much about God — even though he occasionally oversteps the limits of good taste in talking familiarly, not to say glibly, about the plans of God — gives him an advantage as a propagandist. He seems to be more religious than those who talk of national evils as coming naturally to judgment in their fruit. Especially is this true in a day which thinks of national and international welfare largely in utilitarian terms. The field of international ethics has never been very clearly thought through, but in that field we did not, until the outbreak of the Great War, hear much of righteousness and justice and judgment to come. The pulpit has, if anything, neglected its opportunity to emphasize and reëmphasize historical processes as subject to the judgment of a moral God. The danger of cant here is very great, but there is also the other and even greater danger of encouraging impersonalism through failure to teach that national courses are manifestations of the purposes and judgments of the Divine. The days just ahead of us ought to be

quite favorable to the preaching of God as judge of the nations without resort to biblical literalism. The Great War has been in its larger outcome terribly suggestive of the inevitability of Divine Judgment, if we do not limit the judgment merely to one nation. All nations have worked under competitive and imperialistic ambitions, which have brought all to share in greater or less degree the disastrous fruit of such ambitions. It goes without saying, of course, that in dealing with the conception of God as Judge of nations the literalism of the pre-millenarian makes his work dreadfully barren. The type of mind that can regard the present world-crisis so largely from the point of view of the return of the Jews to Palestine shows at once the inadequacies of literalism. Professor F. C. Burkitt has drawn a very interesting parallel between the judgment scene in the Book of Enoch and the judgment picture in Matthew 25. The parallelism is so exact as to suggest irresistibly the dependence of Matthew upon Enoch, and yet the difference is just such as we should inevitably attribute to Jesus. The setting — the nations of the earth assembled for judgment — is the same in both passages. The difference is that Jesus has introduced the distinctively human test as the standard of judgment. It is amazing that the humanity of the test of Jesus as reported in Matthew 25 has not given the impulse to greater spiritualization of pre-millenarian views.

In still another respect the apocalyptic literalist has a tactical advantage in his preaching. He appeals to the human craving for the dramatic in his predictions of crisis after crisis. Here again the holder of the sounder view has been placed needlessly at disadvantage. Not that he need pay overmuch attention to the instinct for the dramatic, but he should pay more heed to the significance of crisis. In the actual world events do move toward a focus, they do show crossings and recrossings;

and a cross-roads in events may be just as important historically as is an actual cross-roads geographically. Nor is this out of harmony with the modern idea of evolution. In evolution events do not always move at the same rate of speed. A long, gradual process of growth may be crowned with a quick harvest-time, which explains the growth and points toward a larger future. There is no reason why a sound doctrine of the imminence of God may not be combined with a sound doctrine of the immanence of God. The pre-millennialist reaps an advantage from his belief that something may happen soon. On the other hand, the attitude of adjustment to a slow-moving process plodding along at a uniform rate begets patience indeed, but not the alert-mindedness which holds all the powers in readiness for the quick whitening of the harvest. This alertness, after all, is the true patience. In historic processes doors open — and then close; roads cross each other — or turn corners; trees of good or evil come to sudden fruitage. Happy the minister who can keep alive this reasonable sense of expectancy! Psychologically he wields an instrument with which to ward off from his people the temptations to the theatric and spectacular in literal apocalyptic. And the advantage is more than psychological. For understanding the movement of divine revelation hardly anything is more important than the illumination which may burst forth at times of crisis. Just as crisis is profoundly instructive in individual experience, so is it in the larger life of society. We keep our intellectual balance by reminding ourselves that a crisis which is not preceded by long periods of preparation is not likely to lead to deep insight; but we keep alive our sense of expectancy by remembering that a slowly working force will sooner or later rush toward a quick revelation of its inner meaning. There is no reason why the pre-millenarian should be allowed a monopoly of the interesting in his preaching.

Finally, there is something very compelling and attractive in the apocalyptic idea of Christ as ruler. It will be remembered that Schweitzer made this view of Christ as ruler one of the essential and permanent contributions of apocalyptic to the thought of the Church. Schweitzer insists that the picture of Jesus as teacher is not true to the fact of the oldest presentation. Jesus was not contemplative but active. And yet there is not after all such a great contradiction between the view of Jesus as teacher and that of Jesus as ruler. The Church has maintained from the beginning that Jesus taught not as a formal instructor but as a leader forcing men to learn the doctrine by doing the will of God.

For the rest, the picture of Christ as working with an apocalyptic plan is not without attractiveness. If in such a picture Christ loses something of amiability, he gains in force. He appears really as compelling events. The modern believer in non-resistance would have great difficulty in claiming Christ for non-resistance in the Marcan picture as interpreted by the scientific student of apocalyptic literature. In such interpretations the Christ is not a passive watcher of events. He seeks to force events. In his thought the Kingdom cannot come till the people are roused to reach forth for it. Hence the insistent call for repentance. Now it is entirely clear that the preacher can use this conception of the Christ — in so far as he is convinced of its truth — without subscribing to the literalistic claim.

It may be objected by some that this article deals with the pre-millennialist all too seriously, in face of the absurdities to which the literalists give themselves. Some critics insist that such absurdities can be met only by ridicule. But one who, like the writer, has seen pre-millennialists rushing through mission-fields in haste to visit all the towns before the imminent coming of the Lord, need not be told to what lengths literalism can lead

some minds. This article, however, is not written for fanatics, but rather for the serious mind who really feels that the advantage in spiritual content is with the literal acceptance of apocalyptic prophecy. Literalism of this sort must be resolutely set aside; but it is possible to set it aside without at the same time abandoning the essential spirit and aim of those who taught in apocalyptic terms some eternal truths about the presence of God in human history. The old seers spoke in apocalyptic terms because there were in their day no other terms to use. With the coming of a new day the literal apocalyptic was outdated, but the spiritual ideals of the apocalyptic still have compelling power. It is a mistake to ignore or underestimate spiritual factors because of the excesses or aberrations of literalistic interpreters of such factors.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN ACTS, AND THE "CITY OF GOD"

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The idea of a Messianic kingdom pervades the whole of Acts. It is the subject of the discourse of the Risen Lord who speaks to his disciples "the things concerning the kingdom of God," and the disciples ask him if he will "restore the kingdom to Israel" in their time.¹ In the prayer of the Apostles, when they quote the words of the Second Psalm "the kings of the earth set themselves in array," they are evidently regarding these as the natural antagonists of the Christ.² When Peter preaches to Cornelius he says that Jesus of Nazareth was anointed by God and went about doing good (*εὐεργετῶν*, a word applied to kings) and healing those under the rule (*καταδυναστευομένων*) of the devil, as though Satan were a rival prince.³ Paul declares to the Jews at Pisidian Antioch that God raised up David as king, and that Jesus "whom God raised from the dead" is the heir of the promise made to David's son, who, unlike his ancestor, "saw not corruption."⁴ Later at Thessalonica Paul was accused to the magistrates of proclaiming Jesus to be "another king" in opposition to Cæsar's decrees.⁵ When Paul alludes to his preaching to the elders of Ephesus at Miletus he calls it "preaching the kingdom of God."⁶ This is

¹ Acts 1 3, 6.

² Acts 4 25, 26.

³ Acts 10 38; cf. Lk. 22 25, *οἱ ἐξουσιάζοντες αὐτῶν* (sc. Gentiles) *εὐεργέται καλοῦνται*. It was applied to the Ptolemies and Seleucidæ (Ptolemy VII and Antiochus VII were so called), and to other public benefactors. Deismann, *Light from the Ancient East*, p. 248 E. T.

⁴ Acts 13 37.

⁵ Acts 17 7; cf. Luke 22 3, *Χριστὸν βασιλέα εἶναι*.

⁶ Acts 20 25, 31.

entirely in accord with the parables in the Synoptists where Jesus compares himself to a king,⁷ and with the four narratives of the Crucifixion⁸; but in the Pauline Epistles there is no such allusion to Jesus. The words βασιλεύς and βασιλεία are applied generally to the Father.⁹ Nor does Paul as a rule compare the Christian polity to a "kingdom," but to a country, a family, a household or body.¹⁰ So far as may be judged by his silence, a Messianic king had no place in his system. Paul, it is true, alludes to Christ's Davidic descent, but only to contrast his birth "according to the flesh," with the proclamation of his divine sonship "according to the spirit of sanctification" at the resurrection.¹¹ It might be maintained that Paul resolutely preserved silence concerning a kingdom in his eschatology with which in his reported speeches Acts is not disposed to credit him. The Christology of the Pauline Epistles, earlier as well as later, transfers the rule of Jesus from earth to the sublime abode of the heavenly powers,¹² agreeing with the Johannine teaching that his kingdom is "not of this world."¹³

In early patristic literature it does not appear that the idea of Christian hope being connected with a kingdom of Jesus as Messiah appealed much to believers, whose attention was devoted to other aspects of his mission. In the letter to Diognetus and in the Syriac hymn of the

⁷ Matt. 18 23 ff., 22 7 ff.

⁸ All the accounts agree that Jesus was crucified as King of the Jews. The Fourth Gospel explains that Christ's kingdom is "not of this world;" John 18 36.

⁹ Βασιλεύς is never used as a divine title except in 1 Tim. 1 17, 6 15; βασιλεία, Rom. 14 17, 1 Cor. 4 20, Col. 4 11 (the Christian dispensation), 1 Cor. 6 9, Gal. 5 21, 1 Thess. 2 12, 2 Thess. 1 5 (the inheritance of the saints). Only in Eph. 5 5, Col. 1 13, is the kingdom connected with Christ. In 1 Cor. 15 24 Christ delivers the kingdom at the end to God, even the Father.

¹⁰ Πατριά, Eph. 3 15 (but see J. A. Robinson's note), πολιτεῖν, Phil. 3 20, πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως. The conception of a heavenly state is characteristic of Stoicism. See Lightfoot on Phil. 3 20; Dill, Roman Society, p. 324.

¹¹ Rom. 1 3. Contrast Lk. 1 32, "He shall sit on the throne of David his father."

¹² Col. 1 15 ff. Eph. 4 10, etc.

¹³ John 18 36.

Soul the Father is the king and the Son his delegate; but it was not till the capture of Rome by Alaric in A.D. 410 that Augustine brought into prominence the doctrine that the Church was a State established upon earth in contrast with the kingdoms of this world. To appreciate the meaning of his teaching which had so powerful an influence on subsequent Christian thought, it is necessary to review the argument of the *De Civitate Dei*, a treatise whose title is better known than its contents, which somewhat belie the suggestiveness of the name affixed to them.¹⁴ Alaric's capture of Rome in A.D. 410 was a calamity the effect of which cannot be properly estimated by its immediate consequences. Rome had for generations been merely the titular capital of the Empire, nor was its so-called sack an overwhelming catastrophe. But it naturally stirred the imagination. It seemed the precursor of the ruin of the entire civilized world. Men were appalled at the thought that a barbarian army had entered "golden Rome," the nursing mother of the nations.¹⁵ To the pagans it appeared a sure sign that the gods whom Christianity had displaced had abandoned Rome to its fate, and a reaction in favor of the old religion was the result.¹⁶ To counteract this Augustine devoted thirteen years to the development of the idea of a *Civitas Dei* existing from the creation on earth, a perfect state contrasted with the evil polity of the world. But in the seventeen books of his treatise the description of the Divine State occupies but little space, most of the work being devoted to answering the current objection that Christianity was responsible for the world-

¹⁴ The late Dr. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 803, after doing justice to the conception of Augustine, adds, "It may be said that the book is less than its title."

¹⁵ *Primum urbes inter divom domus aurea Roma. And
Hæc est quæ gremio materno numine fovet.*

¹⁶ This is the main argument of the early books of the *De Civitate Dei*. The elaborateness of Augustine's refutation of heathenism is a proof of its strength even though the Empire was nominally Christian.

ruin, apparent in the fall of Rome, and to the refutation of heathenism generally. In the first ten books the city of God is hardly mentioned, nor does the name, *Civitas Dei*, occur after the first chapter till the fifth book.¹⁷ Augustine labors to show that the troubles of his age are no worse than were endured in former ages; that the Goths, Arians though they were, treated the city of Rome with a humanity not known in pre-Christian times.¹⁸ He exposes the non-moral character of paganism and the badness of the ancient Roman religion.¹⁹ He shows that the greatest and most victorious nations are not necessarily the happiest, discusses natural and civil theology, deals with Hermes Trismegistus, Apuleius, and Porphyry, and declares Platonism to be the best philosophy of the ancient world.²⁰ He explains the Christian doctrine of angels and demons,²¹ dilates on the freedom of the will, and draws a comparison between the history of the world and that of God's chosen race.²² In short, so many topics are advanced and so much of the theology characteristic of the author is introduced that the City of God seems in danger of falling into the background.

After showing that the great prosperity of the ancient Romans was due to the virtues which they practised and not to their religion, the Eternal City is contrasted with the City of Rome: "No man is born in it because no man dies in it. It is in heaven and we have a promise of it during our pilgrimage on earth."²³ We give the name of the City of God," he says in a later book, "unto that society whereof that Scripture bears witness, which has got the most excellent authority and preëminence of all other works whatsoever, by the disposing of the divine

¹⁷ De Civitate Dei, V, 16.

¹⁸ Ibid. I, 1.

¹⁹ Ibid. II, 4 ff., and III, 2 ff.

²⁰ Ibid. VIII, 1-2.

²¹ Ibid. IX, passim.

²² Ibid. XVI, passim.

²³ Ibid. V, 16. Illa civitas sempiterna est: ibi nullus oritur, quia nullus moritur.

providence, not the affection of man's judgments." ²⁴ In this world the "two cities lie confusedly together," ²⁵ and Augustine shows that they arose "from the difference between the angelical powers." ²⁶ In elaborating his theory Augustine deals with the fall of the angels and the creation, all leading up to the statement that "in the first man the foresaid two societies or cities, had original; yet not evidently, but unto God's prescience, for from him were the rest of men to come; some to be made fellow-citizens with the angels in joy, and some with the devils in torment, by the secret but just judgment of God." ²⁷ The early narrative of Scripture shows the two cities to be characterized by phases of mind each caused by a different sort of love: "self-love in contempt of God, . . . and love of God in contempt of oneself." ²⁸

Among men the two cities began with the posterity of Adam; Cain, the first builder of a city whose name means possession representing the worldly, and Abel the heavenly state. ²⁹ Following Paul, Augustine applies the stories of Hagar and Ishmael, Sarah and Isaac to illustrate his thesis. ³⁰ He concludes this part of his argument by emphasizing his peculiar doctrine of reprobation and election. ³¹

From the remainder of the treatise a few selected passages will reveal the character of the *Civitas Dei* as set forth by Augustine. It is only in part on earth, its true home being heaven, and its earthly citizens are but pilgrims. ³² The bliss of its true citizens in this world is hope, and it is contrasted with the City of the Wicked,

²⁴ De Civitate Dei, XI, 1. Civitatem Dei dicimus cujus ea scriptura testis est, quæ non fortuitis motibus animorum, sed plane summæ dispositione providentiæ super omnes omnium gentium litteras, omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum divina excellens auctoritate subiecit.

²⁵ Ibid. In hoc interim sæculo perplexas quodammodo . . . invicemque permixtas.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. XII, 27. Quamvis occulto dei judicio, sed tamen iusto.

²⁸ Ibid. XIV, 28.

²⁹ Ibid. XV, 5.

³⁰ Ibid. XV, 2.

³¹ Ibid. XVIII, 21.

³² Ibid. XIX, 17.

where God does not govern and men do not obey.³³ "The day of judgment which will come at the end will not however be so much a day of deliverance or even one on which judgment is meted out, but of the vindication of all God's judgments since the Creation." "When we come to that great judgment, properly called the day of doom . . . we shall not only see all things apparent but acknowledge all the judgments of God from the first to the last to be firmly grounded on justice."³⁴ The last two books treat, the first the punishment of the wicked, refuting all the arguments against its being eternal, and also the objections to the flesh becoming eternal at the Resurrection in order that it may be everlastingly punished; and the second, of the happiness of the righteous in heaven their true home, the real City of God.

The importance of the treatise of Augustine, in which he develops his idea of the City in God, lies in its being the matured outcome of the thought of perhaps the greatest of the Fathers, who certainly did more than any one to mould the ideals, not only of the Middle Ages, but also of the Reformation. No one can fail to be struck by the absence of the influence of the aspect of Christianity to be found in the Synoptists and the Acts. In the first place, there is no allusion to a kingdom, in the Hebraic sense. Those whom God has chosen belong rather to a State (*Civitas*, *πολιτευμα*), an essentially Pauline conception. With Augustine and with western Christianity, which he so profoundly influenced, Paul, and not the earlier gospel teaching, was the dominant factor. The approaching kingdom became a "State," which had existed since the fall of the angels and united

³³ De Civitate Dei, XIX, 19, 24.

³⁴ Healey's translation of De Civitate Dei, XX, 2. Cum vero ad illud dei iudicium venerimus, cuius tempus proprie dies iudicii, et aliquando dies domini nuncupatur; non solum quaecumque tunc iudicabuntur, verum etiam quaecumque ab initio iudicata, et quaecumque usque ad illud tempus adhuc iudicanda sunt, apparebunt esse iustissima.

the seen with the unseen. The hopes which Jesus had aroused are deferred; the Second Coming is not a vital part in the scheme, except in so far that it will ultimately destroy the City of Evil. Even the Old Testament is treated less as a source of Messianic proof-texts than as by its narrative demonstrating the continuity of revelation in history.

But this change of outlook is not to be placed in the days of Augustine. It is due rather to Paul. Whether as compositions the Synoptists and Acts are earlier or later than the Pauline letters does not affect the fact that in them the doctrine of the Messianic kingdom is more primitive than that of Paul, who, especially in the later Epistles, makes it more and more centred in a spiritualized Church. In this Augustine strictly follows Paul; for, at any rate in the *De Civitate Dei*, to him, as to the Apostle, the Church is the City of God which has existed from creation both as visible and invisible. Even the calamities of his age cannot make Augustine turn to the Messianic hopes of a cruder Christianity. At the same time he does not advance beyond Paul in his theory of the Church. The *Civitas Dei* is simply the *πολίτευμα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* of the Epistle to the Philippians. It is in no sense a part of the secular State, an *imperium in imperio*, nor does it claim the right to dictate. Like Paul, Augustine teaches submission to the government, and Christians must now suffer, as in the early Church, when their conscience forbids them to obey. In this treatise there is no trace of any mediæval or post-Reformation theory of Church and State, nor is the Christian hierarchy more than alluded to. Still more significant is it that the words of Christ are rarely quoted and he is not regarded as either a teacher or example to mankind, but as the deified Saviour.³⁵ It is hardly an exaggeration to affirm that the entire theory

³⁵ *De Civitate Dei*, IX, 15.

might have been maintained and developed by a theologian who had completely disregarded the Synoptic narrative. Even in the description of the final vision in the Celestial City Christ is not introduced. This mixture of orthodox Nicene theology with what is practically an unitarian piety is present here and in many another early *Summa* of Christian doctrine. Of the Messianic kingdom set forth in early Christian writings scarcely a trace remains. Augustine seems to have been far more influenced by the Stoic idea of a heavenly State than by the promises of Jesus or the hopes of his immediate disciples. His "City of God" does not seem in any way to have Christ as the centre of all. Unconsciously the tendency has been to move away from the Christianity of the Synoptists, the Acts, and the Apocalypse.

SOME OLD UNPUBLISHED LETTERS

EDITED BY PRESERVED SMITH

CAMBRIDGE

Perhaps the most remarkable collection of autograph letters in the world is that made by the late Frederic A. Dreer and now housed in the Pennsylvania Historical Society at 1300 Locust Street, Philadelphia. Among the several thousand letters, there are specimens of the writing of most of the famous people who have lived during the last four centuries. During various short visits at Philadelphia I have run through the whole collection and have copied fifty of the most important epistles written during the period before 1650. For, to my great surprise, a number of the most valuable have lain for all these centuries unknown. Doubtless the fact that the collection is seldom seen by scholars combines with the difficulty of the paleography to lock up many a historical secret well worth the publishing.

For the present article I have selected a few letters bearing on Church history. Five of the most important I shall publish here. A few others, previously published, I have registered and collated, if their value seemed to justify it. The thread of continuity uniting the whole series is found in their religious interest. Doubtless the most valuable of the lot here published is that of Farel to Calvin, speaking, as it does, of Bucer's death, of the famous Bolsec affair, of the poets of the circle of Margaret of Navarre, and of the hitherto imperfectly known difficulties of Calvin with James Bernard. Of like importance is the communication of Hedio on Luther's death,

the Council of Trent and other matters. Of less value are the others, but I trust none here printed is too trivial to be worth the trouble of reading.

Before starting on the pleasant labor of transcription I must thank several of my friends for kind assistance. Professor Charles M. Jacobs has gone over most of the Farel letter. Professor George T. Northup and Professor Marinoni have kindly assisted me in editing the Italian letter. As they have not seen the original I desire to state that they are not responsible for the readings. My father has looked up a few points in books not accessible to me. I now proceed to present the letters in chronological order.

1. JOHN DE' MEDICI TO PETER DE' MEDICI

SAN MINIATO, February 26, 1493

John Cardinal de' Medici, afterwards Pope Leo X, writes to his brother Peter begging him to elevate a certain Bartholomew del Maestro to the college of Signori, because, he says, the man has always been favorable to them and had even treated him, the evening before, on his passage through Signa, to lampreys. Is not the whole spirit of the Renaissance papacy perceptible in this missive? Private favors, even of the most trivial sort, were rewarded with public office. Government was purely personal.

[Address] Magnifico Fratri hon. Petro de' Medicis, Florentia.

Magnifico Fr hon. Io ti dissi alli giorni passati come desideramo che Bartholomeo del Maestro¹ de tui fussi de signori, et tu me ne rispondesti quasi affirmative de farlo. Hora essendo venuto il tempo di crearli te lo mando & cosi come io li² ho data intentione che havera questa dignita & honore alpunkte sotto la promessa mi facesti ti priegho ex animo lo vogli mettere in acto, che per una gratia non potrei per hora aspectare la maggiore; & l' opera sara bene collocata in persona benivola & benemerita di casa nostra, & io sono obligato ad pure farli ogni favore per lo honore smisurato & careccie fadomi piu volte nel transito per Signa.³ A uno papa non si sian

¹ I can find nothing on him in Pastor, or Creighton, or Roscoe's Leo X, 1876. The words "de tui" indicate that he was a partisan of Peter.

² I.e., "gli."

³ A small town on the Arno between Florence and San Miniato.

potuto fare piu; hiersera ci dette insino al lamprede. Pensa se siamo obligato a farli favore. Benevale. Ex Sancto Miniato die xxvi Februarij 1492.⁴

FR. JO. CARDINALIS ⁵ DE MEDICIS.

Translation

Magnificent, honorable Brother: I told you some days ago how we wished that Bartholomeo del Maestro, your man, should belong to the Signori, and you replied as if consenting to bring it about. Now that the time for electing them has come, I inform you of it, and also how I have given him to understand that he will gain this dignity and honor immediately. In view of the promise you made me, I beg you from the bottom of my heart to be pleased to fulfil it, for in the way of a favor I could not now expect a greater. And the trouble will be well spent upon a person kindly and well deserving of our house; and I am also obliged to do him every favor in return for the excessive honor and acts of kindness shown me several times as I passed through Signa. Greater could not have been done to a pope. Last evening he even gave me lampreys. Consider whether we are compelled to show him favor. Farewell. San Miniato, February 26, 1492-3.

Your brother, JOHN CARDINAL DE' MEDICI.

2. LUTHER TO SPALATIN, 1524

This letter is published in Enders: *Luther's Briefwechsel*, iv, 267, with the wrong date, 1523. For collation with the original, see *Luther's Correspondence and other contemporary Letters*, vol. ii, translated and edited by Preserved Smith and C. M. Jacobs, 1918, p. 557.

3. ERASMUS TO LEWIS BER, JANUARY 26, 1527

This witty and historical letter has just been published in *Luther's Correspondence*, vol. ii, the original on pp. 532 f., and a translation and notes, pp. 393 ff.

⁴ According to the Roman and Florentine method of beginning the year on Lady Day, this would mean 1493. See A. Giry: *Manuel de diplomatique*, 1894, p. 127. According to Roscoe (Leo X, 1876, i. 25), John de' Medici had removed to Rome on March 12, 1492. Either he had just returned for a visit or Roscoe mistakes the date 1492 for 1493.

⁵ John de' Medici, born 1475, was made a priest at the age of 7 and given the red hat at 13. When he wrote this letter he was only 17.

4. CASPAR HEDIO TO COUNT PHILIP OF HANAU

STRASSBURG, March 16 and 19, 1546

Hedio (1494-1552) was, after his advent to Strassburg in 1523, one of the leading reformers there until his death.

Philip IV, Count of Hanau-Lichtenberg (†1590), took part in the Religious Peace of 1555.

[Address] Dem Wolgebornen Hern Hern Philippen Grauen zu Hanau und Hern zu Liechtenberg, meinem gnedigen Hern. Zur ei[gnen] Handen.

Hochgeborner, Gnediger Her. E[ure] g[nade] seyen meine unterthenige dienst Zubevor. Gnediger Her. Auf dem xviii tag february ist doctor Martinus Lutherus got ergeben zu Eysleben,⁶ da er die grauen von Mansfeld einer grossen uneynikeit halb miteinander vertragen hat. Sint beisamen auch graf Albrecht und sein gemahl samt vilen predigern. Und ist dass sein letstes gepet gewesen:

Almechtiger got und vatter meines lieben hern Jesu Christi denn ich gelert und bekannt, den der Bapst und die welt lestert und schendet, erbarm dich mein und nimm mein seel in deine hand. Und als er etliche ort auss der schrift, die ganz trostlich sint, gesprochen, als namlich Joh. am 3 cap., Als hat Got die welt lieb gehapt, das er sein sonn gab auf das der an ym glaucht hatt das ewig leben &c, ist er verschyden. Das habe E.g. ich undertheniger meinung nit wöllen verhalten.

Darauf aber Culmannus⁷ E.g. zum Superattendentem nit werden mag, habe ich sust nachfragen ob got der her einen andern wolte anzeigen damit die selbige Kirchen wol versehen. Der almechtige erhalt E.g. zu seinem preiss und der Unterthenigen Wolfahrt. Amen in eil. Strassburg den 16 martij 1546.

E.g. Underth.

C. HEDIO, D.

⁶ Though this letter has no independent value as a source for Luther's last hours, it is interesting as one of the first accounts known to us. Eight letters on the same subject have been published by G. Kawerau in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1881, 1907, and 1913. On the literature of the subject see my *Life of Luther*, p. 470. Since that was written a good deal has come out. The most important texts have been published by J. Strieder: *Authentische Berichte über Luthers letzte Lebensstunden*, 1912. Two accounts of the death have recently been discovered in America, one published by Spaeth in *Lutheran Church Review*, April, 1910, believed by him to be by John Albrecht. The value of the document is denied by Strieder in *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, xv, 1912, 379 ff. G. L. Burr published another account, found written in a Bible published 1546, and printed it in the *American Historical Review*, July, 1911. The author is unknown and the account worthless. See also J. Herderschee: "Luther's Laatste Levensdagen," *Theologia. Tijdschrift*, 51, 5 (1917).

⁷ Leonard Culmann (1497 or 1498-1562), a preacher at Nuremberg, where he defended the Osiandrian doctrines. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*.

Her Martin Bucer hat woll ein meinung gehapt E.G. anzuzeigen einen gnant Antonius Schorus⁸ von Louvain, der fein und gelert, aber der sprach halben zu sorge onverstandig. Zu dem ist er schon gen Heidelberg ein pedagogium dasselbst zu halten.

Auss Regensburg sint brief kumen des dato 12 martij. Und ist das Colloquium⁹ in eines aufzug des wegen k.Mt.¹⁰ mandat der ein form prescribit die dan unsern beschwerlich ist, darauf sie gegenbericht geben haben. Auch hat K.Mt. zu den vorige ij praesidenten den 3 geordnet, hern Julium Pflug.¹¹

Zu Trient ist der hochste handel in der disputation ob der Bapst uber dag Concilium oder das Concilium uber ym. Und achtet man Bepstliche h[eiligkeit] werde unterstann das Concilium zu Rhom, Bononij oder Mantua zulest.¹²

Es gibt noch sprache das K.Mt. woll in Hispania und fur Algeria.

E.g. habe ich dass zurvorige verzeichnet ganz Undertheniger meinung zu gefallen.

In eyl fritag das xix Martij.

CASPAR HEDIO.

Translation

Highborn, Gracious Lord, my humble service to your Grace.

Gracious Lord, on the 18th day of February Dr. Martin Luther was given to God at Eisleben, after he had reconciled the Counts of Mansfeld who had been at odds. With him were Count Albert and his wife together with many preachers. And this was his last prayer:

Almighty God and Father of my dear Lord Jesus Christ, whom I have taught and confessed, and whom the pope and the world blasphemers and reviles, pity me and take my soul in thy hand. And after he had repeated some very comfortable texts from Scripture

⁸ Antony van Schore, or Schorus (1525-52), after studying at Strassburg matriculated at Heidelberg October 16, 1546, where, as this letter informs us, he began tutoring other youths. He published works on philosophy. *Allge. Deu. Biog.* Evidently at this time he did not speak High German, but only Dutch.

⁹ On this conference at Ratisbon, opened January 27, see Pastor: *History of the Popes*, English, xii, 278 ff.

¹⁰ "Kaiserliche Majestät," i.e., Charles V.

¹¹ Julius von Pflug (1499-1564), a moderate Catholic, elected Bishop of Naumburg 1541, but not installed until 1547. He declined the presidency of the conference, offered him by Charles.

¹² The Council of Trent opened with a passionate dispute between the pope and the delegates. See Pastor: *History of the Popes*, English translation, xii, 1914, chap. 6. This led to the expectation that the pope would transfer the council to Rome, Bologna, or Mantua.

(as, for example, John 3 16, "God so loved the world that he gave his son, so that whosoever believeth on him hath eternal life," &c.) he passed away. It was my humble wish not to keep your Grace in ignorance of this.

As Culmann cannot be your Grace's Superintendent,¹³ I have looked elsewhere to see if God the Lord would point out any one else to provide your church with. The Almighty keep your Grace to his glory and your subjects welfare. Amen. In haste. Strassburg, March 16, 1546.

Your Grace's humble,

Dr. C. HEDIO.

P.S. Martin Bucer thought of recommending to your Grace one called Anthony Schorus of Louvain who is fine and learned, but, alas, doesn't know the language. Moreover he has just gone to Heidelberg to tutor boys there.

Letters dated March 12 have come from Ratisbon. The Conference there is in turmoil because his Majesty's decree prescribes a form which is injurious to our people, wherefore they have made a counter-report against it. Also his Majesty, in addition to the two first presidents, has named a third, Julius Pflug.

The principal business at Trent is the dispute whether the pope is superior to the council or the council superior to him. It is thought his Holiness will find some way to translate the council to Rome, Bologna, or Mantua.

There is a rumor that his Imperial Majesty will go to Spain and against Algiers.

I have humbly noted all this for your Grace's pleasure.

In haste, Friday, March 19.

CASPAR HEDIO.

5. WILLIAM FAREL TO JOHN CALVIN AT GENEVA

NEUCHÂTEL, May 25, 1551

Farel (1489-1565), the well known reformer and precursor of Calvin. The most recent lives of him by W. Bevan, 1893, by J. J. Herzog in the *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, and by Mulot in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1908, pp. 362-84, 513-42. Readers of his letters are aware of the obscurity of his style. Many of his epistles to Calvin, printed in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, are headed by the editor with some such comment as "more suo de multis et variis satis obscure." (*Calvini opera*, xvii, ep. 2797.) He wrote a tiny and difficult hand. Never-

¹³ An ecclesiastical officer often called the Lutheran equivalent of the bishop.

theless I have deciphered it and have succeeded in explaining the sense of the epistle, which throws light on some letters of Calvin, and on important events.

S. Christophorus ¹⁴ vulnus quod accepimus per suam absentiam quod non facile curabitur, intempestiva enim facit abitio et longior mora quam negotia omnia ferent, vulnus inquam illud lenivit ut pene non angor, quamvis grave, ob proximi recordationem, ut merito gratias agam D[eo] & gratulor non modo tibi potiss[imum] & ecclesiae ob fructum quem spero, vero etiam Christophoro, qui huius a me admonitus, fidam narravit operam, sumpta evectione ex colloquio quem habueramus in sessione.¹⁵

Jacobus Bernardus ¹⁶ ne eum fraudem eius operae qua D[eus] voluit per eum uti, prout non detrectavit olim pro instauranda ecclesia ista, quam D[eus] dederat impendere; & ut sciat me horum non immemorem nec ingratum, ut nosti me solitum referre officia istius, hoc addes ut meo nomine ei agas gratias, & observet ut pergat semper talibus vere christianis officiis, eum sibi magis et magis demonstrare, quod spero facturum, suo ipsius et ecclesiae commodo & fructu non vulgari, meo vero quam ingenti gaudio, quo triumpho dum video eum nobis salvum superesse, dum alios defleo, non modo salvum sed item ecclesiae Christi utilem. Quod ad primum attinet, cuius initia & progressus, quamvis quisquiliae multae fuerunt admixtae grano, tamen quia D[ei] fuerunt, quae bona fuerunt, & non parum ecclesiae contulerunt, Deo operante in creatura sua, fieri non potest. Quae creatura Dei, quia a Deo prodijt, mihi chara ob dona quae ferverunt, mihi multo chariorem sat efficiat Christus expurgans omnia et perfecta dans ut evangelio serviens pergendo et perseverando in finem usque, sit quam chariss[ima]. Tu qui pater es fuisti et eris, quid potes aliud quam haberi quam chariss[imus]

¹⁴ Christopher Fabri or Libertetus, often spoken of as Farel's colleague at Neuchâtel. He succeeded Farel after his death. See La France Protestante. He had gone to Geneva; see Calvin's answer, June 15, Calvin's Opera, xiv, 133. On April 27, Farel speaks of a "colleague" suddenly leaving; *ibid.* xiv, 112.

¹⁵ Sic for "sessione," referring to the session of the Synod of Neuchâtel held in March, on which cf. letters of that date.

¹⁶ James Bernard, formerly guardian of the Franciscans of Rive, who had become Protestant before Calvin's arrival in Geneva. He was a special friend of Farel, who blessed his marriage in August, 1535. Doumergue: Jean Calvin, ii, 129.

He had done something to offend Calvin and now wished to be reconciled. Farel here intercedes for him quite passionately. Calvin replied on June 15 (Opera, xiv, 133): "Quod ad nostrum amicum νεοπαλιδν spectat, ego vero eum, ut mones et hortaris, sedulo fovebo, et collegis meis ero autor ut idem faciant. Sed crede mihi, nihil sincerum apparet." See the whole passage. The editor, not knowing to whom Calvin refers, cautiously suggests Perrinus, but must be corrected by this new letter.

quem proprio etiam sanguine et vita tua optasses pridem Christo redditum; quid nunc potes aliud quam salvum amplexari, & siquid morbi supersit, unde non plena favorum moenia ¹⁷ non ut optas ¹⁸ videris, non prorsus aversari et desinere eum qui melioratus cupit haberi, & qui spem fecit sanitatis plenae aliquando parandae? Faciunt ¹⁹ & Neo[comi] collegae omnes, quibus tam est cordi omnium salus, ne alienent istum tam utilem; sed ego mihi et meo affectui nimis indulgeo et nihil mirum, nam tantum non extra me sum, & somnare mihi videor, et reduces ex captivitate tam deplorata sibi videbantur. Et quamvis collegis meis nihil opus subire meis hortatibus & multominus tibi, tamen plene novi vos lucem honorantes enim qualemcunque, ita in D[ei] amore, licet praeter meritum, etsi non posset addi aliquid vestro quam sanctissimo amoris et charitati in privatis, cum sit quam maximus, nihil tamen abfuturum etsi non tantus esset quantus est, aliquid me obtestante abfuturum, ut gaudium meum perficiatur.

Monachus Vigianensis ²⁰ multa sibi promittit & in nonnullis utrumque Franciscum ²¹ habet; non reformantes enim humani sententiam de divinis, sensum proprium non verbum D[ei] ponderant. Ex Vireto ²² alia audio quam ex Christophoro, apud Viretum dixit Christophorus se audito aliter sensisse quam prius. Christophorus refert impugnasse eius sententiam et conventum ubi absolverit quae scribit, haec mittere ut audiat quid dicturi simus; sed alio mittat si valet bellumque indicat Deo. Si tu et quae quam apertissime ex scripturis plenoque Dei verbo, illi bullae ²³ mox mox [sic] crepiturae non satisfacis, scilicet ego satisfaciam? Plenius omnia ex Vireto. Martem ridendum sequitur ridiculus Mercurius; it illa in

¹⁷ Sic for munia, a spelling found elsewhere.

¹⁸ Sic; one might expect optare.

¹⁹ I.e., they are all treating Bernard well, as Farel wishes Calvin to do, in order not to alienate him again.

²⁰ I.e., of Veigy, a town near Geneva. Bolsec is spoken of as "the monk" by Farel on June 29 (Calvini Opera, xiv, 143), and is meant here. Jerome Hermes Bolsec (†1585), a Carmelite monk of Paris, whence he went to Ferrara and there became almoner of the Duchess Renée. In 1551 he went to Veigy and then to Geneva, where he quarreled with Calvin, though he had previously embraced the Reformed religion, was first imprisoned and then banished. See W. Walker: John Calvin, 1906, pp. 315 ff; H. Fazy: Procès de Bolsec in Mémoires de l'Inst. nat. génevois, x, 1866.

²¹ In his letter of June 29 (see last note), Farel writes: "Non sperassem tantam mutationem in utroque Francisco: sed sanandos credo. De monacho parum spei est." The editor informs us that one of these Francisci was Sampaulinus, the other he does not know.

²² Peter Viret (1511-71), pastor at Lausanne.

²³ "That bladder," a term of contempt often used by Luther; children's rattles were made of them. Luther's Correspondence, ii, 107.

intentione infimum abys[um], ita vir in aeterna praeordinatione quam vult impetere et enectare, in cinerem vectitur.

Tibi et Colladinis²⁴ et reliquis quid debemus pro labore impenso pauperibus?

Quam vereor ne poetis Margaritae²⁵ malorum omnium radix avaritia fidem & pietatem extinguit omnem! Judas, venundato Christo, sumpta biretta,²⁶ pro Christo Satanam habet durum. Suos novit D[eus]; per eos efficit quod statuit. Non erit vanus labor servorum D[ei]; etiamque flentes seminant messent cum gaudio. Vale.

Accepi pij Bucer²⁷ postremas tandem litteras. Quale pectus! Quis sese demittit tantus! In luctu gaudiendum quod homo tam nobis amicus ad D[eum] migravit. Nec dubito quin migrans nos D[eo] commendavit. Quantum in te recte sensiit & te merito amavit! Magno par est magnificari. Tantum in me ob nimium amorem hallucinatus est, tanti faciens quae ad se scribentur quae potius impensa erant, quod vellem te aliquando idem facere. Cum tam saepe in te peccem scribendo aliter quam decet, cum aliud non noxius²⁸ quam ita misere peccare et semel me admonuisti de ijs quae ad tantum virum scribebam. Forte utrinque rudem habeas amicum; posses ad meliora trahere hunc tam senem. Qui sunt duri, apti ad meliora. Hanc quaeso operam ne graveris mihi impendere, licet tibi imo debes quam liberrime. Quamvis in omnibus cedam Bucero²⁹ tamen amore et affectu in te et tui observatione nihil cedo. Quamdiu hunc furore castiga mone et urge amicum, et quanto liberius & — ut mortuus sum — amarius feceris, tanto mihi gravior & magis officium faciens eris. Colimus qui supersimus sanctam memoriam donec ad ripam quam amicissimam & ad charissimum amicorum coetum qui progresserunt migremus, divinae voluntati grati gratias agentes, quod quamdiu visum fuit in hac miseriarum

²⁴ Leon and Germain Colladon, who came to Geneva in August, 1550 (La France Protestante). Farel's spelling is wrong but found elsewhere.

²⁵ It is possible that this is a reference to Ronsard, whose Odes appeared 1550, and to his protector Margaret of Savoy. But it is more probable that Farel was thinking of Margaret of Navarre, who died 1549, and had been a protector of the "Libertins"; see Walker's Calvin. Rabelais was one of those who claimed her protection, and who had just been branded by Calvin in his *De Scandalis*, 1550. See L. Thuasne: *Études sur Rabelais*, 1904, pp. 402 ff.; *Calvini Opera*, viii, 45; Doumergue: *Jean Calvin*, i, 376.

²⁶ This seems to be Farel's spelling, like the Italian and modern English; the usual Latin form was *birretum*.

²⁷ Bucer died at Cambridge, February 27, 1551. Farel had already spoken of his death, April 27, *Calvini Opera*, xiv, 112. Calvin's reply to Farel of June 15 has in mind what Farel here says, *ibid.* xiv, 133, and note.

²⁸ Used as a comparative, perhaps permissible.

²⁹ So underlined by Farel.

valle tantos nobis utendos dedit annos. Neque lingua neque solum aut quidvis aliud hanc potuit amicitiam impedire quae in finem usque integra duravit; si sata in lachrymis hic et culta, tantum habe solidi gaudij quid, ubi in messe pleni referentur manipuli! O quam bonus est D[eus] noster qui tam malos non aversatos sed bonitate filij vestitos beat omnes quam maximo bono quod in Christo habemus. Ea addit tam cumulate quae non modo pijs expetenda sunt valde, in D[eo] unum esse, sed ipsis etiam in tenebris agentibus. Tamen et hoc bonum inter optima reputatum est. Et ut sensu Dei non potest homo rogitationem excludere quin illi quantumvis ignoto primus deferat, ita amicos secundo habeat loco. O si miseri verum Deum noscerent & quid velit et jubeat, & eo tenderent, & si veros amicos & quid amici velint, quot et quantis essent liberati malis! Utrumque per ineffabilem Dei clementiam novimus & Deum & quid velit & quid jubeat, & quid amici, nempe ut illustretur Christi gloria. Quid enim tanto opere amplexaris in tuo et nostro Normandio,³⁰ ut de alijs taceam, nisi putatur cuius nosti esse quam studiosiss [imus]. Ego quid in te aliud volo? Pergendum nobis est in laudibus Dei nostri, O quam immeritos peccatores amat et ornat merito Christi, quem praedicat colit adorat omnis terra; nihil supersit quod non laudem eius depraedicat.

Vale felix et totus in Do[mino] & vive in via Christi ut gygas, vince calamitatem calamitosi mundi, sicco pede pertransi hoc mare laeteque amarum & quae te in horas decumbere cogunt aegritudines, sanissimas summa alacritate vince. Servat te Christus infractum ad omnia, ut forma³¹ gregis sis ad omnia summa stimulata³² pro Christo ferenda et peragenda. Saluta quaeso omnes. Proximis literis convectis spero aliud successum quam priorem, quod faxit Christus. Collega³³ te salutat.

Neocomi, 25 Maij 1551.

Tuus totus FARELLUS.

Translation

Greeting. The wound which we received by the absence of Christopher Fabri will not easily be healed, for his untimely departure and delay longer than his business requires, make it severe.

³⁰ One of Calvin's colleagues at Geneva, Laurent de Normandie, born at Noyon c. 1510, came to Geneva 1548, died 1569. Cf. Doumergue: Jean Calvin, iii, 1905, pp. 620 ff.

³¹ I.e., "a model," a classical use, rather startling with *gregis*, possibly due to a confused reminiscence of the Virgilian "formosi pastor gregis."

³² Cf. Acts 26 14.

³³ Who this colleague was I cannot determine.

And yet it greatly relieves the pain, although sharp, to remember what recently happened, so that I may justly thank God and congratulate not only you primarily and the church on account of the fruit which I hope from him, but also I congratulate Christopher who, admonished of this very thing by me, had related to me his faithful work, when he had taken his departure after the conversation which we had at the synod.

Let me not cheat James Bernard of the work which God wished to accomplish through him, inasmuch as formerly he was not unprofitable in the founding of the church which God gave into his care. Let him know that I am not forgetful of what he has done, nor ungrateful, and, as you know that I am accustomed to repay such favors, please thank him in my name and let him take heed always to continue in the performance of such truly Christian duties, and let him prove himself, as I hope he will do, profitable unto himself and to the church, bringing forth no common fruit. How great will be my joy, my triumph, when I see him saved with us (while I weep for others), yea, not only saved but useful to the church of Christ. Although much refuse was mixed with the wheat in his first deeds and in his progress since then, yet because these deeds were of God they could not be otherwise than good and not a little profitable unto the church, God working in his creature. This creature of God coming from God, was dear to me on account of his fervent gifts; but Christ has made him much dearer, indeed as dear as possible, since he has purged him and given him all perfect gifts so that he may serve the gospel, continuing and persevering even unto the end. How could you, who are, were, and will be a father, be held other than most dear by him whom you wished formerly to give back to Christ even at the cost of your own life? What else can you do save embrace him now that he is saved? If any of his old weakness is left by reason of which you are unable to give him your full favor, though you do not seem to wish this, yet turn not altogether from him and do not leave him who wishes to be considered as improved, and who offers ground for hope that he will soon be again completely whole. All my colleagues at Neuchâtel, who care so much for the salvation of all, act thus, lest they should alienate this so useful man. If I yield too much to my affection for him, it is no wonder, for I am almost beside myself, and I seem to myself to dream and they seem to themselves like exiles returning from a miserable captivity. And although there is no need for my colleagues to obey my exhortations, and still less need for you to do so, nevertheless I have always known you to honor every light and to live in the love of God. And

although in personal matters nothing could be added to your holy love and devotion, inasmuch as they are as great as possible, yet let it not be lacking in this, even if he (Bernard) was not what he is, but accept my testimony for him, that my joy may be perfected.

The monk of Veigy (Bolsec) promises himself great things and in some matters he has seduced both the Franciscans, for they do not distinguish the human dregs from the divine matter, and they consider rather their own reason than the Word of God. The account given me by Viret differed from that given by Christopher, and when Viret was present Christopher said that he had changed his opinion. Christopher says that he opposed his (Bolsec's) opinion, and that when he (Bolsec) had completed what he has written he would do, he will send the agreement here in order to learn what we shall say. But let him send it elsewhere if he is able, and declare war on God. If you and the clear texts of Scripture adduced by you could not satisfy that bladder that will soon make a noise, how, pray, could I satisfy him? You will learn more from Viret. A ridiculous Mercury follows an absurd Mars. He is going his own way to the lowest abyss; the man is on the way to be burnt to ashes by the very eternal predestination which he wishes to attack and annihilate.

What do we not owe to you and to the Colladons and the rest for the labor you have lavished on the poor?

How I fear that avarice, that root of all evils, has extinguished all faith and piety in the poets of Margaret! Judas, having sold Christ and taken the biretta, instead of Christ has that hard master Satan. God knows his own, and through them does what he has ordained. The labor of the servants of God will not be in vain; though they sow weeping they will reap with joy. Farewell.

I have received pious Bucer's last letter. What a heart! What a man has gone! We must rejoice in our sorrow that a man so fond of us has journeyed to God. I have no doubt that after his journey he commended us to God. How rightly he thought of you and how justly he loved you! It is right to be celebrated by a great man. He was foolish to love me as he did, for he made much of all that was written to him though he should rather have sifted it, as I hope that you also will sometime do; although I often sin by writing to you otherwise than as is fitting, although nothing is more harmful than to sin thus miserably and you have once warned me about the things which I wrote to such a man. Perchance you had a candid friend on either side; you may be able to lead the one who is now so old [sc. myself] to better things. Those who are hard are apt to

be improved. I beg you not to begrudge me the needful attention, although you owe it rather to yourself. Though I yield to Bucer in all things, yet in love and affection for you and reverence for you I yield not at all. Wherefore chastize, admonish, press this friend furiously, and the more freely and — as I am dead — the more harshly you do it, the more you will please me and the more you will do your duty. Let us, the survivors, cherish his holy memory until we also journey to the beloved shore and to the dear company of friends who have gone before, gratefully giving thanks to the divine will which has given us so many years to be used in this valley of miseries. No tongue nor the earth itself nor anything else has been able to hinder the friendship which has lasted untouched unto the end; if it was sowed and cultivated in tears, yet it has solid joy awaiting it when the full sheaves will be brought in at the harvest. Oh, how good is our God who does not cast us off, evil though we are, but makes us blessed clothed in the goodness of his Son and with the great gift we have in Christ! To his other blessings He richly adds this, which is greatly sought by the pious, that we shall be one in God, and He gives this gift even to those who are living in darkness. Yet this blessing is reckoned among the best. And although a man is not able, in the thought of God, to exclude petitions for himself first, yet let him have his friends in the second place. Oh, if only the wretched knew the true God, what He wishes and commands, and followed that, and if they only knew their true friends and what their friends wish, from how many and what terrible evils would they be freed! By God's ineffable mercy we know both God and his commands and our friends and what they want, namely that Christ's glory may be brightened. Wherefore let me embrace you in your and our Laurent de Normandie, not to mention others, lest I should seem to be too fond of one of whom you know.³⁴ What should I wish different in you? We must continue in the praises of our God. Oh, how He loves undeserving sinners and how He ornaments them with the merit of Christ, whom the whole earth preaches, cherishes, and adores! In fact there is nothing that does not proclaim his praise.

Farewell, be happy and live in the way of Christ like a giant; conquer the calamity of the calamitous world; dryshod pass through this happily bitter sea, and with the highest vigor overcome the maladies that at times lay you low. May Christ keep you unbroken for all things, that you may be a model to the flock in all the high trials to be borne and gone through for Christ. Give my greetings,

³⁴ I.e., Calvin himself.

please, to all. I trust that your next letter will be brought to me more safely and quickly than the last. Christ grant it. My colleague salutes you. Neuchâtel, May 25, 1551.

All yours,

FAREL.

6. INSCRIPTION BY JOHN FORSTER. 1552

John Forster, 1495-1556, Protestant born at Augsburg, a noted Hebrew scholar. A specimen of sixteenth century piety and erudition is offered herewith.

GENESIS XLIX,

[Follows a Hebrew inscription, the text of Genesis 49 18.]

Salutare tuum exspecto Domine. Paraphrastes chaldaicus:³⁵ Dixit pater noster Jacob, Non exspecto redemptionem Gideonis, quae est temporaria, neque redemptionem Simpsonis filij Mannae, nam et haec est transitoria. Sed exspecto redemptionem Christi filii Daud, qui venturus est ad accersendum ad se filios Israel. Huius, inquam, redemptionem desiderat anima mea.

Haec est pia et plena consolatione Patriarchae dicti huius declaratio, pertinens ad omnem posteritatem fidelis Israelis, quod ea in rebus adversis non ad praesidia humana confugere debeat, quae aut sunt transitoria aut omnino vana. Sed ad filium Dei ex Dauide secundum carnem natum cuius aut redemptio certa est, ita quoque est vera et aeterna.

JOHANNES FORSTERUS, D.

1552.

Translation

I await thy salvation, O Lord. The author of the Chaldee paraphrase writes: Our father Jacob said, I do not await the redemption of Gideon which is temporary, nor the redemption of Samson the son of Manoah, for this also is transitory, but I await the redemption

³⁵ See the Chaldee Paraphrases in the Targum, printed in Walter's Polyglott. As my father, the Rev. Prof. Henry Preserved Smith, kindly informs me, the Targum of Jonathan at this point reads: "Dixit Jacob quando vidit Gedeonem filium Joas et Simsonem filium Manoe, qui futuri erant liberatores: Non liberationem Simsonis ego perspicio, quia liberatio temporalis fuit; sed ego salutem tuam exspecto et perspicio, Domine, quia Liberatio tua liberatio saeculorum." The Jerusalem Targum reads: "Dixit pater noster Jacob: Non redemptionem Gedeonis filii Joas expectat anima mea, quae est temporalis; neque redemptionem Samsonis quae est salus creata; sed redemptionem quam dixisti verbo tuo venturam esse populo tuo filiis Israel, hanc redemptionem expectat anima mea." It will be seen that Forster had a different text before him. How far it was colored by himself, and how far it represents a genuine new reading, must be left to critics to determine.

of Christ the son of David who is to come to call unto himself all the children of Israel. His redemption, I say, my soul desireth.

This declaration of the said patriarch is pious and full of consolation pertaining to the whole posterity of faithful Israel, for in times of adversity they ought not to flee to human protection which is either transitory or altogether vain. But they should flee to the Son of God from the seed of David according to the flesh, for his redemption is certain and also is true and eternal.

Dr. JOHN FORSTER. 1552.

7. MELANCHTHON TO JOHN PETREIUS

(WITTENBERG), January 31, 1555.

This letter is not found in the *Corpus Reformatorum* nor in Bindseil's *Epistolae Melanchthonis quae in Corpore Reformatorum desiderantur*, 1874, nor is it known to Fleming and Vogt, "Nachweis von Melanchthon-Briefen," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1910 and 1912. It is printed in the catalogue of the Dreer Collection. There were two men named John Petreius. One of them, to whom Melanchthon wrote Dec. 16, 1549, *Corpus Ref.*, vii, 514, and letter in Bindseil, *op. cit.*, was a Nuremberg printer who died in 1550, see *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*. The other was in 1553 pastor in Willansdorf (see Melanchthon's letter to him, *Corpus Ref.*, viii, 29) and later pastor at Zwickau. Cf. *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, xvii, 192 line 55, where he is described as a "hotspur." The present letter is addressed to him.

[Address] Reverendo viro eruditione et virtute praestanti D. Johanni Petreio, Pastori Ecclesiae Dei in inclyta urbe Cygnea,³⁶ Amico suo carissimo.

S. D. Reverende D. Pastor, Exploravimus eruditionem hujus Wolfgangi³⁷ et comperimus eum recte tenere summam doctrinam Evangelii. Quare et te judicamus recte fecisse quod Ecclesiam ei commendasti et optamus ornatas esse talibus ingeniis multas Ecclesias. De consistorio, recte facies si ad proximum referas controversias. Sed tamen poteris cum vobis in nostrum consistorium et nostram Academiam consulere. Dei beneficio, una et concors harum regionum Ecclesia est. Nec sunt ambitiosa certamina de jurisdictione. Bene et feliciter vale. Pridie Cal. Feb. 1555.

PHILIPPUS.

³⁶ Zwickau.

³⁷ I cannot identify this Wolfgang. Probably the Album Academiae Vitebergensis, ed. C. E. Fürstemann, 1841, would do this, but there is not a copy of the work to be found in America.

Translation

To the Reverend and in virtue and learning excellent Dr. John Petreius, Pastor of the Church of God in the noble city of Zwickau, his dearest friend.

Greeting. Reverend pastor, we have examined the learning of this Wolfgang and have found him rightly to hold the chief points of evangelic doctrine. Wherefore we think you have done right in recommending a church to him, and we wish that many churches may be adorned with pastors of such character. You will do right if you refer your controversies to the next Consistory. But you and your friends may consult our Consistory and our university. By God's blessing the church of these regions is at one and in peace, nor is there any strife of ambition about jurisdiction. Farewell. January 31, 1555.

PHILIP.

It may not be unacceptable to the reader if in this place I should add a few other notes on Melanchthon, hitherto unpublished. In the library of Mr. George Arthur Plimpton of New York there are several books with notes in Melanchthon's hand. The most important of these is the copy of Homer published by Aldus in 1517. It contains the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and the lives of Homer by Herodotus and Plutarch. There are three separate title-pages and on each of them there is an inscription stating that the book was given by Melanchthon to Luther in 1519.³⁸ That on the *Iliad* is τῷ ἐν χριστῷ παμφιλτάτῳ Μαρτίνῳ τῷ Θεολόγῳ Φίλιππος MDXIX. The inscription on the title-page of the *Odyssey* is "D. D. Re. Patri Doc. Martino Luthero Θεολόγῳ Ph. Mel." The writing on the title-page of the lives of Homer is "D. D. Rev. Pat. Martino Luthero Θεολόγῳ Philip. Melanchthon." The book is crammed with notes attributed to Melanchthon, of which a few are worth quoting. On the title-page of the *Iliad* he wrote,

³⁸ In the second volume of Luther's Correspondence, p. 177, n. 2, I mistakenly stated that the book was given by Luther to Melanchthon, instead of the other way. I was perhaps misled by Luther's assertion, "I bought a Homer to become a Greek." Did he buy it from Melanchthon, or did he have two copies?

“Est in Homeri poematis insignis suavitas cum magna gravitate.” He sought for parallels to his own age as the following notes show. To Διὸς δ’ἐτελείετο βουλή, he added “Locus de providentia.” He notes “comminatio tyrannica” at the point where Agamemnon threatens Achilles, and when Calchas enters, only to make the quarrel worse, Melanchthon comments, “Commotio inter principes propter religionem.”

Mr. Plimpton also possesses another *Iliad* printed by Aldus, without date, with some notes attributed to Melanchthon. The book was evidently used by some one as the basis of lectures, for here and there come in practical directions, of which the most frequent is “Jocum narrabis.” Teacher’s perennial joke was not invented in our days. Mr. Plimpton’s library contains further Melanchthon’s own *Institutiones Graecae Grammaticae*, Hagenau, 1518, with notes by the author intended to prepare for a subsequent edition. Finally there is in the same storehouse of rare books a copy of *Procli paraphrasis in Quatuor Ptolomaei libros de siderum effectionibus cum praefatione Philippi Melanchthonis*, 1554, with Melanchthon’s name in autograph on the title-page, and, in another hand, “Doctissimo viro d. Georgio Scellar,” probably indicating that Melanchthon gave it to him.

8. CALVIN TO GEORGE, COUNT OF WÜRTTEMBERG &
MONTBÉLIARD

GENEVA, July 13, 1558

This letter is published in Calvin’s *Opera*, ed. Baum, Cunitz & Reuss, vol. xvii, 1877, coll. 253 ff. from a copy made by Beza. The copy varies in important particulars from the original, which I herewith collate:

Col. 253, line 4, *for spero read ut spero*.

L. 8, *for Sed excedere modestiae fines non read Sed modestiae fines excedere mihi non*.

Ll. 9–11, *the words ne vestra Celsitudo excutiendae tantae causae duas horas impendere gravetur are underlined by Calvin*.

Col. 254, 11. 17 f. *for P. read Petrus. The words Petrus Tussanus fallaces praetextus are underlined by Calvin*.

L. 19, *for sua et maligna read et maligna sua.*

L. 25, *for ingratitude non libenter read non libenter ingratitude.*

Ll. 28 f., *the words parum humaniter se gessit quod simultatibus are underlined by Calvin.*

L. 30, *the words me verbo uno admonuit ut me are underlined by Calvin.*

L. 31, *for meo consilio read consilio meo.*

Ll. 34 f., *the words experiri quid mea exhortatio apud eos valeret are underlined by Calvin.*

Ll. 38 f., *the words haereticis parci volens sicuti are underlined by Calvin.*

L. 46, *after factionis Calvin first wrote the words vel suae libidini addictos and then struck them out. This is worth noting as showing that the quick-tempered Reformer was capable of toning down an expression that escaped him in the heat of passion.* l. 54, *after existimationi add et otio fideliter.*

Col. 255, l. 11, *omit the words Celsitudinis vestrae obsequentissimus, evidently added by Beza as more respectful.*

L. 12, *after Calvinus add tuus.*

9. THEODORE BEZA TO PITHOU

APRIL 22, 1566

This is printed in Baird's Theodore Beza, 1899, p. 368 f., with facsimile. The printing is correct except p. 368, line 5 from the bottom "*nous epargnera*" should be "*nous y epargnera*."

Some years ago at Goodspeed's Book Shop in Boston I saw an autograph letter of Beza. I remember nothing particular about it, and inquiry at the shop elicits the information that they have sold it, they know not to whom.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE BOOK OF JOB AS A GREEK TRAGEDY RESTORED. HORACE M. KALLEN.
Moffat, Yard, & Co. 1918. Pp. xiv, 163. \$1.25.

In the earlier editions of Driver's monumental *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, one could read in a footnote the following: "Jewish scholars are often exceedingly clever and learned; but they are somewhat apt to see things in a false perspective, and to build upon superficial and *accidental* appearances extravagant and far-reaching hypotheses." This severe judgment was withdrawn in later editions. It is perhaps not unfitting for a member of his own race to quote the passage in relation to Dr. Kallen's book. As to the ability of the book and of its writer there can be no question. Though the condensed and somewhat strained style of writing is not the highest type of English, it is often picturesque, vivid, and forcible. There are many excellent observations, several pregnant utterances. But taken as a whole, the book fails to convince. It seems to the present writer exceedingly doubtful whether the verdict of time will tend to approve Dr. Kallen's theories as to the original form of *Job* or as to its teaching and its moral.

The author asks us to believe that *Job* was definitely written as an imitation or echo of an Euripidean tragedy; an echo or imitation, that is, such as a Hebrew genius, working within the limits of the legitimate and without an intimate knowledge of Euripides or Greek, might be supposed to create. A later editor or editors destroyed the dramatic form, disturbed here and there the due sequence of words, added a few interpolations, and thus produced the *Job* we know.

Now as Professor G. F. Moore in his very kindly and generous introduction rightly observes, our author's hypothesis does enable him to use as important parts of his theory and of the original recreated drama, certain passages which modern criticism does not know what to do with and commonly regards as interpolations. These passages are (1) 28, (2) 24 2-24, (3) 40 15-41 26. Any theory which presents the necessity of assuming interpolations has a certain *prima facie* fascination.

It is also true that the "play," as arranged by Dr. Kallen, has a certain plausibility (there is no question as to its ingenuity). The

prose introduction forms the Prologue, and may be roughly compared with the "Prologues" in the tragedies of Euripides. The speeches of Job and his three friends, arranged very much as we now find them but with certain transpositions, most of which have already been sanctioned and suggested by modern criticism, form the main substance of the drama. The three interpolations become the choruses. This is an exceedingly ingenious idea, and each of the three passages has a certain fitness (made the most of by our author!) in the place where Dr. Kallen puts them. Two of them are even in different metres from the dialogues. What could be more desirable? The third (the description of Behemoth and Leviathan) is, it must be confessed, in the same metre, "but is very different in theme and content." Moreover, Dr. Kallen's theory finds a place for Elihu. He seems to fill a double rôle, first as leader of the chorus (p. 127), and then as a quasi-Messenger. It is in the latter capacity that he speaks the words (or most of them) which are assigned to him in the text as we now possess it. After Elihu follows the Divine interposition and speech. This too is Euripidean, as every reader of the dramas must remember. And the epilogue is an expanded, Hebraic prose analogue of the epilogues of Euripides. So proudly does our author exclaim: "Prologue, *agon*, messenger, choruses, epiphany, epilogue, they are all evident, with just those differences from the Greek that may be expected from the difference in tradition and background between the two authors."

But surely these Euripidean resemblances are but "accidental and superficial." Interpolations, after all, are not unusual in old Hebrew writings, and the three in *Job* can more reasonably be accounted for in this manner than by turning them into choruses. It can hardly be fairly argued that their nature is "so like that of many of the Euripidean choruses" that it is "more plausible than not that they are such." The "praise of wisdom" (28) might, perhaps, be called "like," and is not easily to be accounted for as an interpolation, but the other two suggested choruses are at all events much more reasonably explicable in the ordinary manner. It is difficult to admit the propriety of Behemoth and Leviathan where Dr. Kallen places them. Job's "inflexible self-justification and challenge to God" could certainly not *only* be met by "an exhibition" of God's power; and though Dr. Kallen may call the description of the big beasts after 31 "pat to that purpose," few readers will be found to agree with him. Then the assimilation of Elihu to the Messenger is surely very far-fetched (p. 32). Nor does our author satisfactorily get over the difficulty that the Hebrew of Elihu's speeches appears

to be later than that of the main body of the work. He can only suggest apparently that these particular speeches have been partially rewritten or modified by a later hand (p. 31).

It is true that there was one Ezekiel, a Greek Jew who wrote Biblical dramas, and it is conceivable that there were Hebrew as well as Greek imitations prior to Ezekiel's imitations. But that there "must have been" Hebrew as well as Greek imitations, it is by no means legitimate to assert.

Dr. Kallen places the date of *Job* as early as 400 B.C. To suit his theory it is rather wonderful that he did not date it a hundred years later (apart from Dr. Kallen and his theory there seems no valid reason why 300 might not have been the date as probably as 400). A frail hypothesis is devised as to how the author of *Job* might have got some knowledge of Euripidean drama. He might, for instance, have actually witnessed the performance of one of the tragedies "on a visit to Egypt or the Syrian coast." He might have heard of Euripides and his plays from a friend. He might have known the Greek language, or at least enough to "catch the drift" or "retain the generic essence" of a witnessed play.

These are shadowy suppositions. That there are certain resemblances between the tone and temper of Euripides and that of the author of *Job* may perhaps be conceded, though whether the Hebrew poem "bears a relation to Jewish orthodoxy extraordinarily like that of so many of the plays of Euripides to Greek orthodoxy" must be doubted. A common criticism of their respective orthodoxies does not take us very far.

Altogether the theory of Dr. Kallen, while interesting and ingenious, must be regarded as, on the whole, a failure. *Job*, in all probability, even its most original form, was never written as a drama, and its author had more probably than not never seen or heard of any Euripidean tragedy.

More interesting to most readers than the strained attempt to prove that *Job* was originally a drama, will be the second division of Dr. Kallen's short essay, entitled *The Joban Philosophy of Life*, in which the true moral and purpose of the book is (for the first time!) exposed and explained. But here, too, able and ingenious — even profound — as our author's conclusions are, it is hardly mere conservatism, obstinacy, or obtuseness, which leads me to question their accuracy. Dr. Kallen, like the rest of us, is deeply impressed with the greatness of *Job*. And his just admiration, as it seems to me, has led him on to find in *Job* his own philosophy of life. What *he* thinks is the true "moral" of life, what *he* thinks is the right explanation

of the riddle of the universe, that he discovers already expounded by the author of *Job*. As the Hero of the Gospels has often been made to preach the particular sort of religion and of Christianity which is most congenial to each commentator in turn, so is *Job* made to preach the philosophy of Dr. Kallen. Nevertheless, fine and austere in many respects as that philosophy is, it scarcely represents that view of life and that explanation of life's riddles which it was the purpose of *Job* to set forth or even to conceal. *Job's* God was not Dr. Kallen's God, whether for better or for worse.

Job in its central assertion attains the "ultimate height, the full ripeness of the growth and unfoldment of the Hebraic theory of life" (p. 45). It seems whimsical or paradoxical that this full ripeness culminates in a God to whom prayer is useless and idle, and who, in His truest nature, is essentially beyond and indifferent to what man calls good and evil. In the growth which leads to this final "unfoldment" the prophets formed a stage and marked an advance; the Psalms, it may be surmised, were a retrogression and a backwater. Dr. Kallen is fain to allow that the "ultimate height" was heterodox and, in one sense, off the line — at all events, off the official line. That the play was preserved is due to the fact that its author "like Euripides, knew the wisdom of conveying his heterodox doctrine by means of a seductive orthodox setting" (p. 68).

The purpose of *Job* might apparently be described as an attempt to overcome the very subtle and pervasive fallacy of the human mind, which persists "in describing the unseen universe as congruous with our own will, as sharing its nature and contributing to its prosperity and final happiness" (p. 44). The Hebrew God-idea developed in "two simultaneous processes." First, Yahweh was moralized; secondly, he was depersonalized. The culmination of the two processes results in identifying him with "the course of nature regarded as a totality, with its energy and dynamic *go*, immanent in all events, transcending each, and making for righteousness" (p. 46). The last words sound as if a little, at all events, of what both the whole Old Testament and the whole New Testament understand by God had survived even in Dr. Kallen's theory. But the Divine righteousness is not what we mean by righteousness. God's justice is nothing like "the justice man conceives of and desires" (p. 70). "His justice is His wisdom, and this again is nothing else than power, force, the *go* and potency, generative and disintegrative, in things" (p. 71). It is a justice "of indifference, of cosmic impartiality, whereby each creature of God's might makes its own nature, without hindrance and without help" (p. 76). This

then is the secret of *Job*, of which it may safely be said that the author of *Job* was himself profoundly ignorant. Dr. Kallen finds important approaches to this non-moral God in the prophets, in whose teaching "conduct and destiny are correlated as cause and effect," where "there is nothing judicial, personal, voluntary," where "disaster follows wickedness or well-being follows righteousness only as indigestion follows over-eating" (p. 66). It is strange what a theory and a faith can make men see in the Bible! *Job*, however, goes much further than the Prophets: the God of *Job* is the "dynamic of the universe," entirely "incommensurable with human nature, the irreducible surd of all experience, whose being and force can be acknowledged, but not reasoned with" (p. 68). And so on.

"The fear of the Lord" is the moral of *Job*. But what does that mean? It means practical, empirical wisdom. It means man's recognition that he must "take his chance in a world" (*i.e.*, in a universe including God) which "does not care about him any more than about anything else" (p. 77). The justice of indifference is all which God has to offer him. Let him therefore "assert and realize the excellences appropriate to his nature as a man," in a world which was made no more for one creature than for another. Let him (and one must admire the teaching, even though it is neither "Joban" nor Judaic) "maintain his ways with courage rather than with faith, with self-respect rather than with humility, or better perhaps with a faith that is courage, a humility that is respect" (p. 78). This then is the ripest Hebrew wisdom. Here we have the austere humanism. The pathetic fallacy is wholly overcome (which the Greeks never succeeded in doing). There are no more "illusions" concerning man's relation to God. Man finds his citadel in his own soul — "even against Omnipotence itself — wherein he cherishes his integrity, and so cherishing, is victorious in the warfare of living even when life is lost" (p. 78). And this enlightenment, wisdom, self-mastery, are in accordance with "science." Thus it is that only with the coming of science has Hebraism begun "to come into its own" (p. 78).

One cannot but feel a certain sombre and austere dignity in Dr. Kallen's conclusions. In a godless, soulless, loveless universe (even though the word "soul" is still used by our author, and a God is still believed in, albeit a God of moral "indifference"), man stands up erect, undaunted, free.

But even if this sombre teaching be true, one thing it is not. It is not Judaism. Dr. Kallen's attack upon Reform or Liberal Judaism (p. 57) seems to imply that he is a Jewish nationalist of the

usual non-religious type. It is mournful indeed if this subversal and denial of Judaism, and of what both Judaism and Christianity mean by God, is to become the irreligion of a Jewish Settlement in Palestine. And it is curious to note how the position at which Dr. Kallen has arrived (and which he seeks to foist upon *Job* and upon "Hebraism") is probably in part the result of an anti-Christian bias. One would have thought that a man of Dr. Kallen's views would have got rid of the pedantry of writing B.C.E. instead of B.C. May we speak of Wednesday and Thursday, but must we not write B.C. and A.D.? More significant is the following: "The terms in which God is described throughout the drama are terms of action; the usual hypostasis of the pleasant emotions of men — of love, of goodness, of charity — is not made." "The pleasant emotions of men" — this fling is doubtless supposed to be very clever and sarcastic; is it not rather somewhat foolish and somewhat sad?

It remains to be repeated that there are many acute observations and reflections in Dr. Kallen's all too brief disquisition (for the text of *Job* occupies 77 pages and the Introductory Essay only 76), which, if space permitted, one would be glad to quote. It seems a pity that he should have accepted the identification of the Servant of the Lord (Isaiah 42, 49, and 53) with Zerubbabel, a hypothesis which is now, I think, very generally discarded.

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

COUNTERFEIT MIRACLES. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. 327. \$2.00.

Dr. Warfield discriminates between miracles, properly so-called, and Special Providences, answers to prayer, etc., in that the former are wrought by an unmediated act of God, apart from processes, and are connected with revelation which, or the bearers of which, they are designed to authenticate and attest. With this definition, the thesis is that miracles have been performed in Christian history since Jesus, only by the Apostles and their next successors to whom they communicated the gift by the laying on of hands. That the Apostolic Fathers make no mention of miracles shows that in their time they had ceased. From the third century on, however, they are related increasingly on account of the influence of heathenism not only, in general, upon and in the minds of Christians but also specifically through the Apocryphal Acts and Gospels copying the

heathen teratology. These ecclesiastical miracles are declared counterfeit almost by definition, since, revelation having been completed in the Apostolic Age, there was no further occasion for their existence, and since behind them, especially such as are associated with the worship of Mary, lies error and not truth. Faith-healing also, when it occurs, is at best only an instance of the general supernatural, since often means are employed, as, for example, rest, and indeed faith itself or any act of mind or will is as truly a means as medicine or the knife. The same is true of mind-cure in all its forms, including Christian Science. There may be cures which are inexplicable, but such an event is not necessarily miraculous. It is interesting to note the absence of even a suggestion that counterfeit miracles may be of diabolical origin.

The discussion, which is remarkably interesting and thorough, reinforced by abundant references to a wide range of reading on the various subjects, inevitably raises the inquiry, although Dr. Warfield does not raise it, how the New Testament miracles would stand the tests by which their counterfeit rivals are detected. The theory would be a trifle neater if the power of working miracles had been confined to Jesus himself, in whom revelation was consummate; but this restriction would be damaging to the inspiration of the Epistles and the Acts. Moreover, if a cure which requires faith on the part of the sufferer or his friends is not a miracle, since a mental act or attitude may be a means of recovery, what is to be said of the statements in the Gospels which make healings conditional upon faith? In recent years the tendency has been to maintain that miracles are not *a priori* impossible, and therefore the question as to their actual occurrence is one of evidence alone; but Dr. Warfield is too astute to be betrayed into that trap. As he repeatedly declares, the evidence for certain ecclesiastical miracles is exceedingly good; far better, one might add, *prima facie*, than for any New Testament miracle. The deliberately written testimonies of an Augustine or a Jerome are better evidence, as evidence goes, than the Gospel records of uncertain date and authorship. If the alleged miracles of the third century and later are due to the influences of the environment, was not the first century also demon-ridden (to use the author's own word concerning it), and may not the New Testament also show the effect of its influence? The author puts himself in a rather perilous position when he says of certain reports of a wonder at Lourdes:

"We are willing to believe that it happened just as it is said to have happened. We are content to know that in no case was it a miracle. . . .

It is a primary principle, therefore, that no event can be really miraculous which has implications inconsistent with fundamental religious truth . . . The whole place, says Benson, is alive with Mary. That is the very reason why we are sure that the marvels which occur there are not the direct acts of God, but are of the same order as the similar ones which have occurred at many similar shrines of many names, in many lands, serving many gods" (pp. 119-123).

That is to say, by definition, miracles accompany revelation as its attestation, and since revelation found its organic completeness in Christ, miracles have ceased and no amount of evidence can make them credible. But one has an uneasy sense that here is a vicious circle — the revelation is known to be such because accompanied by miracles, and miracles are known to be miracles because they attend revelation.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

FREEDOM AND TRUTH: and other Sermons in King's Chapel. HOWARD N. BROWN, D.D. W. B. Clarke Co. 1916. Pp. vi, 337. \$1.75.

This volume contains more than a score of sermons preached by Dr. Brown in King's Chapel, Boston, in the course of as many years, and includes also a brief and vivid historical sketch of the church. The sermons, while covering a wide range of subjects, deal almost wholly with the greater and more abiding themes of the religious life, rather than with issues of temporary and fleeting interest. There is in them, indeed, nothing of that sort of "preaching for the times" which so often degenerates into mere chatter about current events. Dr. Brown deals with large issues from a point of view which, by the long habit of meditation, has become somewhat detached. His preaching is carefully wrought, the distillation of much quiet thinking into a form far more highly finished than that of the vast majority of preachers.

It should be said at once that the result is rather far removed from the popular pulpit oratory of the day. Dr. Brown's sermons are stately rather than "snappy," more full of thought than of "punch," better calculated to produce a reasoned conviction than an emotional thrill. They contain, indeed, an admirable degree of religious warmth and a very genuine spiritual insight, but their chief characteristic is their wisdom, as persuasive as it is unobtrusive. Dr. Brown's observation of current tendencies is shrewd and his judgment upon them sagacious.

It is a criticism of the age rather than of the preacher to recognize that sermons of this type can today command only a rather limited number of hearers. With all their modernity of outlook, their style is that of the great English university preachers to whom Oxford and Cambridge used to listen with attention, or of the American Unitarians of the nineteenth century, with their clear thinking and their high appeal to the moral judgment rather than to the emotions. It requires a congregation with genuine intellectual interests and spiritual idealism to appreciate such preaching. It will be neither understood nor valued by people whose chief interest in the sermon is the hope that it will soon end that they may the more quickly reach the golf links or start the motor-car. But to those who value the great traditions of the pulpit and its position of intellectual prestige, this volume will be most welcome. It is the fruit of a long and honored ministry; the evidence that a kind of preaching which the world cannot afford to lose is still here and there to be found.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE NEW ARCHEOLOGICAL DISCOVERIES AND THEIR BEARING UPON THE NEW TESTAMENT AND UPON THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. CAMDEN M. COBERN. Introduction by Edouard Naville. Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1917. Pp. xxxiv, 698. \$3.00.

This big and handsomely illustrated book by an American professor of the Bible is intended for popular readers, not for scholars, and must be judged by that aim. The author has had some experience in excavation, has seen many archæological discoveries and manuscripts, has read widely, and has diligently assembled material from many sources "to make this work a 'corpus' of all the more fascinating facts and all the most beautiful and worthy sayings that have floated down to us from the opulent centuries in which the earliest Church was trained." Unfortunately the exaggeration of expression and the indefiniteness of thought regarding his task which appear in the author's language here quoted from his preface, are characteristic of the book.

The material objects recovered from the past in modern times (as well as the ancient books and private bits of writing) have expanded and enlivened our knowledge, have sustained or corrected the conclusions of patient scholarship, occasionally (though rarely) have answered a debated question. To make from this vast mass of facts newly brought to light suitable selections which should show

clearly what the gains have been and wherein their importance lies, would be a valuable service, instructive to any reader who desires a just view of the early history of Christianity. Such a work would at the same time strengthen confidence, as this book aims to do, in the critically tested knowledge which scholars have drawn, and always will have to draw, mainly from more familiar sources — the well-known books preserved by successive generations and studied for centuries past. But to perform such a task requires not only this author's wide acquaintance with modern archæological exploration, but a more discriminating judgment than this book shows as to the exact positive significance of the discoveries for historical knowledge, and with that a clearer understanding of the difference between popular and purely scholarly interests.

The best parts of the book are the summaries of the results of archæological work, such as that at Oxyrhynchus, in Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, at Pompeii, Rome, and other places. These are derived from the writer's own work and from explorers' memoirs; and it is interesting to learn the details of humble life in Egypt, to see pictures of Christian churches and the houses of Christians in Syria in the period from the fourth to the seventh century, or to read the graffiti of lovers and loafers at Pompeii. But very little of all this (that which comes from Palestine least of all) has any relation to Christianity; still less is it capable of throwing any light on the New Testament or on "the life and times of the primitive Church." Great ranges of remote facts like these must indeed be considered by scholars, but for the popular reader much, if not most, of it all is of no use whatever. The most significant subject for the New Testament here treated is perhaps that of ancient conventional forms used in writing letters.

A long section of the book consists of descriptions and lists of more or less recently discovered New Testament manuscripts, especially papyrus fragments. These accounts are obviously inadequate for the scholar, while they are confusing, and, it must in all kindness be added, misleading for the popular reader. One great object of the author's interest seems to lie in pointing out the important verses which accidentally happen to be included in this or the other papyrus scrap. Now apart from the fact that hardly any two pages of the New Testament can be found which do not contain at least one highly prized verse, it is very wrong to give the unlearned public the impression that our knowledge of and confidence in the text of the New Testament depends on such chances as these. We should be just as sure of the substantial trustworthiness of the

New Testament text if these papyri had never turned up. And this is part of a tendency unhappily characteristic of Professor Cobern's discussion of these text-critical matters, which has not been escaped by others who have attempted the same thing. In order to make interesting to a general public facts which are in themselves unimportant except to scholars for their own special purposes, it is necessary to exaggerate the "sensational," "epoch-making," "surprising" importance of these discoveries. For instance, in speaking of a third-century papyrus leaf from a New Testament, the author says that "the whole tone of modern New Testament criticism was changed for the better" by the observation that this leaf was in close agreement with Westcott and Hort's text, and exclaims, "It looked as if the Church of the martyrs possess the same New Testament as our fathers revered." One is disposed to ask who ever doubted this, and also whether we have gone so far that a book first published in 1881 is the Testament of "our fathers." The author himself later remarks (p. 173) that "it must be frankly acknowledged that nothing very spectacular or strange has been brought to light in these sixty or more texts." A slight justification for his exaggeration may be found in the fact that he speaks seriously of the opinion of "some skeptics" that "the present New Testament was either originated by Constantine or much changed by him"!

In the discussion of textual criticism and the accounts of early Christian and other documents lately discovered or more fully studied, the writer gives, as elsewhere, much that can be of interest only to scholars, but for them what he gives is wholly inadequate and is not free from painful crudities and errors. Thus one cannot properly say that the assurance that Tatian's Diatessaron was composed from our four Gospels has "rendered obsolete" the theories of Baur and Strauss (p. 209). To hear of Zahn and Harnack as the contributors to knowledge in the Ignatian question, with no slightest mention of Lightfoot; to read that Cicero is said not to have known Greek until he was over eighty years of age; to find a document well known for centuries described as the "recently recovered" Festal Letter of 367 of Athanasius — if it be indifferent to the simple reader whether such things are correctly and justly stated or not, then they ought not to appear in such a book at all.

It is with reluctance that this criticism is written. It is indeed true that no one could read the book through without having his attention drawn to many noteworthy things in a wide field, some of which have to do with the New Testament or with a more or less early Christianity. The extracts from the Psalms and Odes of

Solomon are worth giving here. And many readers will doubtless pick up one or another fact for which they will be grateful because they can use it. But the scholarship of the book is not sufficient for the exacting demands of its popular purpose. At a moment when America must look forward to taking up scholarly tasks dropped by the shattered forces of other lands, it is disquieting to receive a book like this, which tries to cover a great field with popular encyclopædic information, but which everywhere betrays defective training and shows enough neither of thinking nor of omitting nor of revising.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE REVIVAL OF THE CONVENTUAL LIFE IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. RALPH W. SOCKMAN. W. D. Gray. New York. 1917. Pp. 230.

It is not often that a thesis for a doctorate merits notice in a quarterly Review. This of Mr. Sockman's does. It is all that a thesis should be — its theme sufficiently worthy, its treatment un-deviating and straight to its end, its learning ample, its sources wide. The author puts his facts clearly, lets the reader draw his inferences, and keeps his own opinions largely to himself.

Many persons will be surprised at the extent to which monasticism in its various forms has prevailed in the Church of England since the Reformation. Mr. Sockman holds that its root is in the desire for the contemplative life, for asceticism, and for increased opportunities of service, and that this root still existed in the Church of England after the Reformation, though its outward forms had been for the most part cut off. Nicholas Ferrar's house at Little Gidding (1625) was the first attempt to embody the conventual idea; and though this was followed by a few others, and though their legitimacy was recognized by ecclesiastical authorities here and there, but little interest was felt in the matter until the French Revolution sent into England large numbers of priests, monks, and nuns. "That which left an abiding influence in England and contributed silently and indirectly to the Catholic revival, was the patience in poverty, dignity in bearing misfortune, exemplary conduct, and holy living displayed by these victims of the French Revolution. Sympathy, admiration, and the fear of Jacobism were all paving the way for the Catholic revival in England" (p. 26).

In the early part of the nineteenth century, increased interest was aroused by the pressure of the problem of surplus and unemployed

women, by the awakened interest in better nursing, and by the increase of foreign travel. Robert Southey advocated the establishment of Protestant Sisters of Charity; and his words kept coming up throughout the century as motive and support to those who were interested in the monastic idea. The first Anglican Sisterhood was proposed as a memorial to him after his death in 1843. "The old principles of Laud and the Caroline divines had never entirely died out, even in the lethargy of the eighteenth century. The Evangelical Movement had raised the standard of personal piety. The Napoleonic wars and subsequent travel had reopened the continent to Englishmen, and given them a view of continental Christianity. The Romantic writers had revived interest in the Middle Ages" (p. 60). All these causes contributed to the rise of the Oxford Movement, and this soon began to lay emphasis on celibacy. Newman, Pusey, and Keble seem to have been at first little impressed with its importance in their scheme. It was Richard Hurrell Froude who stamped it first upon Newman and then upon the whole Movement. Thenceforth the idea that celibacy was more honorable than marriage contributed directly to the establishment of strictly "religious" Orders. In Newman's opinion, the only way to prevent secessions to Rome was to copy its institutions. "I am almost in despair of keeping men together," he writes in 1842. "The only possible way is a monastery. Men want an outlet for their devotional and penitential feelings, and if we do not grant one, to a dead certainty they will go where they can find it" (p. 90).

Religious Orders for women were successfully established almost two decades before those for men. This was largely owing to the beginning of the new movement for enlarging the sphere of women's activities. Higher education for women and entrance into the professions were still in the future. But the well-to-do, unmarried woman was finding home stifling, and her ecclesiastical advisers prescribed nursing, visiting the poor, attending church services, meditation, because these were the only avenues they saw open and because these would stave off more dangerous activities. Mr. Sockman mentions nine of these Sisterhoods that were founded in 1848 and the following decade. Newman made a beginning of conventual houses for men at Littlemore in 1842; but logic asserted itself in 1845, when he and, shortly after, his friends, entered the Church of Rome. A similar experience in case of Faber and his friends added another handicap to the Brotherhood movement in the Anglican Church; and for almost two decades little was heard of Protestant monasteries. In 1862, however, Rev. Joseph L. Lyne

issued a pamphlet advocating the revival of monasticism in the Church of England, and put his ideas into practice by calling himself Father Ignatius, wearing the Benedictine dress, and adopting with two friends the Rule of St. Benedict. His Order, as he called it, grew, though the genuine Benedictines of the Roman Church laughed at his assumptions. His community, however, died with him in 1908; all but half a dozen members, who joined a community claiming to be Benedictine, founded by Aelred Carlyle in 1898. Father Aelred's Order moved to Caldey Island in 1906, and in seven years reached the height of its prosperity — 33 members. Then logic caught it too, and Abbot Aelred saw clearly that "the Divine authority and unity of the Catholic Church were to be found only in union with the Holy See" (p. 181). Dom Bede Camm, a prominent Roman Benedictine, says of the transference of these English monks to the Church of Rome, "This has been the only serious or, so far, successful attempt to introduce the contemplative life into the Anglican communion. The movement has now collapsed, and it is unlikely that any one will hereafter attempt an experiment foredoomed to failure" (p. 182). This prophecy, however, has not been fulfilled; for the Society of St. John the Evangelist, with headquarters at Cowley St. John, Oxford, founded in 1866, is still active; as are also the Society of the Resurrection at Mirfield (founded 1892), the Society of the Sacred Mission at Newark (1893), and the Society of the Divine Compassion at Plaistow (1899).

The aim underlying all these and similar movements is to have Catholicism without the Papacy. This was the issue in the struggle of the first century after the Reformation in England, and the verdict of that period was that the attempt was impossible. The Oxford Movement renewed the endeavor. Many of its followers who succeeded in walking for a time along the narrow edge, toppled over on to the other side. Others today think they have accomplished the feat, and are proud to call themselves Catholics but not Papists. Whether their dream of Christian unity through such Catholicity will become realized, remains to be seen. Some believe that the war is rendering this more likely; others, less likely.

The proof-reading of the book is bad — "misson" for mission (p. 183); "Neale" and "Neal" on the same page (p. 151); a quotation lacks its final marks (p. 134), a parenthesis its final brace (p. 109). The punctuation in general is often meagre and unintelligent.

FREDERIC PALMER.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. WALTER SCOTT ATHEARN. The Pilgrim Press. 1917. Pp. xiii, 394. \$1.50.

"The problem of the book," says the author, "is the *organization* of religious education in the American democracy" (p. viii). To quote the author again, what he gives us is a "blue print to guide future development" (p. 17). If the term "big business" may be used in a eulogistic rather than dyslogistic sense, we are here summoned to big business in religious education as contrasted with the wasteful and ineffective methods of small-shop denominationalism. It is possible, Professor Athearn believes, so to organize a system of coördinated public schools and church schools as to "guarantee to every child both intelligence and godliness" (p. 21). In almost every detail of this ambitious scheme there is reflected a lively, bustling, adventurous, unconventional, pungent mind.

The outstanding requirements of the proposed re-organization may be summarily stated as follows:

(1) It must be entirely separate from the schools of the State — a second complete school system.

(2) In addition to denominational agencies it must include organs, both local and national, that are directly representative of the populace as a whole, and therefore free from denominational control. The author holds strenuously to the opinion that any mere federation of denominational organs or agencies or representatives would subject the common good to partisan interests.

(3) It must be comprehensive, must reach all the way from the kindergarten to the university. In particular, teacher-training will be provided on the high-school level, the college level, and the graduate-college level.

(4) It must provide professional supervision capable of reaching every local community, and available for any church school that desires it.

(5) It must develop methods of its own by direct research of an experimental sort, particularly with respect to "prejudice," sentiment, and ideals, an area of the mind to which public-school methods have given little attention.

(6) It must establish and maintain standards that will enable it to deal with the public-school system, in all matters that require coördination therewith, "on terms of absolute equality" (p. 107).

(7) If one asks where and how such an elaborate organization is to be started, the answer is that a start has been made already in certain community-schools or systems of religious education, notably the one at Malden, Mass., of which Professor Athearn himself is the

head. Such schools, it is believed, could easily be multiplied, and a next natural step would be a general federation or union of them. Moreover, certain existing organizations that are not under ecclesiastical control might be woven into the new fabric. The Religious Education Association is adapted to serve as the professional association of the leaders of religious education. The International Sunday School Association might possibly be reconstructed so as to serve as a general supervisory and promotional body. Even the American Sunday School Union might have a part.

Let no one ignore this scheme on the ground that it is too ambitious to be practical, or even that it is fundamentally defective. For we need to face, not to run away from, the problem that Professor Athearn has attacked so vigorously. Religious education in this country, as far as organization is concerned, is too nearly chaotic to be creditable to the American mind. The drastic analysis of this situation in Chapter IV has not been printed a day too soon. Especial attention may be called to his summary on page 239, a summary of duplications, confusions, and expenses, all of which must be regarded, ultimately, as burdens that the children have to bear.

His fundamental contentions are likely to arouse doubt at one point at least. Is the creation of still another set of religious organizations — organizations that are expected to include the members of all the churches — is this the shortest road to efficiency? If we had to deal with a new element of population, or with a new function, possibly a new set of organs would be best; but no such reason is alleged. Further, some essential questions with regard to the proposed new bodies are touched upon all too lightly. There must be within them, Professor Athearn reiterates, "absolute academic freedom" (p. 154 f.). Just what "absolute" academic freedom means is not clear; certainly the universities claim nothing of the kind for themselves. On the other hand, the community-system of religious education is to be controlled by persons "of the most profound religious experience" (p. 155). One wonders how this item of administration is to be managed, particularly in a system of "absolute academic freedom." One wonders too whether references to what the churches "must" do (pp. 151, 168), and to "granting" to each denomination the "right" to supervise its own religious schools (p. 240), are to be taken as instances of a careless use of language merely or as signs of a state of mind. In relation to this delicate matter one thing is clear in any case: Professor Athearn's assumption that the members of the various religious denominations can actually be induced to enter the proposed non-ecclesiastical

religious organizations is a marked tribute to the growth of liberality within the churches.

Another point on which too little has been said concerns the relation of Jews and Catholics to a religious enterprise that essays to represent the community and the nation. Every detail reads as if the scheme were Protestant. The chapter on "the unification of educational agencies" does not even mention a Catholic or Jewish agency. The Malden system, which furnishes a model, is, in actual operation, as Professor Athearn indicated at the 1918 Conference of the Religious Education Association, an active coöperation of Protestants, with passive acquiescence or non-participation on the part of Catholics and Jews.

A grateful word must be spoken with respect to the general plan of the book, particularly its classified bibliographical lists and its method of raising more questions than it pretends to answer. On the other hand, the typography of the bibliographical notes is about the worst possible, and there are signs of haste.¹ The discussion of the principles of curriculum building, in particular, offers suggestions and headings without taking time or space to indicate clearly what theory of the educative process the author has in mind.

GEORGE A. COE.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

PROTESTANTISM IN GERMANY. KERR D. MACMILLAN. Princeton University Press. 1917. Pp. viii, 282. \$1.50.

In one sense these lectures belong to the large and rapidly growing class of "tracts for the times" produced by the great war; yet in another sense they constitute a historical essay of independent interest and value, such as might be written at any time. The author is President of Wells College, and the lectures were delivered on the Stone foundation at Princeton Theological Seminary in the year 1916-17. They aim to trace the course of German Protestantism

¹ I venture to catalogue the following: P. 3, "average level of . . . intelligence" and "average citizen" obviously do not state the author's meaning; p. 12 confuses moral training with teaching ethics; p. 42, "References on Reconstruction of Educational Theory Due to the World War" are listed under the general heading, "The Parochial Schools"; pp. 148, 224, "McMurry" is misspelled; p. 148, data "is"; pp. 180, 181, the phrase "association of church schools" is used to designate an entirely non-denominational body; p. 199, lines 8-9, "International" is an interpolation and an incorrect interpretation; p. 220, what is meant by "the present graded curriculum"?

as influenced, on the one hand, by the original principles of Luther, and, on the other, by the subjection of the Lutheran Churches to State control. This task is adequately performed.

The author seeks also to point out the bearing of his history upon the present world-conflict, and to show how nations having "the same religious birthright and presumably the same religious training" can "differ so widely in respect to moral ideals and conduct" (Preface, p. iii) as do Germany and the Entente. This inquiry is of importance, and the problem involved has puzzled and bewildered many thoughtful minds.

The author finds at least a clue to the solution of the problem in the fact that in Protestant Germany the super-addition of ecclesiastical authority to civil power, under the territorial State-Church system, offered "opportunity to a strong race of rulers to establish . . . a form of absolute monarchy, such as western Christendom has never witnessed elsewhere." (This statement needs some qualification, and does in fact receive it elsewhere in the book.) The author follows his clue a little farther, and finds that this unfortunate and in the end disastrous policy of Lutheranism rests upon "the mediæval idea of the submission of the individual subject to the prince-bishop in both civil and religious things" (Preface, p. iv). The inevitable consequence of keeping the people in a condition of "perpetual tutelage" was "a real fear of freedom" (p. 278), and of course also a disqualification for its exercise. In the author's words, "the conditions for the formation of healthy and effective public opinion have been absent from Germany largely because the people were deprived of their privileges as Protestants" (p. 253).

It is not, however, to Martin Luther himself — at least not to the fundamental principles of his early and most creative period — that this development is to be traced, but rather to the surrender of those principles in the subjection of the Lutheran Churches to secular authority, whereby true spiritual liberty was placed in jeopardy. "The Lutheran system cultivated the idea that religion and morality were imposed from above, that they could be cared for like sanitation and education, and that it was the sole duty of the layman to obey. The importance of this in the education and development of the people cannot be exaggerated" (p. 249).

In the course of his argument the author finds opportunity to draw several instructive comparisons between the Lutheran and Calvinistic systems, and their effects upon national life (pp. 219, 234, 247, 254). There is also an effective contrast between the religious life of Germany and that of England (pp. 263 ff.).

The book is not free from typographical errors, especially in the latter half. A line seems to have fallen out near the bottom of page 205, and near the bottom of page 241 the correct statements are reversed. There is an index.

JOHN WINTHROP PLATNER.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

S. AGOSTINO. ERNESTO BUONAIUTI. Ed. Formiggini. Roma. 1917.

A small book, but a very valuable contribution to the spiritual history of St. Augustine. The *Confessions*, written more than fifteen years after Augustine's conversion, rather than a true historical autobiography, is a typical demonstration, applied to his own career, of his theories about the work of God in the government and the spiritual pedagogy of the elected souls. Less mystical but more objective indications of the process which led Augustine to accept the Christian faith are to be found in his philosophical works written in the solitude of Cassisiacum, shortly before his baptism (*Contra Academicos*, *De ordine*, *De beata vita*). In the light of what Augustine says in these books his spiritual crisis appears to have been eminently intellectual in character rather than mystical. When in the year 383 Augustine left Carthage to start a school of rhetoric in Rome, his old Manichæan faith was already tottering and his thought was leaning towards Academic agnosticism. His dream of making a fortune in Rome was quickly shattered when, after several months of hard work in teaching, he found his class-room deserted the very day in which his students were supposed to pay their fees. There came in time a vacancy in a chair of rhetoric in the public schools of Milan, and Augustine started for the imperial city of Northern Italy.

But this year of Roman life was not without influence in Augustine's spiritual and moral evolution. It was a very prosperous period for the Roman Church. After the troubles of his election Pope Damasus had successfully strengthened his authority, and a series of imperial decrees bestowed upon him astounding privileges and authority even in civil matters, giving the force of public law to his decisions on Church discipline and faith. Jerome, then the faithful secretary of Damasus and the idol of the Roman Christian aristocracy, was organizing that ascetic revival which later on led to the foundation of the Latin monasteries in Palestine. The pagan element was rapidly sinking down before the blossoming of

the Christian vitality, and it was that very year that by imperial decree the *Ara Victoriae* of the Roman Senate was overthrown and the fate of the old State religion officially sealed. Although in Augustine's writing very little is found about his experiences in Rome, yet there is no doubt that while he made a step further towards agnosticism, on the other hand he was deeply impressed by the powerful organization of the Roman Church, and acquired a better knowledge of the social and political value of Christianity in the Roman world.

In Milan two new factors exercised a decisive influence on his life: the adoption of the Neoplatonic philosophy, which delivered him from the materialistic postulates of Manichæan dualism and from the anthropomorphic tendencies traditional to African theology; and his acquaintance with the great Milanese bishop, Ambrose. In Neoplatonism Augustine found an idealistic representation of the gnoseologic fact, a pure notion of the Godhead, and finally a solution of the problem of evil which had so long distressed his mind. The influence of Ambrose, his impressive biblical exegesis, his aggressive theology, and especially the example of his life of unbounded and heroic devotion to the Christian ideal of a new society founded on righteousness and charity, were no less effective on Augustine's mind. It seems that it was in the solitude of the villa *ad Cassisiacum* near the Alps that he finally realized the gaps which were to be found in the Neoplatonic interpretation of the universe, and that those gaps could be filled only by the dogmas of the Christian faith. Having christianized his Neoplatonism, and being also fully aware of the high value of practical Christianity in social and political life, Augustine was ready for baptism, which was administered to him by Ambrose in the year 387. Of course, the mystical element was not completely absent from this crisis; Neoplatonism itself is permeated with mystical tendencies; but in Augustine's spiritual rebirth mysticism followed and fostered the whole process, but did not create it. It became, however, more and more prominent in the successive stages of his religious life, so that when, almost seventeen years later, he wrote his *Confessions*, his mind was already used to look into his past life through his new mystical conception of the universe, and thus he was led to describe it in terms of his mystical experience. That is why in his *Confessions* he exaggerates the importance of the faults of his youth, discovering a sinful tendency even in the innocent avidity of the baby for the maternal breast, or in the childish theft of some pears from a neighboring garden, and representing as an unpardonable crime his relation with a concubine.

As a matter of fact, we know from the decree of the Toletan council of the year 400 that to live with only one concubine, namely, a woman of inferior condition, as Augustine did, was not even considered as a sufficient reason to exclude a member from the Christian community.

The successive theological evolutions of Augustine confirm such a view of the character of the initial crisis which led him to Christianity. His theology is the theoretical abstraction of his practical daily work in the Church, and his episcopal praxis is simply religious philosophy put into action. Such a theology was not thought of in the solitude of a monastic cell like that of Aquinas, but was shaped and ripened under the strain of practical necessities and of vital polemics on the most various points and frequently in opposite directions. A strong mind, like that of Augustine, could not fail, working under those circumstances, to pass again and again through a sieve his own ideas and to modify them in a substantial way, according to the new religious experiences of which his life was so rich. That happened especially in regard to the greatest problem of Christian ethics — the question of sin and free will.

In the fervor of the Manichæan polemics against cosmic dualism, Augustine emphasized the spiritual nature of God and the negative conception of evil; in this period therefore his affirmation of free will is absolute. But later in the new Pelagian polemics the problem appeared to him under a new light. In the last analysis the question was whether the redemptive action of Christ involved a real and complete palingenesis of the human soul, or a mere perfection of the Law; whether efficient divine grace received through the sacraments is necessary for justification, or whether human nature can reach such a justification by its own original powers. A few years before (396–397) and so between the two great controversies — the Manichæan and the Pelagian — Augustine under the influence of Ambrosiaster's commentary on Romans had modified radically his views about original sin and its deadly effects on mankind.¹ This new pessimistic conception of mankind, as of a *massa damnata*, and the reaction against the Pelagian emphasis on human capacity to work salvation by itself, led Augustine to deny virtually the individual value of every human action and to formulate his famous principle that the free man is not he who has liberty of choice between two alternatives, but only he who follows with joy the will of his master.

¹ See the article "The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin" published by Professor Buonaiuti in this Review, April, 1917.

The last part of the book deals with Augustine's ecclesiology, and with the religious-social content of the *City of God*. In connection with the latter point, Professor Buonaiuti attacks Professor E. Troeltsch's recent book on Augustine; in which it is assumed that the *City of God* is a mere synthesis of primitive Christian ethics, leading to asceticism and renunciation, and therefore void of any real political value and unable to supply the ideological material for a sound social organization. In fact, Professor Troeltsch, analyzing the political and social elaboration of the Christian world in the Middle Ages, does not discover any trace of a valuable influence of Augustine's thought on the events of that historical period. Professor Buonaiuti starts with criticizing the common erroneous assumption that in the mind of Augustine the City of God is simply the Church. There is no identity between the two institutions. The antithesis between the City of God and the City of Satan is in a moral way applied to the social and political life: the City of God is the society of the idealists and altruists, the City of Satan is the society of the egoists. The passage in Book XIV, 28 is a clear statement of Augustine's thought:

"Two loves built up the two cities: self-love, namely, the egotism which blinds men to despise God, built up the earthly city; the love of God and ideals involving self-sacrifice built up the celestial city. The former takes glory to itself; the latter puts its glory exclusively in the Lord. The former goes after earthly praise; the latter trusts in God revealed in the testimony of conscience. The former proudly lifts up its head; the latter bows humbly to God, saying, 'Thou art my glory and my triumph.' The citizens of the earthly city are dominated by the lust of conquest, which leads them to make slaves of the others; the citizens of the celestial city help each other with a spirit of sweet charity, and fulfil faithfully their social duties."

How to know to which city each of us belongs is evident: "Interroget ergo se quisque quid amet, et inveniet unde sit civis." Christianity, like other mystery-religions, proclaimed the rights and the inviolability of the individual conscience. Augustine developed the social inferences depending logically upon this principle, and set forth the Christian theory that political ethics cannot have a different ground from individual ethics. There is only one fundamental criterion of human values, because there is only one supreme end for human activity — the realization of the divine ideal of goodness. And this is a philosophy of history which is eternal and applies to human history in all its stages.

Such is in a rapid outline the content of Professor Buonaiuti's little book. We cannot say that this estimate of Augustine's

religious crisis as more of an intellectual than of a mystical character is entirely new and wholly original, but certainly it has never been propounded in such a definite way and so well harmonized with the whole of Augustine's intellectual and spiritual career, in a vigorous synthesis of his life and his theology. Being a work of synthesis, there is no room for details in the book. As for the synthesis itself, like all syntheses, it has a personal element, which, however, does not at all diminish the objective value of the study.

G. F. LA PIANA.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN EUROPE (1250-1458). EPHRAIM EMERTON.
Ginn & Co. 1918. Pp. xiv, 550. Maps. \$1.80.

The publication of this new volume by Professor Emerton is an event of great interest to a host of his students and friends. And his students include a very large proportion of all those who have studied history in the last generation, not only at Harvard but throughout the United States. For it is now thirty years since the appearance of his *Introduction to the Middle Ages*. The older of the present generation of professors welcomed this with admiration as the best book on the subject, and used it in their classes. Many of the younger professors now in service began their serious study of history with this *Introduction*. A few years later his *Mediæval Europe* was published, and now we have the third volume in the series.

The author has had a more difficult task than in either of the preceding volumes. In the first the contrast and contact of Roman and Teuton and the influence of the Christian Church dictated the treatment. In the second, "we see Europe wholly under the sway of two vast ideas, feudalism and the Roman Church system." Very different "is the subject of our present study. It is a chapter in human history of which no brief general description can be given. It is impossible to point to any peculiar institutions that govern its life. As we try to unfold the tangled thread of its history, we seem to find only confusion and disorder." But under Professor Emerton's masterly analysis the seeming confusion is straightened out, and we see the orderly evolution of the forces which controlled the period. In order to grasp the important lines of thought the Preface, from which these quotations have been taken, must be carefully read. It is so closely packed with matter that any attempt at condensation is futile. It is summed up, in part, in the following sentence: "This

then will be the natural thread of our narrative: the working out, consciously in literature and unconsciously through social and political conflict, of the idea that individuals or bodies of men voluntarily united in a common interest might, if they pleased, speak and act for themselves." It is a Preface to be studied and pondered over; it suggests questions; it arouses dissent; it compels admiration.

The book begins with a discussion of the principle of the modern State, illustrated by the policies of Frederic II and Louis IX. The treatment of the Constitution of Frederic is especially noteworthy; it is novel and far more informing than any other brief account of this subject. In the chapters on the New Empire and the New Papacy the various lines of policy and the changing constitutional forms are compared and contrasted. Possibly Professor Emerton's method of treatment can be best seen in his chapter on the rise of the middle class. This begins with a statement of the revival of the nominalistic teaching, in opposition to the prevailing realism of the Middle Ages. The new teaching is illustrated by Ockham's *Dialogus* and Marsiglio of Padua's *Defensor Pacis*. This introduction binds together the treatment in the four following sections: on the origin and emancipation of Switzerland, the importance of the merchants and the various leagues of cities in Germany, the democratic movement in Flanders, and the Estates General in France. This is followed by a chapter on the Italian Republics to 1300, where the real elements of Italian unity are made clear. Again, the importance of the middle class is brought out in the summary of the results of the Hundred Years' War. Here the author points out that "in spite of the drain of continuous warfare the productive power of the country was undiminished." The period "was big with the new constructive ideas." "The great cities were growing to be the mainstay of the national principle." Space forbids any attempt to describe the remaining chapters, but mention must be made of the summary of the permanent gains in the conciliar period. These illustrated the general advance in democracy and the emancipation of the nations from papal control.

Professor Emerton hints in the Preface that a volume on the Reformation will follow. This is indeed good news. It must be remembered in judging as to the omissions from this volume. It may well explain why the two chapters on the Renaissance are so limited in scope. Among the subjects which are omitted are the geographical discoveries; the great inventions, except for a bare mention of the printing press; and of course other topics which form the natural background for an explanation of the Reformation.

The maps are unsatisfactory; the execution is poor, the color scheme is not clear, and most of them are too small. The map of the ecclesiastical provinces of Europe is cut to fit the volume by omitting almost all of Spain, one-half of Italy, and other outlying portions. On this map "Mailand" is used for Milan. The map of the Hansa does not extend far enough north to include Wisby.

Throughout the volume the analyses of conditions and summaries of results are masterly. There are many statements which the thoughtful student will remember and will use in forming a judgment as to other periods of history. Those who are impatient with the course of events in Russia may well consider Professor Emerton's statement about the fate of Etienne Marcel: "Like every leader of revolutions he was expected to show in a moment results that need generations of training to accomplish." The temptation is strong to quote many another passage, but any selections would merely reflect the reviewer's own particular interests. Students will profit by this volume in proportion to their maturity and ability to appreciate scholarly work.

DANA C. MUNRO.

PRINCETON, N. J.

AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW. Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. CARL ZOLLMAN. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917. Pp. 473. Paper, \$3.50; cloth, \$4.00.

This is a useful book upon an important topic not elsewhere so well treated. Books on ecclesiastical law, the internal law of the Church, are not uncommon; but the far more practically important external law of the Church, the law that regulates its legal obligations, its rights of property and contract, its capacity and powers, has not before been brought together into a single volume.

The author has undertaken a difficult task. The Church was coeval with the American colonies; but its ways, its organization, its relation to the governing authority, differed radically in the different colonies. Its disestablishment in the various colonies was a process lasting for two centuries. The differing politics of the prevailing sects in the various colonies led to peculiar legal views of church organization. A law which deals primarily with a Congregational church must differ materially from another which is concerned with a Presbyterian or Episcopalian body. As a result of this variety of materials, the laws of our several states at the beginning of our national life were divergent. The tendency toward uniformity of

law among our states, so strong in commercial topics, is little felt in church law.

In view of this innate difficulty in his subject it is surprising how thorough, how sound, and how readable this book is. The citation of authorities is full; the conception of the differing forms of organization is sympathetic; the conclusions are lawyer-like and convincing. The scope of the work is broad. After an excellent discussion of the legal meaning of religious liberty, the author deals successively with the forms, nature, and powers of church corporations; church constitutions; implied trusts; schisms; the decisions of church courts; exemptions from taxation; illegal disturbance of meetings; contracts; clergymen; officers; holding property by dedication and adverse possession; pew rights; and church cemeteries. A chapter on the Methodist Episcopal Deed concludes the book. The arrangement might be criticized as somewhat heterogeneous; a more logical arrangement of the matter would perhaps have cleared up one or two difficulties. Nevertheless, the seeker may easily find the topic which interests him; he will find it clearly stated, thoroughly discussed in the light of all the authorities, and illuminated by the author's conclusion. At the end of each chapter he will find an admirable and useful summary of the contents of the chapter.

The book will be valuable to all those who are concerned with the temporalities of the Church.

JOSEPH H. BEALE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE ORDER OF NATURE. LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON. Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. 234. \$1.50.

The fitness of organisms to their environment has been an unceasing wonder to men in general and a fascinating riddle to biologists in particular. No satisfactory mechanistic explanation of this fitness, however, has yet been given. The Darwinian factors act only as pruning shears and not as creative forces. Natural selection may possibly explain the survival of the fittest, but it does not explain their arrival. Doubtful as a theory of physiological evolution, the Darwinian hypothesis is only too obviously inadequate — as Darwin, Huxley, Kropotkin, and many other biologists have repeatedly pointed out — as an explanation of social evolution. Nevertheless, largely through the influence of such biologists as Haeckel and Weismann in Germany, the dogma of the *Allmacht* of natural

selection in racial progress has been made the foundation of Teutonic political and military policies. The world is now suffering the terrible consequences of pseudo-science and pseudo-philosophy carried out into rigorous action by the military masters of a nation. Fortunately for the world, England has had wiser scientific and political leadership. This, however, is somewhat aside from the main point of this review. But it goes to prove that scientific theories, however abstract and apparently impracticable, may nevertheless have the greatest influence upon the welfare of the human race. In the opinion of the reviewer, Henderson's *Order of Nature* is a book which will strongly influence the scientific thought of the future.

In his thoughtful book on *The Fitness of the Environment* Dr. Henderson discussed the problem of organic fitness from an original standpoint, calling attention especially to the reciprocal character of this fitness. Not only are organisms adapted to their environments but the world is discovered to be "the fittest possible abode for life." In saying this, however, it should be understood that Professor Henderson has in mind not the purely biological problem of the lock-and-key relationship of organism and environment, but the more inclusive problem of the fitness of the world to life in general. Failure to understand his problem has misled several critics of this earlier work.

Theological readers will find *The Order of Nature* interesting for at least two reasons — first, because the book is a masterly survey and summary of the history of teleological thought from Aristotle to Bosanquet, and, second, because the author, mechanist as he is, is nevertheless led after a careful analysis of the problem of the order of nature to accept the conclusion of Aristotle that "the contrast of teleology and mechanism is the very foundation of the order of nature, which must ever be regarded from two complementary points of view." Such a view coming from a theological writer would not be in the least surprising, but coming from a mechanistic thinker it appears symptomatic of the clearer perception on the part of the younger generation of scientific men of the inadequacy of a purely mechanistic interpretation of nature. The teleology which Professor Henderson thinks he discovers in nature, however, is not of the anthropomorphic sort. He will have none of that.

He attempts to demonstrate a hitherto unrecognized order among the properties of matter and to examine the teleological character of this order. He states his problem as follows: "The simpler and more general problem of the teleology of nature as a whole has been

neither recognized nor investigated by science. Yet the problem is now clear enough. All men admit in the teleological appearance of the world something that is real. There is order, stability, and a richly varied collocation of material objects at the basis of it. When we think of the solar system, the meteorological cycle, and the organic cycle, we distinguish that which quite inevitably and directly impresses us as harmonious. Now, as we have seen, it is no longer permissible to doubt that this impression of harmony corresponds to an order in the universe. No doubt science must put aside the philosophical problems which thus arise, and philosophy must deny to all men the right to found a system of natural theology upon the fact. But it is a false and discredited metaphysical hypothesis which leads to the denial of the order of nature as a subject of scientific research. How then is the production of this order to be scientifically explained? What is the mechanistic origin of the present order of nature? . . . The real scientific problem may be approximately solved by discovering, step by step, how the general laws of physical science work together upon the properties of matter and energy so as to produce that order." Thus the problem is an evolutionary one.

Special stress is laid by Professor Henderson upon the unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, which are such as to lead to the presence of water on the earth and of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as well as to the meteorological cycle, which "regulates the temperature of the globe more perfectly than it could be regulated by any other substances concerned in any other similar cycle." Their chemical properties "lead to an even greater variety of chemical combinations and chemical reactions, to an unequalled diversity of properties in their products." Thus they make up "the most remarkable group of causes of the teleological appearance of nature."

Professor Henderson logically concludes that "the properties of hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen make up a unique ensemble of properties, each one of which is itself unique. This ensemble of properties is of the highest importance in the evolutionary process, for it is that which makes diversity possible. To this end it provides materials, and in large measure the necessary stability of conditions. We have already seen that diversity, as Spencer declared, is radically necessary to evolution. . . . We may therefore conclude that there is here revealed an order or pattern in the properties of the elements. This new order is, so to speak, hidden, when one considers the properties of matter abstractly and statically, for it is recognizable and intelligible only through its effects. It becomes evident only when time is taken into consideration. The environment into which life enters

is indeed 'the fittest.'" The organism, however, "so we fondly hope, is ever becoming more fit, and the law of evolution is the survival of the fittest."

"Nor can we look upon either of these peculiarities of the matter which makes up the universe as in any sense the work of chance or as mere contingency. There is in truth not one chance in countless millions of millions that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, and especially of their stable compounds, water and carbonic acid, which chiefly make up the atmosphere of a new planet, should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together. There is no greater probability that these unique properties should be without due (that is, relevant) cause uniquely favorable to the organic mechanism. These are no mere accidents; an explanation is to seek. It must be admitted, however, that no explanation is at hand. . . . Hence we are obliged to regard this collocation of properties as in some intelligible sense a preparation for the processes of planetary evolution. . . . Therefore the properties of the elements must for the present be regarded as possessing a teleological character."

"It will perhaps be objected to this argument that the cause of the peculiar properties of the three elements is conceivably a simple one, such as the properties of the electron. This is perfectly true, but quite beside the point. For, whether simple or complex in origin, the teleological connection — the logical relation of the properties of the three elements to the characteristics of systems — is complex. This complex connection is almost infinitely improbable as a chance occurrence. But the properties of electrons do not produce logical connections of this kind, any more than they produce the logical connections of the multiplication table; for, like the properties of the electrons, such relations are changeless characteristics of the world. Such is the one positive scientific result which I have to contribute to the teleological problem."

In reaching the important conclusion that the properties of the elements are somehow a preparation for the evolutionary process, Dr. Henderson suggests that such a hypothesis has two defects: "In the first place, the term 'preparation' is scientifically unintelligible. Secondly, this hypothesis is not only novel but it is different in kind from all recognized scientific hypotheses. For no other scientific hypothesis involves preparations except those which originate in the organism. In short, we are face to face with the problem of design." Knowledge of the history of human thought, however,

leads Professor Henderson to avoid the use of the term "design." Consequently he modifies his statement, and asserts that "the connection between the properties of the elements and the evolutionary process is teleological and non-mechanical. . . . According to the theory of probabilities, this connection between the properties of matter and the process of evolution cannot be due to mere contingency. Therefore, since the physico-chemical functional relationship is not in question, there must be admitted a functional relationship of another kind, somewhat like that known to physiology. This functional relationship can only be described as teleological. . . . Therefore the contrast of mechanism with teleology is at the very foundation of the order of nature."

Henderson's argument is briefly summarized as follows: "The principal peculiarity of the universe which makes diversity of evolution possible is original and anterior to all instances of the processes which it conditions. And we may recall the fact that this peculiarity consists of a group of characteristics such that they cannot be regarded as merely contingent. Finally, it will be remembered that *the relation of this group of properties to the characteristics of systems is also such that it cannot be merely contingent.* I believe these statements to be scientific facts. If this be so, we have arrived at the solution of a special case of Aristotle's problem of 'the character of the material nature whose necessary results have been made available by rational nature for a final cause.'" Therefore, the conclusion seems necessary that "the contrast of mechanism with teleology is at the very foundation of the order of nature, which must ever be regarded from two complementary points of view, as a vast assemblage of changing systems, and as an harmonious unity of changeless laws and qualities working together in the process of evolution."

The broad scope of the book is revealed in its chapter headings — Aristotle, The Seventeenth Century, The Eighteenth Century, Biology, Nature, Evolution, The Problem, The Three Elements, The Teleological Order. There is in addition an Appendix with brief but important essays by Clerk Maxwell and Fechner. The book will greatly enhance the reputation of its author as a master of the larger problems of science — the *Magnalia Naturæ*.

HERBERT V. NEAL.

TUFTS COLLEGE.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XII

JULY, 1919

NUMBER 3

THE VALIDITY OF NON-EPISCOPAL ORDINATION ¹

GEORGE HODGES

CAMBRIDGE

"The fourth and last lecture," said Judge Dudley, "I would have for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion as the same hath been practised in New England, from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day. Not that I would in any wise invalidate Episcopal Ordination, as it is commonly called and practised in the Church of England; but I do esteem the method of ordination as practised in Scotland, at Geneva, and among dissenters in England, and in the churches in this country, to be very safe, Scriptural, and valid; and that the great Head of the Church, by his blessed spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them accordingly, and will continue to do so to the end of the World. Amen."

I

The reluctance of good Churchmen to acknowledge the validity of non-Episcopal orders is due in part to a confusion of inspiration with direction.

¹The Dudleian Lecture at Harvard University, April 8, 1919. This was one of the last public utterances of the late Dean Hodges. He died May 27, 1919.

There are two theories concerning the making of the church, as there are two theories concerning the making of the world. According to one theory the church was made by special creation, that is, by the personal and definite direction of Jesus Christ. According to the other theory the church was made by processes of evolution; it came into being not like a house but like a tree. A house begins with plans and specifications, and is erected from the first stone of the cellar to the last shingle of the roof in conformity with these prearranged details. But a tree grows. It begins with the mysterious presence of life in a seed, and is shaped thereafter by manifold conditions of sun and rain, of light and shade, of soil and changing seasons. Thus Christ planted his gospel in the souls of men, and it grew into the church. He contributed the initial inspiration of his personality and his message, and the men whom he inspired did the rest; assisted indeed by reference to him and by prayer, but meeting each new situation according to their best judgment, assuring themselves as well as they could of his approval.

A right choice between these theories depends on the New Testament facts. In favor of the direction-theory is the fact that the apostles, up to the end of the Gospels, appear to be dependent persons, without originality or initiative, doing as their Master bade them. He sent them out on experimental missions, the details of which he carefully arranged, even to the provision of the coats upon their backs and the shoes upon their feet. May we not fairly infer that he used a like care regarding that supreme mission for which his whole intercourse with them was a preparation, in furtherance of which they established the church? Was it not with these matters that he was occupied after his resurrection, when, as we are told, he spent forty days with the apostles, "speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God"? Is it

not likely that he instructed them regarding the number and nature of the sacraments, perhaps regarding the ritual of the services, and certainly concerning the orders of the ministry and the transmission of grace by an apostolic succession?

On the other hand, against the direction-theory and in favor of the inspiration-theory, is the fact that the apostles in the beginning of the Acts have no church-ideas. It is true that they baptize; but so did John the Baptist, who was not only no churchman but can hardly be called a Christian. St. Paul, who was not usually austere in matters ecclesiastical, took the disciples of John and rebaptized them, making them begin over again at the beginning. It is true that the apostles observe the feast of the breaking of the bread; but this was a common Jewish custom, kept every week in every devout Jewish household on the eve of the Sabbath. It is true that these baptized persons who are described as breaking bread from house to house are already called "the church": "The Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved." But the word *ecclesia*, which occurs only two times in the Gospels, and both of those times in St. Matthew, may mean there and here only a fraternity or community within the Jewish Church. There is nothing to show that the addition of these disciples to "the church" differed in any material way from the enlistment of mediæval men and women in the Order of St. Francis. On the contrary, the whole situation implies that such an act as a separation from the ancient church and an erection of an independent church apart from the Aaronic succession, had no place whatever in the apostolic mind. The idea that the apostles and their followers proceeded naturally and immediately into schism, and lightly went out of the church whose foundations were in the Holy Scripture, and apart from which, according to common belief, there was no salvation, may

be held indeed by dissenters to whom the church is of no great importance, but every good Churchman knows better. The Christians of the Day of Pentecost had no more intention of founding a church, in our sense of that word, than the disciples of St. Francis. They hoped to convert their brethren in the church to their own faith in Jesus as the Messiah, but this they would do from within, not from without. Whatever their Master said to them in the forty days during which he instructed them in the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God, there is nothing in their behavior to indicate that he said a word about the founding of a Christian Church. They continued in the ancient church till they were driven out. If they had emblazoned a coat-of-arms for the Christian family, they would have drawn a cross upon the shield, but beside the cross, as a further indication of the circumstances of their origin, they would have shown the stones which were hurled at their first martyr, Stephen. They began to be a Christian Church to their amazement, without expectation, without preparation or direction.

What they had was inspiration. St. Paul expresses it when having declared his mind concerning a debated matter (1 Cor. 7 40) he says, This is "after my judgment, and I think also that I have the Spirit of God." The apostles proceeded according to their own judgment, guided by their remembrance of the teaching and example of Jesus. They thought that they had the Spirit of God.

St. Peter, however, in his vision on the housetop, had forgotten the example and teaching of Jesus, and was lacking in the Spirit of God when, being told to disregard the old ceremonial distinction between kinds of food, he said, "Not so, Lord." Jesus had disregarded that distinction. "Not that which goeth into the mouth," he said, "defileth a man." Having so said he departed into

the neighborhood of Tyre and Sidon, for with that declaration his ministry in Galilee was ended. The conservative souls of the scribes and Pharisees were so outraged by this defiance of church tradition that he had to go away to save his life. He had disobeyed not the church only but the Bible (Leviticus 11). From that moment the way was all down-hill, from the heights of popularity to the valley of the shadow of death. But this was so imperfectly understood by St. Peter that the vision on the housetop found him in agreement with the scribes and Pharisees. Even to a voice from heaven, he stoutly replied, "Not so, Lord!"

Accordingly, the apostles proceeded in the ordering of the Christian society, assisted indeed by inspiration, by the example of Jesus and the Spirit of God, but not compelled thereby. For the most part they went right, but sometimes, as in the case of St. Peter, they turned their faces, for the moment, in the wrong direction.

The first thing which they did was to elect an apostle in the place of Judas. If their intention was to restore the number twelve, they were probably thinking in terms of Judaism; they were commending the Christian society to their brethren in the Jewish Church by a loyal recognition of the twelve tribes. This initial act of ecclesiastical organization had no permanent effect. The apostle Matthias had not previously appeared in the records of the Christian discipleship, and he is not heard of afterwards; neither are the Twelve heard of long. It seemed, indeed, for the moment as if the new fraternity was to be controlled by an executive committee of Twelve Apostles, perhaps under the presidency of Peter. But this experiment, if such it was, did not succeed. After a little, the Twelve fall out of sight, and the book called the Acts of the Apostles is found to record the acts of only two apostles — St. Peter, with whom appears St. John as a silent shadow, and St. Paul, who

claimed complete independence of any election or appointment.

The next thing which the Christians did in connection with the ministry was to set apart seven men to care for the poor.

That they did this by the Spirit of God appears in the fact that the division of labor thus effected proved to be for the general good not only immediately but permanently. Whether these seven may properly be called deacons is debated, but it is sufficiently plain that from that day forth the officer who administered the spiritualities had by his side an officer who administered the temporalities. This distinction of duties was not very clearly maintained, even at the beginning. The two deacons about whom we have any account, St. Stephen and St. Philip, distinguished themselves not by their activity in serving tables but by preaching the gospel, that is, by that "ministry of the word" which the apostles had intended to reserve for themselves. But in general the difference of function has continued to this day both within and without the episcopally ordered churches.

It is evident, however, that the work of the Spirit of God in the matter was not to give the apostles an accurate memory of instructions which they had received, but to give them a right judgment in meeting an unexpected need. They were inspired, but not directed. It is inconceivable that our Lord said to the apostles, as he spoke of the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God, "It shall presently come to pass that you will neglect the Grecian widows in the daily ministrations; when that happens look out seven men of honest report whom you may appoint over that business." This would have been like encouraging a disease in order to provide an excellent remedy. The apostles ordained the deacons, and in so doing took the first step toward the abiding organization of the Christian Church, under the impulsion of a local

and immediate situation. They said to themselves, Here are new conditions, what now shall we do? And they proceeded to act after their own judgment, thinking also that they had the Spirit of God. In so doing they set a precedent which was followed when to the order of deacons was added the order of bishops, and when upon the order of bishops was superimposed the order of patriarchs or popes. The same precedent was followed when the church in England subtracted the pope, and the church in Germany subtracted the bishops.

This determination of ecclesiastical procedure not by tradition but by the revelation of the Spirit of God in new conditions appears in dramatic form in the apostolic conference in Jerusalem. Paul and Barnabas, returning from their mission in Galatia, report an unprecedented situation. "The Gentiles," they say, "are receptive to the preaching of the gospel, and are applying in great numbers to be admitted to the Christian society. What shall we do?" For up to that moment nobody had become a Christian without having been first a Jew. Such was the necessary order so long as the Christian Church continued to be a Jewish society. One must be a Jew first; as, in order to become a Franciscan or a Dominican one must first be a Catholic Christian. Thus the question of the independence of the Christian Church came up for discussion.

Against such independence stood the fact of the ancient church. There was the Church, established not only in the immemorial history of the people, but in the pages of the Bible. It was there recorded how the church was not only founded but organized by God Himself. He had appointed its sacrifices and services, even in detail; He had blessed its ministry in succession from Aaron; and He had so concerned Himself with the regulation of its life that there were those who said, "Except ye keep the Law of Moses, which God taught him, ye

cannot be saved." All the associations, all the arguments, all the convictions which addressed the consciences of men in the Middle Ages who considered the possibility not of departing from the church but of disobeying the least of its commandments, were arrayed against the men who suggested that Gentiles might be saved without any allegiance to the Aaronic succession or any reference to the book of Leviticus. The idea that the Christian society could be part Jew and part Gentile was to them like the idea that the American Republic could be part free and part slave. It seemed impossible. Indeed, it proved to be impossible; the Gentiles eventually crowded out the Jews. That, however, was not foreseen by the Jewish Christians who met in Conference at Jerusalem. Neither did they foresee with clearness that their action involved the dependence or independence of the Christian Church, for many of them continued to be good Jews, obedient to the Law of Moses, to their life's end. The conservatives, however, suspected such a result sufficiently to make them natural opponents.

On the other hand, in favor of independence was the testimony of Paul and Barnabas, confirmed, in the course of the discussion, by the experience of Peter, to the effect that there was a revelation of the will of God in the present which amended and corrected and superseded the revelations of the will of God in the past. No matter how stoutly one might affirm that salvation and the Law were bound up together, and that grace could not be had outside the church, Paul and Barnabas and Peter declared that they had seen with their own eyes the unmistakable manifestation of the grace of God outside the church. "God," they said, "has borne the Gentiles witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as he did unto us, and put no difference between us and them." The result was that the conference at Jerusalem formally

resolved to do that which both the Bible and the Church forbade. Against all texts and canons, the plain word of the Bible and the undoubted custom of the Church, they set the revelation of God in the new conditions, which must be encountered with new methods.

When they put in writing the resolutions which they had adopted, freeing the Gentile members of their fraternity from the yoke of the Mosaic Law, they used a phrase which is the true formula of all independence. "It seemed good," they said, "to the Holy Ghost, and to us." Thus they declared the principle upon which they acted. They set forth the proposition that new times make new duties, and that all allegiance to the past is properly subject to our allegiance to the present. The supreme thing, they said, is not what was done in the old time, even though it be maintained by the Bible and the Church, but what is to be done in this new time in which we live, under these new conditions, in new ways, as it may seem good to the Holy Ghost and to us.

In this radical and revolutionary spirit the Christian Church began as an independent organization. That which was born on the Day of Pentecost was a Christian Society within the Jewish Church; that which was born at this Conference in Jerusalem was the Christian Church itself. It had already been recognized by clear-sighted Jews as a heresy; it was now perceived to be a schism. To such consistent Churchmen, who hold all heresy to be an offence against the truth of God, and all schism an offence against the established order of God, the Pope of Rome himself is no better than a dissenting minister.

From that day forward the most conspicuous fact in the New Testament is the ministry of St. Paul. It was independent not only of the Law of Moses but of the authority of the apostles. St. Paul was "an apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father." His call came straight from the sky,

and he had no other ordination than that which such a call conferred. The matter was much debated, and he was careful to make his position plain. The question was as to the necessity of apostolic ordination. The conservative brethren informed the Galatians that Paul had no ecclesiastical standing, because he had not been appointed by the apostles; he was not in the apostolic succession. Paul, writing to the Galatians, not only confesses the fact but glories in it. His ministry is dependent on no man. When I was converted, he says, and commissioned by the Lord Jesus Christ, I went on to Damascus, and thence to Arabia. I conferred not with flesh and blood. It was three years before I even saw an apostle. Then I spent only fifteen days in Jerusalem, and met Peter and James, the Lord's brother, and thereafter went immediately into a ministry of a dozen years in Syria and Cilicia, and was unknown by face unto the churches of Judea. On my return I visited Jerusalem and conversed with "those who seemed to be somewhat," and those who seemed to be somewhat, as for example, James, Peter, and John, added nothing to me. They contributed neither instruction nor authority, only they gave to Barnabas and me the right hands of fellowship and said, Go on with your good work among the Gentiles.

Many of the conservative brethren disapproved of this arrangement, and did their best to hinder and discredit the ministry of St. Paul. The true mind of the church, however, found expression in the giving of the right hand of fellowship, which meant that difference need not result in division. Thenceforth the Jewish part of the church, continuing in the old ways, under the leadership of apostles, and the Gentile part of the church, departing from the old ways and going in new directions, under the leadership of men who though they were called apostles were independent of the Twelve, lived side by side, with

occasional disagreements and misunderstandings but as brethren in one united church. It was a brotherly covenant between those who stood, in later phrase, for the old learning and those who stood for the new; as we should say, between Catholics and Protestants, between those whose ministry derived its authority from the apostles, and those whose ministry derived its authority from the immediate call of God.

The references to the ministry in the New Testament confirm the impression that organization is still subject to experiment; they are in accord with the theory that the common expectation of the speedy end of the world made all such matters unimportant. So long as that expectation continued, there was no thought of laying permanent foundations or of making arrangements for a long future. It was sufficient to meet the present local need. St. Paul in Galatia, for the confirming of the souls of the disciples, ordains them elders in every church. And so elsewhere. Accordingly these churches knew two kinds of ministers, local and general. The local ministers were the elders and deacons; the general minister was the missionary by whom they had been converted. The local ministry was relatively insignificant. St. Paul writes to the Romans, to the Corinthians, to the Galatians, to the Ephesians, to the Colossians, addressing himself directly to the brethren, making no mention of the elders. Writing to the Philippians, he invokes the grace of God upon all the saints, and also upon the bishops and deacons. But neither bishops nor deacons appear under these titles in the list which he gives in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (12 28). "God," he says, "hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, diversities of tongues." The local officers — the deacons, and the elders, also called presbyters, also called bishops

— appear here only towards the end in the terms “helps” and “governments.” In the list in Ephesians (4 11) — “he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers”— they do not appear at all, unless as “pastors.” The Christians are so few that the missionary goes about on circuit among his missions, performing all the necessary spiritual offices, and needing little assistance from those whom he has appointed over the local communities.

These various records of the proceedings of the apostolic church show plainly that the ordering of the ministry was determined by experiment. The primitive Christians had no directions derived in detail from Jesus Christ; what they had was inspiration, by which we mean that guidance into truth and right which God gave then, and still gives, to those who honestly desire to do His will. The inference is that if experiment was a valid process in the first century, it was valid in the sixteenth, and is still valid in the twentieth. No ordering of the ministry is sacrosanct; neither the papal order, with its many ministers; nor the episcopal order, with its three kinds—bishops, priests, and deacons; nor the presbyterian order, with presbyters and deacons; nor the congregational order, with independent presbyters; nor the Quaker order, with no minister at all. These all arose from endeavors to meet what seemed an imperative need, following the precedent of the invention of deacons by the Twelve. Some of the experiments succeeded well, some not so well; thereby was manifested the divine approval or disapproval. Sometimes an experiment succeeded for a time, and was then thought to be a mistake, a hindrance rather than a help; so some felt, wisely or unwisely, about the papacy or episcopacy. The resulting change has its precedent in the tentative conditions out of which every detail of the ministry came. It is to be tested not by its conformity to any

divine direction, but by such conformity alike to the will of God and to the needs of man as appears in its spiritual success.

II

The hesitation of good Churchmen to acknowledge the validity of non-Episcopal orders is due not only to a confusion of inspiration with direction, but also to a confusion of validity with regularity.

As the church passed out of the first century into the second, several conditions emphasized the importance of regularity. Naturally and inevitably the first fine freedom of enthusiasm sobered into organization. It was perceived that the end of the world was not so near as had been believed, and it was necessary to make arrangements for the future. A continual increase in the number of Christians called for a conduct of services and a distribution of ministerial duties such as had not been needed in the little domestic groups which constituted so many of the early churches.

Accordingly a change took place in the position of the local ministry. The three orders to which St. Paul had given prominence — “first apostles, secondarily prophets; thirdly teachers” — had been for the most part itinerant, a ministry at large. The subsequent association of teachers with pastors — “pastors and teachers” — may mean that these were the first to settle and become a part of the local organization. There were also local prophets, as appears in the liturgical confusion at Corinth; but in the second-century document called *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* the prophets are wandering preachers who are beginning to be in disfavor. Some of them have so imposed upon the hospitable brethren that it has become necessary to rule that no prophet shall remain in a parish more than one day, or

two at the most; "If he remain three days, he is a false prophet." Gradually, in spite of efforts to retain and revive it, the order of prophets ceased. As for the apostles, though the title had been extended beyond the first Twelve, they came to the end of their days and died. Thus the local ministers came into a place of new importance.

The apostles and prophets and teachers had been charged with the ministry of religion, in distinction from the presbyters (or bishops) and deacons who had been charged with the ministry of discipline and the care of the poor. That the distinctions were loosely drawn appears, indeed, in the case of Stephen, who went beyond his duties as a deacon to act as prophet or teacher, and in the case of Philip, who exceeded his duties as a deacon to carry the gospel into Samaria like an apostle; every man did what he could, without any strict regard to official limitations. In general, however, the presbyters ruled and the deacons served; having, as we should say, lay rather than clerical duties. They were wardens and vestrymen rather than what we call ministers; thus following the pattern of the synagogue, in which so many of them had been brought up, whose officers were all laymen. The synagogue differed from the temple both in the character of its services and in the ecclesiastical standing of its officers, as the Young Men's Christian Association differs from the Church.

Of course, the presbyters and deacons were engaged in the extension of the Christian religion. Everything that they did was religious, and was in the spirit of the fervent enthusiasm of the time. Whatever their office, they praised and prayed and preached as they were able. But so did all the congregation. The presbyters and deacons baptized, but any Christian might baptize. If they had any special places at the Lord's Supper, the fact does not appear in St. Paul's admonitions to the Corin-

thians, which are addressed to the congregation without reference to the clergy. The Corinthian services, as he describes them, were curiously congregational and non-clerical. Everybody had a psalm, a doctrine, a tongue, a revelation, or an interpretation. The best that could be done in the way of order was to suggest that not more than three members of the congregation should speak at the same time. The local parish was like a frontier mission of zealous people, carrying on their own services, managing their affairs by an executive committee (the presbyters and deacons) and visited at long intervals by a minister (an apostle or a prophet) when one was able in his wide circuit to get to that neighborhood. When the ministry at large ceased and the prophets and apostles came no more, it was necessary to make new arrangements.

One of these new arrangements appears in the office of the presbyter-president. The presbyter in some places had been appointed by apostles, as St. Paul ordained elders in Galatia. More often, the apostles being few, and the churches many and widely scattered, the presbyters were chosen by the congregation, as in Rome, where there were elders before the visit of any apostle. At first for administrative convenience, then for religious direction and order, one presbyter presided over the group of presbyters. Justin Martyr calls him the president. His position, as he appears in the Apology, at the head of the table at the Lord's Supper, suggests one of the ways in which he was naturally distinguished from his brethren. In the nature of things, the Corinthian disorder at the services and the sacraments became intolerable. It was stopped by the election of a presiding officer. The ceasing of the visits of apostles, and the consequent independence of the local parish, increased his responsibilities. The nature of his office was indicated by his title; he was called bishop.

The presbyters had been called bishops from the beginning. St. Paul having summoned the presbyters of Ephesus (the word in our translation is "elders") exhorts them to take heed to themselves and to the flock over which the Holy Ghost has made them bishops (*ἐπισκόπους*, "overseers"). As the presbyter-president came to be distinguished from his brethren, the title of bishop was naturally appropriated to him, signifying his function of oversight. Naturally also, by processes of human nature rather than by any formal action, his influence and authority increased. He was the head of the local church.

It is in this capacity, as a parochial bishop, that he appears in the letters of Ignatius. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, being carried across Asia Minor on his way to martyrdom at Rome, writes letters of greeting and farewell and counsel to the churches of the chief cities. He admonishes them concerning the evil of division, against which he exalts the office of the bishop. "Do nothing," he says, "apart from the bishop." "He who does anything apart from the bishop serves the devil." Obedience to the bishop is obedience to God. "We ought to regard the bishop as the Lord himself." "Reverence the bishop as Jesus Christ, and the presbyters as the assembly of the apostles."

This teaching, as Jerome afterwards reminded the bishops of his time, had no standing in the word of the Lord or of the apostles. "With the ancients," he says, "presbyters were the same as bishops; but gradually all the responsibility was deferred to a single person, that the thickets of heresy might be rooted out. Therefore as presbyters know that by the custom of the church they are subject to him who shall have been set over them, so let bishops be also aware that they are superior to presbyters more owing to custom than to any actual ordinance of the Lord." Indeed, the Ignatian epistles

themselves show plainly that the interest of Ignatius was not so much in the doctrine of the ministry as in the peace of the local parish. In the peril of heresy and schism he found safety in allegiance to the bishop. But the bishop is what we should call the rector of the parish. He is the minister of the local church. He is a parochial bishop; his diocese is the city where he lives. He differs little from the pastors of Puritan churches in colonial New England. Samuel Spaulding of Northampton, whom the discerning Indians called "the Englishmen's God," was a parochial bishop. So were the divines whom Cotton Mather celebrated in the *Magnalia*.

Even so, there were those who protested against any exaltation of one brother above another. The Montanists objected to the rubrics which gave to a master of the assembly the right to limit the primitive liberty of speech and action in the conduct of the service. They claimed the right to interrupt. They wished to speak with tongues and prophesy, and to behave themselves as their brethren had done in the good old times in Corinth. As for the new clerical distinctions by which they found themselves restrained, they resented and refused them. The novel arrangements of precedence and function, according to which one was a bishop and others were presbyters and deacons, they opposed. They recognized no distinctions between ministers and laymen. "Are not we laymen priests," they said, "as well as you?"

In spite of these objections the evolution of the ministry continued. As the Christians increased in number, and there were churches not only in the cities but in the neighboring towns, the parish with the bishop for its rector and the presbyters for curates no longer met the needs of the situation. The presbyters were sent out from the cities to be the ministers of town parishes. Under these circumstances, various rights and duties

which had previously belonged to the bishop alone were now given to the presbyters. At the same time certain exceptions were made whereby the presbyters were kept in dependence. They were prevented from becoming parochial bishops. One of the privileges thus withheld was the laying on of hands in confirmation. This completion of the service of baptism was reserved for the bishop. Another withheld privilege was the laying on of hands in ordination. A bishop indeed might not admit to the order of presbyters without the coöperation of the presbyters; they must lay on their hands with his; but no assembly of presbyters might ordain without the bishop. Thus a part was reserved for the bishop in the office of baptism, whereby admission was given to the membership of the church, and in the office of ordination, whereby admission was given to the church's ministry. Along with these reservations went a natural oversight of the dependent presbyters and their parishes. The effect was to widen the bishop's responsibility and authority. He became a diocesan bishop.

Meanwhile the importance of the bishop was magnified by the use which was made of him in the argument against heresy. The Gnostics, who held that matter is essentially evil, and who therefore denied that God made the world (how could the good God make the bad world?) and denied also that God became incarnate (how could God take our evil flesh upon him?), claimed that their heresy was the true doctrine of the apostles. They based their claim upon a tradition which, they said, had been handed down from apostolic times. They declared that the apostles had taught the Gnostic creed to such as were able to receive it, and that those favored disciples (Gnostics, men who know) had instructed their disciples, and so on.

For such assertions Irenæus (*c.* 150 A.D.) found a determining test in the apostolic succession. The true

doctrine of the apostles, he maintained, is that which the apostles themselves committed to those whom they put in charge of the churches which they founded. This doctrine these men handed down in their turn to their successors. They can tell us whether or not the apostles taught this or that. Here, let us say, is Valentinus teaching Gnosticism in Rome, and claiming to have a secret tradition derived from the apostles. We will confute Valentinus by referring the matter to the bishop. Tell us, Bishop Pius, how this doctrine agrees with the faith as it was communicated to you by your predecessor Hyginus, who received it from his predecessor Telesphorus, and he from Sixtus, and he from Alexander, and so from Evaristus, and Clement II, and Anacletus, and Linus, and Clement I (many names for a hundred years, but most of them martyred), and Clement from St. Peter and St. Paul. Pius answers thus and so, and we perceive that the claim of Valentinus will not stand. The decisive evidence is that of the successor of the apostles.

The effect of this method with heretics was to magnify the office of the bishop. He was thus related not only to the administration of his diocese but to the Christian faith. It was highly important that his election and consecration should be so carefully ordered as to make his succession from the apostles plain. His episcopal genealogy must be without interruption or defect. To guard against the possibility of failure in a single line every bishop must have the hands of at least three bishops laid upon him, thus making the succession not a line but a network of lines. This arrangement discredited any bishop who had come into his place some other way. The disaffection which had led brethren to separate from the bishop of the apostolic succession and appoint another might have been so justifiable that all the right and all the truth were on their side, and the new bishop who lacked the sanction of the succession might have all the other

virtues of the blessed saints, nevertheless he was incapacitated for the necessary work of bearing witness to ancient custom against modern innovation, and to apostolic truth against the falsehoods of heresy. He was denied a place among the custodians of the faith.

The Gnostic heresy went where all the good heresies go: what was true in it became orthodoxy, and what was false was more or less forgotten. The books of the New Testament took the place of the tradition of the apostolically descended bishops. There was no further use for the apostolic succession in the transmission of truth. It was continued in service for the transmission of grace.

The Christians had long differed from their neighbors in the directness of their approach to God. In the Greek and Roman world in which they lived religion was defined in terms of priesthood, and this was also the language of the sacred books which Christianity had inherited from Judaism. Between man and God, offering the prayers and praises of the people and bringing down pardon and help and blessing from on high, were mediating priests. The synagogue, maintained without the presence of priests, had taught a new way in religion, and upon this the Christians had so far improved that they were commonly accused of atheism. They differed from all their neighbors not only in having no statues or symbols of the gods, but in having no altars or sacrifices. As for priests, they were all priests, they said.

It is very difficult, however, to resist the influence of a general idea. Naturally, perhaps inevitably, the Christians used the metaphors of sacerdotal religion. Even in the New Testament, the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews deals with Judaism not like St. Paul, in the spirit of uncompromising contention, but in the spirit of conciliation: Christianity is not so much an opponent of Judaism as a fulfilment, a substantial fulfilment of old prophecies and symbols and sacrifices. We too, he says,

have an altar. Even Tertullian, asserting the Montanist position that there is no essential difference between the clergy and the laity, uses the title "priests": Are not we laymen priests as well as you? Thus far, there is no sacerdotal meaning. In the Christian religion there is only one priest — our great High Priest who has ascended into the heavens — by whom every humblest layman may come boldly unto the throne of grace and obtain mercy and find grace to help in time of need. Gradually, however, the sacerdotal words are applied to the work of the ministry. In the middle of the third century, in the time of Cyprian, although the presbyters are not yet called priests, that title is given to the bishop. He stands at the Lord's Table as at an altar, and offers not only the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving but, as Cyprian says, the sacrifice of the Lord's Passion.

The function of a priesthood, the purpose of a sacrifice, is to gain the grace of God. The priest is endeavoring to secure for us the favor of God. He is doing for us that which we cannot do for ourselves. He is an essential factor in our salvation. But he must be a true priest, duly qualified to mediate between us and God. As schisms increase, and rival claims are made by bishops against bishops and presbyters against presbyters, and now this company and now that declares itself the true church, where shall we find solution and assurance? Cyprian said, In the apostolic succession.

Up to that time the man who was in the succession might say to his dissenting neighbor, Your ministry is irregular. Cyprian taught him to say, Your ministry is invalid.

The test of regularity is accordance with the laws and customs. A regular ministry is that which has proceeded along the accepted lines of development, being loyal to the presbyter-president, and then to the parochial bishop, and then to the diocesan bishop, as these officers appear

and prevail. When presently, against the protests of Cyprian, the diocesan bishops are subordinated to a patriarchal bishop or pope, the regular ministry conforms to this development.

An irregular ministry proceeds along a line of its own. In the time of the presbyter-president it refuses to acknowledge a distinction between the clergy and the laity. In the time of the parochial bishop, and then of the diocesan bishop, it reserves the right to disagree with him. It stands for free thinking and free speaking, and for the independence of the local congregation. It maintains the religion of the spirit over against the religion of authority.

Such an irregular ministry is reprobated by ecclesiastics. The effect of it has often been to weaken the church in its contention with the evil of the world. It has been the resort of narrow individualists, of eccentrics, of rebellious, factious, and sectarian spirits, impatient of the restraints of order. On the other hand, it has often raised a needed protest against superstition, ambition, and despotism in the church. Thus it corresponds with revolution in the state: sometimes unwise and productive only of disorder and reaction; sometimes unsuccessful though provoked by intolerable wrongs; but sometimes a means of setting forward the progress of liberty and justice. From the point of view of the British monarchy, especially as it is represented by the doctrine of the divine right of kings, the American Republic is an irregular government. So is the method of ordination irregular "as practised in Scotland, at Geneva, and among dissenters in England and in the churches in this country." So also is Episcopal ordination irregular from the point of view of the patriarchal bishop of the West, the Pope of Rome.

Cyprian took the exceedingly important step of declaring that these irregular ministries are invalid. They are

not only disturbing and inconvenient and a hindrance to ecclesiastical administration, but they have no spiritual standing. They are null and void. He declared that outside the church there is no salvation. "He cannot have God for his Father who has not the church for his mother. If he could escape who was outside the ark, he too will escape who is abroad and outside the church." Thus he claimed for the church a monopoly of grace. This he did not as a new revealer of the mind of God but rather as the spokesman of the contemporary situation. As a Roman lawyer, acquainted with the processes of Roman order and Roman methods of transmitting power, this, he felt, was what the Christian society needed. This, he said, is how God deals with man.

Thus Cyprian introduced a new definition of the church. Nothing so revolutionary had been proposed since the original declaration of independence in the conference at Jerusalem. Nothing so revolutionary was said again till the Reformation. Cyprian's doctrine of grace determined the character of that aspect of Christianity which is called Catholicism, as Luther's doctrine of grace determined the character of that aspect of Christianity which is called Protestantism. Cyprian and Luther agreed that divine grace is essential to salvation. Luther said that it can be had by the direct appeal of any man to God. Cyprian said that it can be had only in the church, and he defined the church as identified and bounded by the apostolic succession.

The difficulty with Cyprian's doctrine is that it has no standing in revelation, in reason, or in experience. It is not derived from the New Testament, which is a protest against a monopoly of grace. It is not supported by reason, which finds nothing but futility in the claim of any organization to limit by its by-laws the dispensation of the grace of God. It is not supported by experience,

which testifies, on the contrary, that there is at least as much of the grace of God outside the apostolic succession as there is inside. The test of regularity is the canon law, but the test of validity is the blessing of God. It is in vain that irregular ministries are pronounced invalid; for they who exercise them and they who benefit by them know by their own experience that they have the divine acceptance and benediction.

Happily, the Church of England has made no such pronouncement. There are individual Churchmen, indeed, who have maintained in sermons and in printed books that outside of the apostolic succession there is no assurance of salvation. But there are individual Churchmen who have maintained other impossible doctrines. Statements such as these are of the nature of private opinion. The official statement is in the preface to the Ordinal: "It is evident unto all men diligently reading Holy Scripture and ancient Authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been three Orders of Ministers in Christ's Church — Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. Which Offices were evermore had in such reverend estimation that no man might presume to execute any of them except he were first called, tried, examined, and known to have such qualities as are requisite for the same; and also by public Prayer, with Imposition of Hands, were approved and admitted thereunto by lawful Authority. And therefore, to the intent that these Orders may be continued, and reverently used and esteemed in this Church, no man shall be accounted or taken to be a lawful Bishop, Priest, or Deacon in this Church, or suffered to execute said Functions, except he be called, tried, examined, and admitted thereto, according to the Form hereafter following, or hath had Episcopal Consecration or Ordination." The application of this statement is indicated in the phrase "this Church." Nothing is said concerning the ministry of other churches.

The Twenty-third Article of Religion, entitled "Of Ministry in the Congregation," reads: "It is not lawful for any man to take upon him the office of public preaching, or ministering the Sacraments in the Congregation, before he be lawfully called, and sent to execute the same. And those we ought to judge lawfully called and sent, which be chosen and called to this work by men who have public authority given unto them in the Congregation to call and send Ministers into the Lord's vineyard." These sentences are plainly Protestant. Any Methodist or Presbyterian or Congregationalist would say the same. The intention is to secure a selected and instructed ministry and to maintain order.

Except in the invocation of one prayer, in the American office of Institution of Ministers, the apostolic succession is not mentioned in the formularies of the church. The threefold ministry, beginning in primitive Christianity and continued through the subsequent centuries by Episcopal ordination, is held in reverent esteem, and is required in the Episcopal Church, in England and in America. It is the standard of regularity in "this Church." But in the preface to the American revision of the Book of Common Prayer, where it is said that by the gaining of our political independence "the different denominations of Christians in these States were left at full and equal liberty to model and organize their respective Churches, and forms of worship, and discipline, in such manner as they might judge most convenient for their future prosperity," there is no suggestion that by the exercise of this liberty these Christians may be imperiling the salvation of their souls.

The difference between Episcopal and non-Episcopal ordination is not in the matter of validity; for the test of validity is acceptance with God, who blesses these ministries alike, and gives His grace as abundantly by the sacraments of the one as by the sacraments of the

other. The difference is in the matter of regularity, according to the standards of the canon law. It is a minor difference, but yet important because it has to do with the better union of the churches.

The historic episcopate connects the Christians who possess it with the ancient churches of the East and of the West, and is thereby a factor in that larger unity which, however remote from present realization, ought not to be left out of our ideals; there can be no reunion of Christendom without it.

It has also a nearer value by its relation to the contemporary problem of ecclesiastical division. To this difficulty it brings a solution. There are differences within the Episcopal Church which are nearly as great as the differences without. High Churchmen, Low Churchmen, and Broad Churchmen are almost as diverse the one from the other as Roman Catholics, Methodists, and Congregationalists. They are held together by their common allegiance to their father in God, the bishop. It is like the inclusion of various tastes, temperaments, manners, and convictions in a family. It is proved by actual experience that most of the types of religion which now separate people into divided denominations can live together in a reasonable measure of peace and maintain the principles for which they stand, under the conditions of a constitutional episcopacy. It is as democratic and as comprehensive as the administration of the United States.

Meanwhile, as regards those who prefer some other way, we may well agree with Judge Dudley, that "the great Head of the Church, by his blessed Spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them." Dudley believed that God would "continue to do so to the end of the World"; but we may hope that our divisions will not last that long.

THE FIRST EUROPEAN CONGRESS¹

EPHRAIM EMERTON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Most current references to European Congresses prior to the one now sitting in Paris go no farther back than the Congress of Vienna in 1815. These references generally suggest that, whatever may have been done at Vienna, this we do not propose to do at Paris. The implication is that the European world has been running on the wrong track, and that now it is the mission of somebody to set it right and start it anew on wiser and safer lines. Students of history, however, know that Vienna and Paris mark only two stages in a long succession of efforts to bring the peoples of Europe into some kind of harmonious working together for common ends. The terminology of these attempts, the immediate interests involved, vary greatly, so greatly that the casual reader of history easily fails to recognize the community of purpose; but to one who has in mind the fundamental principle of historic continuity the chain of ideas is fairly distinct and complete.

Not to push that principle too far, I am asking your attention to certain aspects of what may fairly be called the First European Congress. You will not find it under that name in historical manuals. There it figures as the Council of Constance, and is commonly treated as a religious conference, held in an obscure sub-alpine German town in the early years of the fifteenth century precisely corresponding to the dates of the recent European war, 1414 to 1418. Its character as a religious assembly,

¹An Address delivered before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 12, 1919.

however, was completely overshadowed by its constantly increasing importance as a forum for the discussion of every variety of European interest. And this universal character was not accidental. It had been prepared for by a long series of preliminary discussions covering at least a full generation and pointing with ever increasing distinctness towards a General Council for their adequate publicity and their possible solution.

The immediate incitement to these preliminary debates was the occurrence in the year 1378 of the so-called, and well-called, Great Schism in the administration of the Church of the West. For seventy years previous to that date the head of the Roman Catholic world had been a Frenchman and had lived in France, under the protection of the French government and generally in harmony with its political policies. This French residence, with its diversion of the papal interests from Italy and Germany, and with its obvious suggestion of enmity to England — for this is the period of the Hundred Years' War between England and France — had brought out a continuous line of protest, and this protest culminated in the year 1376 in the return of Pope Gregory XI to Rome and his death there in 1378.

The election which followed, the first in Rome for two generations, resulted in the choice of an Italian, who called himself Urban VI, and whose election was, as we should say, "made unanimous" by the recognition of the individual cardinals, the constitutional electoral body of the Church. Within a few weeks, however, the French elements in the cardinalate began to discover certain irregularities in the election of Pope Urban, and to develop certain scruples of conscience in regard to their own action. They seceded from the Curia and proceeded to elect a pope of their own, a French nobleman, Clement VII, a relative of the French king, who was undoubtedly privy to the proceedings.

The casual story of the Schism represents these two reverend prelates, sitting on their respective thrones, making faces and hurling anathemas at each other to the grief and scandal of Christendom; but with all that we are not concerned. What interests us is the storm of discussion that almost instantly broke forth as to the means by which this obvious scandal could be healed. Politically Europe divided pretty nearly on the lines already indicated by previous antagonisms. The Latin peoples, plus Scotland — which may fairly be described as the Ireland of that day — stood by the French pope. The Germanic nations, including England and northern Italy, supported the “Roman” claim. A flood of pamphlets, of which the University of Paris was the most prolific source, examined the question in all conceivable lights and suggested a great variety of remedies.

At first the discussion turned naturally upon the legal aspects of the case. “Who began it?” “Whose fault was it?” “Which election was the legitimate one?” These were the questions on which the greatest jurists of the day displayed their learning, their ingenuity, and also, it must be confessed, their party allegiances. Precisely the same thing happened in the recent war. We began with furious debates about the “guilt” of Germany, and Germany retorted with pious insistence upon the “threatening attitude” of France. But very soon it became evident then as now that no progress could be made by this method. The Schism was there; the thing to do was to get rid of it. But how? Each pope declared himself to be the divinely selected successor to St. Peter and so bound to carry out the divine purpose by holding on. All sorts of devices were suggested; we are concerned with only one. From a very early stage all signs began to point towards the holding of a General Council.

But what was a Council? and how could it be called? Obviously neither pope would call a Council to depose

himself; and yet all formal orthodox definitions of a Council included the pope as an integral part of it, and it was universally understood that only a pope could call a valid Council. An assembly summoned in any other way might be ever so imposing in numbers or in weight, but a Council it would not be. Fortunately the way to a solution of this deadlock had been prepared by a profound transformation in European methods of thought that had slowly been making its way for two generations. I refer, of course, to the Nominalistic philosophy, which under the lead of the Englishman, William Ockham (d. 1349), was gradually replacing the mediæval, realistic method of looking at the world of nature and of human relations. In consequence of this transformation men were becoming accustomed to the amazing proposition that the State and the Church alike consisted of the individuals who composed them, and that the law, alike of State and of Church, was to be found in the will of the whole body of the citizens of each.

Here was the clue to the solution of the problem of the Schism. The wrangling of the parties went on. Schismatic popes died and new ones were elected by their respective partisans. But meanwhile there had been growing in both camps a new sense of the supreme importance of unity. In 1408 a group of cardinals from both sides united in a call for a Council at Pisa in Italy. Both popes anathematized everybody concerned, but the thing went on. The call was answered. A considerable assembly met at Pisa, declared both popes deposed and supervised the election in due canonical form of a new pope. The actual election was conducted by the "union" cardinals, but the Council as such validated the election. Of course neither of the rival popes accepted the result. There was now a triple schism. On the death of the "Pisan" pope within a year, a successor to him was chosen by "his" cardinals, and the Schism was still on.

The most important act of the Council at Pisa was its adjournment to a date. That act expressed the feeling of Europe that the Council ought to be a continuing body, the real representative of European opinion in religious matters, and every one knew that there was no subject in the range of European politics that might not in some way be included under the head of religion. It was in pursuance of this adjournment that the Council of Constance, after long negotiations, came together. The choice of the place was the first victory for the party which we may henceforth describe as the party of Reform. Hitherto all councils since the establishment of the papal system had been held either in Italy or, as happened on one or two occasions, in some place under papal control. Now the emperor Sigismund, making himself the spokesman for the universal sentiment of western Christendom, insisted that the forthcoming council should be held outside of Italy, and the "Pisan" pope, John XXIII, driven to extremities by the pressure of Italian politics, was forced to consent. Constance was an imperial German city, accessible from all parts of Europe, in the midst of a fertile country well furnished with roads and waterways for the transport of provisions in large quantities. The emperor made himself the protector of the Council, and the city magistracy undertook the supervision of law and order.

The call to Constance came from Pope John XXIII, not of his own volition but to save his face and to prevent the still greater evil of a call by the emperor or some other power. John's personal character does not greatly concern us. If we could believe one half of the indictment found against him at Constance, we should have to think of him as a blackguard of the deepest dye. A south-Italian, educated as a soldier and a pirate, he had turned to the more profitable trade of a churchman and had risen by all the arts of a successful politician to the

cardinalate and so to the summit of earthly greatness. As pope he had called out endless antagonisms, but might perhaps have overcome these, had it not been for that awakening of the European conscience which had already once expressed itself at Pisa. To this imperative demand even a John XXIII had to bow. When he could no longer resist, he called the Council and came personally to attend it. He came expecting to be its presiding genius; he found himself a criminal before its tribunal, and, like a more recent partner in the divine administration of the universe, he took to his heels at the critical moment, deserted his party and his cause and left the field open for the free action of the great conference he had defied.

As regards the composition of the Council, we are interested especially in the representation of the lay elements of the population. In all the preliminary discussions especial emphasis had been placed upon this point: that any true expression of the mind of Christendom could come only from the free utterance of all persons competent to speak and not merely from the hitherto dominant clerical order. The effect of this emphasis had been seen at Pisa, but now at Constance it was overwhelming. In practice the representation of the laity took two main forms — the representation of governments and the representation of learning. It is, of course, true that learning was still largely in the hands of clerical persons, but the important thing here is that such persons appeared at Constance rather in their scholarly than in their clerical character.

The Constance chronicler, Ulrich Richental, to whom we are indebted for most of our statistical information on this matter, gives at the close of his narrative a summary of the persons who at one time or another took part in the work of the Council. Making all allowance for the uncertainty of numbers, we gain a fair

notion of the proportion of the lay interests. Besides the emperor and empress there were, says the chronicler, 39 dukes, 32 counts and gentlemen of princely rank, 141 counts, 71 *Freiherrn*, more than 1,500 knights, more than 20,000 (*sic*) squires. More than 83 kings from Asia, Africa, and Europe sent ambassadors. There were 472 embassies from imperial cities and 352 from provincial cities. The universities were represented by 37 persons with 2,000 attendants. There were 217 Doctors of Theology with 2,600 persons, 361 Doctors of Laws with 1,260, 1,400 Masters of Arts and Licentiates with 3,000. A later hand has written into the manuscript a total of more than seventy-two thousand persons who came and went during the four years.²

The objects of the Council of Constance are readily defined as three in number. First, the restoration of unity to the Church; second, the purification of Europe from the effects of the Wyclifite heresies which, continued by the Hussite party in Bohemia, had attacked the very foundations of the mediæval papal system; third, "Reform of the Church in Head and Members." Unity, Orthodoxy, and Administrative Reform — an apparently simple program, as to which, "in principle" as we say nowadays, there was no difference of opinion. Everybody wanted unity, nobody wanted heresy, and nobody would have dared to say that he was not interested in reform. It is always easy to agree on fine principles; it is never easy to determine how those principles shall be applied to the hard facts of human experience. At this moment the whole world is discussing whether we shall first set up a League of Nations and then through this League as an instrument proceed to adjust the clamorous demands of peoples who have suffered and paid the price of war, or whether we shall first try to adjust these claims,

² Richental's figures are notoriously untrustworthy. It would probably be safe to divide his totals here by at least two, and in some cases ten would be the safer divisor.

and then form our League of Nations to enforce them. Precisely the same type of questions appeared at Constance and occupied the earnest attention of the best minds in Europe continuously for more than three years.

Those who desired above all things to save the wreckage of the ancient system insisted that the first duty of the Council was to secure a single pope, who then, in virtue of his divine commission, would proceed to right all wrongs and make schemes of reform unnecessary. The reformers, on the other hand, demanded that the Council should first commit itself definitely to certain specific measures of reform and then proceed to choose a pope to carry them out. The debates on this problem form the chief historic interest of the Council, for it is in these that the real question at issue—the nature of the Church as a human organization and its relation to the civil powers—comes to its fullest and freest expression.

Meanwhile the third problem—the purification of Europe from the stain of heresy—came to the help of the other two. This was a reforming council; but it would have been a fatal blunder at this point if it had seemed in any way to identify itself with those movements for reform which rested upon doctrinal interpretations of Christianity. To have shown tenderness toward the doctrines of Wycliffe or Hus would have been as rash as it would be for the present Peace Conference to negotiate with the rampant Bolshevism of the moment. The comparison is in every way justified. It was a fortunate incident that John Hus, already a popular leader of religious and national thought in Bohemia, accepted the invitation of the Council to come to Constance and defend his opinions. Those who have followed the story of the Czecho-Slovak movement of the last two years will have noticed that its leaders point continually back

to John Hus as their spiritual ancestor. He represented the same hostility to German influence, German Kultur, and German political control which have inspired the patriots of Bohemia in these modern days. He came to Constance trusting in the safe-conduct of the German emperor Sigismund, a shifty politician who would never let a scrap of paper stand between him and the welfare of Christian Europe. Hus was handed over to the clerical tribunal, which passed him back to the secular arm, which fulfilled its undoubted duty by burning him alive. The emperor and the Council had vindicated their orthodoxy in the eyes of Europe and could go on with clean hands to the holy work of union and reform.

The reform propositions at Constance dealt mainly with two aspects of the wide-spread corruption which all friends of religion acknowledged and deplored. One of these was a moral, the other a financial evil. The moral indictment touched the personal quality of the clergy both secular and regular. Of course no one undertook to defend, even by scholastic casuistry, obvious violations of morality, but the Church, in its nervous anxiety to protect the sanctity and validity of those sacramental acts on which the whole framework of society was based, had come to minimize the importance by comparison of the element of personal character. The sacraments of an evil priest, so long as he remained a priest, were equally valid with those of the purest. So important was this distinction felt to be that even in the Augsburg Confession of 1530, the Constitution of Lutheran Protestantism, it was retained and defended. The moral delinquencies of laymen were atoned for by an easy system of clerical book-keeping, which was calling forth the denunciations of clear-sighted and plain-speaking men everywhere. Against these dangers there were but two possible defences — the local episcopal discipline, and the supervision of the national governments, and these

were precisely the two forces which the exaggerated papalism of the fourteenth century had done its best to break down.

To strengthen these two forces — national government and the local episcopate — was to be the most important work at Constance. Essentially it was but one endeavor, for during the whole process of its wonderful expansion the Papacy had found the national state and the national churches its most determined, persistent, and powerful opponents. On the whole, it had so far got the better of them, but now, during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, a resistless tide of nationalist sentiment had risen, never to fall again. England and France were fighting it out in the Hundred Years' War. Germany, in her Great Charter, the Golden Bull of 1356, had declared herself independent of foreign control. Italy, still divided into warring provinces, was intensely conscious of a national spirit as against all foreign rivalry, and the same was increasingly true of Spain.

The reflection of all this at Constance is seen notably in the forms of procedure decided upon after some active discussion. It had been assumed that the decisions of the Council would be reached by majority voting, and in anticipation of this, Pope John XXIII had come to Constance with a following of perhaps six hundred men. The utter collapse of his cause in the early days of 1415 made it quite certain that the preponderance of Italian influence was once for all broken. The nations as such were to be henceforth the units both of debate and of action. Five great powers — England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain — agreed upon a scheme which marks a turning-point in the politics of Europe. It was not called a League of Nations, but, partly because it was not so called, it proved to be only so much the more effective in producing common action and a reasonable degree of liberal international sentiment.

The model for the constitution of the several "Nations" at the Council was found in the existing arrangements of the most important universities, such for instance as Paris and Bologna. The "*Universitas*," that is to say, the whole body of teachers and taught, was divided for purposes of administration into groups designated by national terms, but including members of many other nationalities as well. Within these groups were decided the most weighty matters of university policy and discipline. It is probable that the very important part played at Constance by university teachers led to the adoption of this scheme for the Council. Each nation had its own assembly-room where its deputies met regularly to discuss the questions laid before it by a general committee of the Council. Besides these meetings of the several nations there were gatherings of all the national deputies for further discussion. The decisions of each nation on a given subject were submitted to each of the other nations separately, and not until they had been thus approved did they pass on to the General Session of the Council. Within the several nations all members might be present, but only such as were designated by rule could vote. The action of the General Sessions, of which forty-five were held during the four years, seems to have been hardly more than the ratification of what had already been determined upon by the nations.

Even in the General Session, the principle of voting by nations was maintained. After nearly two years of experiment an attempt was made to introduce a majority rule in the final vote, but it was defeated after a rather bitter debate. The ancient theory of unanimity was sustained. Our informant, the French Cardinal Filastre, says that the proposal of majority action was regarded as a sharp trick for some hidden purpose (*astute excogitatum ad aliquos occultos fines*). The procedure by

nations did not, so far as we know, rest upon any formal decree of the Council. It seems to have been adopted by the nations themselves as a measure of practical utility, and to have been accepted by the Roman curial interests as a compromise to avoid worse extremities. The details have to be gathered from rather obscure and scattered hints and references, but the main facts are fairly established. This national and international procedure gave at once to the Council that character as a European Congress which distinguishes it sharply from all previous assemblies. As the debates went on it became increasingly evident that the objects desired by the reforming elements were very largely financial in character and were to be gained only through the action of the national governments. The financial system by which the Papacy lived and thrived had for two generations past been based upon an elaborate scheme of taxation on benefices. Every vacancy in an ecclesiastical office which by any ingenuity could be brought into any sort of relation to the Roman Curia was filled by nomination from Rome, and for this nomination a tax proportioned to the revenues of the benefice was imposed and generally collected. For the higher positions candidates were freely offered by the papal government and accepted with as good grace as might be by the local authorities. Two obvious evils resulted from this practice. Benefices were filled with foreigners bound rather to the interests of Rome than to those of the national state, and money, scarce at best, was diverted from national uses to the support of a power which by its very nature was hostile to every strong local government.

Protests there had been in plenty. England had sought to defend her interests by the famous Statutes of Provisors and *Præmunire*. France had tried to solve her own problem by keeping a hand on the Papacy within her own borders. Germany had sent out a long series

of *Gravamina* in which her wrongs were set forth with convincing eloquence. The trouble was, that by playing off these separate powers against each other the clever politicians of the Roman Curia succeeded in preventing any effective common action. By avoiding direct issues, by bargaining wherever possible, and by the more or less discreet use of the sadly blunted weapons of spiritual discipline the day of reckoning had been postponed. Now, at Constance, the floodgates of the opposition were opened, and from an early moment it became clear that the ancient devices were, at least for the time, utterly discredited. The question was whether this new enthusiasm for Reform would hold out against the marvelously organized and resourceful institution it was seeking to improve.

The actual working-out of reform measures was entrusted to a Reform Commission of thirty-five, representing the nations and including* three cardinals. This commission was appointed in July, 1415, and continued in existence for about two years. Its work was continually interrupted by contentions among the nations themselves and undermined by the jealous activity of the curial or papalist party represented by the College of Cardinals as a whole. The result was that in these two years nothing was accomplished by way of reform, except a rather elaborate scheme which never came to a vote in the Council itself. A second commission of twenty-five was appointed in July, 1417, and succeeded in getting an agreement of the nations upon five points, which were then adopted by the Council. Three of these are worth our attention. The first provided for frequent and regular councils, of which the next should meet five years after the present one, the next seven years later, and thereafter every ten years a council should assemble as by law. In case of a future schism in the Papacy a council should assemble of its own motion

without a call. The whole system of financial exactions, of which the so-called *Spolia*, rights of spoil, were the most outrageous, were to be abolished or reduced to lowest terms.

It is obvious that if these reforms could have been carried out in the spirit in which they were voted by the Council, the whole constitution of the Church would have been radically changed. In place of the monarchical-absolutist mediæval government of the Roman Papacy there would have been substituted a constitutional-aristocratic system. The balance of power would, as the Catholic historian Hefele well says, have been thrown on the side of the episcopate, and the episcopate was everywhere more and more coming to be an integral part of the national state. This alternative was cleverly perceived by the curial party, represented, so far as it was represented at all, by the College of Cardinals and supported on the whole by the Italians, French, and Spaniards, while the Germans and English stood out for the Reform.

Again, after these two years of wrestling, this main issue was brought out more clearly than ever. It had become perfectly evident that the question of church government could not be separated from the infinitely complicated network of political interests represented by the several nations. The discussions between the idealists, the "intellectuals" from the universities, and the hard-headed politicians of the several courts of Europe, might go on forever without reaching a practicable working solution. All this tended to the advantage of the only party which had behind it a unified tradition and a clear idea of what it wanted for the future, the party of the Roman Curia. The conduct of the cardinals, twenty-three in number, was throughout extraordinarily discreet, moderate, and persistent. Among them were some of the most active reformers.

It was Peter D'Ailly, Cardinal of Cambrai, who carried through the Council the all-comprehensive declaration: "The Council is above the Pope." An Italian cardinal, Zabarella, had been the spokesman of the Reform Commission. There had been times when the more radical elements, notably the Germans, had suggested the abolition of the College as the worst obstacle to the re-constitution of the Church. Its natural leader, the pope himself, had abandoned it and left it to weather the storm of abuse alone.

The success of the Cardinalate in keeping itself together and lending a hand where it could, gave it a standing by which it was now to profit. The old wrangle as to precedence of business was now, after two years, renewed with redoubled force, and the Cardinalate was able to throw its weight decisively in favor of proceeding at once to the election of a pope, as the only way of reconciling differences and breaking what had threatened to become a fatal deadlock. Indeed, it had only been by means of ceaseless activity and occasional stretches of the police power of the emperor, that the Council had of late been held together at all.

On the problem of the papal election opinions were widely divided. Should the Council accept the result of the Council of Pisa, acknowledge John XXIII with all his crimes upon his head as lawful pope, and proceed to depose his two rivals already set aside at Pisa? That was probably the original plan; but it had been definitely abandoned after the scandalous flight and trial of Pope John. Or, again, should the Council tie itself to one of the other popes, and thus renew the century-long conflict between the interests of France as against all the rest of Europe? That too had become out of the question. The only course was to wipe off the slate and begin over again. Long and tedious negotiations with the Italian and the French claimants resulted finally in a reasonable

prospect that they could be disposed of, and the Council went ahead with its electoral plans.

Here once more the question of procedure became a vital one. The principle of papal election through a College of Roman clergymen established in the middle of the eleventh century, had fixed itself upon the Church as the most effective way of enforcing the theory of the Papacy as the bishopric of Rome in succession to the alleged bishopric of Peter. In order to preserve this tradition intact the Council of Pisa had, to use its own phrase, "committed the election to the College of Cardinals." At Constance the radical party was inclined to side-track the cardinals entirely and cause the Council to elect a pope by its own right as the supreme representative of the entire Christian body. But a pope so elected would obviously have been, not the successor of St. Peter by vote, as the canon law put it, of "the clergy and people of Rome," but only a presiding officer selected without reference to his Roman connection. Fortunately wiser counsels prevailed, and the matter was intrusted to an Electoral Commission composed of six representatives from each of the five nations with the twenty-three cardinals added as a separate "nation." Two-thirds of the members from each nation and two-thirds of the College of Cardinals must agree upon the candidate. Every precaution was taken to secure the inviolability of the Conclave, and after three days, on the 11th of November, Cardinal Otto Colonna, a Roman nobleman of high reputation for piety and ability, was declared pope. He took the name of Martin V.

Thus two of the three original problems of this great conference appeared to be solved: heresy had been emphatically repudiated, and a unified government had been given to the Church of the West. It will surprise no one who has followed the course of the reform propositions at Constance, that the jubilation over these two

successes should have tended to overshadow interest in Reform. Now that the Christian world had a head once more, it was obviously reasonable that he should be given the opportunity to show how far he was willing to go towards satisfying the universal demand for substantial changes in the papal administration. The answer was not long in coming. Within twenty-four hours after his election Pope Martin issued a decree confirming in all essentials the rules of the papal Chancery according to which the whole elaborate system of papal revenues from benefices was administered. The machinery began to work at once, and the usual unseemly scramble for office and privilege gave full occupation to the army of secretaries that had survived the numerous changes of the Curia.

At the same time the new pope professed himself the champion of reform and appointed a third Reform Commission to prepare and report a scheme. In the discussions and in the report of this commission are clearly outlined the two lines of policy which were to form the most significant developments of the next generation. On the one hand, we find a series of general propositions largely of a moral sort, on which all the nations were agreed. On the other, we see the insidious beginnings of a process which after a century of experiment ended, as it must end, in the glorious revolt, the reluctant secessions, and the permanent schisms of the Protestant Revolution. This was the process indicated by the fatal word "Concordat." The papal power, unable to satisfy all the nations at once, proposed a series of separate agreements with each of them in turn. The nations, on their side, wearied with the long delays at Constance, were inclined to go at least part way towards a working compromise. The Council as a whole could accept the general suggestions of the Reform Commission and was not unwilling to leave the rest to the bargaining of the

several nations. Reform at Constance remained largely in the sphere of pious wishes.

It is this fact that has led even so clear-seeing an historian as Bishop Creighton to describe the Council of Constance as a failure. If by that is meant that it came pitifully short of fulfilling the ardent hopes of the best minds, then it was a failure. If, however, we weigh and measure the extraordinary display of activities crowded into those four eventful years, our verdict must be a very different one. For the first time in the history of Europe the great nations as such had met for conference on matters of the highest importance to them all. Their discussions had gone to the very heart of the several problems involved. The ablest men of the day had expressed themselves with unheard-of freedom and frankness. The sounding universalities of the Middle Ages had received a blow from which they were never to recover. The principle of the national state as the defender of the rights and liberties of its subjects had been asserted in ways that were never again to be seriously questioned. I submit that this cannot be described as failure. Finally, the Council in adjourning provided for its continuation, and thus prepared the way for the still more radical Council of Basel, which for seventeen years maintained in the North a tribunal where every problem of European politics came again to discussion.

The analogies between the situation at Constance and that of the present moment have, I hope, become a little clearer from this hasty survey. We too have to meet the conflicting claims of the nations over against the insistent demands of certain universal ideas. It is no longer the Church which voices these demands most clearly. It is the sense of common interest among certain classes cutting crosswise through the national lines. At Constance, back of all the articulate expressions of partisan claims, lay the subtler but none the less decisive

demands of a population emerging from the social and industrial conditions of the Middle Ages and trying blindly to adjust itself to those of the modern world. So today, behind all the obvious motives of national self-interest and behind all the glowing idealisms of our prophets, is working the silent force of the great transition, as yet unaccomplished, from the age of the horse-plough and the hand-loom to the age of the steam tractor and the wireless telegraph. It is only as the negotiators at Paris shall have the insight to perceive and the courage to proclaim a just balance between these conflicting forces, that they can escape the reproach of apparent failure which has fallen upon the Fathers at Constance.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

The individual's attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny, which is religion, has always an essentially practical coloring. It involves a belief, to be sure, but this belief is never a matter of pure theory; it bears a reference, more or less explicit, to the fate of the individual's values. Hence in nearly every religion which history has studied or anthropology discovered, the question of the future in store for the individual believer has been one of prime importance. The content of this belief is a question for the theologian and the historian of religion; the psychologist, however, may be able to throw some light on the related question *why* people believe, or fail to believe, in immortality at all. What, in short, are the psychological sources from which this belief springs, and what are the leading types of this belief?

If I may trust the data that I have collected in various ways upon this question, I may say briefly and at once, that faith in a future life seems as a rule to be based either (1) on primitive credulity, authority, and habit, (2) on reason, (3) on some form of feeling, or (4) on will.

With nearly all of us who are brought up in religious surroundings, belief in a life after death *begins* as a matter of authority and of primitive credulity. And with many a pious soul, untroubled by a disturbing critical faculty, the belief continues to be based on authority to the end of life. As nothing disturbs it and as it is nourished

rather than weakened by the only intellectual atmosphere to which it is exposed — namely the sermons of the pastor and a few religious books — it grows into a habit which finally becomes too strong to fear attack. With nearly every one of us, in fact, belief based on authority and habit is stronger than we are usually willing to admit. It forms the background of faith in immortality with many a man and woman who likes to think that some argument is the really decisive factor. At times of mental alertness the argument may stand forward as the great protagonist of faith; but when the mind grows weary, it is usually the tradition and the habit of childhood — always there in the background — which come forth as the really decisive forces.

I am inclined to think that belief in a future life is less often based upon argument than is belief in God. Certainly this source of faith in man's immortality contributes far less of strength than does any of the other three suggested above — at any rate if we take into account only its *direct* contribution. The arguments that men offer in support of their faith are in most cases of a negative sort, aiming to show that those who deny the eternal life are no more justified by logic and evidence than are the believers, and thus leaving the door open to faith if one wills to make the faith-venture. More positive arguments are sometimes given. To those who start out with the view that this is a moral universe or that there is a just God, the idea of death ending all seems incongruous and therefore untenable; the evils of this life must be righted somewhere and somehow, the good rewarded and justice done. So far as I can judge, however, this argument is less generally impressive than it was a generation ago. Probably the argument that is both most generally persuasive and logically the soundest consists in pointing out the essential difference between consciousness and its processes, on the one

hand, and the material world and its laws, on the other. This is, of course, the essence of the Platonic arguments, and nothing better is likely ever to be suggested.

The more deep-lying influences productive of faith in immortality are to be found in the realms of feeling and will. At first sight it may seem odd that feeling can give strength to a belief about the future; but on further reflection it will be plain that there is nothing at all strange about this. For the belief in question is not one of reasoning but of immediate feeling; and if an idea is vividly presented and is felt to be congruous with one's background sense of reality, it is *ipso facto* felt as real. Belief of this emotional type as applied to immortality is of various sorts. Many persons who feel it strongly are unable to analyse it, and can describe it only as a "feeling" or an "instinct," or by some other word which in its non-technical sense is sufficiently vague. In most cases it seems to be based upon a direct apprehension of the essential worth of the self; going back, I suppose, to the instinct of self-assertion — if indeed it does not go back farther than any instinct. The individual is conscious of inherent powers and purposes too great to be exhausted here, and feels that his own nature is such that the death of the body is irrelevant to its life. This is not an argument nor a demand, but an immediate sense that the death of the spirit is intolerably — almost ludicrously — incongruous with what one feels of indubitable reality within. This kind of belief is usually very strong, and has the added advantage of being at its strongest at exactly the times when it is most needed. It is not, however, for all, and I cannot say that those in whom it is the dominant type of faith form a very large class.

Far and away the largest of our four classes is the fourth — those, namely, whose faith is based chiefly on desire. The nature of this desire varies with different people. The fundamental as well as the most wide-

spread and influential form of it is simply the love of life as such, the instinctive impulse which normally makes men cling to life, however wretched they may be. In the words of Wijnaendts Francken, "The demand for self-preservation is one of our most powerful instincts; it transcends the tomb itself; for the desire for immortality is nothing else than one form of the search for self-preservation."¹ This sometimes expresses itself in instinctive horror at the thought of death — a point of view so vividly exemplified by many passages in the Book of the Dead. Horror at the destruction of the body, of course, plays no part in the desire for immortality today; yet dread of annihilation is with many still as strong as was fear of the tomb with the ancient Egyptian. If I may trust the replies of my respondents and Schiller's report of the responses to the S. P. R. questionnaire, the desire for eternal bliss seems to have little to do with the faith in question. Possibly I should mention one kind of happiness as an exception to this statement; for hope of reunion with one's friends is certainly one of the very largest factors in the desire for immortality. The demand for moral progress, for enlarged opportunity for service, and for a better chance for those who have had no chance here, are mentioned not infrequently by my respondents among the reasons why immortality is wished for. But quite as common as this desire for a future life on its own account is the demand that it shall exist in order to give meaning and significance to this life. Thus we are brought back again to that inherent demand for conscious life as such, for an endless continuation of spiritual opportunity, which is at the bottom of so much of the earnest desire for immortality. As we have seen, it is based upon an instinct — if indeed it be not ultimately based on something deeper still — and it manifests itself through all grades of spiritual development,

¹ *Psychologie de la Croyance en l'Immortalité, Revue Philosophique, LVI, 278.*

from the unthinking, organic fear of death, up to the longing of the artist, the philosopher, and the mystic.

Now for the other side. Having seen some of the psychological sources of belief in a future life, we may ask, What are the psychological influences involved in the doubt or denial of a future life? In a general way, of course, the answer is to be found in the absence of those causes which our study has shown us lead to belief. In the first place, we must recognize that a fairly large number of persons have no real desire for life after death. The causes of this indifference are not easy to ascertain with any degree of completeness or exactitude. Possibly some guidance may be found in a comparison of our times with the Middle Ages. The loss of desire for a future life in the last 500 years is due in part to the greater attractiveness of this world in our times and the increase of interests of all sorts which keep one's attention too firmly fastened here to allow of much thought being spent on the other world. As people cease to think about a future life it becomes less vivid to them and hence less an object of desire. The shattering of authority and the weakening in popular estimation of the arguments in its favor have also had the same tendency of making it seem less real and hence less genuinely longed for. For desire and belief are *mutually* helpful; not only does desire tend to beget belief, but some sort of belief in at least the possibility of the object is a condition of any real desire for it. In the 15th and 16th centuries men so desired the spring of perpetual youth that they were willing to risk all they had in the search for it. Youth is no less loved today, but it can hardly be said that anyone ardently desires to discover a spring whose magical waters would make it perpetual. We do not desire it as our ancestors did, because we no longer harbor it in our thoughts as a genuinely possible object of discovery. Other causes for the loss of desire for

immortality besides its lessening vividness are of course at work in various individuals — and always have been. Distaste for life in general, weariness, and dread of responsibility, tend to make one look forward to death as the definitive end with carelessness or even with longing.² Cases of this sort, however, are not common, and are probably little commoner today than in previous ages. The great cause of the loss of desire is the indifference described above, due to the disappearance of the vitality of belief.

I have no idea to what extent the change in the intellectual atmosphere of modern society has undermined emotional belief, but there can be no doubt that it has been the great factor in weakening belief from authority. And here the various arguments against human survival of death have been reinforced by all the rationalistic influences of every sort that have been steadily wearing away the authority of Bible, Church, and tradition these many years. Hence from several sides is borne in upon us the immense influence of thought in determining belief. This influence as it comes to bear upon the individual is largely indirect and largely negative, and for that reason when one studies the particular positive beliefs of individual men and women, thought seems to have a very second rate — or fourth rate — position. But when we take into consideration the movement of society during several centuries we see that the influence of thought (directly upon society and indirectly upon the individual) is of prime importance — something too often forgotten by the enthusiastic anti-intellectualism of our day. In fact, it would be a mistake to say that thought modifies

² Leuba sums up the causes for this loss of desire as he views them in the following words: "A weariness of existence, temperamental or the fruit of age or of other circumstances; a disposition to enjoy the mood that informs Bryant's noble poem, *Thanatopsis*; and especially, perhaps, an inability to picture in intelligible and acceptable form a future life, suffice to make of a death that ends all a satisfactory, even a desirable goal." (*The Belief in God and Immortality*, p. 301.)

the individual's belief only indirectly; for if we take into account its negative and destructive influence, its action is certainly direct enough. This destructive action of thought upon belief takes place more frequently and more easily today because of the psychological atmosphere that has been produced by the successive triumphs of natural science. Students of science are less likely to believe in immortality than others, not because the arguments against it are stronger than those for it, nor yet because they see the logical difficulties in the way of immortality more clearly than do those whose thought has been engaged chiefly in other lines, but largely because their training has produced in them a habit of regarding the scientific laws of the material world with the same sort of reverence that the old-fashioned Christian feels toward the teaching of Scripture. While scientists as a class are less likely to believe in the survival of bodily death than others, there are significant differences between different classes of scientists. Statistics indicate that over fifty per cent of the historians and physical scientists believe in immortality, while among the biologists and psychologists the percentage of belief is notably lower. This fact is undoubtedly due to the constant effort made by both the latter classes to view the phenomena of life and mind in terms of something like mechanical sequence; an effort which with some has become a habit, and by some is regarded as a presupposition of scientific procedure.

The truth is, non-belief, like belief, draws its strength not only from reason but from authority; in fact, for many enthusiastic students of science the will not to believe has a good deal to do with the result. In certain scientific circles it is not good form to believe in a future life; and the ascetic ideal which would sacrifice selfish interests for the personal values of science also comes into play. Moreover non-belief, like belief, is not merely a

product of logical argument, authority, habit, and volition, but is largely influenced also by the imagination; and the peculiarly objective point of view which natural science inculcates and the habit it produces of considering causation and the laws of matter universal and invariable, give a certain cast to the imagination which makes the idea of the survival of bodily death increasingly difficult.

This question of the imagination is most fundamental to the understanding of belief and disbelief. It is very difficult to believe earnestly in anything that we can in no way image to ourselves; and this general fact finds ample application and illustration in the field under discussion. Though no doubt there are exceptions, it is still a very general truth that those who deny a future life are those who find it impossible to imagine it in vivid and persuasive fashion; while they have few doubts on the subject who find little difficulty in imagining it and who perhaps would find it difficult to imagine death ending all. Belief and disbelief would therefore seem, in one sense, to be correlative to two types of imagination or two points of view from which the imagination regards the future life.

We can best get at these two types of imagination by contrasting two classes of persons who are known to have quite different views on the subject of immortality. Perhaps no large class of men are more given to a skeptical or even materialistic view on this subject than physicians; and probably none have more genuine faith in a future life than clergymen. Doubtless differences of opinion on authority and on the logic of various arguments have much to do with this difference of belief; but these things do not fully explain the contrast. The physician finds it hard to imagine, with any reality-feeling, life after death, while the clergyman finds it easy to do so. And the reason for this is largely to be found in the fact that

the physician tends to think of death from the point of view of the body, and that death means to him usually the death of some one else; whereas the clergyman views death more subjectively and from the point of view of the "soul." The physician takes the objective view of death. All his experience, his training, his daily work, his professional habits of thought, lead him to this. Inevitably death means to him the ceasing to function of certain vital organs. Thus it comes about that even when he thinks of his own death he pictures it also objectively — externally; he sees his body lying on a bed; his heart ceasing to beat, his respiration stopped. Those manifestations of life in which he is professionally interested he pictures at an end; and that *means* to him that life has ceased. As dies the beast, so dies the man — literally true from an external viewpoint certainly. As this habit of thought grows upon the physician or scientist, he finds it increasingly difficult to hold alongside with it the old view, taught him in childhood, that conscious life continues beyond the grave. To believe it might be logical enough, but he finds it very hard to imagine with any lively sense of reality.

The clergyman, on the other hand, thinks of death, as I have said, from the point of view of the "soul." Death means to him primarily *his* death; that is the type of death for him. He thinks of other people's death as meaning what his own death would mean. That is, he views death from the subjective, or, rather, the inner point of view. Very likely he knows little enough about the physiology of death: or if he is versed in this aspect of the case, it is not this primarily that he thinks about. Death means to him a form of subjective experience, not a physiological phenomenon. His whole training and his daily work enforce this view. As a result it is very easy for him to imagine a continuation of conscious existence after death; in fact, it may be difficult for him to

imagine the contrary. And of course not only is this true of ministers but it holds frequently of many other men whose thoughts are habitually occupied with the spiritual and inner side of life. Goethe is quoted as saying, "It is, to a thinking being, quite impossible to think himself non-existent, ceasing to think and live." This is the natural attitude of the untaught mind. It is with a tremendous shock of surprise that the child learns that he must some day die; and for a considerable time most children probably refuse really to believe it. The belief that life as a matter of course will not end seems to be almost as natural as the desire that it should continue. The idea that life will end may be logical but it is an acquired and secondary product.

"All men think all men mortal but themselves."

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, it is hard to think of the world continuing to run along and we not here to witness it. We are all incipient Berkleyans, at least to the extent that in our image of various external events there is usually, in the background of our minds, an implicit recognition of its relation or possible relation to us. We picture ourselves as the hidden beholders of all that we imagine. More important than this is the fact that the thought of one's self ceasing to exist is most difficult for the natural man, quite aside from his relation to the external world. Our past experience of consciousness is of a stream which, in spite of its temporary breaks in sleep, still seems to us really continuous and without conscious beginning or end. We have gone to sleep many times, but always to wake once more. *We have got into the habit of being alive.* Hence the association of non-being with ourselves is unnatural and difficult. Nor do past experience and the laws of association and habit explain the whole matter. Life somehow *feels* itself and *wills* itself to be end-

less — not explicitly, but by a violent reaction against the idea of extinction. To look at oneself objectively, from an exterior point of view, as one of those things which may cease to be, requires a considerable degree of sophistication, and both in the individual and in the race it is learned only with difficulty.

The two types of imagination that I have been describing — the external and the inner — are to be found not only in different individuals with different kinds of training; they may alternate within the same individual under varying circumstances. If I may take myself as an example, I find my own belief in a future life at its strongest when thinking of my own death. At such a time it is unnatural for me to take any but the subjective and inner point of view; so that the thought often gives me a kind of secret exhilaration such as one feels who sees his enemy in the distance and cries "Come on!" But when I see a person die I am sometimes very skeptical. I remember seeing a man run over by a train, and being surprised to find how hard it was for me to believe that the man's consciousness still existed or would ever exist again.

But difficulties connected with the imagination are responsible for another source of weakness in the belief in immortality, in addition to this objective and external mode of representation. Belief in an abstract truth, a truth which can be conceived but not imagined, is usually cold and lacking in that vividness which is the primitive touchstone of reality. The more concrete details that can be added to our mental picture, the more real does it become to us. This increased sense of reality through imagined details is the effect which the historical novel has — or should have — upon the reader. It makes Louis XI or Richard I real and living to us by supplying a host of concrete details which add the very warmth of life to characters that had been but names before.

Now it is the impossibility of surrounding the idea of the next world with any concrete details which are not themselves almost impossible, that makes the belief in question so hard for many to retain. If the departed really still have conscious existence, what are they doing? What are the conditions of their life? What are their employments and their pleasures? If we allow ourselves to ponder over these questions, most of us will find our notion of a future life taking on the color of a fairy tale. The questions, if we face them steadily, demand some kind of answer; and yet almost any conceivable answer that shall be put in vivid detail will make the belief all the more difficult. The historical attempts that have been made to picture the next world so as to give it the reality-feeling that comes from vivid images, have all had but very moderate and temporary success. From the *Book of the Dead*, through Virgil, Dante, Milton, down to *Gates Ajar*, the descriptions in our hymn books, and the latest revelations of the spiritualists, they all seem either mythical or puerile, so far as they are given in terms of detailed imagination. And the same thing surely is true of the *Book of the Revelation*. The Bible elsewhere on this point is wisely reticent. Jesus had no descriptive phrases for the life of heaven which were anything more than plainly symbolic. And his immediate followers perceived the wisdom of his example. "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things that God hath prepared for them that love Him."

For from the nature of the case, all the material for the details of another life must be drawn from this; and yet it is plain that if there is a future life (unless we adopt the conception of reincarnation), it must be in many of its details and surroundings very different from this. Hence the ascription to it of images drawn from this life strikes us as inharmonious and incongruous. The idea

therefore never gets dressed out in the details which are so helpful in imparting reality-feeling, and for most of us it remains always largely abstract and verbal. Hence the large number of people who, while not denying it, and even willing to say that they suppose they believe in it, are quite indifferent to it and never give it a thought. The imaginative difficulties in it are such that it resembles one of those small stars which can be seen only by indirect vision, and which disappear when looked at directly. Many people find that their belief in immortality is strongest when they think least about it.

There are two or three classes of people whose faith in a future life is not greatly affected by the difficulties we have been discussing. These are, in the first place, that small class of thinkers who have trained themselves to live so constantly in a world of concepts that lack of imaginative vividness is no loss. Much larger is the class of uncritical believers, whose faith is based upon authority, and who either find no difficulty in accepting the pictures in *The Revelation*, or else possess so strong a faith that difficulties in imagining a future life are powerless against it. A smaller but in many ways more interesting class are the mystics. For them the difficulties which others feel are not overcome but quite lacking. They will tell you that they cannot only conceive but imagine — or rather directly experience — what the future life will be, at least in its most important aspect. For them the most significant feature of that life will be its union with the Divine; and this is for them, they insist, no mere verbal phrase nor abstract idea nor pious hope, but a genuine and very real experience of this present life. People such as these need no detailed descriptions of how the dead are raised up or with what body they shall come. The details they can leave with perfect confidence for the future to reveal. The substance they already possess.

For the great majority who are not mystics, however, the difficulty of giving the future life any imaginative reality must always be a source of real weakness in belief. If they cling to the hope, they usually avoid any serious attempt to picture the details of the future life, either dodging the question altogether or refusing to take any suggested answer seriously. One of my respondents — a student of natural science, who yet hopes for and believes in immortality — writes: “To hold this faith without picturing the nature of the future life I find impossible; but I manage with ease and naturalness to keep those mental pictures in a flux, as it were, making them the poetry of my faith without giving them the definiteness which would challenge my own scientific criticism.” This man’s position is the wise one for most people who desire to keep their faith. Belief in a future life, like belief in God, is usually an *attitude*, a way of holding oneself in relation to the future, quite as much as a definable concept, and certainly more than a detailed picture. To try to turn it into the latter, either in oneself or in others, is surely not wise. “How are the dead raised up and with what body do they come? Thou fool!”

These then are some of the psychological influences tending to weaken the belief in a future life. Having considered this general question, it may be of some interest to consider briefly the more special question of the weakening of this belief within Christianity. For that it is being weakened I suppose there is little doubt, and that it is being weakened more rapidly in western Christendom than in other parts of the world seems probable. One of the things that strikes one most forcibly on a visit to India — at least if I may trust my own experience — is the vitality of the belief in immortality among all classes of society except those that have come under Western influence. Not only does there seem to be comparatively

little theoretical skepticism on the subject; the belief seems to hold a vital place in the lives of a surprisingly large proportion of the people. The chief cause for this contrast is undoubtedly the fact already pointed out, that modern Western science tends both to destroy authority, undermine various ancient arguments in favor of immortality, and also induce a form of imagination distinctly hostile to this belief. I think, however, there are several additional factors which give Hinduism a certain advantage over Christianity in nourishing a strong belief in immortality. One of them is connected with the question of the imagination already discussed. The Hindu finds no difficulty whatever in imagining the next life, for his belief in reincarnation teaches him that it will be just this life over again, though possibly at a slightly different social level. I am inclined to think, moreover, that the Christian and the Hindu customs of disposing of the dead body may have something to do with this contrast in the strength of their beliefs. Is it not possible that the perpetual presence of the graves of our dead tends to make Christians implicitly identify the lost friend with his body, and hence fall into the objective, external form of imagination about death that so weakens belief in the continued life of the soul? We do not teach this view to our children in words, but we often do indirectly and unintentionally by our acts. The body — which *was* the visible man — is put visibly into the grave and the child knows it is there; and at stated intervals we put flowers on the grave — an act which the child can hardly interpret otherwise than under the category of giving a present to the dead one. And so it comes about that while he is not at all sure just where Grandpa is, he is inclined to think that he is up in the cemetery. Much of our feeling and of our really practical and vital beliefs on this subject, as on most others, is of course derived from our childhood impressions. And so it comes about

that this attitude toward the body and the grave is not confined to children. Says Agnes in Ibsen's "Brand" of her dead boy Alf, when her husband has reproved her for thinking tenderly of the little body in the grave:

“‘What thou sternly call'st the corse,
 Ah, to me, my child is *there!*
 Where is body, there is soul;
 These apart I cannot keep,
 Each is unto me the whole;
 Alf beneath the snow asleep
 Is my very Alf in heaven.’”

The Hindu is not likely to make this identification. The body of his lost friend is burned within a few hours after death, and the ashes swept into the river and forever dispersed. There is no body left and no grave in which he may center his thoughts of the departed. If he is to think of him at all, it cannot be of his body and must be of his soul. The Christian decks the tomb of his departed one with flowers; the Hindu instead performs an annual Shraddha ceremony to the spirits of those gone before.

But there is, I believe, one further reason for the greater strength of the Hindu faith over the Christian, and that is to be found in the contrast between the two conceptions of immortality. In the Christian view the soul's survival of death is essentially miraculous. The soul is conceived as coming into existence with the birth of the body, and the thing to be expected is that it should perish when the body perishes. This is prevented through the intervention, so to speak, of God, who steps in and rescues the soul and confers upon it an immortality which, left to itself, it could never attain. Thus it comes about that when the idea of supernatural intervention has been generally discarded, and even the belief in God as an active force outside of nature has been weakened —

as is the case all over western Christendom — there is little left to support the belief in the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body. In India all this is changed. The soul's immortality has there never been thought dependent upon any supernatural interference or miraculous event, nor even upon God himself. There are atheistic philosophers in India, but they are as thoroughly convinced of the eternal life of the soul as are the monist and the theist. For in India the soul is *essentially* immortal. Its eternity grows out of its very nature. It did not begin to be when the body was born, and hence there is no reason to expect that it will cease to be when the body dies. Existence is a part of its nature. If you admit a beginning for it, you put it at once out of the class of the eternal things, and are forced to hang its future existence upon a miracle. But for the Hindu "the knowing self is not born; it dies not. It sprang from nothing; nothing sprang from it. It is not slain though the body be slain."³

But while it is hardly to be questioned that the belief in immortality is less widespread with us than it is with the Indians, it would be a great mistake to regard it as a secondary and unimportant part of Christianity as Christianity is actually believed and felt and lived today. Christianity, like Hinduism, has always considered faith in immortality one of the essential aspects of religion. Not all historical religions have done this. The Old Testament made little of personal immortality, as did also the classical form of Paganism, while orthodox Buddhism of the "southern" type seems to deny it altogether. But Christianity has persistently and steadily put its emphasis upon this larger human hope. And if we base our judgment as to what Christianity believes, not on the aggregate of persons who inhabit Christendom

³ Katho Upanishad I. 1. I have discussed this question at greater length in my "India and Its Faith." Pp. 105-107.

but upon those Christians whom popular thought singles out easily as religious people, we shall find that the hope of eternal life is still one of the essential and characteristic elements of Christianity. The difficulties in the conception which I have pointed out are undoubtedly present, and the faith of many Christians is plainly weaker because of them. Yet in spite of these things faith in immortality is still a living and most important part of the Christian conviction.

I am aware that this is not the opinion of all who have studied the subject. Thus Dr. G. Stanley Hall writes: "As to *immortality* in the orthodox sense of the word, if men really believed that there was another life vastly better and more desirable in every way than this, the world would soon be depopulated, for all would emigrate from it, unless fear of the mere act of dying deterred them. At least all the strong and enterprising souls would go. But in fact even those surest of Heaven stay here to the latest possible moment, and use every means at their disposal not to graduate into the *Jenseits*, even though their lives in this world be miserable. Does not this show that belief in post-mortem life is a convention, a dream-wish?"⁴

The fallacy of the argument used in this quotation is presumably plain enough. The fact that people do not commit suicide is no proof that they do not believe in a future life, as Dr. Hall would have us think; it shows merely that the instinctive impulse for self-preservation, combined with the reiterated teachings of the Christian churches that suicide is a great sin, has strength enough to keep those who believe the other life is best still on this side, until it is God's will to take them. But aside from this psychologically sound explanation of the matter, and even if we were dealing with the (psychologically

⁴Thanatophobia and Immortality. American Journal of Psychology, October, 1915, p. 579.

quite impossible) cold intelligences that President Hall for the moment seems to believe in, the utmost that his test proves is that religious people prefer one life at a time; that no matter how fair the next life may prove to be, they prefer to postpone it till the hour comes and they are ripe for it.

The question of the intensity of belief in what Dr. Hall, in characteristic phrase, calls the "post-mortem perduration of personality,"⁵ is not to be settled in so simple a fashion. For many indifferent people it may be what Dr. Hall calls it — "a kiosk in Kamchatka, which believers have invested something in and fitted out with such comforts as they can" — "better fifty years of earth than a cycle of Heaven." But for many a religious soul — and for many more of them than Dr. Hall evidently supposes — the hope of eternal life is something truly vital and fundamental, something too sacred and profound to be treated intelligently in Dr. Hall's flippant phrases. It may be that my experience is untrustworthy, but certainly it has been my observation that among religious people the hope and belief in a future life are very central to their religion. The results of my questionnaire show the same fact, if they can be trusted to show anything at all. Among one hundred and forty-seven respondents, one hundred and thirty-one believed in a future life, as against sixteen who were agnostic. Of fifty-seven respondents to a question concerning the growth or decay of the belief, forty-five insisted that their faith in immortality was increasing, seven noticed no change, and five found a decrease. I should claim no value for these figures were it not that I believe my respondents to have been fairly representative religious people, and that the tone of their answers is quite in accord with what the figures indicate. The faith in immortality may be less widespread than the belief in a God, though this is

⁵ Educational Problems. New York; Appleton. 1911. Vol. I, p. 144.

doubtful. Leuba's figures would, in fact, indicate the contrary. All the different classes of American scholars whom he investigated, except the psychologists, were found to include a larger percentage of believers in immortality than of believers in a personal God.⁶ Whether this be true of the majority of mankind or not, certainly there is one sense in which the belief in immortality *means* more than the belief in a God. It is less a matter of theory and, when strong, is more personal and practical in its nature. It is far from being merely the continuation of a childish superstition, but, like the belief in God when this is normal, it changes and grows with the growing mind. My respondents may have exaggerated the increase of its strength with their maturing and advancing years, but their testimony is, I believe, trustworthy in so far as it indicates the steady increase of value that this faith has for life. To the religious man and woman this hope-faith becomes increasingly a part of his existence, a secret source of new courage and strength, as the years go by.

It is this essentially pragmatic value of the belief in immortality that I would stress in closing this essay. As the belief in miracles and special answers to prayer and in the interference of the supernatural within the natural has gradually disappeared, almost the only *pragmatic* value of the supernatural left to religion is the belief in a personal future life. In many advanced religious circles the Absolute is climbing the throne of Jehovah, and the idealistic universe which has taken the place of the old one, when examined closely, turns out to be just the materialistic universe with a new set of labels. In such a world only a minimum of pragmatic value is left to "God," and only the belief in human immortality is left us from all the ancient faith which taught that the religious universe was really different and had

⁶Op. cit. Chap. IX.

appreciably different consequences from the non-religious one.

If we affirm with Höffding that, from one point of view at least, "the essence of religion consists in the conviction that value will be preserved,"⁷ then surely the belief in human immortality is very central to it. In a very real sense, moreover, one may say that this faith is psychologically deep-rooted and psychologically justified. For it is based on the clear apprehension of a great truth and a great postulate. The truth is that value and conscious life are correlative terms, and that each is impossible without the other. The postulate is that spiritual life is different in kind from and essentially independent of the world of matter and its laws and operations. Intimately intermingled the two are, but the human spirit has always insisted that they are not identical, and demanded that they shall not be utterly inseparable. The faith in the immortality of man's spirit is the great expression of this postulate, and of the inherently idealistic demand of human nature that the values of the universe shall not wholly perish. In one sense therefore this faith is even more fundamentally human — as it has in fact been more widespread both in space and in time — than the belief in a personal God. For it is essentially humanity's belief in itself, its faith in the highest form of the spiritual life that it has known. The particular forms of this faith have varied with man's changing circumstances through the ages and inevitably will vary. But the fundamental demand for the continuance of conscious and rational life, somewhere and somehow, will pretty certainly last as long as men have ideals and hopes, and continue to take any attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny.

⁷ *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 14 — et passim.

IS THE DESIGN ARGUMENT DEAD?

WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON

LINCOLN UNIVERSITY

The basis of theistic belief is fortunately broader than the theistic arguments. People believe in God before they argue in favor of His existence, and the fortunes of theism are not inseparably bound up with any of the arguments framed in its support. No one, however, who is interested in the rational basis of theology can be indifferent to the fate of an argument which, whatever the philosophical objections to be brought against it, has in all ages of the world made a powerful appeal to human reason.

While objections to the Design Argument alike from the theistic and the anti-theistic camps were made before the time of Kant, the two influences most hostile to it in modern times have been the Kantian philosophy and the Darwinian theory. We know what Heine thought of Kant's theistic philosophy: "I can hear the bell. Kneel down. They are bringing the sacraments to a dying God." The Design Argument was supposed in any case to have received an effectual *coup de grace* at the hands of Darwin, even if it survived the rough handling of Kant's *Critique*.

To destroy knowledge of God in order to make room for faith was the avowed object of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the argument of the whole work may be said to culminate in the criticism of the theistic proofs. The essence of Kantism, in spite of the elaborate apparatus of the *Critique*, is quite simple, and has been thus expressed by his translator, Max Müller, in his preface: "That

without which experience is impossible, cannot be the result of experience, though it must never be applied beyond the limits of possible experience." A standing objection to Kant is that he himself transcended the limits of "experience" when he asserted the existence of things-in-themselves, but there is another very obvious objection of kindred import. Reason, with Kant as with everybody else, does in fact "soar beyond the world of sense" (p. 477) and "soar above all possible experience" (p. 513), when an inference is drawn to the existence of our fellowmen.

"We are spirits clad in veils,
Man by man was never seen" —

and it is generally believed that he never can be the object of possible sensible experience in the Kantian sense. The principle of the parsimony of causes might lead us to maintain that our fellowmen are automata, as Descartes supposed animals to be, or might even lead us so deep into the abyss of Solipsism as to say (with Tennyson again),

"Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee,
Am not thyself in converse with thyself."

The answer to Kant is that we do constantly "soar beyond the world of sense," and if we did not we could not transact the business of life. Why reduce experience to chaos by setting arbitrary limits to knowledge? If we can and do every day transcend "experience" in the narrow sense by inferring intelligence and purpose behind the actions of our fellowmen, why can we not, as Kant himself apparently allows us to do in the preface to his second edition (p. 702), follow the natural bent of the reason and explain "the wonderful beauty, order, and providence, everywhere displayed in nature," by referring them to "a great and wise Author of the World"?

Kant's own admissions in favor of the Design Argument, whether attributed to candor or to inconsistency, do much to dull the edge of his own criticisms. If there is at present an anti-Kantian reaction in philosophy, a re-examination of his critique of the theistic proofs would be timely.

The topic of Darwinism and Design has been worn threadbare in the discussions of the past fifty years, and no re-opening of the question will be fruitful unless it is motivated either by new developments in science or by the discovery of a new philosophical standpoint. The continued criticism of Darwinian Selection, the discussion by Henderson, Wallace, and others of the Fitness of the Environment, and the attempt of Bergson to find a *via media* between Mechanism and Finalism may furnish an excuse for the observations that follow.

I. *Natural Selection and Its Critics.* The great contribution which Darwin made to the thought of the world was, according to Huxley, that he eliminated the teleological factor from the explanation of life. As Weismann, who of course goes beyond Darwin, puts it: "Every species *must* have arisen just where, and when, and in the form in which it actually did arise, as the necessary outcome of the existing conditions of energy and matter, and of their interactions upon each other." Where Weismann puts mechanism in the place of design other interpreters of Darwin substituted chance, and perhaps a cruel chance, mechanism and chance agreeing in the exclusion of purpose.

As Alexander the Great, to the disgust of his Hellenic friends, changed his habits as he extended his conquests, and assumed the dress and manners of the Persians, so the Darwinian theory in extending its dominion over regions remote from the biological field was transformed into a mechanical theory of the universe. J. T. Merx in his *History of European Thought in the 19th Century*

thinks that Darwinism has immensely strengthened the mechanical view of the world. It enthroned mechanism in the very heart of the organic world, where design was suppose to reign. Automatic crowding out, at the expense of those who were crushed, produced overtopping individuals, and these of such excellence that they "give the impression of having been originally designed"; while in fact they are designed as little (or as much) as the tall mountain peak which towers above its neighbor. The secret was out at last. It was shown that a non-purposive mechanism could produce the evidence of design, that the fortuitous could evolve the fit (Vol. ii, pp. 412 f.).

The teleologist will protest against the equation of mechanism with chance which is often assumed in discussions of this character. Mechanism has in fact a closer affinity with purpose than with chance, these two latter being the only two ultimate theories of the universe. All the machines we know about are the result of purpose, and the assumed world-mechanism may naturally be assigned to a similar origin unless there is sufficient reason to the contrary. In human mechanisms the more complicated the machinery and the more elaborate the product, the more evidence is there of a high order of intelligence. The evidence of design is to be found, not in any one wheel or cog, but in the arrangement of the whole, in the coördination of parts and in the product. Kipling's "Secret of the Machines" presents the argument:

"We can pull and haul and push and lift and drive,
We print and plough and weave and heat and light,
We can run and jump and swim and fly and dive,
We can see and hear and count and read and write!

.

Because for all our power and weight and size,
We are nothing more than children of your brain!"

When the man in the street asks who it is that made the mechanism and drives the mechanism, the thorough-going mechanist can only take refuge in a convenient agnosticism. Mechanism is a teleological conception, and it is not to be identified with Chance unless it can be shown how chance can produce the mechanism. Lucretius, it will be remembered, endowed the atoms in their downward movement with a power of declination, a sort of freedom or quasi-consciousness. The fortuitous-concourse theory is still held by so distinguished a writer as Mr. Bertrand Russell in his *Philosophical Essays*; but the belief that the clash of primitive atoms, whether or not endowed with this quasi-consciousness, could result in a cosmos, has been made more difficult by modern physics and astronomy. That "a molecular plebiscite," to use Martineau's phrase, could have resulted in the majestic sweep of an ordered universe, in a unitary world-mechanism, is as improbable as that victory could come to an army each of whose units should hold a referendum before deciding whether to obey the commander's orders.

The case of Darwinism and Design would be simplified if the biologists themselves would decide whether natural selection was the real cause of the appearance of new species. At present the doctors disagree. Professor W. B. Scott in his *Theory of Evolution* (1917) says that the Darwinians are still in the majority or at least have a plurality, since no alternative theory of the origin of species has as many advocates as that of natural selection. His study of fossils, however, leads him to reject Darwinism as not offering an adequate explanation of the observed facts (p. 25), and he quotes Professor Bateson as saying that as to the causes of specific diversity "we have to confess an ignorance almost total." Similarly Professor H. F. Osborn says in his *Origin and Evolution of Life* (1917) that "the causes of the evolution of life

are as mysterious as the law of evolution is certain." A large if not an increasing number of biologists, while dogmatic as to the fact of evolution, are agnostic as to the factors which bring it about. The unsettled state of opinion in scientific circles is reflected by the humorous versifier:

"Let natural selection go;
Its methods are by far too slow.
Poor Darwin's dead, DeVries is king;
Mutations have become the thing."

The final rejection of natural selection would not prove the case for the teleologist, but it would remove from the field the only hypothesis which has attempted to show how chance could mimic the work of design. Professor Scott, while believing that the question of design is metaphysical rather than scientific, puts the case temperately when he says (pp. 30, 31): "In order to hold the evolutionary hypothesis it is not necessary to deny the ideal relationships between the successive gradations of living beings, or to exclude belief in a creative plan, which has been worked out by the method of evolution." The most recent survey of the question from the theological side leads its author to the conviction that "the marks of design which the world exhibits and the testimony which it bears to its Creator, so far from being obscured or diminished by the discovery of the process of Evolution, become clearer, brighter, and more convincing than they ever were before."¹

II. *The Fitness of the Environment.* The world of organisms and organs has been the citadel of the Design Argument, and it was in this citadel that Darwin was supposed to have dealt teleology its death blow. It would be a sort of poetic justice if a new development in evolutionary science should establish teleology again in the stronghold of mechanism, the pre-organic world.

¹ J. N. Shearman, *The Natural Theology of Evolution*, 1916, p. x.

The argument of Professor L. J. Henderson in his striking book, *The Fitness of the Environment* (1913) and in his later article, "The Teleology of Inorganic Nature" (*Philosophical Review*, May, 1916), may be condensed into two propositions: "Logically, in some obscure manner, cosmic and biological evolution are one," and the biologist "may now rightly regard the universe in its very essence as biocentric" (*Fitness*, pp. 278, 312). Further, quoting from his article, the connection between the properties of the three elements, hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, and the evolution of life which they favor to the maximum extent, is "almost infinitely improbable as the result of chance" (p. 271), and "there is not one chance in millions of millions" that these properties should simultaneously occur.

Professor Henderson has established teleology in a sphere in which there can be no question of selection and its mimicking of design. He has placed an effective weapon in the hands of the theistic philosopher, while he with scientific reserve — for why should the scientist become theologian? — declines to use it himself.² An

² Professor Henderson argues that the order of nature is teleological, but he seeks to share Darwin's agnosticism when it comes to the admission of Mind or Purpose back of nature. Upon this subject, he says, "clear ideas and close reasoning are no longer possible, for thought has arrived at one of its natural frontiers" (p. 281). His positive thesis is (1) that the relation between the original elements and the freedom of evolution is not a chance relation; (2) that the connection between the two "is a causal connection"; (3) that the connection is only intelligible "as a preparation for the evolutionary process"; (4) that "we are ignorant of the existence of any cause except mind which can produce results that are fully intelligible only in their relation to later events" (p. 271); and (5) that the relation must be conceived as "teleological," because "there is no other way to describe it" (p. 279). It seems to me that what Professor Henderson says as a scientific specialist may be used to serve the purposes of theistic argument without being discounted by what he says of the frontiers of knowledge.

I do not see that the argument against chance and in favor of teleology is broken by Professor R. B. Perry's criticism in his article, "Purpose as Systematic Unity," in *The Monist*, July, 1917. Professor Perry compares life to a die with the same number on all the faces, while the environment is a die with a million of faces only one of which matches the first die. "That the two should match in any single instance is highly improbable; the chances are millions to one against it. But if it should happen that there was only one trial, its happening to be successful would prove nothing as to there being anything more than chance at work" (p. 373). But

evolutionist of greater fame, the late A. R. Wallace, felt no such scruples. In his latest work, *The World of Life* (1911) taking up the same problem, he speaks of "the existence of a special group of elements possessing such exceptional and altogether extraordinary properties as to render *possible* the existence of vegetable and animal life-forms"; and draws the conclusion that the Mind that caused these elements to exist and then built them up into such marvelous structures "must be many million times greater than those which conceived and executed the modern steam-engine" (p. 416).

To have fitness, preparation, a teleology which excludes chance, or frankly Purpose, thus recognized by competent scientists as lying at the foundation of biological evolution is a gain for the Design Argument, and one from an unexpected quarter. But if a teleological relation is assumed as existing between the inorganic and the organic spheres, surely a similar relation may be assumed between both of these spheres and the realm of humanity. A biocentric view of the world naturally passes over into an anthropocentric view, and we are not surprised to hear Wallace argue that the purpose of the universe is the production of intelligent and moral beings. An astronomer of note, T. C. Chamberlin, closes his recent volume on *The Origin of the Earth* with the remark that "the emergence of what we call the living from the inorganic, and the emergence of what we call the psychic from the physiologic, were at once the transcendent and the transcendental features of the earth's revolution." Such extensions of the Design Argument have

the teleological character of the inorganic world is seen not in the appearance of one element among millions of other possible elements, but in the simultaneous appearance, among other less favorable possibilities, of certain necessary elements, necessary compounds and necessary properties of compounds, all of maximum advantage for life. It is as though there were a million of dice thrown together and all at the first throw turned up sixes. It is this coincidence of factors indefinitely numerous and all coöperating to the maximum freedom of organic evolution that Henderson thinks is staggering to the advocates of chance.

been made, in different ways, by Mr. Balfour and Professor Royce.

Assuming, perhaps too hastily, that in the organic sphere the fortuitous might evolve the fit, and that selection might counterfeit design, Mr. Balfour, in his *Theism and Humanism* (1915) points out the immeasurable improbability that a fortuitous arrangement of molecules should produce not only living matter, but living matter of the kind upon which selection might act. His main purpose, however, is not to carry the argument downward into the pre-organic sphere but upward into the realms of æsthetics, ethics, and science. He would do something "to show that 'design' is demanded by all that we deem most valuable in life, by beauty, by morals, by scientific truth; and that it is design far deeper in purpose, far richer in significance, than any which could be inferred from the most ingenious and elaborate adjustments displayed by organic life" (p. 51).

Professor Royce has given a new turn to the argument for the Fitness of the Environment by insisting in his *Problem of Christianity* that nature, inorganic and organic, is pre-adapted to be understood by human intelligence. That man can weigh the worlds in the balance of his thought, and summarize in his generalizations so vast and complex a range of facts, is an indication that the relation between the facts and the generalizations is not fortuitous. A biocentric view of the universe is of necessity a teleological view, and it naturally points on to an anthropological view. The considerations urged by Henderson and Wallace, while not entirely new in the history of theistic reasoning, have given a new impetus to the Design Argument and have brought within its sweep all the periods of natural history.

III. *Bergson's Critique of Finalism.* The story of evolution as Bergson tells it, certainly in a fascinating manner,

is a drama in three acts. Life or consciousness, the hero, is imprisoned by matter, the villain, and is struggling blindly to be free. In the first act, the vital impulse tunnels its way into the vegetable world; but as it reaches only the lethargy and immobility of vegetable forms, the result is so far a failure. The second act finds consciousness working its way into the animal world and attaining mobility; but, arrested at the stage of instinct, it can only respond to the environment in a way which is patterned after the mechanical action of matter. In the third act, "by a tremendous leap," consciousness, in spite of the efforts of matter to drag it down to the plane of mechanism, reaches at last spontaneity and freedom in man.

By what means then did our hero, life or consciousness, make his escape from imprisoning matter? It was not by Mechanism, for the mechanism of matter was all the time opposing life and hindering its advance. It was not by Chance; for, as Bergson acutely argues in opposition to Darwinian selection, chance could not secure the coördination of parts necessary to the evolution of living beings, nor on different lines of development fashion two organs so much alike as the eye of a mollusk and the eye of a man. It was not by Purpose; for purpose implies finality, fixity, with no play for the reality of freedom or of time. Bergson is evidently in search of a category which shall be neither mechanism, chance, nor purpose; and he finds it in the conception of an original vital impulse, neither mechanistic, fortuitous, nor purposive, working its way toward consciousness and freedom against the downward current of matter.

Sympathizing with Bergson's revolt against mechanism and absolutism, we may venture to ask whether his semi-mystical vital impulse is clearly enough conceived and described to answer the purposes of philosophy, and whether it is able to fulfil its author's intention, namely,

to safeguard free-will and to vindicate the reality of time.

When the curtain rises on Bergson's engaging drama of *Creative Evolution*, the principal actors, life or consciousness and matter, are already on the stage and already in action. But how did life become imprisoned in matter? Whence the impulse to escape from matter's entanglements? And what were the antecedents of matter, the villain of the plot? To these difficult questions we find in Bergson no consistent and satisfactory answer. His prevailing exposition is based on a dualism of life and matter, regarded as two coördinate but antagonistic currents, one moving upward and the other downward. Both life and matter are then to be regarded presumably as manifestations of one underlying principle, if the question of origin is raised. But in the section on the Genesis of Matter he speaks of matter as being the arrest of life, saying that we must believe that life as the inverse of materiality is the creator of matter by its own interruption alone (p. 245). Still a third theory is suggested when it is said that life or consciousness on our planet, before the condensation of nebula was achieved, was in a state of dream or sleep. It took its first flight when by an inverse movement the nebulous matter appeared. Here matter seems in a way to be the creator or at least the awakener of life (pp. 256, 257). Life in fact is defined as a tendency to act on brute matter.

This vacillation in conceiving the relations between life and matter suggests that Bergson's vital impulse is to be regarded as a scientific hypothesis (some would say as a poetic fancy) rather than as an ultimate or metaphysical theory. This impression is strengthened by a reading of *Creative Evolution*, which leaves one in doubt whether God is to be identified with the vital impulse, and is working up in the course of evolution toward consciousness and freedom; or whether God is to be

regarded as the creator of the vital impulse, and is thus a "creator of creators." There are hints that Bergson believes that his system is capable of a theistic interpretation, but the decisive word as to the real quality of his theism is scarcely to be found within his *Creative Evolution*. Bergson, we may insist, is not in the position to speak the authoritative word on Finalism, until he makes clearer his ultimate metaphysical view, that is, his view of the nature of God and His relation to the world and to life.

Our second question was whether Bergson's vital impulse was competent to do the work assigned to it, that is to safeguard the interests of time and of free-will. Here again the uncertainties as to the origin of the vital impulse and its relation to matter come back to vex us. With Bergson time alone has primary reality, while the spatial world has only artificial or symbolic existence. Objects in space are merely, says Bergson in a striking phrase, the mirrors of our possible actions. But what of the geologic or astronomical ages before the appearance of life or the rise of intelligence? These treat only of that which is reversible, mechanical, calculable, not of real duration, and so they cannot in the proper sense be real. These ages and their history collapse into chaos. There were then no laws of nature or no cosmos at all, for the categories of intelligence and the laws of nature, we are told, have evolved together as the result of the push of the upward stream of life against the downward stream of matter. There can be no question with Bergson of the "fitness of the environment" in the pre-organic period, nor can we ask with a popular preacher, "When God was filling up his coal bins in Pennsylvania millions of years ago, where were the men who were going to burn that coal? Tell me God does not plan ahead!" For with Bergson, when he is strictly interpreted, there were no chemical properties, no elements,

no coal bins or coal deposits, perhaps no matter at all, before the vital impulse or original impulsion began to work. If it be said that the original impulse was eternal, the difficulty for Bergson would be still more serious, for eternity is his *bête noir* which he has used all his ingenuity to exorcise from his system. Bergson's exposition of time is admirable from a psychological standpoint, but the complaint will be made that he reduces it to so narrow a rôle that it cannot be viewed as the very stuff of reality. It is interesting to notice that a recent critic of Bergson, Professor Pringle-Pattison in his *Idea of God* (1917) complains of his want of balance in his treatment of the past and of the future. In his rejection of finalism and his insistence upon the unpredictability of future action, Bergson has broken the link between the present and the future, and has forgotten "the essentially anticipatory character of conscious action, as purposive, and all that is implied in the causality of the ideal" (p. 377).

Bergson is right in championing the cause of freedom against systems whether naturalistic or monistic that would swallow it up. But the interests of freedom, it may be maintained, are far safer in a universe, where, as the finalist believes, will and purpose are enthroned than in a world controlled by blind, capricious, and unintelligent forces. These interests are safer in such a finalistic world than in a world whose fortunes depend on a mere tendency to act on brute matter, without pre-conceived objects to be attained, or predetermined grooves to direct activity. Such a mere tendency to act on brute matter, such a blind *vis a tergo*, would not lead out the lines of life into complexity, beauty, spontaneity, and freedom, any more than the force of gravitation would bring down the mountain water to the city dwellings without aqueducts and mains laid for that purpose. Such a general tendency to act without foresight of ends

will in fact be another name for mechanical force or chance, the impotence of which to account for the course of evolution Bergson has so acutely set forth.

The Design Argument is not dead, because the state of opinion in the biological field is not unfavorable to the conclusion that intelligent Purpose is at the heart of the universe; because the study of chemistry and physics leads to a biocentric, and the study of ethics and æsthetics leads to an anthropocentric view of the world; and because no half-way house has as yet been found between the ultimate theories of chance and purpose. It is not likely to die because, in the words of Kant, "it gives life to the study of nature, deriving its own existence from it, and thus constantly acquiring new vigor."

At the beginning of the war faith was tried, and some adopted Mr. Wells' view of a finite God, while others were tempted to believe that history had no meaning, but that progress, to use an expression of Mr. G. B. Shaw, was "an infinite comedy of illusion." There has been happily a change in sentiment, as the moral issues of the struggle and the possible beneficent effects have been more clearly distinguished. We may now be thankful that we are living "in freedom's crowning hour," and that we are able to say,

"I saw the powers of darkness take their flight;
I saw the morning break."

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION

EDWARD FARWELL HAYWARD

CHICOPEE

In the process of world readjustment incident to the war no department of man's life is likely to remain unaffected. Probably the more deeply we go into human nature, the more profound will be the reactions. On the surface the earth will not be the same. The scars which the Thirty Years' War left upon Europe have not yet been wholly effaced. Although the World War did not last as long, its far greater intensity and destructive force insure a vaster modification of outward nature. We already begin to see how powerfully government, society, and industry are to be affected. The whole order of life is being subjected to new pressures and set in new directions. The programme of education will have to be rearranged to meet the demands of a young manhood which has been tested ideally and practically as no other has ever been tested. Is it then likely that religion, that last resort of the human spirit, can hope to escape the challenge of the hour? To indicate certain tendencies which are already apparent and to point out the probable changes which they foreshadow — one can hardly hope to do more at this time — is the purpose of this article. It will have to do not merely with the attitude of the popular mind toward religion in general, but more particularly with the demand which it is likely to make upon the Church as the depositary and working instrument of religion.

Undoubtedly religion in the world in the future, as in the past, will continue to be dependent upon the

institution which mediates it to man. The fears or hopes of those who foresee the passing of the Church need not be taken too seriously. Any changes which are to come will best be indicated by reference to the Church, which will register them and give them expression. The Church, like man himself, has three sides, three departments of life — one intellectual, one spiritual, and a third which is merely bodily. Or, to put it another way, the Church is first a dogma, then it is a devotion, and finally it is a discipline. In all of these departments of its life it has been a development, changing from age to age with the evolution of the race. The modification, the growth, however, has been most marked in theology; and today it is possible to see a sort of culmination of the long course of doctrinal reconstruction which has been going on.

For a long time the process had to do with doctrines themselves, substituting new ones for old, or softening the rigors of those which were still retained. Then in New England at least, and measurably in other parts of the country, the change was indicated by the new lack of emphasis upon doctrine, an attitude which might be due to either greater breadth of view or lessening sense of the importance of theology. The significant fact is that through all these changes sectarianism has been little affected. The various denominations still maintain their respective enclosures and the force of their separate appeals. How this can be in the face of the modification and even of the discrediting of doctrine, is puzzling until we come to see the final effects of dogmas long held in common by groups of believers. That which is first held as a subscription, at last becomes a tradition, issuing in a habit of mind and an attitude of life. The creedal foundation still exists. As a corner-stone the dogma underlies the Church, but, like other corner-stones generally, it is buried out of sight. Once it was

much in evidence; today in the increasing multitude of new religions, interests, and demands it is seldom referred to. Once it was a finality, it was held as a fixture; now its relation to the Church's life is fluid, it is held in solution.

Out of the long reference to it as a logical foundation has sprung up at last a condition which we cannot better describe than by calling it atmospheric. This is indeed the last analysis of any common thought or action or life among men, and it may be felt as final in any home, in any school or business place. Habits and convictions which men hold in common issue at last in an atmosphere, to which the average person is far more susceptible than he is to the fine distinctions of dogmatic theology. We now mean more than a scheme of doctrines when we speak of Calvinism or Wesleyanism or Unitarianism; we have in mind a general attitude, a state of feeling, a temperature, in short, a climate of the soul which we find congenial or otherwise to our religious needs. When we enter a church, this atmosphere meets us; when we try to live and work in it, this is the condition which determines whether or not we feel at home. The air which seems native to us, in which we breathe most freely, decides our particular church-adherence far more than any personal understanding of or entering into doctrinal differences.

How many loyal and devoted members of any church-communion would be equal to the task of defining intelligently the dogmatic grounds upon which their loyalty rests? And yet this inability does not seem to affect either the loyalty or the devotion. The dogma still plays its part; it has created the atmosphere which has become the active agent in holding church-adherence. This is the only way that we can account for the startling revolutions which occasionally visit individuals and do so much to disrupt and sadden family life. The Unitarian boy goes away to college; and presently, to the bewilderment

of his parents, announces his intention of studying for the priesthood of the Roman Church. The explanation he would probably offer would be that a study of the doctrines of the Church had induced him to change his belief. The chances are, however, that the aggregate of all the influences which have gone into the making of the Church of Rome met the young impressionable mind in far subtler forms than that of ratiocination at the very doors of the Church itself. The spell was first woven about the spirit, the impulse of conformity was first awakened, and finally justification was sought for the desired step in a study of the doctrines. At the last analysis the Church itself becomes its own best teacher. Pressure of earlier environment does not always determine the type of mind; when it finds the environment which is native to it, the inevitable change becomes not so much a conversion as a reversion; and then the doctrinal readjustment becomes easy. This, to be sure, is not always the path of religious reconstruction, but there is reason to believe that it is by this more unconscious method that most cases of conversion are wrought.

A woman who had been brought up in a Calvinist church in a country town tells of a visit to New York City when she was eighteen years old. As a child she had sat in her pew and swung her feet in protest, although she could hardly have understood, much less reasoned about, what she heard. Being taken to a liberal church in the city, she declared that for the first time she felt the customary tension relax, and realized that she was now at home in a church, a conviction which never afterward left her. All that one service could do for a girl of eighteen would hardly account for such an experience unless it be that the doctrinal foundation of the churches has much more than a merely intellectual effect. At the last analysis we should probably find that church-allegiance is largely a feeling of restfulness, a sense of being

satisfied and at home in one church more than in another. However important we may hold the doctrinal basis of religion to be, we must remember that Christianity began in an impulse of faith and personal loyalty to Jesus which was so enthusiastic and compelling as to need no other justification. This exaltation of spirit, this new sense of security and happiness in the presence of a great spiritual discovery, was not reasoned or intellectualized either by teacher or by disciples. For two hundred years this joyous experience was enough. Then, as the ardor cooled, as the sense of divine nearness began to fade, came the need, which is first indicated in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, of formulating the faith and basing it solidly on a foundation of dogma. A Christology became necessary only when devotion to Christ had begun to wane. Formal theology then took the place of prophecy. When the regenerative force of a free gospel had spent itself, there was nothing to do but to create the institution and buttress the Church upon doctrinal finality. But as time went on the burden of this fixity became increasingly unbearable, until in our own day we have seen the whole doctrinal structure undermined by either denial or indifference. This process seems likely to be accentuated by the war. The readjustment which is coming everywhere is emphasizing a new demand for simplification of Christian teaching and for unity and co-operation of Christian effort. Everywhere the barriers are being broken down. Men are coming together, learning to live and to die together. Race and nation have ceased to be dividing lines and boundaries. In the light of these new understandings and sympathies, what hope is there for a denominationalism founded upon difference of opinion? That men should differ is as necessary as ever, but the *credo* which divides is becoming more a working formula than a religious test; its divisiveness is only superficial; the deep currents of the religious life run

beneath it, and may have a common spiritual experience in spite of all differences of theological belief.

As the growing things of the earth obscure the soil from which they spring, so the obtrusion of doctrinal sources may mean the disturbance of vital processes of religious life. It will always be the business of the Church to condition religious emotion on the right sort of thinking; but the theology itself is not as important as the emotions it helps to create. Its final expression is an attitude and spirit. "When all theological systems have been reduced to a condition of fluidity and flux," writes Professor Andrew McPhail, "a universal church will formulate itself and all men will be drawn unto it for the sheer enjoyment of losing themselves in the Infinite. By the contemplation of heavenly things the transitory and perishable will seem of less importance than they now appear to be; and men will turn from them with hatred and full purpose to endeavor after a new obedience."

This sense of the transitory and perishable in much that passes for religion has been deepening in these days when the foundations of the earth are being broken up, and thought of serious things has begun to disturb our materialistic self-complacency. Much more has been happening than the bombardment of sacred cathedrals in the war which is bringing every dependence of the human spirit to the testing. More than even a new theology we need a new kind of theology, a theology which exists as a fertile soil for the genuine fruits of the spirit, a theology which shall bring all men together in a working brotherhood, however far apart they may be in their thinking. The best part of any dogma ought to be what it can do for those who cannot wholly accept it. There is enough of the Ritualist or the Puritan or the Liberal in religion in us all to make us glad and grateful for the churches which these represent, and even to allow us to profit by

their ministrations on occasion, if only they will have it so. The ideal mother is one who cares for her own, but is loved also by all the boys of the neighborhood, who feels an interest in all, and makes them all share in her motherhood. Mother Church is to become a neighborly and not merely a domestic reality. A boy does not think less of his own parents and his own home because he shares the kind offices of other boys' parents and homes. The very width and variety of these larger religious relationships is necessary to realize the ideal of motherliness in the Church. Nor does dogma offer any obstruction when we accept Professor Francis G. Peabody's definition of faith as a matter of consecration rather than of conformity, as a way of walking rather than a way of talking — "*we walk by faith.*" The stress of great undertakings, the common sufferings and dangers which are welding men of different creeds and nationalities together, are preparing the way for this broad inclusiveness, this sense of an underlying brotherhood in all the differing sentiments of sects. The young men who are coming back from the war are bringing this new point of view with them. We read of the devout Catholic taking part in the Communion service in a Y. M. C. A. tent, and of the Protestant mingling with the Catholic soldiers at mass, of rabbi, priest, and minister indiscriminately sharing the offices for the dead upon the battlefield. Can any one doubt that this is to have effect in the years to come, even if the old lines of church-cleavage still hold? The attitude and spirit of Liberal religion are vindicating themselves to the world; and the question naturally comes, Why, with this immediate advantage, the Liberal Christian church may not more and more come to meet the religious needs of men? What better indication for the future could there be than a religious fellowship which holds its doctrinal contribution as only a part, and not the whole, of Christian teaching, and

which regards doctrine in general as a working method in religion rather than as a test of truth? If it were a question of theology only, the answer might be more easily reached. In the adjustments of the future, however, two other elements will have to be reckoned with — the element of worship and the element of discipline. Though it may *rest* securely on its doctrinal foundations, a church cannot work successfully, above all, it cannot advance and conquer, without a spirit to sustain it and a form to hold it together.

These last two demands of a working church have not been adequately met thus far by religious Liberalism. If, for instance, we take Unitarianism as an example, we find that on the side of worship it has not shown an emotional expression which corresponds with the strength and clarity of its thought. That it has in it the possibility of a deep spiritual experience is evidenced by its output of hymns which have been adopted into the hymnals of all the churches of Christendom, and which are acknowledged by all to have a peculiar depth and singing quality. The Roman Catholic, when he sings "Nearer, my God, to Thee," forgets its Unitarian origin, as does the Evangelical when he clinches his denunciation of Liberalism by using "In the Cross of Christ I glory," both Unitarian hymns. And yet, in spite of this individual expression, the fact remains that collectively the Unitarian Church has not yet evolved a devotional life which is at all comparable with its rational power. Its services have tended to be bare, and its hold upon its followers slight. To have clarified theology and to have enriched hymnology apparently is not enough. Something more is needed than merely to come together to reason about the things of the spirit. That which a true thinking about religion has liberated in the heart ought to have set the people to singing and to have created a worship which is both satisfying and compelling. A church must

first believe; it then must worship and work. Its truth has not fully come to power until it has been caught up into the surroundings, the forms, the expressions, which make it alive and operative. Its convictions must first convict itself before they can hope to convince others. Afraid as it is tempted to be of emotion, and suspicious as it is bound to be of discipline, the Unitarian Church has yet to face the fact that its characteristic differences have to do with only the bases of religion. The content of an effective working religion is always and everywhere the same. It must first and last *move* people; and the pathway of the motive is emotive. Without emotional power it will be feeble and aborted. The only question is, What kind of an emotion; by what law, from what foundation, does it proceed?

This is the great task of the free spirit everywhere, in civil and political as well as in religious life. Can the free spirit in man be depended on to foster the ideals which create the discipline of a true democracy? That spirit has been learning that it moves more freely as well as more effectively within the limits of self-restraint and corporate responsibility imposed from within; and will not the church have to share with the camp and the corporation the new insight? If liberalism in religion, with all its splendid fearlessness in thinking, with all its devotional depth in the individual, remains barren in concrete emotional expression and in responsible church loyalty, it cannot hope to inherit the future. A mere platform or forum for the discussion of God, duty, and destiny is not a church. A church is a worshipping body, and not a spirit merely which is detached and diffusive. With Unitarian character as good as it is, it would seem to be almost a crime to narrow or restrict the appeal which it makes. An active principle of goodness, thoroughly alert and benignly aggressive, spreading a contagion of gladness and service and hope through the world, would

seem to be the natural outcome of the individual health of mind and soul which underlies this church fellowship. What we actually find is that the instrument is neglected; the tree stands brave and beautiful, but it bears scanty fruits. Its success in segregated individuals, which is real, becomes relatively a failure through inability to organize its resources and to function widely.

The next step for the Church is to pass from the Higher Criticism, which has too long engaged its attention, to the Higher Creation which is now possible. Already a High Church party appears among the Unitarians, demanding a new appreciation of worship and a deepening of regard for the institution of religion itself. Admitting that the Church must be free, conceding the honorable place which intellect has in its councils, these younger men are pleading for beauty of expression, for a worship which is not only adequate, but which may be common to all. Reason is divisive. There can be no perfect unity, and hence little organic effectiveness, in the head. It is the heart which binds men together. In deeper feeling, in closer union, in that fuller symbolism which helps to create the one, and in that organization which helps to promote the other, lies the hope of the Church.

Whether or not this new party is to dominate the future of the Unitarian Church remains to be seen, but at least its rise at this time is significant. Especially is it significant in the fearlessness of its announcements and the fullness of its claims. Without surrendering any of the fruits of the age-long struggle for liberty of conscience, without any disparagement of the intellect or any lessening of respect for individualism, this party is prepared to go far in its demand for what it feels is a richer, fuller life. At a conference recently held in the Unitarian church in Birmingham, England, an attempt was made to crystallize this sentiment into action. The

purpose of the conference was to see if ways could not be devised for "reconciling the principles of individual and congregational liberty developed among the free churches with all that is essential to the life, faith, worship, and order of the Catholic (*i.e.*, the older, ritualistic) church." Sympathetic with this movement in England for a fuller liturgy and a more effective life, there is another in this country which is meditating innovations even more extreme. All of its members are committed to the idea of catholicity, and some of them go so far as seriously to consider the restoration, at least in modified form, of the mass.

Whatever may be one's personal attitude toward these proposals, there can be no question that the present order, or lack of order, is being challenged with demands which will somehow have to be met. It is a soldier, actually at the front in France, who takes us a step farther and who sees a "practical" Christianity only where the emphasis is laid on discipline. It may well be doubted if beauty of worship, important as it is, is our greatest need today. Certainly the emphasis on worship is sorely needed, but what is needed more is a rehabilitation of conscience which shall bring a new authority and a new obedience. "What would happen," writes this soldier, a Frenchman, "if we engaged in continual speculations regarding our military duties? As soldiers our task is to use our entire efforts in performing them. It is the same with our Christian duties; this is not the time for discussion but for prayer." The fact is that it is the emphasis on the institution of religion which leads naturally to the enrichment of its services, and which also tends to lend a greater sanction and authority to the Church. Spirit *and* discipline make up an army. They make up a church too. A spiritually-minded man is indeed spiritual in all his *ways*. He does not imagine that he is spiritual only when he thinks, or only when

he obeys the moral law out in the world. One of the *ways* of the Spirit, as well as one of the great Highways of life, is the practice of religion. To observe the laws of the Church, to obey its command, is to get that enlargement, that blessing of obedience to a Divine Government, which our young men are learning to get from obedience to a civil government.

Many things have been made clear to us in the years of our great world-testing, not the least of which is the modern need of a new imperative. To enthrone the categorical imperative of Kant in a church as unfettered as the free spirit in man, would be to do what has been done by American Democracy in the hour of its great trial. Freedom politically has shown itself capable of discipline. The Church, to be effective, must find the way to a new sense of responsibility, a new obedience. Individualism has undreamed-of potentialities, once the spirit is deeply aroused and the right sort of public opinion is created. In the war our citizenry has risen to a new civic consciousness which has supplied the needed compulsions. A national conscience has been born, and that too at a time when the individual conscience was supposed to have weakened. Probably never in the history of the world has so colossal and so splendid a moral awakening ever been witnessed. The Church did not create it directly, but it came out of the deeps which the Church has been preparing through all the years of its history. It was the new civic consciousness, the new public opinion, which called the new sense of responsibility into being.

The rehabilitation of conscience, not the reconstruction of theology, and not the beautifying of worship merely, is the greatest need of the Church today. To say that men are neglectful of religious duty because doctrine does not square with reason and science, or because the services of the Church are bare and unin-

viting, is superficial. These are good excuses; the real reason is that conscience has broken down, that in the distractions of life and the growing assumption of individual initiative and accountability by corporate action everywhere, the power of the Ought has weakened in the souls of men. Gradually men have come to feel about the Church as they have felt about the State, that they would get what they could from it in their hour of need and give to it as little as possible. Any attempts at moral militancy on its part, any assertion of claims upon its world constituency, are resented. And yet the possibilities of a new discipline are as latent in the Church as they have proved to be in the State; only the compulsions must come here also from within. They must develop from the new spirit, the new conscience, which an unfettered, democratic Church is best fitted to create.

Conscience — and yet what has the world not suffered in that sacred name! And how without prayer and fasting shall one dare to invoke that symbol by which humanity has been so often obstructed and enslaved? In the light of past experience it is not strange that men are reluctant to give obedience to religious authority, so much of the sin and indifference of men is to be laid at the door of this principle falsely applied. But the lesson of history must be relearned, and conscience must be seen in a new light. Leaving all the learned definitions, why not identify it simply with the sense of responsibility and give it the larger implications of social duty? Conscience which has indeed made cowards of us all, yes, and worse than cowards, community-slackers, social obstructors, must be taken from its narrower, personal definition and restated as the principle which conditions not only any common life, but also any individual development which is adequate to the needs of life. *My* conscience is what one so often hears about,

the *my* bulking larger in the mind of the Protestant than the conscience itself. Mark the perfect man, we are admonished, and behold the upright. But if in his effort to stand straight he leans so far as to fall backward, it will be difficult to mark his perfections, and obviously he cannot, when so prostrate, be called upright. The point to be noted is that unless one is first *up-right* he cannot hope to become *up-right*; so that the conscientious objector and the conscienceless rejector come out finally at the same place.

What we need is a new religious conscience to match the new civic, the new social, conscience which has of late found expression among us. Can the Church create this out of its own deepened life? Turning away from its disputations, and subordinating all forms of prettiness, can it concentrate all its energies upon the moral call to arms, upon the thought of service, not of itself, not even of others merely, but of that loyalty and devotion to religion itself, the higher, the more essential and enduring patriotism, which is presented to us consistently in the form and order of the living Church? Especially can the liberal church, free and unfettered, that democratic flower of the spirit, do this? If it can, there is hope for it and for humanity. It will be more difficult for any other to rise to the demand of the hour. The age is suffering for want of a new consciousness of God, and a new realization of His exigency in human affairs. God must be allowed to speak within us, as He spake of old, and the Voice must come to us objectively. Till conscience is enthroned again, it is useless to reconstruct theology or to enrich worship or to revive religion. The root of the matter resides in the will. A new motivation of religion is the crying need of the hour.

BOOK REVIEWS

PLATONISM. PAUL ELMER MORE. Princeton University Press. 1917.
Pp. ix, 307. \$1.75.

This book will claim attention from a wide circle of readers, not only for the interest which all thinking men have in Platonism, the most pregnant product of ancient Greek thought, but also because the present volume comes from one of our foremost American critics, whose past studies, literary and philosophic, have ranged from ancient India and Greece to the present time and place. Therefore we turn to this interpretation of the elusive master with happy anticipations, eager to see what Plato's thought may mean to a non-professional scholar, for we know that such may sometimes give a fairer and more edifying interpretation than the professional, whose thought may have been confined within too narrow bounds. And it should be stated here at the outset that Dr. More does not disappoint us. He knows the Platonic dialogues well, and, in spite of a few slips in interpretation, we may add that he knows them accurately. Naturally many will differ from him on this point or on that, but such differences are inevitable when we are dealing with a writer like Plato, whose dialogues are graceful, suggestive, and alluring, not formal, schematic, and final. Happily Plato's quest for the truth was never ended, and therefore we have no definitive Platonic system. Every interpretation must be partial; every interpreter, as Dr. More aptly says, "has no other measure than his own capacity."

The nine chapters of this volume are made up from five lectures delivered at Princeton University in October and November, 1917, on the Vanuxem Foundation, with the addition of much material which could not be included in the oral presentation. Little is said of Plato's views on education, art, and politics, but the attention is centred on Plato's ethical theme. This subject involves a discussion of the aims of Socrates, of the relation of Plato to his master, of Plato's doctrine of ideas, his science and cosmogony, and finally of his metaphysics. In an appendix Dr. More summarizes in useful fashion his own ideas as to the proper sequence of Plato's works. It is perhaps ungracious, where so much is given, to regret that we have

not more; but the reviewer cannot help feeling that if the author had sketched the political, social, and intellectual environment in which Plato grew up, and had thus given him his historical background, the present book would have gained in value; for exalted as Plato now appears to us, and great as he was in his own day, he was nevertheless the child — the noblest child, we shall gladly grant — of his time, and his philosophy becomes the more intelligible as we understand the factors of which it was composed and the conditions which stimulated him to construct it.

Dr. More begins his work with a discussion of the three "Socratic theses," the three impulses which, to our author's mind, carried Socrates toward philosophy. These he defines as follows: "an intellectual scepticism, a spiritual affirmation, and a tenacious belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge." The scepticism of Socrates is shown to have been no merely negative doubt as to the possibility of truth and reality, such as it was in the case of Pyrrho and others — whom we must recognize, nevertheless, as not wholly illegitimate children of Socratic teaching; but it was rather an intellectual habit of examining all things, that by examination the seeker might arrive at clearer and more positive notions. It is true that at first sight there seems to be much in common between the Socratic "scepticism" and the Sophistic doctrine of relativity; but the latter led to negative results, while the former, if often in the Platonic dialogues it reaches no conclusion, is always aiming at positive ends — at the attainment of concepts of universal validity, and at the elevation of human life. To his passion for inquiry Socrates added a faith in the validity of his intuitions concerning morality and religion; and when Plato's reader is impatient with Socrates' tantalizing failure to draw the conclusions which he desires, he is still bound to remember that Socrates was positive-minded; that however much pleasure this vexer of men's complacency might apparently have in showing up his subject's ignorance and in confessing his own, there were fundamental matters on which he had no doubts; nor did any arise in his mind when at the crisis of his life he faced his judges; for although he cheerfully confessed that he did not know whether the death he was facing might not prove a blessing instead of a misfortune, he boldly affirmed that he did know that it was an evil and a shameful thing to do wrong and to disobey one's superior, whether god or man; and that therefore he would never be afraid of things which might prove in the end to be good, nor would he ever flee from such rather than from the evils which he knew were evils and nothing else (*Apol.* 29 B).

Again the positive character of the Socratic quest appears in the thesis which Dr. More defines as "a belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge." At first hearing this sounds like a mere paradox, but due consideration of the evidence proves that Socrates held knowledge in the moral field to be that certainty which is attained by reasoning on the pleasures and pains of life. When a man rationalizes the springs of conduct by weighing the near and remote consequences of his acts, he is in a fair way to acquire prudence in action, that is, to be virtuous. If we willingly grant that this is utilitarianism, we shall also maintain that it is a rationalized and ennobled utilitarianism. After all, was not philosophy from Socrates' day largely *ars vivendi*, which is equivalent to saying that it was ethical? Utilitarian need not always be an adjective of condemnation.

The inconsistency between this utilitarian thesis and the Socratic scepticism and spiritual intuition is one which Dr. More wisely does not attempt to overlook or brush aside, and he makes a timely protest against letting the rationalistic Socrates overshadow the sceptical searcher and the religious intuitionist. Gomperz at one extreme has reduced Socrates to the rank of a rationalistic teacher of the unity of virtue and knowledge; Burnet at the other extreme would attribute to Socrates most of Plato's philosophy. Dr. More steers a middle course and restores to us an historic Socrates, a human being, who stirred both the minds and the emotions of those who listened to him. Systems he left for his followers to develop.

By the "Platonic Quest" Dr. More understands a development of the spiritual affirmation and the belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge which was marked in Socrates' thought and teaching; Plato gives a rational justification to this belief, and so proves that virtue and happiness are inseparable. That justification is the theme of the chapter in which Dr. More discusses many important parts of the *Republic*. In his treatment of the different forms of the State there are occasionally points at which we might note exceptions, but in general the discussion is accurate and illuminating. Plato's aim in his great dialogue is clearly shown to be the profound commonplace, approved by the common sense of mankind, that justice alone secures happiness and that injustice inevitably dooms man to misery. Thus Plato by his arguments justifies the affirmation of the spirit before reason, and shows himself content to rest on the knowledge thus secured as the principle of life.

Such a conclusion as this depends, of course, on Plato's (or was it Socrates'?) sharp distinction between knowledge and opinion, happiness and pleasure. Whether it is not somewhat confusing to call

the recognition of these distinctions a dualism may be questioned, for this is a term of such wide applicability (*cf.* p. 123) that it tempts us to overwork it. Again we might complain with a certain justice that in his chapter on Plato's psychology Dr. More sometimes uses inexact modern equivalents for the faculties and functions of Plato's tripartite $\psi\chi\eta$; and again perhaps he attributes to Plato a clearer concept of the unity of personality than the dialogues warrant.

The Platonic "ideas" Dr. More divides into two main categories, the rational and the ethical. In the first are included mathematical forms, genera or species of natural things, or of manufactured objects (the square or cube, man or horse, table or chair); in the latter category we must place such ideas as justice, virtue, *et cetera*. The abstract ideas, as we call them, which deal with ethics, were in all probability Plato's first and main interest (p. 171); that is to say, he was brought to his doctrine by ethical rather than by logical considerations. Dr. More could well have quoted Aristotle (*Meta.* 987 b) in partial support of his views, although to the reviewer's mind a strong argument can be made for the opposite contention. Be that as it may, Plato clearly held in his maturity to both ethical ideas and ideas of natural classes and of manufactured objects, and maintained that all the ideas had existence anterior to the individual objects and exterior to the human mind; in other words, that reality was found only in the ideas. Thus Plato secured a firm foundation for his ethical system by finding virtue's warrant in the immutable reality of the ideas. Moreover, he frequently treats the ideas of beauty, justice, and righteousness as intimately united, and thus intentionally, or unwittingly, confuses æsthetics and ethics. But from this confusion, whatever its cause, Plato secures for the individual a great impulse towards goodness, for by the contemplation of ideal beauty one is drawn to love the idea of goodness, and so to become good himself.

When Dr. More explains the true Platonic ideas (p. 182) as the "imaginative projections of the facts of moral consciousness," one is tempted to question whether he is not attributing to Plato a conscious process which hardly belonged to him. The development of the doctrine of ideas or forms had a long history before Plato, and it seems not improbable that his predecessors, *e.g.*, the Pythagoreans, as well as Plato himself, arrived at their notions by intuitive bounds fully as much as by inductive processes. Perhaps this is what Dr. More means by his expression "imaginative projections"; if so, the reviewer must plead guilty to dullness of apprehension.

Space requires us to discuss briefly the chapter on Science and Cosmogony. By Plato's Science Dr. More means intellectual dialectic which deals with things of time and space, and which attempts to determine the reality behind the individual phenomena. By a discussion of parts of the *Republic*, involving the familiar distinction between opinion and knowledge, and the curricula of studies for the ideal State, he comes to his conclusion that, in Plato's view, the value of Science lay in the training which it furnished for the true philosophic life; that is to say, Science is the means of the soul's ascent. The treatment of Science leads inevitably to the *Timæus*, in which the story of creation is set forth, not clearly—for the course was hardly clear to Plato—but with a constant recognition of the presence in the cosmos of two factors—the divine element and brute necessity. The former works in the higher sphere, and is now thought of as the supreme Ideal or, more personally, as God; the other element, Necessity, ἀνάγκη, in the *Timæus* corresponds in general to the Infinite or the Unlimited, τὸ ἄπειρον, of the Philebus. This is the substratum from which the Demiurge and his subordinates create the sensible world. The understanding of Plato's concept of Necessity, ἀνάγκη, Dr. More would make the touchstone to determine the true Platonist. He defines it as "the resistance of the meaningless and incomprehensible flux of things, whether in nature or the human soul, to the government of order and happiness." But as Goodness is at once the motive and the end of God's action, which introduces order into the formless and disordered substratum, therefore the divine Reason orders the world toward Goodness, in so far as Necessity allows. Thus Plato's cosmogony is teleological.

In his chapter on Metaphysics, Dr. More discusses the puzzling problem of the *Parmenides*. He reviews the many types of interpretation which the past century has brought forth, and rejects them all; but he stands closest to Gomperz. With him Dr. More agrees that the attack on every form of doctrine of Ideas is conducted with relentless logic and rigor. What then are we to say of Plato's obstinate adherence to the doctrine which logic has demolished? Dr. More replies that Plato accepts "the reality of Ideas as a necessity of inner experience" so cogent that the assaults of logic cannot shake our faith in them. Viewed thus, the dialogue becomes a defense of Plato's system.

Finally, in his conclusion, Dr. More acutely deals with the influence of Platonism, especially of Platonism misunderstood, in religion and philosophy, devoting most attention to the English Platonists. His exposition of the relation between romanticism and the

perverted doctrine of Plato is interesting and important. The test for him of the long line of pseudo-Platonists is that they lay hold of all the "imaginative and emotional elements of Platonism, but forget that the spiritual affirmation speaks from a dark recess of the soul." The true Platonist, on the other hand, knows that the divine spirit, like Socrates' dæmon, always speaks to check and inhibit, never in positive commands; only the false sectary imagines that the spirit bids him follow his desires and so turn liberty into license. If Dr. More is right here, and the reviewer believes that he is, his words deserve the careful consideration of every one who earnestly desires a guide to righteousness.

We have given so much space to this book because we believe that it is one of much importance to the readers of this REVIEW. Although some clergymen appear to feel that they have been called to everything save theology, the one subject which should be the intellectual basis of their calling, still theology remains the queen of the sciences; and no Greek thinker had so much influence on Christian thought as Plato. Therefore we commend to them the study of Dr. More's work.

Yet one curse must be pronounced upon it: *damnentur omnes qui indices omittunt.*

CLIFFORD H. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

LIBERAL JUDAISM AND HELLENISM. CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE. Macmillan & Co. 1918. Pp. xi, 328. 6s.

It is easy to define neither religion nor any organized expression of it. Even orthodoxy is constantly changing. Conservative Judaism is not what it was a century ago, while Mr. Montefiore's Liberal Judaism was then unknown. Jews have no authoritative ecclesiastical body to determine their creed or dictate their conduct, so that while on certain fundamentals all are agreed, Judaism for most of them is a matter of individual interpretation. Hence the warrant for Mr. Montefiore's attempt to define Liberal Judaism. It is not his first essay in this field. What is known as Reform Judaism began in Germany in the early part of the nineteenth century. Today the movement, strong as it is in America, knows little following in Europe. Judaism throughout Europe is most conservative. But Mr. Montefiore for a generation at least has been championing the cause of a liberal interpretation of his faith. In 1903 he published

his *Liberal Judaism*. In a prefatory note he stated that the essay "does not present the views of any existing organization or party, and no one but myself is responsible for any of the statements and opinions which it contains." He might make the same confession of his present volume. Indeed again and again he stresses the fact that neither officially nor unofficially is he the accredited representative or spokesman of any body of Jews. Yet there is no doubt that in many respects he voices the sentiment of a considerable number of his co-religionists.

Scholarly, Mr. Montefiore is profoundly religious. He is an intellectually religious enthusiast. Thoroughly modern, he has profound reverence for the past. He believes wholly in the higher criticism of even sacred literature, but it remains none the less sacred literature to him. He does not deny or attempt to gloss over the faults of the Old Testament, but he argues logically that its weaknesses do not neutralize its strength, that its faith is a matter of evolution, that its value should justly be determined not by its humble beginnings but by its remarkable achievements, its spiritual attainments. And so he finds warrant for his Liberal Judaism in the old Book of Books.

To the New Testament Mr. Montefiore applies the same test he uses with the Old. He makes clear what of the New Testament not even Liberal Judaism can endorse or accept. But he argues that it has much to offer which the Jew would do well seriously to consider. He presents the most reverent estimate of the character of Jesus, though explaining clearly why for ages neither he nor his teachings found favor among the Jews. Much that Jesus taught, the Jews had known before his time. Yet Jesus, he contends, complements Jewish teaching in many ways, and presents it in more intense, more gripping, and therefore more appealing fashion. It is indeed the very intensity, the enthusiasm of Jesus that accounts to us for what we usually term his impracticable idealism. And yet is idealism ever impracticable?

Even Rabbinitism can serve the cause of Liberal Judaism. For Judaism has never been static, so that after the Canon was closed the story of the faith was continued. "Rabbinic morality is common-sense morality shot through with idealism." It "smoothed the rough moral and religious edges of the Old Testament." Independently it found some of the development contained in the New Testament.

For the spiritual achievements of Hellenism Mr. Montefiore has the profoundest admiration. "No religion can live in the Western world which has not settled accounts with Hellenism." He traces interestingly the relation between Judaism and Hellenism, shows how Hellen-

ism has indelibly affected Judaism (and Christianity too, for that matter), and urges on his people a more cordial welcome of the finer contributions which Hellas has made to religious thought. Liberal Judaism, he is certain, will not be wanting in this needed hospitality.

For these many reasons, the author holds, Liberal Judaism need not fear the trying times that are upon us. Whatever political, social, industrial changes come to pass, Liberal Judaism will survive. It too will change, will expand, will probably become more liberal, abandoning, it may be, some of the things it now urges, admitting newer truths, newer revelations, but loving always truth, the universal truth, that relates every man, of every faith and land, to God, the truth that will endure and bless.

Mr. Montefiore's appeal for a liberal, spiritual, universal faith, one that will embrace all truth and all men, that will bring God to man and man to God, that will unite men in the common service of God and man, is well-nigh irresistible. And though it may be too eclectic for our denominational day, still it points the way and is bound to serve the cause to which it addresses itself. And especially now, when because of the war, on the one hand, men are asking as to the relation of religion to life, the justification of religion in the face of what has taken place, and on the other, are religiously drawing nearer to each other. Is not this the day for a frank, logical, liberal restatement of religion, call it by whatever name you will?

And so the liberal Jew applauds Mr. Montefiore's message, though where details are concerned he may have to part company with him. It is difficult, for example, to understand why, considering its program, Liberal Judaism, justifying as it does the retention of ceremonies that still have religious significance, should hold fast even for "reasons of a social and juridical order" to rites that no longer have religious or, for that matter, even hygienic warrant (p. 69). Why retain Biblical passages whose message we have completely outgrown? And what right have we to reinterpret them, giving them a meaning we know they were not intended to convey, simply that we may go on using them (p. 68)? Mr. Montefiore is here no more convincing than in his insistence that passages from the New Testament, however beautiful and deeply religious, even when they present a point of view finer than that of the Old Testament, must not be used by Jews: "They belong to another theology, another religion, even to another world of religious thought than ours" (p. 114). True. But how can the liberal Jew of Mr. Montefiore's type harmonize his admiration and enthusiasm for these teachings with his insistence that we who are Jews dare not make use of them?

Mr. Montefiore regrets that the Pirke Aboth is contained in no liberal Jewish ritual. A condensed version is to be found in the Union Prayer Book issued by the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Justly he deplores the fact that so little of Rabbinical literature is accessible to the English-speaking public. The Jewish Publication Society of America is planning now to meet the need. There is a typographical error in the note on p. 86: "Dr. J. Kohler" should read "Dr. K. Kohler."

HARRY LEVI.

TEMPLE ISRAEL, BOSTON.

ST. PAUL'S FIGHT FOR GALATIA. C. H. WATKINS. The Pilgrim Press. 1914. Pp. 312.

In this book Dr. Watkins presents to English readers in a somewhat expanded form a thesis that was accepted by the University of Heidelberg for a Doctorate of Theology. (Published in 1913 by Mohr, Tübingen, under the title of *Der Kampf des Paulus um Galatien*.) He speaks in his preface of particular indebtedness to his chief theological teacher, the late Professor Johannes Weiss, to whom, along with Dr. Alexander Souter, sometime Professor in Mansfield Collège, Oxford, the work is dedicated. It should be stated, however, that while he doubtless owes much to these teachers in the way of stimulus and suggestion, his conclusions are the fruit of his own independent investigation. In not a few instances he has not hesitated to reject as untenable emendations and interpretations that were championed by his Heidelberg preceptor.

The material of the thesis is arranged in three main divisions. Part I deals with The Present Struggle in Galatia (pp. 16-152); Part II with The Previous Stages of the Struggle (pp. 155-260); and Part III with General Observations on the Cogency and Justice of the Epistle, the Personal and Polemical Characteristics of the Apostle manifested therein, and the probable Success of his Efforts (pp. 263-312).

It is the earlier part of the work that will be found of particular interest. The opening chapter deals with the style of Galatians. An effort is made to trace from sentence to sentence the alternations of Paul's emotion resulting from his surprise, disappointment, or chagrin at the threatened ruin of his labor. This psychological analysis is often over-subtle. Paul's emotional fluctuations can hardly have been as abrupt and transitory as is here imagined. Such

an atomistic treatment fails to do sufficient justice to the dominant mood pervading many paragraphs and, to a certain extent, the whole Epistle. Perhaps the most important result that emerges from this study of style is the conclusion that two sets of passages in Galatians must be interpreted with caution. On the one hand, there are verses that are obscure and that may be misleading because they are not calm, and, on the other hand, we come upon utterances that are open to the charge of calculation and bias because they are calm. It accordingly follows that caution must be exercised in employing Galatians as a historical authority. Its statements need at all times to be carefully scrutinized and everywhere one must reckon upon the possible presence of a strong subjective factor. Not alone should account be taken of what the Apostle actually says, but likewise of the kind of influence that he is seeking to exert. This contention of Dr. Watkins, which is advanced in his opening chapter, runs through his entire book. He does not cease to point out that in this Epistle Paul speaks as a controversialist and that all his statements must be understood from such a point of view.

Following the discussion of style there is a chapter on the charges and insinuations brought against the Apostle by his opponents, and an effort is made to recover them in so far as they can be extracted from his own words of defense. A considerable measure of uncertainty will always attach to the results of such a quest, because Paul has not seen fit to deal directly with his critics' accusations, but has chosen rather to refute them by an indirect and allusive method. In this portion of his investigation Dr. Watkins has shown good exegetical judgment. The much discussed passage, Gal. 2 3-5, is interpreted as follows: "Particularly in regard to Titus the demand was made for circumcision, and for that matter I can understand its being made, but from our point of view the proposal was an impossible one, and it failed to be carried."

The third chapter deals with the principles of Paul's gospel and the contrasted positions of his opponents. It is urged that these latter must have been Christian at heart and that, however poorly they may have succeeded in their efforts, they must still be credited with an endeavor to preach Christ. Very likely they had much more in common with the Apostle than might at first appear, and than he himself recognized. His inability to do them full justice might be due in part to his unique spiritual experience, and in some measure to his strong polemic interest on the present occasion. It will not be strange under such circumstances if he is inclined to over-emphasize points of difference.

The second section of the book opens with a new examination of Gal. 1 10-2 16; the aim being this time to discover the real facts of the historical situation and to ascertain whether they are always correctly set forth by Paul. At several points it is concluded that he has hardly done justice to the past, but that he has rather imposed upon it an interpretation which suits his present purpose. For example, at the conference in Jerusalem he probably "recognized the authority of the senior Apostles in a more thorough-going fashion than one would suppose from a hasty reading of the verse (2 6) as it now stands." It is the refusal to recognize the authority of these teachers now that leads him to deny it more decisively for a former time.

When Dr. Watkins comes to take up Acts he confines his discussion largely to chapter 15, which he believes deals with the same events that are recounted in Galatians 2. Paul's earlier visit to Jerusalem, spoken of in Acts 11 27-30, was doubtless so unconnected with the topics of Galatians that it could be altogether passed by. A special section in defense of this position and in reply to his critics and reviewers has been added by Dr. Watkins to the English edition of his book.

The Apostolic Decree (Acts 15 19, 20) is interpreted as a proclamation of Gentile freedom. Its primary purpose was not, as is so often erroneously supposed, to impose restrictions, but rather to repeal circumcision and other legalities. When the matter is so construed, it is possible to "reach the important conclusion that there is no sharp contrast between the Epistle and the Acts. According to both, the essential thing in the Jerusalem agreement is the liberation of the Gentile Christians from the Law, especially as incarnated in circumcision." While such a decree might conceivably come as a sequel to the strife in Antioch, Dr. Watkins holds that on the whole it is best assigned to the Council at Jerusalem. To this same time may belong a discussion of the question of common meals for Jewish and Gentile Christians, and an effort may have been made to establish a working agreement. Against such a background of compromise we can best understand the controversy in Antioch. In this wise Dr. Watkins believes that Acts and Galatians can be made to criticize and supplement each other. There are, however, probably few who will follow him in this conclusion.

The third part of the book is given over largely to an examination of Paul's personal and polemical characteristics as revealed in the Epistles. We are admonished anew that a recognition of his devotion and of his many noble qualities should not lead us to forget

that in this letter he is a controversialist, the leader of one side only in the dispute. "It was what he himself on this occasion intended to be."

As might be anticipated from a perusal of the chapter-headings, there is in Dr. Watkins' book a considerable measure of repetition, but it always seems to serve some good purpose. At times the English style leaves something to be desired, possibly because it does not altogether escape the hampering influence of the German original. Of the typographical errors the most disturbing is the substitution of Timothy for Titus on page 124. Of the book as a whole, apart from its detailed conclusions, it may be said that it brings a valuable contribution to the interpretation of Galatians. It emphasizes as has not been done before that the Epistle is essentially an emergency-writing, both as regards its form and its content. In depicting Paul as a controversialist the writer has had much greater success than he has in harmonizing Acts and Galatians.

WARREN J. MOULTON.

BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE COURSE OF CHRISTIAN HISTORY. W. J. MCGLOTHLIN. The Macmillan Co. 1918. Pp. iv, 323. \$2.00.

Ten years ago Professor McGlothlin of the Southern Baptist Seminary published a *Guide to the Study of Church History* which was really only a syllabus of topics, well arranged, with continuous references to a few standard textbooks and collections. Now he has expanded this syllabus by giving it a more narrative form and adding sixty pages of Questions and Topics to the two hundred and fifty pages of his text. The bibliography has also been enlarged, but is still slight and casual. The author's purpose, to promote the study of Church History in colleges, is commendable, but his method is more adapted to the infant class than to students of collegiate grade.

THE ACÁTHIST HYMN OF THE HOLY ORTHODOX EASTERN CHURCH. In the original Greek text, and done into English verse. Edited by W. J. BIRKBECK and G. R. WOODWARD. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917. Pp. viii, 62. \$1.25.

The late W. J. Birkbeck, well known for his studies on the Russian Church, had planned this new edition of the Acáthist Hymn, which reproduces the liturgical text, as contained in the *Great Horologion*

(Venice, 1892: pp. 421-437). The Acáthist Hymn (so called because it is read or sung *none sitting*) was first recited in honor of the Virgin Mary for the repulse of the Hagarenes from Constantinople in the reign of Heraclius (A.D. 626). Generally it is attributed to Sergius, poet-patriarch of Constantinople (610-641). The English translation, which is due to Mr. G. R. Woodward, is on the whole faithful to the Greek text, although sometimes it amplifies unduly the original thought of the Byzantine poet.

THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS XAVIER, EVANGELIST, EXPLORER, MYSTIC.
EDITH ANNE STEWART. With translations from his letters by DAVID
MACDONALD, B.D. Headley Bros., London. 1917. Pp. 356. Eleven
portraits, maps. 12s. 6d.

The nineteen chapters into which the life of St. Francis is divided are arranged in a strictly chronological order. The preliminary chapters are an interesting review of the antecedents of St. Francis, national, domestic, and educational. Chapters IV and V deal at some length with the order of the Jesuits and especially with the religious charter of the Jesuits, the Spiritual Exercises. All this is legitimate arrangement, for Xavier next to Ignatius Loyola was the Jesuit and the Spaniard of primary importance. The following chapters confine themselves almost exclusively to Francis. They recount his labors in Italy and at Lisbon, the journey from Lisbon to Goa, to Cape Comorin, to Ceylon, Japan, and back to India again, and they end with the untimely death of Francis.

The book is useful; it is carefully done; it reveals the author's love of her subject; it manifests familiarity with the principal sources and with the modern literature on the subject (in fact the author should be especially commended for the admirable bibliography in the appendix). But to the reviewer at least it fails to convey with power the fascination of the Saint himself. The parts that appeal to me most strongly are those relating to Ignatius and the order of Jesuits rather than those pertaining directly to St. Francis. It would be difficult to draw a picture so winning that the reader's attention would be impatient with all that did not intimately relate itself to the subject. But this is precisely what the author should do. Xavier was a great man — in some ways greater than Ignatius. He was not only a remarkable personality, but he was intimately associated with events of a religious, sociological, intellectual, and geographical importance inferior to none in

early modern days. The author tells us all these things, but she does not make them matters of commanding importance. She does not make one regret that the last page of the book has been reached. In fact she inserts others and herself a little too much, and, save here and there, she does not let Francis stand forth clearly as he is.

Wherever the author allows Francis perfect freedom, the book is of real value. There are translations of many letters, a good proportion of which are to Ignatius Loyola. To me these are the best portions of the book. The author has done a real service in producing them in such convenient form. There are descriptions of the horrors of a sixteenth-century voyage and of the attempts of Francis to alleviate the sufferings of his fellow-passengers; there are accounts of foreign lands and strange peoples, all in Francis' own words; there are directions by him as to the proper nurture of heathen peoples in the Christian faith — very rudimentary, very crude, but very effective. These are of a value second only to that of the letters to his master. But there should have been more of these. The letters of Francis are a mine of religious, pedagogical, and ethnical information. He was intimately associated with the creative days of Portuguese Colonial power. The book just misses the effective assertion of this fact. Another edition should have more of Francis and less of his times and his contemporaries. He should be allowed to speak more, and there should be less running comment on what he says. These remarks are possibly a council of perfection. They may be hypercritical. But one always wants to see a good book made a little better.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

THE EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL,
CAMBRIDGE.

WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? A STUDY OF RIVAL INTERPRETATIONS. GEORGE CROSS. University of Chicago Press. 1918. Pp. x, 214. \$1.00.

In this little book, written in clear, simple style, the author gives us an introductory section of his apologetics; that is, he presents discussions "preparatory to a statement and vindication of the truth of the Christian religion." This being his task, the plan of his work is of much interest and importance. The plan adopted by Professor Cross is that of delineating six rival types of Christianity, and then presenting in a concluding chapter his conception of the essence of Christianity. The interest and importance of the plan are that it provides a way of organizing the manifold and complex

results of the scientific study of Christianity so that their meaning for the life of today may be grasped and interpreted. Not one stereotyped form, but a number of relatively plastic types, each possessing certain values and certain limitations, is what Christianity offers to the modern world, in the judgment of the author; and even in his definition of the essence of Christianity he does not seek fixity of traits, but regards growth and variety as permanently normal characteristics.

So useful is this method that one feels impelled to wish that it might be developed a little further. The problem, not wholly solved in this book, is to utilize the phases of historical development in order to throw light upon the present situation without confusing successive stages of development in the past with types that rival each other in the present. The point may be illustrated in the case of two of the author's six types — Apocalypticism and Protestantism. Apocalypticism is treated as *the* type of pre-Catholic Christianity; the consequence is that one of the most significant facts for present Christianity — the existence of several great types of Christian experience in the New Testament itself — is largely obscured. And at the same time little is said of the pre-millenarianism of today. Again, when Protestantism is placed as a type alongside of such others as Evangelicism or modernized Protestant Christianity, Rationalism, and Mysticism, it evidently is being presented chiefly as a stage of historic development — the portion of Protestantism which today rivals Mysticism, Rationalism, and modernized Protestantism being left undefined. A remedy for the difficulty here pointed out might be secured by drawing more upon the psychology of religion, along with the history of Christianity, in the defining of types, and by making it more clear that the ideas of first importance for apologetics and theology are those which bear upon the present and the immediate future — where control or guidance may be exercised.

The characterization in brief compass of types which include a great mass of historic material is interestingly and skilfully carried out. Apocalypticism is placed in the framework of general Oriental mythology. "Jewish Apocalypticism is a modification, under the influence of the Jewish religious spirit, of a widespread, if not universal, Oriental philosophy of the universe and of human life." One is surprised, however, by the judgment that Apocalypticism was "the very flower of prophetism." Surely it is not the apocalyptic literature, but the prophetic, which means the most to the world. The treatment of Catholicism as a type of Christianity — normal on the basis of a certain philosophy of the universe and history and morals — is

a great gain over regarding it as Antichrist or as a mass of superstition. Mysticism is presented as having been of great historic value, but as possessing too little socially constructive capacity for our age. Protestantism is characterized with enthusiasm, fulness, and discrimination. "The three great mountain peaks of the Protestant religious consciousness" are said to be, "loyalty to a personal God, confidence in the orderly course of the universe, and the sense of inner worth." If, however, Protestantism and "modernized Protestant Christianity" are to be presented as two different types, one is inclined to feel that such a characterization should be applied to the latter type rather than to the former. Rationalism is treated appreciatively, but is judged to be "ultimately aristocratic." Evangelicism, or modernized Protestant Christianity, is described as a new type of Christian life and thought. Among the forces mentioned as producing it are, the eighteenth-century religious revival, the development of popular education, economic progress, democracy, the achievements of science, the historical and psychological points of view. The author's discussion of this type suggests interesting questions. Can a new type of Christianity be said to have already emerged, or is its emergence largely a matter of the future? May not Evangelicism, as the author conceives it, contain too diverse elements — involving too much inner tension — to permit of its functioning as a unified type?

The point of view from which Professor Cross discusses his final theme, "What then is Christianity," is admirable. He does not intend here "just one more attempt to reduce our religion to its ultimate and irreducible essence." He aims rather at "suggesting lines of further development" for those characteristics of Christianity which he finds most vital now. "Christianity," he says, "is nothing if it be not ceaselessly creative of the new." (This, of course, is true, not historically, but from the standpoint of the author's apologetics.) "The ideally true Christianity, the Christianity that can actually be the religion of all men and bring all men to the perfect man, lies yet in the future." From this point of view the author presents as permanent features of Christianity, the aim at wholeness of spiritual life; the experiencing of a Higher Being through the realization of this aim; the normative significance of Jesus for the determining of what wholeness of spiritual life is; "the practice of the most perfect human fellowship"; the intimate blending of worship and morality; the capacity for securing moral redemption; the capacity for giving men perfect peace. With regard to this fine closing chapter one major query arises. Is sufficient prominence given to the thorough-

going social character which the Christianity of the future promises to possess?

Considered as a whole, this book seems to be well adapted for popular use and at the same time to contain much that is suggestive for the professional student. It gives good promise for the future work in the theology of evangelicism in which the author plans to discuss the manner in which we should undertake "to reconstruct the expression of the eternal realities of the Christian faith."

EUGENE W. LYMAN.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

HUMAN NATURE AND ITS REMAKING. W. E. HOCKING. Yale University Press. 1918. Pp. xxviii, 434. \$3.00.

By *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, published in 1912, Dr. Hocking put us heavily in his debt, and this new book has added to the obligation. In some respects it is better than its predecessor. The style is as flexible as ever, but of closer weave. There are as many allusive vistas of thought, but they less frequently divert a reader's attention from the main line of the argument. It is bright, brilliant in spots (sometimes almost too brilliant for perfect lucidity), but it never trembles on the edge of flashiness. If one wishes the author were more restrained, he but compliments him on having much to restrain.

The substance of the book was given at Yale in 1916 in a course of lectures on the Nathaniel W. Taylor Foundation. Appropriately therefore in view of the dominating interest of Professor Taylor, it deals essentially with the theological subjects of sin and salvation, but the difference in the formulation of the problem, as well as in its solution, marks a century of religious progress. One is pleasantly reminded now and then of Yale's great theologian, as the sight of an old-fashioned warming-pan hanging in the chamber hallway of a steam-heated house recalls the ways of our ancestors; but the whole context of the discussion is different. The original material to be made over is human nature with its propensity to evil, which, as Dr. Taylor stoutly contended, is not identical with an evil propensity. Instead of propensities, however, Professor Hocking speaks of instincts, and the question is how they may be transformed or remade. Central among these instincts is the will, to which Professor Hocking gives more ability than was acknowledged by Dr. Taylor's cryptic

"certainty with full power to the contrary." Will is now interpreted in such a way as to emphasize its intellectual elements. "Will in the last analysis is thought assuming control of reality" (p. 81), and consequently the transformation of the will is accomplished by the education of thought. The will is more closely defined as "the will to power" (the author was heroic, writing while the war was on, to keep the ominous phrase, although its fangs are effectually drawn), which, beginning as power *over*, is remade into power *for*, that is, selfishness is converted into service. How is this accomplished? In social conditions, generally considered, this instinct like others (pugnacity is taken as an example) has a natural dialectic of its own; but the process is hastened by the closer application of the selected best of these conditions through the institutions of the State, such as laws and schools, and most of all by the "divine aggressiveness," which is the author's way of putting the doctrine of grace. As the will to power is central among the instincts, all others should be correlated to it harmoniously. But it frequently happens that indulgence of other instincts contradicts the better idea lying behind the will to power; this is sin, and its punishment, remorse, means the emphatic reaffirmation of the denied idea.

It would be unjust to both author and reader to summarize the argument any further. Surely enough has been said to indicate that it is an exceptionally rich and rewarding book, which no one interested in the sort of questions to which the HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW is devoted can afford to neglect.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

MORAL VALUES. A STUDY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT. WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT, Ph.D. Henry Holt & Co. 1918. Pp. xiii, 431.

This is a book of which it is difficult not to speak in terms of enthusiastic admiration. Its greatness, however, does not lie in any one special feature that the reviewer could readily single out and emphasize. Great is the work as a whole, as the elaborate exposition of one central thesis, the systematic unfolding of one fundamental conception. Luminously simple is the ruling idea; it is the sustained and consistent application of it which reveals its depth. It has in common with all genuinely great ideas the distinction of being at once simple and profound.

So simple is the underlying theme of *Moral Values* that it can be stated in a few words. If one word could suggest Professor Everett's

moral philosophy, that word would be "sanity," in the sense in which Charles Lamb uses it as "the admirable balance of all the faculties," lack of sanity being "the disproportionate straining or excess of any of them." Indeed, nothing simpler and nothing more complex than the sane life is what Professor Everett defines as the moral life.

Of this philosophy of sanity, if it may be so described, only a few salient ideas can here be noted. "Ethics," according to the author, "is concerned with nothing less than the whole business of living" (p. 8). It is not the task of morality to create "a totally new life, but to bring order into the life that now is; not to break the will or uproot the desires that pulse within us, but to reveal their true meaning and to bring them into more complete harmony" (p. 35). Thus it may be seen that "morality is as wide as are the interests of life, and must extend to the control of every part of its manifold content. It is no separate interest but the principle of the order and harmony of all interests, the law of the whole" (p. 217). For this reason, no one *particular* good can be defined as the goal of our moral endeavor. "The perfect good . . . cannot be found in any single aspect of our nature, however exalted, but only in the integrity of all its parts and the harmonious realization of them as a whole" (p. 201). The content of the good life, therefore, must be sought in the rich totality of our human nature, nothing human being "alien to the moral task" (p. 187). The winning of the richest possible content of life — this is indeed "the task to which our human powers are called" (p. 161). But the moral ideal lies in the direction of "spiritual wholeness which comprehends and dominates all interests of life" (p. 220). The work of morality becomes thus creative. It is the work of unifying the interests and activities of life, "giving form and order to what would otherwise be lawless and capricious" (p. 203). Life with its natural chaos and strife is simply material out of which is to be fashioned an "inner order" and a "well-ordered polity."

The moral task thus viewed furnishes a standard for the estimate of the concrete values of life. The historical sources of these values, the relation they sustain to desire and impulse, the description of their exact meaning, the distinction between values that are instrumental and those that are intrinsic — these are problems interpreted in the light of the formal definition of ethics as "the science of values in their relation to the conduct of life as a whole." *The law of the whole* suggests in the briefest form possible the whole of the moral enterprise. It is at the basis of civilization as "the effort progressively to embody in institutions, laws, customs, and ideals,

all human values in just proportion" (p. 218). And what is progress but the extension of "the meaning of the whole"? "We of the present day regard it as our task to mould all that has since been won by science, philosophy, and religion, by political, economic, and social reconstruction, into a still richer and more harmonious order" (p. 218). The law of the whole acts as a unifying principle — "in spite of the fact that its very comprehensiveness baffles a too exact definition" (p. 220) — of the manifold goods of human life, distinguished as economic values, bodily values, values of recreation, values of association, character values, æsthetic values, intellectual values, and religious values. The resulting ideal worthy of our effort is an organic world of values, which, though a free creation, must manifest in every part the principles of unity and order. The law of the whole then with its categories of unity, order, harmony, balance, proportion — categories of sanity — is for Professor Everett a natural law as well as a moral law. Violation of this law results "in an inescapable deterioration of personality" (p. 318). The law of morality is a statement "of what ought to be, in view of what actually is" (p. 314); "it points to an ideal of good rooted in the very needs of our nature" (p. 315).

Laws in whatever realm they operate are general in nature and simple in statement. The test of their validity is both empirical and logical. The moral sphere is not exempt from the scientific requirement that a law to be true must "work" and must be inherently consistent. From this point of view, Professor Everett's procedure is strictly and eminently scientific. With the aid of a general and simple principle he has attempted to unify the manifold and complex facts and theories of conduct. Happiness and perfection, egoism and altruism, duty and conscience, virtue and freedom, and other opposing issues that have permanently held a place in ethical thought, receive here their due recognition and adjustment. "Simplicity is a merit," the author himself insists, "only when it is warranted by the data to be explained."

The critical reader, however, will feel that those problems of conduct which are bound up with metaphysical questions suffer somewhat from over-simplification. This is particularly the case in the otherwise skilful exposition of the problem of freedom. The problem of freedom is intimately linked with time and causality. Without a metaphysical interpretation of the temporal and causal structure of reality, the problem of freedom is scarcely touched. A judgment less final on this intricate question would have contributed to a greater appreciation of its complexity. The same criticism might

be urged against the author's interpretation of the relation between morality and religion. Professor Everett's analysis of religion is certainly profound, and the chapter which is devoted to it is perhaps the finest in the book. But what he claims for religion may be supplied by metaphysics. The distinction between the religious and the metaphysical attitudes toward the world is not made very clear. The impression gained is an identity either of religion and philosophy or of philosophy and morality. Here too a more critical examination of the problem would have added to its profundity.

In conclusion, a word about the form of the book. It is beautifully written. Professor Everett's language has distinction, lucidity, charm, and grace. His style is reserved and dignified, yet seldom austere; it is serene, yet always human; it is objective, yet never wholly impersonal. The book merits to be classed as a work of literary art. It manifests as a whole and in every part unity, order, balance, and proportion. It is itself a fine vindication of the principles of sanity it so earnestly teaches.

J. LOEWENBERG.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

FREEDOM AFTER EJECTION. A REVIEW OF PRESBYTERIAN AND CONGREGATIONAL NON-CONFORMITY IN ENGLAND AND WALES. Edited by ALEXANDER GORDON. Manchester University Press. 1917. Pp. vi, 393.

The manuscript here printed and very competently edited is a survey of Presbyterian and Congregational ministers in England and Wales, prepared for and certainly used by a joint body appointed in 1689 or 1690 by the Presbyterian and Congregational organizations to administer a common fund for the assistance of poor ministers and congregations. Circular letters were apparently sent out and from them the information in this survey was compiled. The entries were made over a period of two years, 1690-92, and concern both Presbyterian and Congregational ministers and churches. There is information of grants of money to ministers, of grants to congregations, and of loans and gifts to young men studying for the ministry. Such subscription-lists as exist have been published. A valuable commentary by the editor provides an unusually precise account of the origin and development of the "Happy Union," the creation of the common fund and its administration, the vital split between the denominations, and the creation of two funds. The records also throw considerable detail upon the case of Richard Davis

of Rothwell and the controversies created by him and relating to him.

It has always been easy to secure information about doctrinal controversies, theoretical notions about church government, and biographical details of most religious movements. Certainly the history of Non-Conformity has abounded in such detail, not only before but after the Restoration. The institutional aspects of religious history are more important but more difficult to treat, and it is to this phase of the subject that this volume refers. Indeed the historical issue has always been of comparatively greater importance to the Non-Conformists than to the Established Church, and in particular, it has been vital for the Non-Conformists of all types in England and Wales to trace their historical antecedents and establish a literal continuity with the early movement of which so much has been written. Where church government has played so large a part in the history of the sect itself, the exact origin of those notions of church government can never be a matter of indifference to those who at present espouse and practice it. This document makes far clearer than ever before the fact that the continuity of the present Presbyterian and Congregational churches in England and Wales is to be traced to the years immediately subsequent to the Glorious Revolution. Light is thrown upon the attempted amalgamation of the two churches, and the exact time and manner of their separation, from which moment they have preserved distinct organizations down to the present day.

There is also vital information upon the finances of both organizations under the voluntary system which has been necessarily characteristic of them in a country where the Established Church could alone command the support of the State. Financial questions of the gravest difficulty the Established Church itself was unable to solve during the seventeenth century, and these same problems presented themselves to the Non-Conformist bodies, creating there also almost insuperable difficulties. Again comes the question of the relation of laity and clergy, and their relative authority or lack of authority in administration and jurisdiction. From the first it had been clear that the power of the purse was in the hands of the laity. From the first the clergy had claimed that doctrinal learning and the "gift of prophecy" gave them the paramount, if not exclusive, right to authority. There is much evidence in this volume of the later phase of the struggle between the laity and the clergy to achieve some sort of adjustment. Scarcely secondary in importance was the question of the relative influence upon the policy and affairs

of the churches of the gentry and of the "common sort." Should there be a democratic system in which each man's vote should be as good as another's, or should the Church accept and therefore perpetuate the social and economic distinctions of the temporal world?

Beside these great and fundamental issues there is material of the utmost importance in regard to the personnel, both of clergy and laity, the size of congregations, their geographical location, the relative strength of Presbyterianism as contrasted with Congregationalism, and the comparative financial strength of ministers, prominent laymen, and congregations in the aggregate.

The general conclusion to which the study of this material seems to lead, is that both the Presbyterian and Congregational bodies were smaller in number at the end of the seventeenth century than one would expect, after a century of active propaganda and the ascendancy of Non-Conformity during the Civil Wars, the Ejection to the contrary notwithstanding. It is hard to suppose that the number of professed believers could ever have reached in the earlier years of the century the numbers so confidently enumerated, and have then suffered by mere force of the Restoration and its policies alone any such decimation. The manuscript enumerates 759 ministers. Unquestionably it does not contain a full count; but even if that number is doubled and trebled, it is still far from the figures often quoted for earlier years. The personnel of the ministers and the laity alike is less distinguished than at earlier periods. Fewer of the former are university graduates or perhaps competent students without a degree, and fewer of the latter are men or women of rank and station, though some still seem to be men of wealth.

Comparatively, though not actually, however, the poverty of both Presbyterians and Congregationalists, taken as a whole, seems to be greater than before; the financial problem a greater obstacle to their growth, and its difficulties increasing rather than decreasing. There is lack of evidence of that readiness of the laity voluntarily to contribute considerable sums for the support of their own ministers and of needy congregations which the history of the movement previous to 1640 supplies in abundance. The subscriptions recorded to the common fund are all small, and the larger come from the clergy and not from the laity; a matter which will certainly bear some further investigation. Where did the clergy get it? For the record seems clearly to distinguish between money contributed by the clergy themselves, and the money which they merely collected. It is certainly erroneous to say, as apparently the editor

does (p. 163), that the subsidizing of the clergy by the collection of a common fund began in 1662. Certainly in the very earliest days of the movement in 1583 and 1584, a fund of money was collected by the ministers in London from prominent laymen, was administered and parceled out by these same ministers in precisely the same manner as this fund. The practice continued certainly till 1592, but was then apparently for some years discontinued, owing to the active opposition of the government to the Classis movement. The historical continuity therefore was lost. The collection of funds and their distribution was resumed on a much larger scale under James and Charles. This whole question of the financing of the Puritan movement is one of the greatest importance and of the deepest interest, but to which as yet very little attention has been given.

This record makes it clear that relatively to the economic progress of the community and the general rise in prices and wages, the pay of the ministers had fallen off considerably. There are a good many in 1690 receiving less than £20, many with £10 or less. In the earlier days even the less prominent and able members had received stipends as large as £30 and £40, while £50 and £60 contributed by a relatively small congregation or by one layman was by no means uncommon. Those figures represent apparently the maximum which all but the most influential ministers could hope to obtain in 1690. Is it not possible that in this inability of both the Presbyterian and Congregational churches to obtain the same relative financial support as in the earlier decades, lies some explanation of their comparative loss of position and influence in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?

ROLAND G. USHER.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

CHURCH AND STATE IN ENGLAND TO THE DEATH OF QUEEN ANNE. HENRY M. GWATKIN. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917. Pp. viii, 416. \$5.00.

Dr. Gwatkin had made an eminent reputation in the field of early church history; and it is deeply to be regretted that a volume by him, dealing with a subject for which he showed no special qualifications, should have been published without the changes he would doubtless have wished to make. It is, frankly, a book that has no other value than that of a pedestrian narrative of obvious events without any real understanding of their perspective. Dr. Gwatkin seems rarely to have been abreast of modern research, and he unfailingly writes

with prejudice, once his own sympathies are engaged. He has little of that knowledge of constitutional history so essential to his subject. He does not understand the reign of Richard II, which he interprets in the spirit of "Little Arthur's History"; he does not know the causes of the struggle between Becket and Henry II in 1163; he knows nothing of Maitland's fundamental paper on *Execrabilis* in the Common Pleas; he has not examined Dr. Leach's work on the effect of the dissolution of the chantries; it would be astonishing, in view of his statements, if he had ever read the *Institutes of a Christian Man*.

These are perhaps sins of omission. But it is to be doubted whether Dr. Gwatkin really understood wherein consists the problem of Church and State, as English history interprets it. He does not seem to have realized that from the Conciliar Movement England was plunged into the mid-stream of European thought; a cautious Scottish monarch would not have brought Casaubon to this country for nothing. He does not see the significance of men like Tyndal and Cartwright and Sherlock, whose writings go to the roots of the problems they confronted. The real history of Church and State is not merely, as he makes it, a statistical table of events. It is the presentation of the conflict between divergent views of life, the explanation of their origin, the interpretation of their value. In this aspect Becket is not merely an English but a European figure; and the Statutes of Provisors and *Præmunire* are landmarks in the history of the secular State. The subject Dr. Gwatkin chose for these lectures is a great one; but such dignified anecdotage is inadequate to its treatment.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

GOD'S WONDER WORLD. A MANUAL FOR RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN JUNIOR GRADES. Together with Leaflets. CORA S. COBB. The Beacon Press. Pp. 335. \$1.25. Leaflets, 50 cts.

"The religious thought running through all these Lessons — that God is with us continually and leads us on to all that we accomplish — should never be lost from sight." This assertion (p. 250) informs the inquirer at once of the intention of the author. It is to lead children into a region where investigation will reward them with fascinating discoveries, and where they will constantly explore with delight, with reverence, and with consciousness of God. The ways of ants, bees, spiders, toads, bats, and owls; clouds, plants, and

trees; the work of the rain, the story of electricity — these and many other things are brought within the comprehension of children, and many suggestions are given as to leading a child to think and observe for himself. While there may be room for question as to the form in which some of these facts are presented, the book will be an invaluable assistant to both parent and teacher.

THE EXPERIENCE OF GOD IN MODERN LIFE. EUGENE WILLIAM LYMAN.
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. x, 154. \$1.00.

Professor Lyman's peculiar designation of his theme in a work which seeks to show the compatibility of the Christian conception of God with the mental habits of a modern educated man, reminds one of Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, and, like it, is rather ambiguously suggestive of the apologetic method of the mystics. At first glance it seems to mean that modern life in its highest interpretation may be truly regarded as a divine experience, that is, an experience on the part of God Himself. It may also mean that men of the present day enjoy an objective experience of God, whereby He becomes as real to them as any other fact can be. This is evidently what the author means to say, for he speaks repeatedly of men consciously experiencing God, of this as an experience of objective reality, of God as "a fact" (pp. 11, 14, 31, 35, *et al.*). The position is that of the theological realist.

As the argument proceeds, however, the position seems to shift to the first of the two suggestions. For the claim made by some to the effect that they know God to be real because in certain definite experiences of theirs they feel an immediate assurance of His objective existence, is supported on the ground of the high quality of this experience. The author's favorite designation of its character is that it is an experience of "moral creativity." That is, the man has an experience of bringing new moral existence into being; there is no "world ready-made" but a "world in the making," and this is an experience of God, since God's nature is ultimately "moral creativeness." In this activity therefore man is one with God. The divine experience and his own are one. In man's moral career there is a divine experience. Man's moral creativity is God's own experience. Thus the author's realism becomes a form of mysticism. Is this God personal?

An effort is made to vindicate this claim on behalf of modern religious experience on three counts: its power in the development

of personality, its furtherance of social progress, and its contribution to the evolution of the cosmos. This seems the natural order in covering the whole field which apologetics must examine. The treatment, however, lacks integration. The three counts are taken separately, whereas they might be unified by showing how the personality comes to consciousness only in the community-consciousness and finds fulfilment only when the cosmos becomes organic to its self-expression and self-realization. The value of the work lies in its suggestiveness rather than in thoroughness. The author deeply feels that the belief in the existence of God needs vindication anew and that this vindication must proceed from within the human conscious experience; but the conclusions he reaches are anticipated by saltations and not reached by clear and coördinated reasoning.

The philosophical instrument mainly employed in obtaining results is Pragmatism, with some assistance from such works as Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose* and Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. The tentative character of the treatment is thereby accentuated, and brilliancy of suggestion alternates with obscurity of expression and far-reaching assumption. The terms, *reality*, *fact*, *experience*, *religion*, though key-words, are of uncertain meaning. The opening sentence, "The modern world is in quest, dumbly and half-consciously, of a religion," is in substance often repeated. But is religion something that men get and lose, or something that they seek? Is not their very seeking their religion? The testimony of such great men as Martineau, Bushnell, Ritschl, and Tolstoy to the reality of the experience of God is taken at its face value, but the proof of the truth of their utterances is found in "the reality sense," "a sense of being in contact with reality in a new and deeper way and of functioning harmoniously with it," "an experience sufficiently grounded in reality," "the feeling of reality" (pp. 32, 37, 43); which is surely unconvincing to any one who has not had that incommunicable experience. In his peroration and summary at the close the author frankly, it seems, abandons any attempt to reason with his readers: "In all these experiences fact and value meet and blend both in human ways and in ways that reach far beyond the confines of humanity. Experiences, *we irresistibly feel* [italics mine] are experiences of God. They reveal to us the very essence of creative power and they bring us into a veritable sharing in the creative process." If one is to be convinced finally simply by the irresistible feeling some one may have, there is an end to argument and theology must repose on dogmatism.

The aim of these lectures is a noble one, namely, to arouse a desire to share in the Christian fellowship with the will of God, and the area

of human endeavor opened to view is full of hope and promise; but it can be conquered only by a more stringent exercise of the unified powers of feeling, thought, and will than the author allows.

GEORGE CROSS.

ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

MYSTICISM AND LOGIC. BERTRAND RUSSELL. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Pp. viii, 234. \$2.50.

In this new volume Mr. Russell has brought together ten essays and addresses, previously printed elsewhere, the first of which gives its title to the collection. After the admirable account of Mr. Russell's philosophy recently given by Dr. Hoernlé in the pages of this REVIEW,¹ it would be superfluous to say anything further here. In the Preface, however, there is a reference to the essay on *The Free Man's Worship* which suggests that the author anticipated or has profited by one of Dr. Hoernlé's criticisms — "In theoretical Ethics the position . . . is not quite identical with that which I hold now. I feel less convinced than I did then of the objectivity of good and evil." In the case of other essays also, dated footnotes correct statements in the earlier text. Is it impertinent to suggest that such indications of changing thought should lead Mr. Russell to soften somewhat his dogmatic tone — although he would indignantly protest against the adjective. He has a shocking way of dashing cold water upon one's glowing ideals and ardent hopes of realizing them in the world; but a cold shower is stimulating to a healthy system.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

¹The Religious Aspect of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy. R. F. A. Hoernlé. HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, April, 1916.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XII OCTOBER, 1919 NUMBER 4

ISAAC WATTS

FREDERIC PALMER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It is somewhat singular that the teachers of Protestant theology who have had probably the widest influence have been not professors of divinity, not preachers, not persons of any standing as theological instructors, but unofficial men and women, often laymen and always self-appointed. For I suppose it is unquestionable that poetry and especially hymns have spread theology more widely than have treatises of divinity. Calvinism was stamped upon English-speaking peoples not so much directly by the *Institutes* as by Milton's *Paradise Lost*; and even more efficient in establishing the system which came to be known as Evangelicalism were the hymns of the eighteenth century; secondarily those of Newton and the Wesleys but primarily those of Isaac Watts. The formative influence of Watts, especially upon the religious life of New England, has been profound.

Hymn-singing is to us so much a matter of course that few persons probably are aware how recent a feature in public worship it is, and how great a strife was involved before it became established. Singing, it is true, formed part of the church service from primitive times; but the hymns of the Oriental and Latin Churches were generally sung by priest and choir, not by the people but for them,

and, throughout the Middle Ages, not in the mother tongue. After the Reformation the necessity was felt for songs in the vernacular in which all the people could join; and Luther's hymns sent the Reformed doctrines flying through Germany, while the Psalms in Clement Marot's version were sung by French courtiers and peasants and fell from the lips of Huguenots as their heads fell at Amboise. In England the same need gave rise to the metrical version of the Psalms by Sternhold and Hopkins, which was adopted by the Church of England in 1562 and continued to be used for nearly two centuries and a half. But, let it be noted, in both the last two cases it was Psalms that were sung, not hymns. The Psalms, it was maintained, were inspired, while hymns were not. This argument would seem to compel the use of the holy text in every particular, without the change of a word and even in the original Hebrew; and there were those who stood up sturdily to the logic of the situation, and stumbled through the difficulties of trying to get a congregation to chant the very words of the Scripture, though not in the original. Chanting, however, had a certain popish flavor; and to avoid both this and unworshipful discord metrical versions were tolerated. In King Edward the Sixth's chapel a metrical version of the Acts of the Apostles was in use, and the royal ear was edified by listening to such inspiring strains as the following:

“ It chaunced in Iconium,
As they oft tymes did use,
Together they into did come
The sinagoge of Jeus.

Where they did preache and only seke
God's grace them to atchieve;
That soe they speke to Jeu and Greke
That many did bileve.”¹

¹ The first mention of the substitution of congregational psalmody for the old choral mode of worship places it in the reign of King Edward VI: “On March 15, 1550, M.

Some, however, took refuge in banishing music altogether; and in the case of the Nonconformists in the latter half of the seventeenth century there was an additional reason for this. Singing might betray to the informer the meeting-house or the wood where the persecuted were assembled. Among those congregations which had no singing was the Baptist church in London whose pastor was Benjamin Keach, and of which half a century ago Mr. Spurgeon was pastor. In 1691 Keach published a book entitled *The Breach Repaired in God's Worship; or Singing of Psalms, Hymns, and Spiritual Songs Proved to be an Holy Ordinance of Jesus Christ*. This led after long discussion to the decision by his congregation to introduce singing; whereupon a disapproving minority seceded and established a place of worship for themselves unpolluted by song.²

Other churches compromised on the Psalms in a metrical version, but, feeling that the line must be drawn somewhere, drew it at hymns. This issue again rent churches asunder. In 1623 George Wither published *Hymnes and Songs of the Church*; and he succeeded in procuring a letter-patent ordering that it should be inserted in every copy of the authorized *Psalm-book in meeter*. But the hymns never became popular, and in 1634 the permission

Vernon, a Frenchman by birth but a learned Protestant and parson of St. Martin's, Ludgate, preached at St. Paul's Cross before the mayor and aldermen, and after sermon done they all sung in common a psalm in metre, as it seems now was frequently done, the custom being brought to us from abroad by the exiles." Nichols's Progress of Queen Elizabeth, I, p. 54.

² "A curious controversy once agitated this body [the Baptists], as to the propriety of singing at all in worship; a practice which, at one period, they generally omitted. Mr. Keach was the first who broke the ice; he began to introduce singing at the ordinance; after a struggle of six years it was added to the devotions of thanksgiving days; and after fourteen years more of perseverance and debate it was permitted at the close of each service on the sabbath, that those who chose might withdraw and not have their ears offended by the sound. The church, however, divided, and the inharmionious formed a new society, which still flourishes in Mays Pond. Isaac Marlowe fiercely opposed Mr. Keach, designating the practice as 'error, apostasy, human tradition, pre-limited forms, mischievous error, carnal worship.'" Thomas Milner; Life, Times, and Correspondence of Rev. Isaac Watts, p. 360.

was withdrawn. We may perhaps trace some influence of Wither upon Watts; especially between the former's evening hymn, "Behold the sun that seemed but now, Enthronéd overhead," and the latter's "Thee we adore, eternal Name" (II, 55), and between Wither's "Lullaby" and Watts's celebrated "Cradle Hymn." Yet the influence, if it exists, is shown not in imitation but rather in simplicity of subject and feeling.

The aversion to hymn-singing had a certain justification in the strong influence which, as I have said, hymns exert, and the possibility — which unfortunately, as we see, is no mere possibility — that erroneous opinions held by the well-meaning but ignorant authors of the hymns, may be inculcated by them. It was Isaac Watts, who has been called almost the inventor of hymns in our language, who bridged the chasm between the songless or Psalm-using worship and the exuberant hymn-singing of our day.

He was born at Southampton in 1674. His father kept a boarding-school, and was a Nonconformist. This latter fact prevented the boy from going to the university. For though some friends offered to meet the expense of a university education for him, this would have involved his becoming a member of the Church of England; and with the memory of the imprisonment for religion which his father had suffered, while his mother sat with Isaac in her arms on the stone at the prison-door, he refused the offer. Stories are told of his youthful precocity in literature — that he began to read Latin at four years old, and Greek and Hebrew soon after; that he composed respectable devotional verses at seven or eight; that he devoured books, and spent his casual pennies for them. Rev. Samuel Price, his colleague in the pastorate, gives the following account of the beginning of his hymn-writing, before he was fifteen years old:

"The hymns which were sung at the Dissenting Meeting at Southampton were so little to the gust of Mr. Watts that he could not for-

bear complaining of them to his father. The father bid him try what he could do to mend the matter. He did; and had such success in his first essay, 'Behold the glories of the Lamb,' that a second hymn was earnestly desired of him, and then a third and fourth, till in process of time there was such a number of them as to make up a volume."³

This is an instance of the excellence and the defect of Watts as a hymn-writer. Apart from the fact that it is remarkable that a hymn like this could have been written by so young a person, the hymn shows Watts's directness of statement, ease of expression, and vividness in depicting a scene; but its origin was the demand of an external occasion rather than the compulsion of an internal impulse. Much of his poetry is of this stamp, and therefore tends to being machine-made. It would have been well if he had taken the advice of his friend Sir Edward King, who said to him in early life, "Young man, I hear that you make verses. Let me advise you never to do it but when you cannot help it."

When he was fifteen he was sent to an academy in London, whose principal, Rev. Thomas Rowe, was also minister of a congregation of Independents. On leaving the academy he entered on one of those periods of mental incubation in which poets — Milton, Tennyson, and many others — have often engaged. He spent two years and a half in his father's house, doing nothing, so far as accomplishment was visible, but, like another Congregational poet — Robert Browning — reading, meditating, writing, training himself in the handling of verse. Then for five years he was tutor in the family of Sir John Hartopp at Stoke Newington, a London suburb. For the last three of these years he was also assistant minister at the Mark Lane Independent Chapel in London; and when in 1701 the pastor, Dr. Isaac Chauncy, retired, Watts accepted a call to succeed him.

³ The Hymn-Lover. W. Garrett Horder. P. 98.

His health, however, had never been strong since a serious illness which he had when he was fifteen years old. Moreover, he had none of the modern knowledge of hygiene which enables feeble bodies to defy their limitations. So he indulged himself in hard work and little exercise and sleep cut short, till after a few months in the pastorate another severe illness laid him aside. He must have had much sweetness, intellectual power, and personal attraction to account for the devotion which his congregation, even after so short a connection, showed him, and for their patience with his limitations throughout his long life. In dedicating a volume of sermons to his congregation he wrote: "Two and twenty years are now expired since you first called me to this delightful work. . . . Your forward kindness hath always forbid my requests; nor do I remember that you ever gave me leave to ask anything for myself at your hands, by your constant anticipation of all that I could reasonably desire."⁴

They gave him Rev. Samuel Price as an assistant, and for nine years he was able to take his duties with more or less regularity. Then another long attack of fever was followed by what we should call nervous prostration. Mr. Price now relieved him from most of the duties of his office by becoming co-pastor with him, and one of his friends, Sir Thomas Abney, invited him for a visit to his house at Theobald's, some dozen miles north of London. Watts went for a week, and remained with the family for thirty-six years, as long as he needed an earthly home.

Sir Thomas Abney was wealthy, prominent in city affairs, and, though a Nonconformist, had been in 1700 Lord Mayor of London. Theobald's had been built as a palace by Lord Burleigh, but had been destroyed by the Long Parliament. Part of the splendid garden, however, still remained; and here, overhung by two rows of elms, were a long walk and a summer house, where Watts is said to

⁴ Preface to *Sermons on Various Subjects*. Vol. I.

have composed many of his works. Sir Thomas and Lady Abney were the kindest of friends to him, and their family became his own. Dr. Samuel Johnson found somewhat similar hospitality in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Henry Thrale at Streatham Park; and shortly before Watts went to Sir Thomas Abney's, John Locke ended with his life a fourteen-year visit to Sir Francis and Lady Masham at Oates in Essex. Such a relation between host and guest was close enough to require the distance of politeness and distant enough to exclude close quarreling; though this was hardly the case always between Johnson and the Thrales.

While Watts was living with the Abneys Lady Abney's brother, Thomas Gunston, died, and left to her his manor-house at Stoke Newington, which was then a country village. Some time after, probably about 1735, the Abneys removed to Stoke Newington, though Sir Thomas had died in 1722. Here Watts spent the last thirteen years of his life. He never married; and it was through the three daughters of his hosts, Sarah, Mary, and Elizabeth Abney, that he gained that acquaintance with childhood which led him to become the pioneer in the religious education of children.

His residence with the Abneys did not interrupt his relations with his parish; for whenever he wished to officiate, Lady Abney's carriage was at his disposal, and when he did not feel able, his colleague, Rev. Mr. Price, stood ready to supply his place. The rush of parish work, which in our time drives many a minister to constant busyness and intellectual sterility, did not then exist. The demands of a parish, apart from public services, were much the same as they had been a century before in George Herbert's day; and though the duties of a city minister were naturally more complex than those of a country parson, they were on the same plan. "The Country Parson," says Herbert, "upon the afternoons in the weekdays takes

occasion sometimes to visite in person now one quarter of his Parish, now another. For there he shall find his flock most naturally as they are, wallowing in the midst of their affairs." To live in the country with no household cares, to drive into town and preach occasionally, to have a colleague who should attend to the business of the parish — such conditions would seem to some modern ministers ideal, to others ludicrously insufficient. To Dr. Watts they gave the opportunity of establishing a close bond between himself and his congregation, of gaining a prominent position as a preacher and leader among the Nonconformists, of publishing an amount of prose vast for even a literary person in that voluminous age, of attaining a place — not of the first rank but indisputable — among the poets of the language, and of moulding the thoughts and kindling the emotions of English Protestant Christians for more than a century.

After Sir Thomas Abney's death his widow and her daughters continued to care for their guest with the same munificent and affectionate devotion they had already shown. As he grew feeble a friend asked him one day how he was. "Waiting God's leave to die," he replied. On November 25, 1748, in his seventy-fifth year, the awaited permission came.

In 1722, the University of Edinburgh conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Divinity. He was a voluminous writer; in addition to his poetical works he published on logic, astronomy, geography, grammar, pedagogics, and ethics. He published also in his lifetime three volumes of sermons and twenty-nine treatises on theology. His publications were fifty-two in all. His collected works were issued in London in 1810 in six volumes and again in 1812 in nine volumes. He has a monument in the cemetery in Abney Park, where he is buried, and also in Westminster Abbey, with a memorial hall and a statue in his native Southampton.

It was the need for song better adapted to public worship that led Watts to writing, and it was he who constructed the bridge between the metrical versions of the Psalms and the ampler hymnody of our day. The further pier of his bridge was, it is true, the Psalms in a metrical version. Like Lazarus, he had "come forth," but with the clothes of the dead past still around him. But this version of his was quite different from that of Sternhold and Hopkins, or of Tate and Brady which had preceded it. They had largely confined themselves to a Procrustean arrangement of the Biblical words into lines and feet. But the character of Watts's version was expressed in its title: *The Psalms of David Imitated in the Language of the New Testament*. He never hesitated to read the New Testament into the Old, to substitute gospel for law, to make David sing the song not only of Moses but of the Lamb. Thus where the author of the 103d Psalm says, "Who redeemeth thy life from destruction," Watts amplifies and transforms this into

" 'Tis he, my soul, that sent his Son
To die for crimes that thou hast done."

That Watts had gauged the public need with accuracy is shown by the reception which his Psalms and hymns met. Among the Nonconformists they drove out all others and dominated song in worship for a century. Their influence reached New England somewhat later than their home. *The Bay Psalm Book*, published in 1640, was used here until the middle of the next century, when it was superseded by Tate and Brady, and this toward the end of the century by Watts. A half-century later the Psalms came to be generally disused and a wider range of hymns desired. This led to the publication known as *Watts and Select*, in which to Watts's Psalms and hymns there were added two hundred and thirty-four hymns by different authors.

Two obstacles have prevented a more general appreciation of Watts's poetry. One is the enormous amount of his output and the consequent worthlessness of much of it. Few persons are patient enough to wade through six hundred hymns together with two volumes of other poetry in order to winnow the grain from the chaff. But the nutritive grain is there. The other obstacle is that the hymns are generally regarded from a homiletic rather than a poetic point of view. Their value is supposed to lie in the doctrines which they set forth; and because these doctrines are today for the most part out of fashion, the hymns are relegated to the scrap-heap. But their value lies, as with all poetry, not in inculcating an opinion but in conveying a mood. The background must be granted. The pastoral poetry of the eighteenth century dealt in nymphs and swains, creatures as impossible to find in the country as fairies or salamanders. But granting that the poet chose to employ these figures, the important question is, what did he do with them? So if one would discover the value of Watts, his theological scenery must be assumed. In order to understand him we must see not merely the world but the universe as he saw it. Assume a great Monarch sitting aloft upon a throne, exercising a sway of arbitrary and absolute power over those for whom the poet's favorite designation is "worms of the dust." Never mind whether that is an adequate conception of God, but could there be a more splendid statement of it than this?

"Keep silence, all created things,
And wait your Maker's nod?
My soul stands trembling while she sings
The honours of her God.

Life, death, and hell, and worlds unknown
Hang on his firm decree.
He sits on no precarious throne,
Nor borrows leave to be.

.

Chained to his throne a volume lies,
 With all the fates of men,
 With every angel's form and size,
 Drawn by the eternal pen.

Here he exalts neglected worms
 To sceptres and a crown;
 Anon the following page he turns
 And treads the monarchs down.

Not Gabriel asks the reason why,
 Nor God the reason gives,
 Nor dares the favorite angel pry
 Between the folded leaves.”⁵

Or see the poet again as he stands with bated breath
 before this sovereign presence:

“The Lord! how fearful is his name!
 How wide is his command!
 Nature with all her moving frame
 Rests on his mighty hand.

Immortal glory forms his throne,
 And light his awful robe,
 While with a smile or with a frown
 He manages the globe.

A word of his Almighty breath
 Can swell or sink the seas,
 Build the vast empires of the earth
 Or break them, as he please.

Adoring angels round him fall
 In all their shining forms;
 His sovereign eye looks thro' them all,
 And pities mortal worms.”⁵

This thought of the Divine action as based not upon reasonableness but upon pure will is as inspiring to Watts as it is repulsive to us. He has a thoroughly Hebraic joy in it.

⁵ H. L. P. 9. The references are to any edition of the Psalms and the Three Books of Hymns, and to *Horae Lyricae*, ed. Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, 1854.

“ When the Eternal bows the skies
 To visit earthly things,
 With scorn divine he turns his eyes
 From towers of haughty kings;

Rides on a cloud disdainful by
 A sultan or a czar,
 Laughs at the worms that rise so high,
 Or frowns 'em from afar.

He bids his awful chariot roll
 Far downward from the skies
 To visit every humble soul,
 With pleasure in his eyes.

Why should the Lord, that reigns above,
 Disdain so lofty kings ?
 Say, Lord, and why such looks of love
 Upon such worthless things ?

Mortals, be dumb! What creature dares
 Dispute his awful will!
 Ask no account of his affairs,
 But tremble and be still.

Just like his nature is his grace,
 All sovereign and all free.
 Great God, how searchless are thy ways!
 How deep thy judgments be! ”⁶

It would be difficult to express the majesty of God more adequately than in the following verses:

“ Nature and time quite naked lie
 To thine immense survey,
 From the formation of the sky
 To the great burning day.

Eternity, with all its years,
 Stands present in thy view;
 To thee there 's nothing old appears;
 Great God, there 's nothing new.

Our lives through various scenes are drawn,
And vexed with trifling cares,
While thine eternal thoughts move on
Their undisturbed affairs.

Great God, how infinite art thou!
What worthless worms are we!
Let the whole race of creatures bow
And pay their praise to thee!" ⁷

Again, his heaven may not be ours, but see what a charming place it is. He is as confident in regard to its features and inhabitants as he is of the country around Theobald's. Yet if we smile in the superiority of our knowledge or stiffen up and declare "No such topography for me!" we shall miss the sweetness and felicity of such glad lines as these:

"There is a land of pure delight
Where saints immortal reign;
Infinite day excludes the night,
And pleasures banish pain.

There everlasting Spring abides,
And never-withering flowers;
Death, like a narrow sea, divides
This heavenly land from ours.

Sweet fields beyond the swelling flood
Stand dressed in living green;
So to the Jews old Canaan stood,
While Jordan rolled between." ⁸

The incomparable joys of heaven, eagerness to reach it, and the consequent insignificance of death, are his favorite subjects. One leads to another.

"My God, the spring of all my joys,
The life of my delights,
The glory of my brightest days
And comfort of my nights,

⁷ II, 67.

⁸ II, 66.

In darkest shades if he appear,
 My dawning is begun.
 He is my soul's sweet morning-star,
 And he my rising sun.

My soul would leave this heavy clay
 At that transporting word,
 Run up with joy the shining way
 To embrace my dearest Lord;
 Fearless of hell and ghastly death,
 I'd break through every foe;
 The wings of love and arms of faith
 Should bear me conqueror through."⁹

Those who have known Watts's hymns have perhaps no association with them more sacred than with that one which they have often heard sung by pious fathers and mothers, half in doubting hesitation, half in triumphant confidence:

"When I can read my title clear
 To mansions in the skies,
 I bid farewell to every fear
 And wipe my weeping eyes.
 Should earth against my soul engage
 And hellish darts be hurled,
 Then I can smile at Satan's rage,
 And face a frowning world.
 Let cares like a wild deluge come,
 And storms of sorrow fall;
 May I but safely reach my home,
 My God, my heaven, my all,
 There shall I bathe my weary soul
 In seas of heavenly rest,
 And not a wave of trouble roll
 Across my peaceful breast."¹⁰

Edwin Paxton Hood says: "The gifted nobleman, who was the Mecænas of the past age, was not an indifferent

⁹ II, 54.

¹⁰ II, 65.

critic, and when called on to cite the most perfect verse in the language, he immediately instanced " the last stanza above quoted."¹¹

Such a celestial prospect makes one long for its realization. Moses was the fortunate one in his death, in spite of his disappointment, for he not only received God's commands but was accompanied at every step by the comforting Divine presence.

" Sweet was the journey to the sky
The wondrous prophet tried;
' Climb up the mount,' says God, ' and die! '
The prophet climbed and died.

Softly his fainting head he lay
Upon his Maker's breast;
His Maker kissed his soul away
And laid his flesh to rest.

In God's own arms he left the breath
That God's own spirit gave.
His was the noblest road to death,
And his the sweetest grave." ¹²

With such a blissful transition in view, death is a welcome messenger, and a saint who is dying is to be envied.

" Lord, when we see a saint of thine
Lie gasping out his breath,
With longing eyes and looks divine,
Smiling and pleased in death;

How could we e'en contend to lay
Our limbs upon that bed!
We ask thine envoy to convey
Our spirits in his stead.

Our souls are rising on the wing
To venture in his place,
For when grim Death has lost his sting
He has an angel's face.

.

¹¹ Isaac Watts, *His Life and Writings*, Homes and Friends, p. 104.

¹² H. L. P. 129.

Oh! if my threatening sins were gone
And Death had lost his sting,
I could invite the angel on,
And chide his lazy wing.

Away, these interposing days,
And let the lovers meet!
The angel has a cold embrace,
But kind and soft and sweet.

I'd leap at once my seventy years,
I'd rush into his arms,
And lose my breath and all my cares
Amidst those heavenly charms.

Joyful, I'd lay this body down
And leave the lifeless clay,
Without a sigh, without a groan,
And stretch and soar away." ¹³

However we may portray heaven, we are apt to be squeamish about depicting hell, even if we concede its existence. Though we may take symbols for realities elsewhere, we never think of regarding the condition depicted in Dante's *Inferno* as a statement of fact. But Watts saw no reason for restraining his imagination in describing a locality which to him was as real as the slums of London. Moreover, the homiletic fashion of the Middle Ages, when the torture of criminals was common and frequently a public spectacle, had not ceased in Watts's day, as indeed it has not wholly in some quarters at present, and preachers were accustomed to balance their exhibition of the splendors of heaven by lurid descriptions, reeking with brimstone and bristling with horrors, of the torments of hell. Watts is much more restrained than most of these, both in quantity and quality. His hymns on this subject are comparatively few. The worst of them is the following:

"My thoughts on awful subjects roll,
Damnation and the dead;
What horrors seize the guilty soul
Upon a dying bed!

Lingering about these mortal shores
 She makes a long delay,
 Till like a flood with rapid force,
 Death sweeps the wretch away.

Then swift and dreadful she descends
 Down to the fiery coast
 Amongst abominable fiends,
 Herself a frightened ghost.

There endless crowds of sinners lie,
 And darkness makes their chains;
 Tortured with keen despair they cry,
 Yet wait for fiercer pains.

Not all their anguish and their blood
 For their old guilt atones,
 Nor the compassion of a God
 Shall hearken to their groans.

Amazing grace, that kept my breath,
 Nor bid my soul remove
 Till I had learned my Saviour's death,
 And well insured his love!"¹⁴

It is difficult, in view of such verses, to keep the compact we made with the poet, and, while appreciating his poetry as poetry, let him display his theology unprotested.

His tendency to visualize scenes makes almost every description vivid. One would hardly suppose a study in anatomy could be put into a hymn; but Watts accomplishes this feat, and makes the anatomy thoroughly poetic.

"Let others boast how strong they be,
 Nor death nor danger fear;
 But we 'll confess, O Lord, to thee
 What feeble things we are.

Our life contains a thousand springs,
 And dies if one be gone.
 Strange, that a harp of thousand strings
 Should keep in tune so long!

He spoke, and straight our hearts and brains
 In all their motions rose.
 'Let blood,' said he, 'flow round the veins!'
 And round the veins it flows.

While we have breath to use our tongues,
 Our Maker we 'll adore.
 His spirit moves our heaving lungs,
 Or they would breathe no more." ¹⁵

I said it is difficult in reading some of Watts's hymns, to take them for their poetic worth and not cry out on their theology. It is especially hard for a child-lover when the poet faces the dualism at the base of his system of theologic thought and carries it unflinchingly to its logical conclusion. The Latin mind had from the first posited an opposition between the Divine and the human. Whatever is of the one is not of the other; the Divine is non-human, the human non-Divine. It follows that certain departments belong to God, certain others to man. "The heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord's; but the earth hath He given to the children of men." The torturing dilemma then presents itself, Which shall I love, my friends or God? Not both, for what is given to the one can but be just so much taken from the other. I ought to love God supremely, but can I refrain from loving my friends? Many a tender conscience has been thus plunged into torment because it has not understood the First Epistle of St. John. Watts felt obliged to versify on all the doctrines of his theology, and therefore on this. If we have an eye for beauty rather than for dogmatics, we may forgive him his poem for the sake of one line in it.

"Where'er my flattering passions rove
 I find a lurking snare;
 'Tis dangerous to let loose our love
 Beneath the Eternal Fair.

Souls which the tie of friendship binds,
 And partners of our blood,
 Seize a large portion of our minds,
 And leave the less for God.

Nature has soft but powerful bands,
 And reason she controls,
 While children, with their little hands,
 Hang closest to our souls.

Thoughtless, they act the old serpent's part.
 What tempting things they be!
 Lord, how they twine about our heart
 And draw it off from thee!

.

Dear Sovereign, break these fetters off,
 And set our spirits free!
 God in himself is bliss enough,
 For we have all in thee."¹⁶

We may well overlook the dreadfulness of his doctrine for the sake of the felicitous tenderness of that line,

"What tempting things they be!"

Watts himself seems to have felt that the poem needed some excuse, for he never included it among his hymns, and to the section of poems of which this is the first he added a note, saying that it may be an apology for what may displease in them that they were written "in his youngest years." Moreover, he was regardlessly illogical in his practice, and refused to dismiss the love of children as infringing on love to God; for he was fond of children and devoted to the daughters of Sir Thomas and Lady Abney. Much theology which he felt bound to hold he, like other people, found it convenient to be not held by.

But more than this, he was the first to recognize that children had poetic rights and to give them a place in literature. In all Chaucer's crowded picture-gallery there is no portrait of a child; for the only tale bearing on the

¹⁶ H. L. P. 103.

subject is a monkish legend,¹⁷ and its subject is as far from being a real child as is the hero of an infant biography in a Sunday School library. Spenser has nothing to do with children. Shakespeare deals with them only four brief times.¹⁸ Milton, apart from his youthful poem on the Death of a Fair Infant, does not mention them; for though the actors of "Comus" were originally children, the characters in the Masque are mature. Dean Colet had cast on them a kindly eye, and had endeavored to soften the asperities of learning for them.¹⁹ But that child-world, whose discovery has been so marked a feature of the last fifty years, was unknown in the seventeenth century, and Isaac Watts was the Columbus who brought it into notice. Not that he had that interest in the study of children in themselves, that absorption in the charm of their looks and ways, that admission of their concerns to a level in dignity and importance with those of older people, which characterize modern child-worship. These have been later developments. To him, as to his contemporaries and our own benighted grandparents, children were to be seen and not heard, and they must ever be taught subordination, obedience, and their own comparative unimportance. But Watts had a profound interest in their education, especially their education in religion. He en-

¹⁷ The Prioresses Tale.

¹⁸ Cf. King John, King Henry V, Coriolanus, Macbeth.

¹⁹ In the Latin Grammar which he wrote for his school of St. Paul's he says: "For the love and zeal that I have to the new school of Paul's and to the children of the same, I have of the eight parts of grammar made this little book. In which, if any new things be of me, it is alonely that I have put these parts in a more clear order, and I have made them a little more easy to young wits than (methinketh) they were before; judging that nothing may be too soft nor too familiar for little children, specially learning a tongue unto them all strange. In which little book I have left many things out of purpose, considering the tenderness and small capacity of little minds. . . . Wherefore I pray you, all little babes, all little children, learn gladly this little treatise and commend it diligently unto your memories, trusting that of this beginning that ye shall proceed and grow to perfect literature, and come at the last to be great clerks. And lift up your little white hands for me, which prayeth for you to God, to whom be all honour and imperial majesty and glory. Amen." *The Oxford Reformers: Frederic Seebohm*, p. 214.

deavored to construct a path from the school-books, to which they were driven by duty, into a field of literature to which they would resort of themselves. The path, it is true, conducted, not as with the children's books of today, to the flowery meadows of unhampered amusement, but to the uplands of morality and religion. But it was a pleasant path, adapted to little feet; and if a finger-post every now and then was pointing a didactic moral, why, that was only what every child expected and every grown person would have been shocked to find absent. So Dr. Watts issued a book, *Divine and Moral Songs*, parts of which, it is safe to say, have become almost as classic in the childish world as Mother Goose. Few well-bred children of the past generation — I cannot speak with as much knowledge of those of the present — did not know

“ Whatever brawls disturb the street,
 There should be peace at home;
 Where sisters dwell and brothers meet,
 Quarrels should never come.
 Birds in their little nests agree;
 And 'tis a shameful sight
 When children of one family
 Fall out, and chide, and fight.” ²⁰

And

“ Let dogs delight to bark and bite,
 For God hath made them so.
 Let bears and lions growl and fight,
 For 'tis their nature too.
 But, children, you should never let
 Such angry passions rise;
 Your little hands were never made
 To tear each other's eyes.” ²¹

And

“ How doth the little busy bee
 Improve each shining hour,
 And gather honey all the day
 From every opening flower!

²⁰ H. L. P. 317.

²¹ Ibid. P. 316.

How skilfully she builds her cell!
 How neat she spreads the wax!
 And labors hard to store it well
 With the sweet food she makes!

In works of labour or of skill
 I would be busy too;
 For Satan finds some mischief still
 For idle hands to do."²²

His Cradle Hymn, "Hush, my Dear, lie still and slumber," has crooned many a tired child to sleep. These *Divine and Moral Songs* deserve remembrance and respect not only as pioneers in literature for children but for the intrinsic merit of many of them. "Edition after edition rapidly issued from the press in England and America, and translations have since appeared in many of the European and transatlantic languages. The number of copies that have been circulated throughout the world must amount to many millions; upwards of thirty millions in this country are regularly kept in print; and, upon a moderate computation, the average annual sale in England only cannot be less than eighty thousand."²³

In summing up the characteristics of Watts's poetry we may place first its reverence. It was a time when the thought of the immanence of God in nature and in man had almost fallen out of sight. The devout Christian of our day sees God around him so constantly, though he may not always call the higher element in life which he sees by the name of God, that the Divine presence is no surprise to him; he takes it as a matter of course. But to the men of the eighteenth century, filled as they were with the thought of the Divine transcendence, it was always a wonder and a surprise when the heavens or the earth opened and behind the visible they beheld God. They

²² H. L. P. 320.

²³ Thomas Milner: *The Life, Times, and Correspondence of Rev. Isaac Watts*, p. 372.

delighted, as they expressed it, to "see God in His works"; and in the fields decked with flowers, the towering mountain, the roaring sea, the glittering night sky, it was not directly beauty that they saw but the Jehovah of the Old Testament suddenly revealed, and before such an immediate vision they bow in awe. This attitude of worship is the chief characteristic of the best work of Watts. He is occupied with the deepest subjects which can interest men and which must interest them perpetually. They wear in him, however, the dress of his day, and this unfortunately often repels us. But beneath their dress lies their kinship with the souls of every age. These subjects he always treats with befitting dignity. More than that, when he approaches God there is ever with him the sense of awe; he bows low in the Divine presence. And as this is the subject of profoundest interest to him, it is the field of his most satisfactory work. He is almost unique in his ability to convey the impression of sublimity. His Muse is best when she walks with an *incedo regina* air. It is sometimes supposed that the Puritan mind had little interest in poetry. That interest is often underestimated. But as the central doctrine of Calvinism was the absoluteness of God, that poetry was chiefly interesting to the Puritan which exhibited this absoluteness in all its grandeur. It was partly for this reason that Watts had so strong a hold upon minds which inherited the Puritan tradition. In the austere doctrines which they held he showed them the springs of feeling.

This is the second characteristic of his poetry — its passion. His verses are by no means mere rhymed theology, but they are the outpouring of the effect of theology upon a sensitive and eager soul. He has not only found, as an earnest thinker might, the meat for daily life lying hidden in theologic doctrines, but he has discovered the joy in them, the dread, the inspiration, the bliss. He carries them over from the domain of thought into that of feeling,

and in giving us their emotional value, awakens it in us. The Puritan, contrary again to the popular impression, was not an unemotional person, though it took something of the eternal to touch his emotions; but when they were touched, they burned with a deep and consuming fire. Lord Rosebery in one of his speeches says, "The Puritan was a practical mystic, the most formidable and terrible of all combinations." In a sermon on the use of the passions in religion Watts exclaims:

"Have they [preachers] no such thing as passion belonging to them? . . . Have they no springs of affection within them? or do they think their hearers have none? Or is passion so vile a power that it must be all devoted to things of flesh and sense, and must never be applied to things divine and heavenly? Who taught any of us this lazy and drowsy practice? . . . Did the great God ever appoint statues for his ambassadors to invite sinners to his mercy? Words of grace written upon brass or marble would do the work almost as well. . . . How careless and indolent is a whole assembly when the preacher appears like a lifeless engine, pronouncing words of law or grace, when he speaks of divine things in such a cold and formal manner, as though they had no influence upon his own heart! When the words freeze upon his lips, the hearts of hearers are freezing also."

The Romantic Movement had not yet awakened men to behold the world; but that enthusiasm which the Romanticist came to feel for the world of Nature, Watts felt for what he would have called the world of grace; but his world, instead of having for its contents hills and fields, had whatever concerned God, the human soul, and salvation. If the Church of England could have recognized the value of emotion in religion and found a place for it within her respectable doors, the Methodist Movement, of which it was the very life-blood, would probably not have resulted in secession. But during Watts's boyhood Dr. South was denouncing enthusiasm as worse than popery; "a monster," he calls it, "from whose teeming womb have issued some of the vilest, the foulest, the most absurd practices and opinions that the nature of man (as corrupt as it

is) was ever poisoned and polluted with.”²⁴ A generation before the Wesleys and Doddridge taught people to sing their religion, Watts was preparing the ground by pouring forth psalms and hymns which were full of ardent religious feeling.

Another characteristic of his poetry is its introspection. In this, it is true, he is not alone, for most religious poetry down to comparatively recent times has been occupied chiefly with religion in its relation to the individual. It was the distinctive note of Puritanism that the human soul and God are the two great objects which fill its vision. “God and I; I and God,” was the solemn chant sounding perpetually through the chambers in which the devout Puritan soul dwelt. The modern development of a social conscience had not yet awakened men to the complexity of the soul and therefore to its corporate relations with others. So Watts, like other devout singers, sees primarily the Jacob’s Ladder connecting heaven with himself. His introspection, however, we may perhaps say, has a somewhat different emphasis from that of George Herbert, for example, a century earlier. Herbert, in meditating on his soul and God, fixes his gaze more on God — His outgoing bounteousness, His unwearied search for men, His familiar converse with them. It is the angels descending that he sees. Watts is apt to give attention rather to the other end of the Ladder — the condition of his own soul and the ascending angels. He rejoices that he is among the saved; he wonders whether he is; he is overcome at the thought that it is for him that Christ died; he examines what came to be called, in the curious religious phraseology of the day, his “frames.” This, however, is not mere egotism, for he regards himself as a type of every earnest Christian. But he gave a strong impetus to religion as a personal experience, to what was called “experimental religion,” which pressed upon every one the insistent question “Are you a

²⁴ South’s Sermons; Satan Himself Transformed into an Angel of Light.

Christian ? ” The question would probably never have occurred to Herbert, so much would it have been for him a matter of course. To Watts, and even more to the generation following, it was the universal question of vital importance. The strength of the Church of Rome lies in her utilization of those sides of human nature in which choice is not directly involved, which are appealed to by the institutions of religion. Much of the strength of Protestantism lies in her call to the will, to personal affirmation. This has been a marked characteristic in that strong type of personality which has been so prominent a feature in Protestantism. Protestantism and individualism are near of kin.

To these characteristics of Watts's poetry must be joined another — a certain love of beauty. The assiduous study of nature had, as I said, not then arisen. But Watts has an eye for the country landscape as he walks

“ Abroad in the meadows to see the young lambs
Run sporting about by the side of their dams,
With fleeces so clean and so white; ”

and he exclaims

“ How fair is the rose! What a beautiful flower!
The glory of April and May! ”

He feels the calm of a summer evening:

“ How fine has the day been, how bright was the sun!
How lovely and joyful the course that he run,
Though he rose in a mist when his race he begun,
And there followed some droopings of rain!
But now the fair traveller's come to the west,
His rays are all gold and his beauties are best;
He paints the skies gay as he sinks to his rest,
And foretells a bright rising again.” ²⁵

But it is chiefly in his literary style that he shows his eye for beauty, or perhaps we might rather say for form.

²⁵ H. L. P. 345.

Dr. Johnson declares of him: "He was one of the first authors that taught the Dissenters to court attention by the graces of language. Whatever they had among them before, whether of learning or acuteness, was commonly obscured and blunted by coarseness and inelegance of style."²⁶ This verdict is supported by a passage in a letter from Enoch Watts to his brother Isaac, in which he says: "A load of scandal lies on the Dissenters only for their imagined aversion to poetry." Isaac Watts insists on the importance of beauty and therefore of poetry, and in poetry, of fit and beautiful expression. To appreciate the innovating character of the following passage we must remember that in his time poetry, like novels, was regarded by the pious as "worldly":

"The profanation and debasement of so divine an art has tempted some weaker Christians to imagine that poetry and vice are naturally akin; or, at least, that verse is only fit to recommend trifles and entertain our looser hours, but it is too light and trivial a method to treat anything that is serious and sacred. They submit, indeed, to use it in divine psalmody; but they love the driest translation of the Psalm best. They will venture to sing a dull hymn or two at church in tunes of equal dulness; but still they persuade themselves and their children that the beauties of poetry are vain and dangerous. All that arises above Mr. Sternhold is too airy for worship, and hardly escapes the sentence of 'unclean and abominable.'"²⁷

Felicities of expression are continually occurring in his verse. Thus he says:

"There 's nothing round this spacious earth
That suits my large desire" (II, 10).

His spirit would fly above, within the starry heavens,

"Beyond those crystal vaults
And all their sparkling balls;
They 're but the porches to thy courts,
And paintings on thy walls" (H. L., p. 71).

²⁶ *Lives of the Poets*. Vol. II, p. 453.

²⁷ H. L. Preface, p. lxxxii.

"Lord, when I quit this earthly stage,
Where shall I fly but to thy breast ?
For I have sought no other home,
For I have learned no other rest " (II, 100).

"In all my vast concerns with thee,
In vain my soul would try
To shun thy presence, Lord, or flee
The notice of thine eye.

O wondrous knowledge, deep and high!
Where can a creature hide ?
Within thy circling arms I lie,
Beset on every side! " (Ps. 139).

"Thy words the raging winds controul,
And rule the boisterous deep;
Thou mak'st the sleeping billows roll,
The rolling billows sleep " (Ps. 89).

"Lo, what a glorious sight appears
To our believing eyes!
The earth and seas are passed away,
And the old rolling skies.

His own soft hand shall wipe the tears
From every weeping eye,
And pains and groans and griefs and fears
And death itself shall die " (I, 21).

The similarity of thought in the lines beginning

"My mind to me a kingdom is,"

which, dating a century before Watts, are ascribed both to Edward Dyer and to William Byrd, does not take from the dignity and felicity of Watts's "True Riches":

"I am not concerned to know
What to-morrow fate will do;
'Tis enough that I can say,
I've possessed myself to-day.
Then if haply midnight death
Seize my flesh and stop my breath,

Yet to-morrow I shall be
 Heir to the best part of me.
 Glittering stones, and golden things,
 Wealth and honours that have wings,
 Ever fluttering to be gone,
 I could never call my own.
 Riches that the world bestows
 She can take and I can lose;
 But the treasures that are mine
 Lie afar beyond her line.
 When I view my spacious soul,
 And survey myself a whole,
 And enjoy myself alone,
 I'm a kingdom of my own." (H. L., p. 182).

The solemn dirge of the ninetyeth Psalm is almost as impressive in Watts's version as in the stately words of King James's translators:

" Our God, our help in ages past,
 Our hope for years to come,
 Our shelter from the stormy blast,
 And our eternal home,

 Under the shadow of thy throne
 Thy saints have dwelt secure;
 Sufficient is thine arm alone,
 And our defence is sure.

 Before the hills in order stood
 Or earth received her frame,
 From everlasting thou art God,
 To endless years the same.

 A thousand ages in thy sight
 Are like an evening gone,
 Short as the watch that ends the night
 Before the rising sun.

 Time, like an ever-rolling stream,
 Bears all its sons away;
 They fly forgotten, as a dream
 Dies at the opening day.

Our God, our help in ages past,
 Our hope for years to come,
 Be thou our guard while troubles last,
 And our eternal home!"

When I remarked that Watts has a certain love of beauty I meant, as we generally mean by the phrase, an uncertain one. His aim — let me say it again — is ever homiletical; and not being interested in pure beauty for its own sake, he can do violence to it in ways which would be those of a ruffian if they were not merely those of a preacher. Thus he never lets imperfect rhymes stand in his way. He rhymes *wing* and *begin* (II, 58.3), *not* and *thoughts* (III, 6.1), *tune* and *throne* (III, 8.1), *bliss* and *trees* (II, 16.5), *me* and *sea* (I, 127.2). Of this last we may say, "But that is all right." But according to the pronunciation of his day, it was not, for the latter word was then pronounced *say*.²⁸ When he is under headway he does not pause to make his rhyming-scheme consistent. Instead of *abab*, as in the rest of the hymn, he puts in *abcb* (I, 108.1). He shows at times shockingly bad taste, as for example:

"Here we behold His bowels roll
 As kind as when He died,
 And see the sorrows of His soul
 Bleed through His wounded side" (III, 4.6).

And when our great-grandparents laid away their loved dead, and the otherwise beautiful hymn, "Why do we mourn departing friends?" rose to the mournful wail of "China," how it must have jarred painfully to come to the third stanza:

²⁸ "God moves in a mysterious way
 His wonders to perform;
 He plants His footsteps in the sea,
 And rides upon the storm." *Cowper*.

"Here thou, great Anna, whom three realms obey,
 Dost sometimes counsel take and sometimes tea."

Pope; Rape of the Lock. III, 7.

“ Why should we tremble to convey
 Their bodies to the tomb ?
 There the dear flesh of Jesus lay,
 And left a long perfume ” (II, 3.3).

He worked at the technique of his art, and his work shows. His lines flow smoothly and swiftly, without break. He never embarrasses the sense to fit the metre. He is skillful in varying the *cæsura*, and in the use of lines end-stopped and run on. He experimented with various kinds of verse, and the result exhibits skill. Here he is wielding Sapphic hendecasyllables:

“ When the fierce north wind with his airy forces
 Rears up the Baltic to a foaming fury,
 And the red lightning with a storm of hail comes
 Rushing amain down,

How the poor sailors stand amazed and tremble!
 While the hoarse thunder, like a bloody trumpet,
 Roars a loud onset to the gaping waters,
 Quick to devour them.

Such shall the noise be and the wild disorder
 (If things eternal may be like these earthly),
 Such the dire terror, when the great archangel
 Shakes the creation.” ²⁹

But there is an appalling amount in his output. One hundred and fifty Psalms, each in many cases in several different metres — Long, Short, Common, Particular — three hundred and sixty-five hymns, thirty-six “Divine and Moral Songs,” two unassorted books of hymns and lyrical poems — it is enough to daunt the stoutest seeker for poetic gold. Knowing that most of such a mass must be but dust, one wishes for a sifter to make a selection from his poems, as Matthew Arnold did for Wordsworth. This indeed has been accomplished automatically. The compilers of hymn-books have taken what they found valuable and incorporated it in their publications, and the

²⁹ H. L. P. 74.

bulk of this has been very considerable. *The Sabbath Hymn Book*, published in 1858, contains two hundred and fifty-five hymns by Watts. The number in more recent publications is less, owing to the change in popular theology in the last half-century. But take almost any hymn-book of the present day, and it will be found that Watts has contributed to it more than any other writer.

I said his hymns are not mere rhymed theology, though they aimed to be theology — that is, Calvinism — in rhyme. His God is the Hebrew Jehovah unmodified. His theory of the Atonement is bloody substitutionalism; his hell is material and perpetual. But he aimed to do something more than put Calvinism into verse; he aimed to give its emotional value. And as we look over his most repellent lines, we shall find almost all of them bathed in an atmosphere of feeling, and gaining a respect, a worth, and often a beauty thereby. Yet while he accepted the Calvinism of his day, a kindly heart compelled him, as it has done so many others, to modify illogically its severities.

“That spirit led him to declare his persuasion that heathens and savages who never heard of the gospel, are not left to perish unavoidably without any hope or any grace to trust in; but if there be found among them any who fear God and work righteousness, they shall be accepted of Him, through an unknown Mediator, as Cornelius was. It led him to entertain a curious opinion concerning the souls of those who die in infancy. The execrable notion that they are condemned to eternal punishment for their portion of original sin, he utterly rejected. . . . Rather than condemn them to a wretched resurrection for the purpose of being condemned, he would have chosen to believe in a metempsychosis, and that the soul on its early separation from one body entered into another, in which it might go through that state of trial on which its eternal destiny might equitably depend. But in his judgment it was more likely, as more consonant with Scripture, that they underwent, in its strict and final sense, the penalty of temporal death denounced against all the race of Adam, and that there was no resurrection appointed for them.”³⁰

³⁰ Southey's *Life of Isaac Watts*, in *Horae Lyricae*. P. xxxix.

And this loop-hole he enlarged yet more favorably, for he held that the infant children of the elect would be regarded as part of their parents, and so exempt from annihilation and accepted under the covenant of grace. With all his picturesque location of heaven and hell, he catches a glimpse of modern Broad Churchism, and recognizes the destiny of the soul as established automatically:

“Perhaps it may be furnished with some new vehicle of more refined matter; perhaps it may abide where death finds it — in anywhereness or nowhereness, not changing its place but only its manner of thinking and acting and its mode of existence, and without removal finding itself in heaven or hell according to its consciousness of its own deserts.”³¹

This kindness of heart obliged him to make a survey for himself of the strait and narrow way, and to come to the following conclusion: “I am persuaded there is a breadth in the narrow road to heaven, and persons may travel more than seven abreast in it.”³²

One cannot claim for Watts a place in the first rank of poets. He only occasionally steps into the second rank. He is not likely to be among those whom we take down from our shelves to read in the half-hour when we crave to have the drab dullness of ordinary life gilded with an inspiring glow. Yet when we take his hand, he may lead us into the domain of the eternal, and as we behold him kneeling there in joy and awe we become aware that we are in the presence of God. He was the first Englishman who set the gospel to music, and in his special field of song he has never been surpassed.

³¹ Southey's *Life of Isaac Watts*, in *Horae Lyricae*. P. lv.

³² *Ibid.* P. xxxix.

THE REASONABLE APPEAL OF THE BOOK OF REVELATION

JAMES HARDY ROPES

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

In the popular mind, the Book of Revelation is doubtless the most difficult of all New Testament writings. Whether it deserves that reputation may well be doubted, for there are other books of the Bible in which scholars would probably say that the unsolved problems are more fundamental. But the Book of Revelation stands at the end of the collection, and few readers penetrate so far. It seems remote from modern habits of thought and expression. It lends itself for the most part less readily to the practical, if sometimes superficial, use of the ordinary reader.

This sense of the difficulty of the book is no merely modern phenomenon. Among certain groups of the past, to be sure, Revelation has ever been a favorite book. The dreamers about the future have enjoyed it, and used its prophecies to frame their own pictures of what they hoped for. The insurgents against established order have turned to their own account its fierce reproaches against a tyrannous civilization. The oppressed have found in it comfort. But with those men of the ancient Church with whom we as educated men and rational thinkers have most sympathy, the scholars of the Greek Church, we find a different attitude. Revelation was, indeed, at the outset generally accepted. In the second century it was among the earliest books to be included in the growing New Testament. Hardly anyone doubted its right to be counted there. Yet in the third century the Greek theologians of Alexandria — Origen and those whom he influ-

enced — were repelled by it, as are many today. Scholarly training could not understand it, and could not reconcile itself to its strange thought and grotesque expression. Origen, in that century, retained the book, but he made no secret of his unsympathetic attitude; and those who came after him found ground for denying that it had been written by an Apostle, and so for excluding it from the New Testament. For centuries it was in debate in the Greek Church. The great Syrian Church — farther in the East — had its New Testament from the Greeks, and received it without the Book of Revelation, so that to this day it is not a part of the official Syrian New Testament.

The Roman Church of the early centuries, more dependent on authority and tradition, less accustomed to independent rational reflection, held fast to this ancient document, and it was largely through Roman influence that the Revelation was finally accepted by the Greeks. But its history from the third to the fifth century shows that it presented to our spiritual ancestors difficulties similar to those which it has offered to many of us.

What is the reason for this difficulty which the book has caused? It is due mainly to the fact that the original readers for whom the book was intended lived in a different intellectual world from us and from Origen. The literature they read has only in part survived, the ideas which made their background have given place to others. They knew and loved this kind of prophetic vision; to us it is foreign. They recognized its purpose and understood its method; for us these things have all to be reconstructed by an effort of the imagination, and through the aid of erudition, often drawn from fields but rarely entered.

In consequence of this the mode of approach to the book has generally been radically wrong. The method of explanation adopted has not suited the nature and structure of the thing to be explained, and thus for the most part

interpretation has only involved in darkness the secrets which this book was meant to throw into the highest light.

About the Book of Revelation hundreds of books have been written. Most of them — including some of the longest — are worthless. Even the genius of Sir Isaac Newton added less than nothing to that great man's fame when it exercised itself upon this theme. Learning, ingenuity, infinite labor have all proved to be wasted when guided by a perverse theory of what was to be sought. In all intellectual effort aptness in framing the right question is the most important art, the highest flower of scholarship. The failure of interpretation of the Book of Revelation has been due to defective judgment at that point.

The older interpreters were apt to seek in the book an historical picture of worldly events which were future to the writer, and which are known to us from the later course of history. As a prophet he foresaw and foretold the future. With great ingenuity and in very variant ways the commentator's place in the great drama was elicited. The events portrayed up to that point were identified with known historic facts. The enemies who are brought upon the scene with such distinctness, and devoted so confidently to destruction, were always his own, the learned and earnest commentator's, peculiar enemies. Against them he was thus able to quote the authority of holy writ. Of their speedy downfall he had comfortable assurance.

If you were a heretic or a schismatic, you believed that the Pope of Rome and the organized Church were the great foes of truth and righteousness, and you would be able to declare them to be the Beast and the False Prophet, and to find in the history of their misdeeds the events prophesied by the ancient seer. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the book was abundantly used by the partisans of the Emperor against the Pope. But if in that same period you were Pope Innocent III, you

could gain by the same method a prophetic denunciation of the Saracens and Mohammed, and could reckon out the predestined length of their power. If, somewhat later, you were a Protestant, the enemy was the papacy. Romanist writers have believed the book to foretell the wickedness of Martin Luther, whom the Lutherans on the contrary found referred to as the angel "flying in mid-heaven, having an eternal gospel to proclaim unto them that dwell on the earth," and saying "with a great voice, 'Fear God and give him glory . . . and worship him that hath made the heaven and the earth and sea and fountains of waters.'"

According to your politics it was possible to direct the thunders of the Holy Bible against Napoleon Bonaparte, or the liberal movement of 1848, when Satan was loosed, or the power of the Slavic and German Empires, concealed under the names of Gog and Magog. The appalling catastrophe of the Great War of today has called forth similar interpretations.

And the numbers in the book, the thousand years, the forty and two months, the 1260 days, the mystic 666, lent themselves to endless fascinating calculations of just how long these various powers of evil should be permitted to exercise their baneful sway, and how soon the people of God might hope for final divine intervention.

This method of interpretation was obviously useful, but as obviously unsafe and unconvincing. It contained the seed of its own destruction, and could only lead to the abandonment of all use of the book. As a heaven-bestowed eternal calendar, the book proved a failure; as a philosophy of modern history, its point of view was indeterminable.

Throughout Christian history, however, and in recent years with great seriousness a wholly different and far more sober mode of approach to the book has been followed, and has been advocated with vast learning. In

this majestic picture, it is said, the author is not prophesying the historical future now known to us, but reflects the events and conditions of his own time as he knew it. These enemies from the Euphrates were the Parthians in one of their incursions upon the civilized world; the earthquakes and wars are to be identified with the events of the first century; the flight of the woman is the retreat of the Christians from Jerusalem before the siege. We have to look not for prophecy, but for history, known to the writer, and re-told by him in figure and symbol in order to show that in his time the prophecies of old have been fulfilled, that the end of all things has arrived, and that the great deliverance stands before the door ready now to enter, bringing divine succor and victory to the elect.

This general view, the archæological and historical interpretation of the book from the events of the writer's time, has in it much that is true, and it prevailed among the wise scholars of the later nineteenth century, but it breaks down when applied in detail as a complete explanation of the dramatic story. No satisfactory historical sequence can be made out, and this whole system of interpretation fails to do justice to the plain intention of the writer to offer prophecy, not history. A book like Daniel, written in the second century before Christ in the name of a faithful hero of four hundred years earlier, can naturally put into his mouth prophecies after the event, relating to the intervening course of historical affairs between Daniel and the writer, but the Book of Revelation purports to be written not by a leader of the past but by a contemporary. The seer is expressly told, "Seal not up the words of the prophecy of this book; for the time is at hand. . . . Behold, I come quickly"; the Lord "sent his angel to show unto his servants the things which must shortly come to pass."

These methods of attack upon the problem, then, are unsuccessful, and leave it a hard book. How shall it be

made easier ? With what key shall we essay to unlock its secret ?

To this question the only real answer is the successful application of the right key. We may, however, with profit indicate some of the methods which present-day study of Revelation employs, and which make easier this book which has seemed so hard.

In the first place may be put a simpler and less sophisticated attitude toward the book. It must be taken for what it purports to be, if it is to be understood. Older interpreters tried to find in it a panorama of modern history based on supernatural knowledge; later scholars thought the writer was giving us a great symbolic picture of his own times based on observation and information. These were assumptions, sophisticated views founded on the belief that an inspired book must have a certain character and reveal certain things. Let us permit the book to teach us what it will, not what we will. Let us avoid reading into it things and ideas that only a person who can look back on nearly two millenniums of history since the birth of Christ could possibly know. Is not this a more reverent, as it is certainly a more fruitful, mode of approach to any book of the New Testament ?

With this simpler attitude to the book belongs a right view of the nature of prophecy and of vision. Prophecy is not a chronicle unrolled from the wrong end, a mere history read beforehand. The significance of prophecy does not lie in useless information about events of the future which it is divinely empowered to convey, information which is interesting solely as a miracle. Its significance lies in the great principles of God's activity which it has been vouchsafed to the prophet to grasp. His account of the future is really a statement of one way in which these principles might work out, and is always figurative, symbolical, and in large measure vague. In the nature of the case, insofar as a prophecy is definite, it will generally be

wrong. This view of prophecy makes it possible for us to approach this book with simple-minded readiness to take what it gives us, and without feeling the necessity of somehow transforming its prophetic pictures into correspondence with what we suppose to be the facts intended.

Similarly the modern conception of the nature of visions enables us to understand better this book of visions. Visions take place, and they may be involuntary. But in them is used the material with which the seer's mind and imagination are already filled. The elements of which they are made — the stuff of these dreams — are ideas drawn from many quarters and often traceable. The value of a vision does not come from its supernaturalness as attested by its inexplicability, but depends rather on the moral and spiritual worth of the idea which it enshrines and expresses. For these reasons a sharp and strict line cannot be drawn between visions as involuntary experiences, later written down, and visions as a literary form. Both are the work of the imagination, operating in much the same way. The seer may often not know whether he thought he saw with inner vision these things of the spiritual world, or whether he only described them as if he had seen. And it makes but little difference to us which was the case. Sheer supernaturalness has no inherent moral or spiritual value. In a book like the Revelation we must treat the complicated series as having a rational unity and relation of parts. Many signs betray artistic adjustment and careful plan, the use of earlier materials, the weaving of them together by the cunning thought and skill of an author. That he had visions, and many of these very visions, who shall deny? But this book is no fortuitous accumulation of separate atoms; it is an organic system of visions, not a dream tale.

This leads us to the second method of modern study which makes this Apocalypse easier. It is the comparative study of apocalyptic writing as a branch of Jewish

and Christian literature. We have here no isolated instance of this kind of book, but only one branch of a great, wide-spreading tree. Apocalypses were merely the form which Jewish prophecy took in the later days of Jewish history and which was imitated by Christian writers. The greatest of Jewish apocalyptic writings is the book of Daniel. With it seems to start the series, which includes the Books of Enoch, in themselves a whole library of apocalypses, the Assumption of Moses, the Apocalypse of Baruch, the Apocalypse of Ezra (II Esdras of the English Apocrypha). The Christian writings in which the long list was continued are mostly little known, and their names need not be recounted. From the ancient Apocalypses of Peter and Paul through many later examples down to modern times we have such books.

These books are prophecies; and here it is worth while to pause and notice the difference between a Utopia and an Apocalypse. A utopia sets forth an ideal condition of human society, as it might conceivably develop. Plato, in his *Republic*, Sir Thomas More, the modern Socialists, and countless other portrayers of an imaginary perfect state have thought out and described how they would like the world to be. The writers of apocalypses have not done this. They have observed, or have apprehended by faith, the forces at work in the world, and have assessed in the light of faith their present and future relative strength, and so have described not what the world ought to be, but what it will be. As with all prophets, the moral and religious value of their work lies not in their success in hitting on the right details of the future development of the world's history, but on their insight in seeing the deep forces and their interplay. The final outcome of any apocalypse written from the theistic point of view must of course be the triumph of God, however brought about. But the forces now working may be leading primarily and directly to a very different goal. Hopefulness of the ulti-

mate issue may be entirely consistent with despair as to the immediate and temporary outcome.¹

The Book of Revelation thus becomes intelligible when it is recognized that it is written in part by the conventional methods which can be studied in other writings of its class.

A third method of modern study is also important. The material of apocalypses, the figures and symbols, the locusts, the dragon, the scarlet woman, the tree of life, the sea of glass mingled with fire, the horsemen, the harvesters, the gates of pearl, the walls of precious stones, the river of life — these and countless more, smaller and greater, are not here used for the first time. They do not spring directly from the needs of the writer's own expression. They are conventional, traditional, derived. Some of them represent the mythology and folk-lore of many peoples and times. Some of them are suggested by political and physical events of the writer's own time. They belong to the apocalyptic type. It is the task of the student to examine them in detail, to discover, if he can, by

¹ A book in the form of a modern novel, published in 1908, entitled *Lord of the World*, written by a Roman Catholic, the late Mgr. R. H. Benson, is an instructive example of a modern apocalypse. In this imaginary picture is worked out the great issue, as Mgr. Benson conceives it, between the individualism of Christian religion on the one hand and the communism of secularism on the other. The result is first the purification of the Church through persecution, then the triumph of the forces of this world by virtue of their superior physical power — a gloomy view which might seem to contradict faith in a ruling God. But this is only the preliminary stage, the "woes" of the end of the present age. The consummation arrives, as in the old apocalypses, by the direct intervention of God, the end of this material world, and the introduction of the coming age in which, in a new world, not our own, the rule of God is complete. With rare literary skill and restraint the picture of the future is unfolded. We see again the old figure of Antichrist, but in modern dress, and have presented to us a modern development and interpretation of the whole machinery of apocalyptic thought. This striking book is a good commentary on the New Testament Apocalypse, for it shows the vitality of this type of literature and its aptness for the effective expression of a self-consistent view of the essential nature of the great underlying spiritual realities, good and bad, as they appear to a serious observer. Whatever one may think of Father Benson's doctrine, to the student of the New Testament and of the history of literature his book is of the greatest interest.

comparative study, their origin, to trace their history, and so to account for their form in this book and to learn the particular sense in which this writer has used them. Thus it becomes possible to distinguish between form and substance, between mode of expression and the emotions and aspirations and convictions out of which in ways now beautiful, now grotesque, but always powerful, the utterances of the apocalyptic seer have sprung.

This is a laborious but fascinating task, not yet completed. To not all of our questions here will the attainable knowledge of ancient thought permit an answer. Yet enough has been recovered to enable us to see how the rest must have arisen, even in cases where we cannot point to the actual source of the apocalyptic language.

The greatest source here is the Old Testament, and the first condition of understanding the Book of Revelation is to observe how much of it is the echo and repetition of Old Testament language and imagery. The writer must have known that he was reproducing and codifying and recombining Old Testament prophecies. He must have been aiming, in part, to show how under Christian principles these prophecies still held good, and how the Christian Church might with clearer vision, and in an awed sense of the nearness of the great culmination, still use this great inheritance from the Hebrew seers.

In these three ways then the Book of Revelation can be made easier than Christians have often supposed: by a simpler attitude of willingness to take it for what it appears to be, without trying to make out of it what we might wish to find there; by recognizing through comparative study of other apocalypses the conventional character of the type of literature to which it belongs; and by a study of the sources from which the detailed imagery is drawn and by which that imagery is to be explained.

Before passing on to speak of the origin and contents of the book itself a word should be said as to some of the elements, not all of which are always recognized, which give this book its greatness as a monument of the world's literature. For that it is, wholly apart from the reverence for it produced by its place in the New Testament. To a degree remarkable in view of the general sense of its unintelligibility it has entered into the living thought of men. We talk in its phrases, and in a hundred ways are subject to its influence.

The cause is in part the majesty of its imagery. Of this no illustration need be given, or can be without citing continuous sections. Whatever the underlying ideas, their expression is sublime, and may well be set on a level with the greatest that has proceeded from human pens.

Again, its greatness arises in part from its deep roots in popular modes of thought. It stands close to folk-lore, from beginning to end. This may suggest superstition and triviality. Quite the reverse. A relation to folk-lore is characteristic of nearly all great literature. Homer, the Greek dramatists, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Faust — the greatest literature, like the greatest music, has its roots deep in the soil, includes the combination into beautiful and powerful elaboration of those things which the simple but profound thought of the plainest of the people has struck out with the imaginative genius and freedom of intellectual childhood. Not the sublimated conceptions of the highest culture, but the broad passion of the peasant constitutes the soil for the intellectual products which survive by their greatness.

Further, the Book of Revelation is permanently great literature not only because of its noble form of expression, and because it is close to the thought of humanity on a large scale, but because of its hold on profound spiritual truths. This gave it its place in the Bible. This is what has endeared it to the Christian heart. This will perpetu-

ate its use and will lead men to read it and to be stirred by it, and increasingly as it is better explained and understood.

Let us turn then to the Book itself.

It was written, we are told by Irenaeus, who lived a hundred years later, "near the end of the reign of Domitian," who died in the year 96 of our era. The reader may remind himself that the crucifixion of our Lord took place in the year 29 or 30, the martyrdoms of the Apostles Peter and Paul not far from the year 64, and the destruction of Jerusalem in the year 70.

This statement of Irenaeus corresponds to the facts of the book and to the situation in the Church which the book seems to reflect, and is on the whole to be accepted for the final composition of the book in its present form. It was thus probably written a generation or more after the Epistles of Paul, probably somewhat later than the Gospels of Mark, Matthew, and Luke, and was perhaps nearly contemporary with the Gospel of John.

The place of writing was evidently Asia Minor. The book opens with messages for seven of the chief churches of that region, plainly coming from some one who has intimate knowledge of their inner state.

We can gain a clear idea of the situation. The churches of Asia Minor were made up, like those of the cities of Greece and of Rome, mainly of persons who had been heathen, not of Jews. But these were in great measure men and women who before becoming Christians had already been profoundly influenced by Jewish ideas and ways. They had often been attendants at the services of the local Jewish synagogue. They knew the Old Testament, and valued it. They recognized that Christianity rested on Judaism, and they liked Jewish literature and ways of thinking. At the same time they were not Jews. Their natural associations were largely with their heathen neighbors. By the time the Book of Revelation was written

the life of these churches had been going on for thirty or forty years. The first flush of Christian enthusiasm was past. Various dangers already beset the Church, and were apparent to the watchful eye. Paul's old enemies, the Jews, were still active in their hostility to the Church, which had supplanted them in their best field of progress and proselytism. From another side speculative religious teachers, within and without the Christian circle, were raising their heads. They combined attractive ideas drawn from many religions and philosophies into a new mixture, and were in a sense progenitors of the later Gnostics. As was natural to religious thinkers of a low order whose interests were primarily intellectual and not moral, who were ready to draw from heathen mythologies and cults, and who habitually turned toward the blurring moral intoxication of asceticism, these teachers were often lax in matters of morals upon which the Church leaders justly laid stress.

From the surrounding world came constant incitement to share in the pleasures and customs of a civilization founded on and impregnated with heathen worship. Idolatry and heathenish immorality were insistent. The worship of heathen divinities in one form or another, the sharing in the festivities of idolatrous sacrificial feasts, the licentiousness of daily habit — all these things were a constant danger and temptation to these Christians, who, we must remember, were, after all, but human, as we are.

The only form of religion established and imposed by the government upon all loyal citizens (except Jews) was the one which appears with great distinctness in the Book of Revelation — the worship of the Roman Emperor. This had arisen in the East, and had finally been adopted by authority as the necessary religious basis of the unity of the Empire. Temples of the Emperor were springing up in the first century. Asia Minor was a great seat of this worship. To refuse to do the acts of reverence which it

required was to present oneself in the guise of a traitor to one's sovereign, and left no recourse to the authorities but to punish. This supreme form of idolatry, peculiarly abhorrent to the Christian mind, showed itself clearly to the writer of our book as the culmination of the work of the powers of darkness. In this devilish institution the final effort of the long world-struggle of evil against God was to be discerned.

The earlier stages of persecution had already been passed when our book was written. One martyr, Antipas at Pergamum, is named. The clear-seeing eye of the writer has already recognized that the danger of direct persecution is increasing, and that it centres in the public institution of the worship of the Emperor. How far persecution had gone is hard to say; the general impression left by the book is that the writer and the readers were well used to it.

The period is one of the most important in the history of the Christian Church, and it is unfortunate that we have so little direct historical account of it preserved for us. For the greater part of our knowledge we are dependent on inferences from this book and from the other literature of the time.

Who was the writer is not known. Apocalypses were generally written in the name of some hero of the distant past, such as Enoch, Noah, Moses, Elijah, Baruch, Daniel, Ezra, who was supposed to have foreseen these things, and we can generally detect the real writer's date by noticing, as in the Book of Daniel, the point where the prophecy ceases to correspond exactly to history, and becomes real prophecy. But not so with our book. It is frankly written for the present, and the writer's name is given as John. The unsettled critical inquiries as to whether the opening verses and the name John are a later addition to the original book we cannot here consider.² The Church has gen-

² The same is true of the inquiries into the possible composite structure of the book which have much occupied critical scholars. The book as it stands is an artistically

erally, but not always, believed that this was the Apostle John, the son of Zebedee, from whom the great Fourth Gospel and the three Epistles are alleged to come. But modern critical scholars, like some ancient critics, find it hard to believe that the two authors are the same. And the problem of authorship must here be left unsolved.

The purpose of the author is not difficult to see. It is purely practical, not at all speculative or theological. He will warn and encourage his fellow-Christians — warn them against worldliness and down-heartedness, two evils near akin, and encourage them to confidence in the object of their faith, in the power of God, and in God's ultimate victory even over the great forces which are soon to assemble themselves for the last great onset. This book shall stir the reader's feeling, and fire his imagination, and so fit him to survive the great and dreadful test which lies before God's little flock.

So we pass to the contents of these visions.

The book is in the form of a letter, with opening greeting and farewell salutation. But this is only a convenient literary form, a kind of dedication to the seven Churches whose members and their needs were particularly in the writer's mind.

The letter opens with a description of a wonderful vision granted to the seer, in the island of Patmos off the coast of Asia Minor. He became possessed by the Spirit on the Lord's Day, and saw the Lord Jesus Christ, surrounded with symbols of his great attributes and authority, many of these being drawn from the Old Testament. From him at that time he received his call to be a prophet, like that of Isaiah in the temple before the seraphim. "Write, therefore, the things which thou hast seen [the description of the vision], and the things which are [the inspired comments on the actual condition of the

framed whole, and as such is the subject of the present article. The reader curious about these theories will find a guide in James Moffatt's Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament.

seven churches which occupy chapters 2 and 3], and the things which shall come to pass hereafter" [the visions of the future which fill the remainder of the book]. (Chap. 1.)

On the details of the early chapters, containing messages to the seven churches, we cannot dwell. They are constructed with singular literary skill, largely out of materials drawn from the Old Testament, and contain a number of allusions still recognizable to local matters at Pergamum, Thyatira, and the other cities, as well as many valuable hints about the religious situation in those places. Here, as in the rest of the book, the explanation in detail is a matter for study, and is full of interest. (Chaps. 2 and 3.)

After these things, the seer having now received his special instructions for the churches of these localities, a door is opened into heaven, and the seer passes through it to be granted a vision of God on his throne — a vision of gorgeous splendor and dazzling light. Grouped about God's throne are the members of the heavenly court — the four cherubim, in shape like living creatures, and the twenty-four angelic elders, who all render worship day and night and cry aloud with doxologies of praise, and with them ten thousand times ten thousand angels presenting their homage to God the King. (Chap. 4.)

Presently the seer observes in God's right hand a book, that is, a roll, sealed with seven seals. It is the book of human destiny. Christ alone is worthy to break the seals and open the book and reveal the future. And Christ appears on the throne with God, in the form of a Lamb as if slain. Amid choruses of praise, which accompany the action through the whole work like the lyric choruses of a Greek tragedy, the Lamb takes the book and one by one breaks the seven seals. And now the visions of the future begin. (Chap. 5.)

In all the Jewish expectation of the future, great emphasis was laid on the "woes" which were to precede the

end. These doubtless represented the concentration of the powers of evil for a last onslaught on the armies of God, and also the general breaking-up of social and physical order connected with the end of the world. They were sometimes called the birth-pangs of the Messiah. The gospel apocalypse in Matthew, chapter 24, has much to say of them. In our book they occupy with most elaborate development a very large part of the action, and enable the author to find suitable place for his traditional material. The great series of foreign invasion, wars, famine, pestilence, cosmic disturbance, is spread before us in a panorama of overwhelming awfulness.

As the seals are successively broken, four horses with their riders appear — a white horse of foreign conquest, a red horse of war, a black horse of famine, a pale horse of pestilence. At the fifth seal the souls of all martyrs cry out to be avenged; at the sixth the earth quakes, the sun becomes black and the moon red, the stars fall and the heavens are removed. We seem ready for the consummation when the seventh seal shall be broken. (Chap. 6.)

But no; an interlude of two visions. From the Twelve Tribes 144,000 persons are first sealed, that they be not hurt; and then the prophet sees before the throne the countless multitude from every nation rendering homage to God and to the Lamb. Logically these interjected visions are hard to explain; esthetically and emotionally they have admirable artistic value. For a moment the tension is relieved, we breathe freely as we see the glorious reality beyond these dark events; then the clouds shut in again and the grim series is continued. The seventh seal is broken; but it does not bring the end. Instead it introduces a new series of seven — the seven blasts of great trumpets. Hail and fire mingled with blood desolate the earth; the third part of the sea is made blood; the third part of rivers becomes wormwood; the third part of the

sun and moon and stars is darkened. At the fifth trump a star falls, and from the abyss come forth demonic locusts with the stings of scorpions, under their king Apollyon the Destroyer. They are perhaps an army of centaurs. The sixth trump sounds, and a still greater barbarian invasion from the great river Euphrates is let loose. We are again ready for the seventh trump, and the end — but the end is not yet. (Chaps. 7-9.)

Instead, after a renewed impartation of knowledge to the seer through a little book which he swallows (Chap. 10), appear two forerunners of the Messiah, perhaps Moses and Elijah, as the Jewish expectation on the basis of Malachi's prophecy had foretold. (Chap. 11.) They shall meet with martyrdom at the hand of the beast from the abyss, but shall be restored to life and ascend up into heaven in a cloud. And in that hour there was an earthquake, and the tenth part of the Holy City fell.

Then the seventh angel sounded, and the whole court of heaven raised their voices in praise to God because now at length the rule of the world has passed over to the Lord and to his Christ, and the time has come for the dead to be judged, and for the prophets and saints and all the God-fearing to be rewarded. (Chaps. 10, 11.)

But again for the reader this is not yet. We are still delayed in order to have brought before us the most singular and least well explained section of the whole book. A great sign is seen in heaven. A woman clad in the sun, with the moon under her feet, gives birth to a son who is to be the Messiah and to rule the nations with a rod of iron. A great red dragon stands ready to destroy the child. But the infant is caught up to God to be preserved, the woman escapes to a place of safety, there is war in heaven, and the great red dragon, who is called the Devil and Satan, is cast down from heaven to earth, where he carries on his persecution of the woman and the rest of her seed. (Chap. 12.)

What does this mean ? Can it all refer to the future ? Was the Messiah not yet born ? Whence the imagery ? Who is the woman ?

A type of ancient myth is found in different religions in forms varying in detail. The Greeks told of the birth of Apollo from Leto, the attempt of the dragon Pytho to kill the child, and his rescue by Boreas and Poseidon. With the Egyptians it was Isis, or Hathor, the mother of Horus, who fled from the dragon Typhon and escaped to an island. The twelfth chapter of Revelation does not seem to be an allegory derived from the facts of contemporary history. It may be that a current myth has here guided the pen of the Christian apocalyptist.

But what does he mean ? Apparently he has for once turned back from his picture of the future to a revelation of the heavenly counterpart and spiritual substratum of the events of the recent past. By the aid of this mythological narrative he portrays the events in heaven which have given rise to the occurrences that he and his contemporaries have actually known on earth. The birth of the Messiah was conceived as a fact in heaven apart from but yet parallel to his earthly appearance. He is now in heaven, he will come to judge and rule; meantime to the war in heaven which followed his birth have succeeded the persecutions from the Devil which the Church has undergone. These distresses have thus not been accidental, but are a part of the necessary development of events. The Messiah is with God. The Devil has been conquered in heavenly warfare, and is at present making his last stand on the earth. The joy of the angels is justified. Men on earth may look beyond the torment of persecution to final triumph and lasting peace.

In this chapter about the woman we have thus an interpretation of the experiences of the Church in years then recent. In the next chapter (13) this account of the significance of real events is continued with reference to the

more recent past and to the present, and so, after, as it were, going back and picking up another significant thread and following it down until it joins his main thread, the writer returns to his dramatic picture of the future.

A beast now appears from the sea with the power of the Devil. He is the imperial power of Rome, which makes war on the saints. Another beast comes from the earth. He may be the Antichrist, in whom the world-power of evil was to be concentrated, and he is the servant of the beast Rome, and the latter's agent in promoting the worship of the Emperor. We are dealing here with imaginary figures; the beasts do not represent real persons; it is the relations intended which are real. The imaginary figures are indeed not wholly the puppets of the allegory; they have some dramatic vitality of their own; but the relations of spiritual forces are those which the writer saw actually manifested in his own world. (Chap. 13.)

The number of the Beast is 666. No explanation of this is quite satisfactory. The usual one is that the name which finds its numerical equivalent here is Nero Cæsar. By another reckoning the number is taken as referring to the Emperor Gaius. At any rate the atrocities of the persecution of the Christians in the reign of Nero, and the horrors of Nero's general misgovernment, seem to be reflected in these chapters.

The distress seems now to have reached its height, and the end is drawing on. Various signs are given that herald it — angels fly in mid-heaven and proclaim the destruction of the modern Babylon, visions are seen of the Lamb and of those virtuous souls who come victorious from the beast and are free in heaven to praise the works and ways of the Lord God Almighty. Again we have a series of seven — seven angels with bowls, that is, *pateræ*, such as were used for pouring libations at an altar. The bowls, however, contain, not new phases of the onset of evil, but

the outpourings of the wrath of God's punishment on a wicked world. The earth, the sea, the rivers, and the sun receive this wrath. It is poured on the throne of the beast, and his kingdom is darkened. A foreign invasion from the far East — a Parthian peril — breaks loose, and ends with the battle of Armageddon. (Chaps. 14-16.)

"And the seventh [angel] poured out his bowl upon the air; and there came forth a great voice out of the temple from the throne, saying, 'It is done.' . . . And Babylon the great was remembered in the sight of God, to give unto her the cup of the wine of the fierceness of his wrath." Then follows the judgment of the great harlot, the scarlet woman on her blasphemous beast. The details introduce the seven hills of Rome, and the series of Roman emperors — first down to Vespasian, and then in a modified statement down to Domitian. Through it all gleams the lurid figure of Nero, the dead, who in the popular superstition is yet alive and to return. (Chaps. 16, 17.)

The downfall of Rome with all her grandeur and luxury and crime is depicted in a kind of elegy of triumph. She is mourned by princes and merchants and seafarers who gained their living by ministering to her lust.

"And a strong angel took up a stone, as it were a great millstone, and cast it into the sea, saying, 'Thus with a mighty fall shall Babylon, the great city, be cast down, and shall be found no more at all.' And the voice of harpers and minstrels and flute-players and trumpeters shall be heard no more at all in thee; and no craftsman, of whatsoever craft, shall be found any more at all in thee; and the voice of a mill shall be heard no more at all in thee; and the light of a lamp shall shine no more at all in thee; and the voice of the bridegroom and of the bride shall be heard no more at all in thee; for thy merchants were the princes of the earth; for with thy sorcery were all the nations deceived. And in her was found the blood of prophets and of saints and of all that have been slain upon the earth." (Chap. 18.)

But a great voice of a great multitude in heaven cried, "Hallelujah; salvation and glory and power belong to our God."

With that the scene changes completely.

“And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse and him that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in righteousness he doth judge and make war. . . . And his name is called the Word of God.” (Chap. 19.)

The Messiah is come.

And so the hosts of evil are defeated. The dragon, which is the Devil and Satan, is chained for a thousand years. The hopes of the people of God are accomplished in this millennium, in which their due share falls to the martyrs and confessors who in the first resurrection rise and reign with Christ. At the end of the thousand years is launched the last ineffective assault of the dragon. He seeks out, in the uttermost corners of the earth, the last barbarians, Gog and Magog. They are destroyed by fire before the beloved city, and the Devil is cast for ever and ever into the lake of fire and brimstone.

Then ensues the general judgment of all the dead, who are raised from hades and receive according to their works; and there follows the end of death and of hades, for they with the wicked are thrust into the lake of fire. (Chap. 20.)

“And I saw a new heaven and a new earth . . . and the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God.” The place of eternal bliss in fellowship with God is brought to the righteous. All things are made new and shall endure for ever. History is ended, eternity begun. (Chap. 21.)

“Behold I come quickly. Blessed is he that keepeth the words of the prophecy of this book.”

This bald summary can do no proper justice to the crowded pageant of the Book of Revelation, throughout overburdened with rich embroidery of splendid detail. Three brief observations remain to be made.

First, it has, I hope, been made clear that the Book of Revelation is no useless allegory of modern or of ancient history, but is a work, indeed a masterpiece, of literary art. The natural result of modern study of this book is to lead one to enjoy and to love it, to receive from it an influence upon his mind and heart. We can see that this book of the Bible, by being — even though imperfectly — understood, is restored to its place of dignity as a worthy expression of the human spirit. This increase of the legitimate claim of the book on the reverent interest of men is the proper and usual result of serious modern criticism. For on understanding the book much of what was repellent falls into its fit place, and is no longer a disturbing element.

Secondly, this book, with its visions of the future, its strange imagery, and its lofty poetry, brings us into direct contact with a generation of real Christians — their ideals and emotions, their dangers and aspirations, their love and worship, their hatred and abhorrence. We see here the reflection of their sufferings, and learn at what a price our comfortable privileges have been bought. We are stirred by their power to see the eternal and invisible, and our own faith should be made stronger by this contact with theirs.

Thirdly, not only literary and historical, but religious value belongs to this book. The great truths of apocalyptic and eschatological thought are permanent, and no church can be powerful which does not hold them with firmness and vitality. For they are the truths that right and wrong are eternally hostile, that God's cause is the cause of righteousness, and that His triumph is sure.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MYSTICISM AND THE DIVINE IMMANENCE

H. C. ACKERMAN

NASHOTAH HOUSE, NASHOTAH, WIS.

Recent studies in religious mysticism from the standpoint of psychology have netted, *inter alia*, the following contributions: (1) The conceptualization of divine reality, apprehended through the peculiar spiritual experience of the mystic, is based, not upon some aboriginal idea of deity, but upon the humanization of some sacred aspect of nature. (2) Mystical intuition is not a unique form of experience, but simply a way of experiencing which involves *more* of consciousness than is ordinarily exercised in plain matter of fact attention to the familiar object of the world. (3) The objectivity of God aroused as a postulate in the mind under the pressure of an intensified interest in, or concentration upon, the causal meaning of holy aspirations, is but the projection of the idealized self before the retina of the actual self as though it were a disparate entity independent of any necessary connection with consciousness. (4) The ideational aspects of the mystical *superself*, to which is attributed extraneous being, are such as denote social rather than individual qualities of life. And further (5), this subjective creation appears more intensely real (vital) or dynamic in its manifestations than the normal self, owing of course to the heightened form of the feelings and emotions out of which it is generated. In fine, the nature of the "unchartered reality," which makes itself *felt* in the excess of spiritual ecstasy, appears to overlap or transcend the natural bounds

which limit human nature and to elicit potentialities of perfection.¹

These conclusions bear upon the traditional claim of the mystic to experience God directly, and seemingly tend to a negation of the whole position. Certainly then they must be reckoned with, not simply in defense of the objective reality of God, but for the sake of clarifying our concepts of divine being. And it is especially important to examine this psychological ruling because the chief result of these scientific findings is to relegate to a sphere of second-rate interest the truth about the objective reality which underlies religious experience as a whole, and to emphasize exclusively the subjective reaction or interaction as the all-important factor in religion. The problem of what God is becomes accordingly negligible so far as the value and power of spiritual life is concerned. Indeed, a recent writer goes so far as to say, "Surely, in a study of religion, we need not be concerned with the objective reality behind the conceptual constructs of the religious consciousness."²

It is not the mystic only who may be said to protest against a dogmatic prohibition of this kind, but hosts of rationalistic thinkers are determined to bring the primary object of religious faith within the connotation of intelligent definition.³ Still, the psychological inquiry is entitled to a hearing and, in fact, should be recognized by both sides as making a contribution without which any substantial advance in theology would be permanently blocked. Let us ask then, what is the truth that has been uncovered? The answer may be put thus: the psychology of mysticism has not shown conclusively that there is an illusion in the mystic's apprehension of the "absolute

¹ Cf. John M. Meeklin, *The Revival of the Ontological Argument*. JPPsSM, Vol. XIV, No. 5, pp. 124-135.

² A. A. Goldenweiser, *Religion and Society: A Critique of Emile Durkheim's Theory of the Origin and Nature of Religion*. JPPsSM, Vol. XIV, No. 5, p. 117.

³ Cf. Durant Drake, *Seekers after God*, HTR, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp. 67-83.

other," but it has demonstrated the improbability of any direct knowledge of, or acquaintance with, a God *transcendent*. This is the primary contribution: there is no transcendent deity with whom communication is established in ways peculiar to mysticism. If it is insisted that there *may* be a transcendent God, nevertheless mysticism can not establish a guarantee. But though one may waive the suggestion of any transcendent reality in mystical experience, it is a *non sequitur* to infer that the mystic is under a delusion in regard to his at-one-ness with God; for, as a matter of course, this is exactly what the psychological analysis indicates, namely, that the personal object of religious experience is decidedly God *immanent*. In this paper I hope to make such a view tolerable to the psychologist.

My thesis may be stated negatively as follows: the sacred object of mystical contemplation is not *merely* the idealization of self-potentialities. *Potentia* connotes possibilities and powers, but not in unlimited degree; they function in proportion to a scale of existing actualities. For instance, the potentiality of the acorn is measured by the oak *and no more*; but the spiritual idealization postulated in mystical conceptualization involves *more* than can be measured by the self. It embodies a fullness of being which is immeasurable (infinite); or, to put it another way, this idealization connotes an expansive idea, the "fringes" of which transcend the possibilities of human experience. This "vision of God," which is perceived by means of the elasticity of consciousness and is wrongly identified exclusively with the self *and no other*, is not only an exhibition of superhuman potency but of human impotency as well. It is a manifestation of illimitable power, which, traced back to more elemental form, implies a spring of energies altogether out of proportion with the capacities of human nature. Since a search for fundamental reality is equivalent to the hunting down of the

elemental, it becomes simply a matter of logical economy to determine the most primary real whence all subsequent properties are derived. The ideational content of the God-idea then naturally presupposes energies which underlie their incomplete expression in consciousness. The truth of the matter is that the psychology of mysticism being dynamic, we are bound to trace the mystic's intellectual sensitiveness causally, and note that the God-concept is the effect of forces which certainly can not be measured in terms of the self alone. The conclusion would be that the idealized projection of the self witnesses to the drive, the push, the ardor or *élan* of the divine immanence. Why distort and corrupt elemental being, manifested in consciousness by that peculiar expansion of the self which is the experience of the mystic in acute forms and the common experience of the layman in less poignant or more blunted forms, by identifying the finite self with its infinite *superpotentiality*?

Now the primary interest of religion is in origination, in contradistinction from the science of morality, which is based upon the *terrain* of "ends" or results, beneficial or detrimental to life. To be more specific, it is the interest in the *cause* of spiritual aspiration which determines the peculiar bent of the religious consciousness. Religious reflection, as is most conspicuously revealed in piety, is not the prophetic or forward vision; it is a contemplation of primary rather than ultimate (attractive) causation.⁴ It may be admitted though that so far as religion is taken to include morality it of course embraces the prophetic outlook as well. Still, the distinctive truth-seeing of the religious consciousness is bound to be immanent rather than transcendent (or teleological). The confusion involved in the notion of a transcendent deity is the failure to recognize the fact that the God-transcendent is unreal in the present; he is simply the God in the future, who

⁴ As a matter of fact *final* causation is anomalous in scientific investigation.

becomes, or rather is, immanent when experienced. Therefore we need feel no dismay because mysticism does not apprehend God transcendent, since it is impossible to reach *ahead of existence*. While time endures, all present anticipations of God are rightly attributed to God transcending existence, but wrongly attributed to a God who transcends now; which means, in other words, that the transcendent deity is the God of subsequent manifestation merely. The actual experience of the divine being must necessarily be confined to all that which is connoted by divine immanence. We are indebted then to the psychology of mysticism for pointing out the fact that immanence and transcendence are not correlative but progressive and continuous terms.

Let us consider in this light some of the aspects of mysticism which modern psychology accentuates, particularly those which have been mentioned in the beginning of this discussion. The denial of the aboriginal God-idea and the substitution of a humanized aspect of nature transfigured by the religious thrill, is not less than an admission of immanent potentiality superior to that of human personality. For it is patent that an immanent deity could only become an object of consciousness within the compass of consciousness itself, so that the "transfiguring" or "humanizing" of nature in itself need give rise to no denial of deity. The point is, why humanize and transfigure the natural perception? The answer is, because consciousness is struggling with an object of experience which forces or compels recognition in spite of the limitations of consciousness. It is not consciousness which idealizes or overmagnifies nature in terms of itself; it is the superabundance of energy within it which projects the self out into mystical idealization. Nothing shows more clearly the dynamic process which constitutes the nature of spirit.⁵ Thus the religious thrill reveals the

⁵ See my article, *The Nature of Spirit*, BW, Vol. LIII, No. 2, pp. 145-148.

weakness or subjection of consciousness in the control of superior energies.

Again the recognition of religious intuition as a whole experience rather than singular neural reactions or interactions does not make the God-postulate self-limited in reality, *i. e.*, elementally, since intuition at best is but partial and successive effects of a spiritual causality which is by no manner of means limited to the potentialities of the actual self. Not that consciousness is the subjective effect of *Dinge an sich* outside; there is no subjective frontier over which reality passes under a contraband form. It is true that the form of the God-concept will naturally be circumscribed by consciousness, but it does not follow that consciousness is a measure of the divine, since the conceptualizations are but passing effects of energies (spirit) whose origin is indeterminate and whose extension and scope are immeasurable. The spirit is like the wind, whose passing is *felt* but the whence and whither are indeterminate.

The generalized or social character of the mystical concept is in keeping with the tendency of spirit to expand and overpass the boundaries of individual selves, but the socialized self is not coterminous with immanent deity. It is, rather, another manifestation of spirit in the inevitable overflowing of personal life. Thus the individual who is constrained spiritually to idealize himself socially does so through a superior power.

Finally, the emotional accompaniment of the mystical concept testifies again to the dynamic character of the divine immanence as the all-pervasive creative elemental force, neutral in the non-conscious universe but qualified by spiritual significance in human nature. It is said that the excessive excitement and the enhanced emotion of religious ecstasy in its most pronounced forms is a stirring or stimulation of one's spirit within and a letting it go after some manner of *laissez-aller* spontaneity. This

sounds true enough; but what is interesting about it is the spiritual momentum itself, the involuntary tendency to increase when once started. Surely the spiritual life is not self-propelled ⁶ ("By grace are ye saved . . . not of yourselves; it is the gift of God . . . lest any man should boast."). This is the essence of the mystery. And why then is it not interpreted correctly by the mystic who concludes that the soul is in the hand of *God*?

The gist of the foregoing argument may be restated thus: the "idealized self" is not *selbstverständlich*; it is an "other-than-rational" product, in which the mysteries of origin, cause, infinity, elemental reality, and the like are involved, notions which are not attributable to the creation of consciousness, since they can not be said to be experienced,⁷ *i.e.*, immediately. Why then hesitate to conclude that these *differentiæ* between the self and the *alter* constitute evidence of autogenetic personality whose only admissible meaning is God?

In closing this paper, one word more. The religious philosopher is under obligation to the psychologist for taking mysticism as an experience out of the realm of metaphor and symbolism and placing it in the domain of natural science. Not that sufficient progress has yet been made to satisfy true devotion; since, left to the tender mercies of natural science, the equation of the God-idea with an over-idealized self leaves wanting the nice point that mysticism has sought to emphasize, namely, the reality of God manifest through human conception; but when we translate divine transcendence (anticipated divinity) into terms of immanence, which should be done to counteract an immature analysis of elemental reality, as seen in

⁶ Now moral life is self-controlled. But morality and spirituality are distinguishable. Aristotle puts the whole matter in a nut-shell thus: life is determined to be indeterminate; which means, in this connection, that spiritual propulsion is deterministic and moral compulsion is indeterministic, or free. That is to say, religion constrains us to make moral decisions.

⁷ Hocking (The Meaning of God in Human Experience) notwithstanding.

the logical impatience of mystical imagination, the light of a new day will begin to break through the obscurities — not to mention the aridities and vacuities of mystical metaphysics — which have so long darkened the horizon of religious knowledge.

THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF CONSCIENCE AND MORAL PRINCIPLE ¹

ROBERT JAMES HUTCHEON

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

With the guns of Flanders and Picardy shaking our deepest being, it has been almost impossible for us during the last two years to think at all. Thinking demands the calm hour and the dispassionate frame of mind, and no one of us has had many such hours or many such mental dispositions for some time past. But it is our duty as moral leaders in our respective communities to think as steadily and dispassionately as we can, so that our leadership shall be, not that of hysteria and emotion, but of a discriminating and inwardly controlled moral intelligence. To that end I invite your attention in this Berry Street Conference — so long devoted to serious discussion of vital topics — to a subject that seems to me of great, if not supreme, importance at the present time, namely, *The Nature and Validity of Conscience and Moral Principle*.

My thought has been turned to this subject by the presence in our midst of "the conscientious objector." Towards such persons we Unitarians, because of our traditions and principles, ought to be sympathetic beyond most religious bodies. Many of us in the name of conscience have left the churches and religious associations in which we were reared, given up fair prospects of ecclesiastical preferment, and joined ourselves to a small and unpopular religious fellowship. The heroes of conscience have furnished us the most important examples of the virtuous life as we have tried to interpret it to our congregations. The

¹ An address to the Berry Street Conference, Boston, May, 1918.

word "conscience," in our use of it, has always had associated with it a wealth of tender and exalted feeling. To say of a man that he was a man of conscience was regarded by us as almost the highest judgment we could pronounce upon him. To be true to conscience was thought to be the highest goal of our own moral ambition.

But the great war has come and complicated the inner life of the spirit. Some of us are moved by our consciences to offer ourselves, our sons, and our possessions to what we consider a holy crusade against the military brutality, the political aggressiveness, and the spiritual pride of an autocratic European government. We feel that to fail to come to the help of Belgium, France, Serbia, Armenia, and Russia in this time of woeful need would be to forfeit our manhood and to abandon the stricken people of the world to an endless slavery. If we do not entirely misread our own minds, we are supporting the government not because of the recrudescence of the fighting instinct in us, or because we have abandoned our hope and yearning for universal human brotherhood, but, on the contrary, because we believe that all that we, as Liberals, hold dear would be endangered by the triumph of the arms and the spirit of Germany. If our sons and the boys of our congregations who have gone to the front, should fall in this war, their memories will always be green in our hearts and homes and churches, and we shall think of them as young heroes who died to preserve to the world the liberties without which our lives thus far would have been impossible.

On the other hand, there are those who in the name of conscience take the very opposite stand. They see nothing noble in the war. For them a man's morality is compromised when he takes a gun in his hand or encourages others to do so. They can discover no glory but only tragedy in America's part in the war. Their citizenship has become to them something to be ashamed rather than proud of, they feel themselves isolated from the majority

of their former friends, and they are pained by that isolation, but conscience assures them that their position is morally sound and they maintain it in the face of opposition and entreaty. Each group appeals to the authority of conscience, and conscience leads them to opposite conclusions. All that is most holy and commanding and authoritative in one good man's heart urges, nay, drives him, into the war, and all that is most holy, commanding, and authoritative in another good man's heart forbids him to enter it.

In such a situation many old questions concerning conscience inevitably arise. What is conscience? Is its authority over the individual absolute and ultimate? Must it be respected by us even when it commands individuals to do things of which we deeply disapprove? Probably very little that is fresh can be said on these questions, but at least we are forced to ask them anew, and the old answers may have more meaning because of the very urgency of our need for them.

Few Unitarians can reflect on conscience without recalling the beautiful story from the child life of Theodore Parker:

“When a little boy in petticoats in my fourth year, one fine day in spring my father led me by the hand to a distant part of the farm, but soon sent me home alone. On the way I had to pass a little ‘pond-hole,’ then spreading its waters wide. A rhodora in full bloom, a rare flower in my neighbourhood which grew only in that locality, attracted my attention and drew me to the place. I saw a little spotted tortoise sunning himself in the shallow water at the root of the flaming shrub. I lifted the stick I had in my hand to strike the harmless reptile; for though I had never killed any creature, yet I had seen other boys out of sport destroy birds, squirrels, and the like, and I felt a disposition to follow their wicked example. But all at once something checked my little arm, and a voice within me said, clear and loud, ‘It is wrong!’ I held back my uplifted stick in wonder at the new emotion, the consciousness of an involuntary but inward check upon my actions, till the tortoise and the rhodora both vanished from my sight. I hastened home and told the tale to my

mother, and asked what it was that told me it was wrong. She wiped a tear from her eye with her apron, and taking me in her arms said, 'Some men call it conscience, but I prefer to call it the voice of God in the soul of man. If you listen and obey it, then it will speak clearer and clearer, and always guide you right; but if you turn a deaf ear or disobey, then it will fade out little by little, and leave you all in the dark and without a guide. Your life depends on heeding this little voice.' "

Now what does this beautiful and appealing little bit of autobiography suggest as to the nature and origin of conscience? Undoubtedly it suggests the theory of Bishop Butler and others, that conscience is an innate, underived, unanalyzable, inexplicable, and universal power of moral discrimination, a special magisterial faculty, which has absolute and unquestioned authority over the individual. This faculty passes judgment on man and his actions, declaring, without the possibility of error or the possibility of appeal, that some actions are in themselves right, just, and good, and that others are in themselves evil, wrong, and unjust.

But in spite of the appeal which Intuitionism makes to the active moral nature, it can no longer be accepted as a satisfactory account of the nature, origin, and authority of conscience. It would be incorrect to say that the idea of faculties of the mind has been entirely abandoned in psychology, for so great a psychologist as William McDougall still manages to make a restricted use of it. But the old-fashioned way of describing the mind as consisting of a bundle of faculties, such as perception, imagination, conception, judgment, reason, will, etc., has lost all value for our present thought. If "faculty" be taken as meaning only a psychical capacity for an ultimate, irreducible, or unanalyzable mode of being conscious of objects, the mind truly has faculties. Knowing, feeling, and striving are such faculties, for they cannot be explained as a conjunction of more fundamental capacities. More-

over, each of these groups of mental dispositions may in turn be said to include a number of faculties. Striving seems to be of two ultimate kinds, namely, striving towards and striving away from an object or appetite and aversion. Feeling, again, seems to be of two ultimate kinds, namely, agreeable and disagreeable feeling. We may even recognize a variety of modes of knowing; for example, being aware of objects, affirming or denying objects, and comparing objects.

When I object to the Intuitionalist view of conscience, then, as something ultimate and unanalyzable, I am not objecting to these words in themselves as having no meaning in psychology. I believe not only that the structure of the mind is ultimate and unanalyzable but the mind itself as well. I have no sympathy for the mode of thought which reduces intelligence to instinct, and instinct to compound reflex action, and reflex action to the irritability of protoplasm, and the irritability of protoplasm to tension in its different parts due to the incidence of impinging physical forces or to the chemical affinities of one element for another. So to explain the mind is to explain it away — never a satisfactory mode of procedure. Nor do I say that in our metaphysical thinking we may not legitimately conceive of something more ultimate than individual minds; but I feel that in all our thinking on the concrete problems of human life, it is inadvisable for us to begin with anything more ultimate than the mind itself. For us at least that mind and its structure are ultimate and irreducible.

But it is one thing to admit that there are ultimate and irreducible faculties, and another thing to show that conscience is such a faculty. History makes it perfectly plain that conscience does not command the same acts or reprimand equally for the same misdeeds. Conscience forbids the Hindu to eat meat, but the Christian conscience is silent in this regard. The content of the Roman Catholic conscience differs profoundly in many matters from the

content of the Protestant conscience. One type of conscience lies back of political and social conservatism, and another type lies back of political and social radicalism. Conscience may command in the same individual different kinds of conduct at different periods of life.

Moreover, conscience, as we all experience it, is by no means the infallible guide which it is sometimes said to be. Life is full of new and complicated situations which it does not help us to meet. It certainly does not reveal to us on all occasions with subjective certainty or objective infallibility what duty demands. It may be adequate for the solution of the more common problems of life, such as the community has long been dealing with, but the more novel and delicate situations of experience demand an insight and a wisdom which conscience cannot give. Just as habit cannot take the place of selective and creative consciousness, so conscience cannot take the place of analytic reflection and fresh moral insight.

Remembering then the obvious differences in the contents of conscience as it manifests itself in different groups and its obvious defects from the point of view of infallibility, it becomes impossible for us to use uncritically the definition of Parker's mother, "Conscience is the voice of God in the soul of man"; or the similar notion of Butler that conscience is a sort of inner oracle, imposing its decrees by divine right on the human will; or the general intuitionist belief that it is a special faculty, of which nothing more can be said than that it is and that it must be obeyed. Hence we are driven back to ask over again what it is and how it came to be.

If conscience is not a special faculty, what is it? When we recall that conscience and consciousness have the same derivation, we find the clue of which we are in search. If consciousness be defined as the sense we have of ourselves as realized in knowledge, then conscience may be defined as the sense we have of ourselves as realized in conduct.

Conscience is nothing more and nothing less than a man's whole personality when he engages in moral action or makes a moral judgment. Conscience is the self making moral judgments, or the self realizing itself in and adjusting itself to human relations. As such it includes all the fundamental capacities or activities or faculties of the mind. It contains a cognitive element, for it estimates the rightness or wrongness of actions in accordance with some standard or ideal intellectually conceived and formulated. But it also contains an element of feeling, for all moral judgments and adjustments are accompanied by emotions of greater or less intensity. Remorse, for example, which is possible only to a person of conscience, is one of the most violent, as the sense of satisfaction which follows right action is one of the most pleasing of human emotions. And, finally, it contains an element of volition; for conscience inhibits us from doing many things which impulse suggests and it urges us on to duty when the spontaneous impulse towards it flags. The self of man is many-sided. It has economic, social, aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious interests; but these are all aspects and functionings of one self. Of course the self sometimes seems and is divided against itself. One group of impulses conflicts with another group. Even one duty comes into conflict with another duty. But above all these conflicting impulses and motives, there is, in every normal person, what we call a real self, a master self which, given time enough, will control and dominate all the lower selves. This real or master or higher self is none other than conscience — the self as regulative of conduct, pronouncing cognitively on the rightness or wrongness of acts, experiencing certain moral emotions as its ends are realized or not, and checking impulse or reinforcing it as the particular occasion may demand.

When conscience is thus defined as the self making moral judgments, it is soon evident that our second ques-

tion, How did conscience come to be? is practically unanswerable. No one has ever succeeded in telling the story of the genesis of the individual self. When did the self come into being? At the hour of conception, or of birth, or at the moment when the child towards the end of his third year first uses the pronoun *I*, or when? No one can answer. No more can anyone say how children of the same parents, born in the same home and reared in the same environment, have different selves. Origins are mostly hidden from us, and certainly the origin of the self is.

But though the origin of the self as conscience is inexplicable, it is not difficult to see that the content of conscience is generally due to social environment. Conscience is for the most part the voice of the community speaking to and in and through the individual. Even the greatest philosopher has his main problems set for him by the life of his time. His thinking is inevitably carried on in a specific social medium. His language is an inheritance, and in using it he must submit to the shaping influence of the past. Consciousness is always individual, in the sense that it is never a mere part of a social or race consciousness and can never appropriate a community's spiritual gains without going through some of the processes by which they were achieved. Consciousness is always unique. But the objects of which it is conscious are social objects, and one person's reactions to the common social objects are inevitably of essentially the same nature as those of others. There would be no common social life at all if *blue* and *sweet* and *hard* and *round* and a thousand other common words did not mean essentially the same for all. The individual mind is not a mere piece of the race's mind; but still no individual ever escapes altogether from the idiosyncracies and limitations of his race's mentality.

So is it with conscience. It is unique in the sense that my conscience is mine and yours yours. It is for each one of

us a pressure on conduct which is exercised from within his own mind. But the content of conscience, its judgments as to right and wrong, the standards and ideals by which it judges conduct, are for the most part social or community standards and ideals. Take a cross section of the conscience of average men and women at any time or place, and we shall find that its content is more collective than individual. Certain individuals doubtless had originally more to do than others with the creation of the social standards and ideals, but, once created, the average individual judges his conduct by them without any inquiry as to their source or the legitimacy of their authority. If the collective conscience is infallible, his may be so also; but if the collective conscience is liable to error, as all history shows it to be, then his conscience is still more fallible. We should always respect conscience in the sense that we should never urge men to act against it, but we should strive to make men see that their moral judgments, like their cognitive judgments, are liable to error and that conscience is always in need of education and revision.

I have said that for the most part conscience is the voice of the community speaking in the individual. But of course that is not the whole truth. In the realm of knowledge a few individuals acquire a mastery of their mental processes and of the methods of investigation, experiment, generalization, etc., which enables them to be independent of the judgments of the average person altogether. True, science is never anything more than common sense extended and systematized and become critical of itself, but the advantage it has over common sense is so great that the scientist's system of concepts seems at first to have no relationship at all with the mere rule-of-thumb generalizing of the average man.

The same is true of the self as conscience. The individual may become independent of the conscience of his community. A more inward and, as it seems to him, a more

commanding and a higher voice may begin to speak to him, condemning acts of which his community approves and urging him to acts which his community condemns. The history of morality and religion is full of the stories of men whose consciences have been thus individualized. Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah among the prophets, Jesus and Paul in the New Testament, St. Francis and Luther in subsequent Christian history, Mazzini, W. Lloyd Garrison, Theodore Parker, and Henry George among social reformers, are conspicuous instances of such individualizing of conscience. They break away from the conventional morality of their community and achieve a moral elevation and independence which make them heroes for all time. So dramatic has been the awakening of the individual conscience in some cases that it has seemed more like the call of Deity to the prophetic soul than the sudden maturing of some subjective insight and impulse that has long been developing in the subconscious mind. If ever conscience can be spoken of as absolutely individual, that is, as without any social mediation or as the voice of God in the soul of man, or as perfect and infallible, surely it is in cases such as these.

But is the highly individualized conscience necessarily arrived at without any social mediation? Is the individual's community necessarily confined to those he knows in the flesh? May he not live in a world peopled by the saints and heroes and prophets of the histories, poems, stories, and sacred scriptures he has read? It would be impossible, of course, to demonstrate this in every specific case, for few moral and spiritual biographies are known to us in their entirety. But it is hard to doubt that it always is the case. The individual self achieves self-consciousness through the give and take of social life. And in this social interaction ideal and historical persons may be just as real as, indeed much more real than, one's flesh-and-blood acquaintances, and through spiritual contact with these per-

sonages the individual conscience may get a content very different from the content of his community conscience. We do well when we insist on the fact that the conscience of the individual may outgrow in many respects the conscience of his neighbors, but we yield too far to our craving for uniqueness when we insist that the more inward and commanding conscience is attained by turning our backs on our fellows altogether. We often speak of being alone with our conscience and our God, and there is a sense in which this is true. But whenever we are, our self has always its social implications. The self with which we pray in our closets is a self made up of sentiments, affections, regrets, aspirations, and hopes of which we have become possessed through our interaction with other human beings, just as the system of concepts by means of which we think in our quietest and most solitary hours in our libraries is the product of our intellectual commerce with many other minds both living and dead. I am just as eager as any one to defend the uniqueness of the individual mind and conscience. But I am persuaded that we compromise rather than protect that uniqueness when we think of it as abstract and achieved without social mediation. There is, I grant, no social mind of which the individual is only a detached fragment, like a chip from a statue. Every individual mind is unique. But there is no individual mind that has not been conceived and developed within the matrix of the social mind. No more is there an individual conscience that has developed outside of all relationship with the moral life of humanity. The genius in the intellectual world does hit out thoughts and hypotheses which no one ever uttered just in that way before, but they are always the culmination of mental processes which have been going on in many other minds as well as his own. He only anticipates the vision of others, and when he announces his vision it is caught up by an ever-increasing school of disciples, that is, persons whose

thoughts were already moving in the same direction. Likewise, the genius in the moral world achieves ethical insight and conviction which no one before had ever achieved, but, like Jesus, he always nourishes his moral nature on the insights of preceding prophets, and his own unique ethical contribution is a flowering of those insights in his personality and his teaching.

And if there is no individual conscience that has not been attained by way of social mediation, so no individual conscience is infallible in its own right. The dogmatist in the intellectual world is the man who continues to believe in his own cognitive judgments even when they fail year after year to receive the approval of his intellectual peers. Of course he may be right, and in that case he is not a dogmatist; but human minds are built pretty much on the same ground-plan, and if any individual fails to convince his open-minded peers, it is much saner for him not to be too sure of his judgment but to study the whole problem afresh and try to feel the force of others' criticisms.

Nor is it essentially different with conscience. If a highly individualized conscience can only grow up within and by means of the moral life of humanity, the highest test of its worth must be, not alone the degree of its subjective certainty, but also its power to persuade and convince those other souls whose movement of purpose and aspiration, like his own, is ever upward. There may be fanaticism in the moral as there is dogmatism in the intellectual world, and they derive from the same psychical source. Failing to see that both conscience and thought are socially mediated, people refuse to test them by social standards. Especially is this the case in regard to conscience. The individual conscience seems to them so holy that it carries authority for them in its own right. But the holiness of conscience is not due to its occupying any unique place among our so-called faculties. As a faculty conscience is no more holy than cognition, but since it

deals with conduct, the most important part of life, it acquires an aspect of holiness which cognition seldom if ever acquires. If knowledge seemed to us of supreme importance, cognition would become our holiest faculty; but knowledge has always been thought to be secondary to good will and right conduct and holy aspiration, and therefore cognition seems and for all practical purposes is less divine than conscience.

I am well aware that what I am saying, unless carefully stated and carefully followed, may seem calculated to undermine the authority of the individual conscience and to cut away the ground from individuality altogether. But that at least is not my intention. I care not how far one may carry the thought of differentiation among human individuals — indeed the further it is carried the better I am pleased — provided it is always acknowledged that it is the differentiation of a continuum. The idea of the continuity of the individual with humanity must be conserved unless we are going to abandon ourselves to a pluralism that would make even the thought of society impossible. The individual as a highly differentiated member of society I can most heartily believe in, but the individual as a human atom, as the possessor of so-called natural rights, as endowed with a conscience which makes it possible for him to pronounce infallibly on questions of right and wrong without interaction with the social mind, I can neither understand nor believe in. The pluralist would shatter society into a multitude of independent human atoms; the absolutist would merge all individuals in the whole, and treat them as mere temporary modes of the eternal, as the waves are mere temporary conformations of the water of the sea; but the more critical thinker will seek to preserve both values. He will think of differentiation and continuity not as opposites but correlatives. He will see that the individual has rights only as a member of society; that his cognitive judgments can be

considered valid only in so far as they succeed, given time enough, in carrying conviction to his intellectual peers; and that his conscience gets whatever infallibility it has from the fact that he has absorbed into himself and carried to a completer fulfillment the moral impulses and insights which he, as a member of society, has inherited from the past and appropriated from the living present.

And what is true of conscience is equally true of what we call moral principle. This word too has romantic associations in our thought. Fidelity to principle is regarded by all of us as one of our supreme human virtues. We are never done extolling it over against expediency or the tendency to compromise. And when we realize what a moral principle is, we see why we prize fidelity to it so highly. For a moral principle is a persistent deliverance of the conscience of the best people of society. It is a generalized expression of the moral experience of whole generations of men and women, and no part of our inheritance is more precious than the complex of sentiments, reverences, loyalties, and affections which we call the moral life of the past.

But here again we must be on our guard. Principles must not be treated in an abstract fashion. A moral principle is always someone's interpretation of personal and social welfare, and it gets its sacredness from the character of the purpose at which it aims. But no individual's interpretation of welfare and no generation's interpretation of welfare can be strictly regarded as infallible. Indeed, we may go further and say that the entire race's past interpretation of welfare may be inadequate to our present and future needs. The human race is always undergoing new experiences, and never more so than in the present; whole nations are now being subjected to griefs and perplexities and the bitterest necessities, which no preceding generation could possibly have predicted; the relations between the old social classes are being and will continue

to be revolutionized. And if moral principles are good men's interpretations of human welfare, is it inconceivable that the insight of the past may not be entirely adequate to the demands of the present and the future? Moral principles are a precious part of our inheritance, but they are, not so much coins to be preserved just as they are when we receive them, as seeds to be planted in the soil of our own time. The system of concepts in the scientific and philosophical world which we inherit from the past is indispensable to our intellectual life. To repudiate that system would be to find ourselves once again in the flux and chaos of the primitive man's unorganized sensations. But that inherited system of concepts is not an arbitrary group of abstract words. It is the living body of our thought, and as such must be forever sloughing off dead tissue and renewing its life by fresh experiences and fresh interpretations of old experience. "Die to live" is the principle which prevails in all living thought-systems.

So must it be in moral systems as well. Principles are not fixed and rigid guideposts to conduct. They are general summaries of experience; and as experience is always growing and changing, principles must be at least as flexible as the movement of the moral life itself. Fidelity to principle is not a fanatical loyalty to the letter of ethical commands, such as is involved in the common sayings about "hewing to the line, let the chips fall where they may," or "do justice, though the heavens fall." Rather fidelity to principle is faithfulness to those movements that one believes to be making for human welfare. Moral life is a living process in the souls of men, and that process must answer to the changing environment in which each generation finds itself. It may at any moment in its history be fairly well gathered up and expressed in maxims and precepts and proverbs and principles; but we become moral, not as we faithfully conform to these principles, but as we feel in our souls and realize in our lives the social

sentiments and loyalties and affections which constitute the living process of morality.

It is perfectly possible that some may conclude that what I have said means essentially a throwing open of the doors to compromise and expediency. It may be thought that as primitive man needed what Bagehot called "a rigid crust of custom," so men today need fixed and inflexible moral principles to guide them in this period of moral and political chaos. I agree that such fixed principles may be of great advantage at a certain period in our moral development; but for us that period is surely past. We are today confronted by a new world situation; social adjustments vaster than we had ever predicted must be made in the course of the next few years; the moral life must be expanded as it never has been before to include in its sweep all nations of men. And as we face this fateful future, we must all be anxious about our equipment for duty and opportunity. To say that we must abandon conscience and moral principle would be irrational, for that would be tantamount to saying that the past has nothing to teach us concerning the future. But I do say that we must abandon our abstract view of conscience and moral principle and our tendency to treat them as stereotyped solutions of all our moral problems. Our supreme guides must be, not a lot of ready-made principles and intuitions, but good will, the desire to coöperate, willingness to do whatever the social welfare demands, insight into the mighty forces for good and evil that the war has let loose, sanity in discriminating between the possible and the impossible, and a will to believe and a will to persevere that nothing can daunt or overwhelm.

We are undoubtedly moving towards a future big with destiny. Let us go out to meet it, not with a few abstract ethical formulas about justice and democracy and equality and natural rights, but with a living mind, a mind in vital interaction with the minds of other men and women,

a mind open to the teaching of the events amid which we live, a mind that is willing to be tentative and experimental because it knows, as Professor John Dewey says, that there is no such thing as complete moral maturity, and that all persons are still more or less children in process of learning moral distinctions; in a word a mind that follows the movement of life itself, never changing in its purpose of getting forward, but ever feeling after new ways and means of reaching the goal.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SELF AND NATURE. DEWITT H. PARKER. Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. x, 316. \$2.00.

Professor Parker invites his readers to embark with him on an "intellectual adventure"; and as one who has ventured I gladly bear witness that it is well worth while to accompany him. There is something singularly attractive about the intellectual honesty with which he attacks his problems. Bold yet self-critical, sure of his vision yet not dogmatic, he writes at all times with that inimitable freshness which comes only from first-hand reflection. His claims to originality, so far from being immodest, are amply justified. His theories are never mere patterns ingeniously constructed out of chips from the workshops of others. Much as he has learned from the great thinkers to whom he acknowledges his obligations — from James and Royce and Santayana, from Russell and Bradley, from Peirce and Bergson — yet he has preserved his independence of thought, and the views which he puts forward are always his own, and often both novel and important.

Metaphysics is for him the attempt to construct a total vision of the world from that fragment of it which each of us has in his own experience. "Radical empiricism extended through the imagination," is his method. A frankly "animistic conception of nature" is his conclusion. Nature for him is a single experience or mind, of the tissue of which "sensations" form a real part. To maintain within this context the distinct individuality of human minds, and thus to achieve a fresh solution of the old problem of pluralism and monism, is, I think, his chief concern. I could wish, though, that he had expounded his theory of nature on its merits in a chapter by itself. At present the reader has to piece it together from scattered passages. His attention is never focused on the theory as a whole. It is too much dispersed among particular problems.

The first of these particular problems concerns the nature of "self" and "mind" (Ch. I). Like Descartes, Parker invites us to begin with ourselves. Inspection of experience (which is for him synonymous with consciousness or mind) reveals that self is only a "part" of mind — that part which as "activities" can be distinguished from "content." Content is whatever the self "finds" or "is in contact with," in short, what is immediately experienced, what is present, as distinct from what is represented by ideas. The *unity* of the mind

consists precisely in this contact of self and content, just as the unity of the self consists in the felt "interweaving of activities."

On this basis Parker proceeds (Ch. II) to offer a theory of personal identity. As this is one of the theories for which he explicitly claims originality, it deserves to be stated and examined at some length. Its point is to defend the truth of the judgment in which each of us declares his present self to be identical with his past self. The *concept* of self-identity must be based on the *fact*, that is, on the *experience* of identity. Identity must be "given." It must be "found in experience." Moreover, it must not be analyzed away into *similarity* of present and past. Nothing but *numerical* identity will do. Now if experiences, as the usual view has it, are momentary events which never recur, it is impossible for anyone ever to have the same experience twice. He can have only another experience very similar to the first. But this yields *two* experiences, not "one and the same." On these terms therefore personal identity cannot be saved. Hence we must hold that the very same experiences can recur, that "the very stuff of the old is born again." So far all is plain sailing.

But now the difficulties begin. Identity, we are told, is a matter of "more or less." It is never without difference, hence always "partial." This invites us to single out the parts which are identical, and more, which are identical absolutely and numerically. What are they in the self? To this question Parker returns varying answers. Sometimes he refers to examples like "the experience of carrying out a plan," where there is *one* plan worked out step by step through a long sequence of experiences. But mainly, I think, he falls back on the "feeling" of identity: "There is a sense of familiarity which pervades all experience and is the abiding identity within it." He clearly means that the feeling of familiarity which I have now is one and the same at all times; the feeling of identity is an identical feeling. But there is yet a third streak, where the life of the mind is described as "self-making and self-mending"; where identity is said to be at a maximum in the concentrations of one's whole being on a serious effort, and at a minimum in light moments of self-forgetfulness. We shall readily agree that in this sense a man is now more, now less, himself, that is, at his best; but our standard here is the positive spiritual quality of the experiences involved. The discussion at this level is beyond the mere sense of familiarity, and equally beyond the problem of what is numerically identical in my present and my past. Parker's failure to differentiate these three levels at which the problem of personal identity may be discussed, seems to me to be the great weakness of this chapter. What he requires is the concept of the "concrete universal,"

which both secures numerical identity and within it leaves room for all the fluctuations of qualitative identity.

Chapter III, on "The Metaphysics of Perception," defends the thesis that "appearances" or "sensations" are "real" and constitute the very substance of natural objects. "Nature is full of warmth and cold, pressures and touches and colors unperceived by man . . . [it] sings for itself and for us too in the sound of the brook, and paints pictures for itself and for us in every landscape that we see" — a doctrine of which Parker claims that it "should recommend itself not only to the reason but to the emotions." But no mere scraps of quotation can reproduce the union of acute reasoning and poetical feeling with which this chapter is written. Chapter IV applies this theory to the "Relation between Mind and Body." The body, as a physical thing, is a tissue of sensations; but it is also the instrument through which the self expresses itself, and on which its perception of and intercourse with the rest of nature depend. Hence without the body the soul cannot exist. The death of the one is the death of the other.

Lack of space compels me to pass with a bare mention the chapters on Time, Causality, Space, Universals, and even the long and brilliant chapter on Relations, with its masterly discussion of the theories of Bradley, Royce, and Russell, and the author's own original conclusion. I turn to Chapter X, on "The Unity of Minds." Here Parker boldly applies the concept of the mind of nature to the support of the two theses that "all minds overlap with nature and through nature with one another," and that "minds die." "Even as the mind springs from nature, so it dissipates back into nature again." "The death of the mind is the result of a conflict between the body and powers of the environment which find the activities of the organism incompatible with their own." Yet if the theory accounts for death, it accounts also, so Parker claims, for the origin of life, the origin of mind, and the freedom of rational action. At the same time, there runs through all nature a streak of chance, of the non-rational, which only on repetition becomes law and habit. The influence of Charles Peirce's "tychism" is here evident.

The conclusion (Ch. XI) has manifestly been written with deep feeling. It has an effect of sombre and restrained eloquence. It gives Parker's answer to the age-old questions of human hope and destiny — immortality, progress, the birth of the superman, cosmic perfection. It argues that philosophy cannot prove immortality, nor establish a theodicy — an inclusive perfection in which evil is overcome. Yet it concludes that despite suffering and mortality this is

neither a cruel nor an aimless world. We are permitted a real, if mortal, happiness, and our deaths are necessary in order that other and perhaps superior beings may realize their destiny. Meanwhile, the fundamental values of life remain intact. True, we can no longer believe in the "protected" world of the Theism of our forefathers. Yet this is no cause for pessimism, but rather a challenge to courage and adventure. "He surely has small hold upon the good who, despite sorrow and disappointment, does not find life worth while, just in thinking and loving, in laughing and creating, be it only for a brief period, followed by a sleep where no evil memories mock."

I shall have failed completely in this review if every reader of it does not become a reader of Professor Parker's book.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL. GEORGE A. BARTON, Ph.D., LL.D. The Macmillan Co. 1918. Pp. x, 289. \$2.00.

This book is the second to appear in the much-needed Religious Science and Literature Series, which is designed to meet the wants of colleges and universities. Its value is therefore not to be judged primarily by its possible contributions to original research in the subject treated, but is rather to be determined by its pedagogical adequacy. The accuracy of the scholarship in such a series ought to be assumed as a matter of course. But is the disposition of the material of the kind to convey to the student a knowledge of the intricate questions involved without confusing him, and at the same time is the general treatment of the subject calculated to awaken curiosity and stimulate interest? These are the prime requisites, I take it, for the success of the proposed volumes.

Dr. Barton, to whom the immensely important but correspondingly difficult subject of the Religion of Israel has been intrusted, is one of the most accomplished and productive of our American Orientalists and Semitic scholars. The debt of recognition for an unfailling stream of stimulating contributions to biblical science and oriental research is one of those debts of honor which his colleagues are most happy to discharge. In the present volume Dr. Barton will sustain his reputation for the thoroughness of his scholarship and the mastery of his field. From the remotest pre-Israelitic antiquity to the Logos speculations of Philo and the New Testament he has traced with care the various stages of development of Hebrew thought, which he rightly

claims is "one of the most fascinating and important phases of human history." The first chapter is devoted to the Semitic background, out of which the Hebrew religion sprang like a root out of a dry ground without much form or comeliness in it. The second and third chapters consider the value of the early biblical narratives and the origin of the Israelitic nation, with special reference to its tribal relations and to the problems connected with the conquest of Canaan. Then follow six chapters in which the religion of Israel is traced from the covenant with Moses to its culmination in the legalism of the centuries immediately preceding Christ. Budde's Kenite theory of the origin of Israel's religion is tentatively adopted, and the foundation of its ethical development is seen in the covenant idea. The last seven chapters may be regarded as little monographs on special phases of Israel's religious thought, for which no sufficient room was found within the general framework of the book. The topics covered are Priesthood and Ritual, Angels and Demons, the Religion of the Psalmists, and of the Sages, Five Religious Tracts (*Ruth, Jonah, Esther, Judith, and Tobit*), the Hopes of the Apocalyptists, and the Jewish Dispersion, with special reference to the *Wisdom of Solomon* and Philo.

Those who are familiar with Dr. Barton's work will understand at once that there are very few questions which have occupied the minds of scholars that are not at least adverted to in the pages of this book. But the question may fairly be raised whether the wealth of detail has not been at times allowed to blur somewhat that sharpness of outline which is so necessary in a book written for the instruction of college and even university men. Unhappily the experience of the reviewer does not permit him to hope that anything in the way of a general literary knowledge of the Bible, to say nothing of a scientific knowledge of it, on the part of the average undergraduate, can be presupposed. Statements therefore whose significance would be at once intelligible to the scholar or advanced graduate worker may often be quite unmeaning to the ordinary student. Dr. Barton, it is true, realizes this in certain important connections. For example, he prepares the way for the complicated discussion of the conquest of Canaan by a preliminary chapter on the method of treating the patriarchal narratives and early genealogies. Yet should there not be in any book designed for colleges and universities a preliminary chapter on an even more fundamental subject? I refer to the fact of revision in the Bible. To the student unaccustomed to the analysis of ancient sources the operations of modern scholarship often appear at first sight to be quite arbitrary. If an introductory chapter could be given

to illustrate the fact of revision in the Bible, beginning possibly with such a telling example as the two forms of the Decalogue, or with some of the many striking examples to be drawn from a comparison of Kings and Chronicles, the student would be prepared to follow the reasoning and accept the conclusions of modern scholarship in a much more comprehending and acquiescent frame of mind. I think it is also highly desirable to devote a brief chapter to a summary of the main results of the critical analysis. The incidental allusions to these outstanding results, *e.g.*, at page 20, seem hardly adequate. Of course the suggested readings at the end of chapter II on the analysis of Genesis are intended to supply the needs of the student in this respect. Yet the modern view of the development of Israel's religion is so indissolubly intertwined with the literary analysis of the material that a short chapter on this subject seems desirable from the pedagogical point of view. Granted that such a chapter might involve a few repetitions later on, this difficulty would be more than counterbalanced by the gain in the orderly approach to the main theme. Dr. Barton's very admirable discussion of the general Semitic background would follow very easily upon the two suggested chapters. The views advanced in the book are on the whole those of the moderate school of criticism, and this is well. A book designed for college use should not be made the vehicle for speculative reconstructions which have not as yet been subjected to the test of searching criticism.

In conclusion may I be permitted to refer to a few details that call for comment. The importance of the historical background for the understanding of Mosaism is rightly insisted upon and considerable space is given to this subject. But there is no corresponding background furnished for the comprehension of eighth-century prophecy, a subject which Dr. Barton is particularly well qualified to treat. The religious problem which Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah set themselves to solve was occasioned as much by the advance of Assyria as it was by the internal conditions of the sister kingdoms.

The prevailing views of Hosea's marriage, so brilliantly expounded by Robertson Smith, are adopted. They give an undoubtedly rich spiritual meaning to the account of Hosea's marriage; but they involve a highly imaginative interpretation of chapter III, and do they do real justice to chapter II? Dr. Barton strangely ignores what to the present reviewer is the chief contribution of Isaiah to Old Testament religion, namely, his spiritualized conception of the doctrine of the Remnant. On the other hand, the Messianic element properly so called, in Is. 9 2-6 and 11 1 ff., is considered to be original and is singled out for special emphasis. Possibly the time has not yet come

to discard this view in college text-books, though I am more and more convinced of its improbability. But the statement that Isaiah chose Tiglathpileser IV as the pattern of his ideal prince (p. 105) cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. On the other hand, it is a pleasure to note that Dr. Barton comes out unequivocally for the collective theory of the Servant in Deutero-Isaiah. A campaign should be undertaken against what the reviewer believes to be the utterly mistaken course which the interpretation of the Servant Songs has taken in recent years, due largely to the weight of Duham's authority. The individualism of Jeremiah and Ezekiel is of course referred to; but ought not Ezekiel's formulation of the doctrine to be elaborated and criticized more fully than is done on page 125? Ezekiel's one-sided theory of individualism complicated so greatly the current dogma of rewards and punishments, and this complication of the doctrine stands in such intimate connection with the development of the doctrine of the future life, that it seems as if more attention should have been paid to these thought-sequences. I wonder also if more space might not have been advantageously given to the exceedingly interesting and instructive Messianic movement after the Exile, represented by the work of Haggai and Zechariah. The failure of this movement, hinted at on page 133, paved the way for the domination of legalism, and in part at least may account for the waning of prophecy in the subsequent period, to which Dr. Barton alludes but which he does not discuss (cf. pp. 139, 146, 156). Should there not be a more outspoken condemnation of the imprecatory element in the Psalms than is found on pages 201 and 213? The resort in our day to these blotches upon the higher religion of Israel in order to clothe present hatreds with scriptural authority is a sad commentary upon our professions of belief in a developing revelation, and the unjustifiable character of these fierce outbursts from the Christian point of view needs determined emphasis. The chapter on Angels and Demons gives a most useful summary of studies in literature not readily accessible to the average college student and should start the necessary questionings in his mind when he comes to the same subject in the New Testament. In the discussion of Philo's relationship to the New Testament, ought not reference be made to the Epistle to the Hebrews as well as to St. Paul and St. John?

The queries that have been raised in the foregoing are suggested with all diffidence. I do not wish to play the part of an upstart Elihu to a Nestor in Semitic studies (if this Alexandrian blend of biblical and classical lore may be pardoned).

KEMPER FULLERTON.

MANAISM: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION. IVY G. CAMPBELL.
(*American Journal of Psychology*, January, 1918). Pp. 49.

Students of either the psychology or the history of religion should not overlook Professor I. G. Campbell's study of manaism. By manaism Dr. Campbell means the preanimistic theory "that man first explains things, not in analogy to his own soul, as animism holds, but rather by postulating a great force" (p. 2). This force is known as mana, Wakanda, or orenda. The author bases her analysis of manaism on a painstaking examination of field workers' reports. The following quotation indicates the extent of Dr. Campbell's sources: "Not only the beliefs of primitive people quoted by the holders of this theory [manaism] but also comparable ones from other parts of the world have been considered. . . . In presenting the compilation of material gathered from reports of primitive peoples, selection has been made of that gathered from parts of the world which have not previously found a large place in the literature of preanimistic discussions. Since the data from North America and Australia have been previously extensively cited, this study, in order to uphold its contentions, stresses the data of Africa and Australasia, exclusive of Australia" (p. 2).

From her study of this material Dr. Campbell reaches the significant conclusion that primitive people do not, as a matter of fact, regard mana as impersonal. The conventional view that mana means impersonal force is attributed by Dr. Campbell to a confusion of three uses of the word "impersonal." The term, she truly says, "has been used in one of three ways, as equivalent to (1) mechanical, (2) non-bodily, (3) super-individual" (p. 17). She admits that mana is impersonal in the second and third of these senses — that it does not belong to one concrete individual human body and that it is a super-individual or collective power. But she contends that mana may be both incorporeal and over-individual without being impersonal or mechanical in the first, the literal sense of the term. The conception of mana as literally impersonal, though held by Leuba, Schmidt, and others (p. 17) is, in Miss Campbell's opinion, flatly opposed to the testimony of "nearly all the field-workers," for they "report mana as spiritual." She herself conceives of mana as personal power experienced by man "when he is acting with his group" (p. 35³) — a power which he may "eject" into a higher being, and even into a God (p. 42² *et al*). In the following comparison with Durkheim's theory she accentuates the significant features of her own: "Both," she says, "make the contrast of the social and the individual self the basis on which religion is built up; but whereas he makes everything connected

with the social sacred and hence religious, we would include within a religious complex only those objects which are regarded as capable of giving help. . . . Moreover we differ from Durkheim in regarding the power which makes the object capable of being a religious object a personal and not an impersonal one. Our theory agrees with animism in holding that the soul is the important thing in religion, but it is the soul or self that is experienced as very efficient that is anthropomorphised to become a god" (p. 40³).

It is evident that manaism thus conceived is no longer sharply opposed to animism, the belief that the soul is "the principle by which all things" are to be "explained." And the hotly debated question of the relative priority of manaism and animism thus becomes, as Miss Campbell says, "irrelevant"; for mana cannot be prior to the soul when it is part of the soul (p. 22⁴). "We cannot," she says, "find any culture where the concept of mana is present" in which "there is not also a belief in spirits in the sense of ghosts or dream-doubles. Either concept," the writer adds, "may assume the leading rôle (p. 25⁵). . . . Manaism as well as animism results from the tendency of the human mind to interpret things in terms of its own inner experience."

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. WILLISTON WALKER. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. xiii, 624. \$3.00.

Students have long felt the need of a manual covering the whole field of Church History to serve as a guide to more detailed study of the best and most recent literature of the subject, and as a text-book accompanying the lectures of the classroom. Professor Williston Walker has at last given us such a work in a form attractive both to the professional student and the general reader. It is remarkably complete and well proportioned, presenting the most recent developments in the life of the Church and exhibiting the full internal growth of organization, worship, and doctrine as well as the outer fortunes of the historic institution. The obvious demands on such a book, apart from the purpose of stimulating interest in the subject, are that it should furnish the data in a precise and accurate form, that the data should be constructed in terms of the historical development established by modern investigation, and that the account should be written in the impartial spirit of scientific intelligence. Professor Walker's book meets these demands admirably. All the essential facts are pro-

vided and the footnotes and a judicious bibliography enable the reader to coördinate the use of the book with the consultation of sources. The construction illustrates the present state of historical science. There is no distorting bias of speculative theory, eccentric view, or theological partisanship. There is surely no Protestant school in which it can fail to become the standard text-book. The only general criticism that might be offered is that the story is not more related to economic and social conditions; but doubtless the time is not ripe for a presentation of this type justified by generally accepted views. Historians are advancing our comprehension of the life of institutions by references to these factors, but the safe, discriminating, and accepted formulation is not yet achieved.

Since so satisfactory a guide to study is not likely to be supplanted at any early date by a competitor, it is to be hoped that the German practice may be followed, so that by revision in detail it may evolve into a perfected form. Some trifles ask for amendment. "Asclepiodotus" is misprinted as "Asclepiodorus." The incident in the life of St. Francis (p. 257) was not "on a pilgrimage to Rome," and (p. 258) the date 1216 should be 1209. Duns Scotus' advocacy of the Immaculate Conception is overstated. In the bibliography Heimbucher's *Orden und Kongregationen* should be mentioned in its later edition, and the reader should be told of books so indispensable as Nielsen's *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*, and MacCaffrey's *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*. Apart from such small matters, the mode of statement can often be improved by substituting for a relatively insignificant general remark one that by special definiteness implies something as to historic process. For example, the information (p. 349) that Melanchthon's *Loci* was enlarged and modified in later editions is in that form unimportant. The important thing is that while the first edition eliminated and disparaged the ecumenical dogma and limited attention to the experience of ethical redemption, later editions restored the metaphysical elements of Catholic dogma. This intimates a transition from the *Glauben* of the early Luther to the *Glauben* of creedal assent in later developments. Our generation is specially interested in the psychology of religious experience and can detect many disparities that once were concealed by identity of verbal expression. Luther's "faith" (well characterized on p. 346) was not the intellectualist "faith" of Calvin. A little sharpening of phrase can suggest distinctions like these that often mean the differentiation of groups and traditions. This line of criticism leads to a regret that Jonathan Edwards' departure from traditional Calvinism has not been indicated.

The issues of Old Light and New Light, of Conversion or Christian nurture, spring from Edwards' effort to differentiate the experience of grace from the activity of human faculties. By the omission Edwards loses significance in the record of important historic change.

To justify the suggestion of such amendments in detail mention may be made also of a little obscuration of a difference in the Christology of Origen from later orthodoxy. Chalcedonian orthodoxy affirmed two natures in one person. For Origen Jesus was one person and the Logos another person. There was still something of the older Adoptionism in Origen's view. There is the more justification for mentioning the detail since Dr. Walker commends the Chalcedonian formula as meaning a revelation of God "in terms of a genuinely human life." If that was the real meaning, Apollinaris had been misled as to the intention of the God-Man conception, and the formula would not have gravitated to the result of meaning an impersonal humanity becoming personal in the personality of the Logos. Dr. Walker's remark, however, applies admirably to the Christology of Origen. Here again is a criticism that is not querulous. Something hinges on it, and Dr. Walker as an admirer of the work of Loofs will see that what is meant is that the physical redemption theory was not a presupposition of Origen's thought.

The book thus happily furnished to general reader and theological student is learned, luminous, and complete, the work of one who has mastered a complicated subject.

FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE.

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

JESUS AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. FRANCIS A. HENRY. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916. Pp. iv, 444.

This book stands high in the ranks of the *Vermittlungstheologie* — that long line from the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Alexandrians through Aquinas and the Schoolmen down to the exponents of the modern New Theology, who have endeavored to build a bridge between the religion of the past and their own day. It maintains that the life of Jesus as set forth by the Synoptists furnishes the true and the only true Gospel — the exhibition of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men. This was early corrupted by mistaken views of Jesus' Messiahship, by the rabbinic theology of Paul, and by the paganism of the Catholic Church. The author's message is therefore essentially, though not verbally, "Back to Jesus." In uttering this he, like others who have proclaimed this message, does perhaps scant

justice to the inherent need to religion of theology. Probably most students of Christian history would assign greater legitimacy to the connection between Jesus and the later intellectual developments of Christianity. Without such development, and with the accounts of the Synoptists alone when examined in the light of biblical study, it is doubtful whether we should have an adequate basis for Christianity. "Back to Jesus" implies that we shall find there a foundation broad enough to build a world on. Yet if we did not have the Pauline and Johannine amplifications, even with all their misunderstandings, the life of the ages would have had fewer Christian answers to its questions, fewer questions which it cared to ask.

The book, however, is full of deep and sound thinking, and its tone is admirable — judicial without sternness, conciliatory without pliancy, courteous, serious, holding its lofty aim of discipleship constantly in view. And its style is correspondingly direct, close-knit, clear; revealing large margins of learning yet not displaying them. It presents the reader with an ease which has been bought by the labor of the writer. There are many illuminating insights and felicities of expression. Those who have been repelled from what they see labeled as Christianity may find here a reverent and thoughtful guide to an acceptable apprehension of Jesus' message.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

GREEK GOSPEL TEXTS IN AMERICA. EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament. First Series; Texts. Vol. II). The University of Chicago Press. 1918. Pp. x, 186. \$1.50.

THE GOSPEL MANUSCRIPTS OF THE GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY. CHARLES CARROLL EDMUNDS and WILLIAM HENRY PAINE HATCH. (Harvard Theological Studies. IV). Harvard University Press. 1918. Pp. 68.

THE WASHINGTON MANUSCRIPT OF THE EPISTLES OF PAUL. HENRY A. SANDERS. (The New Testament Manuscripts in the Freer Collection. Part II). The Macmillan Company. 1918. Pp. x, 65. \$1.25.

Professor Goodspeed's volume gathers together six collations of Greek Gospel manuscripts now in American or Canadian collections, with brief introductory studies and one or two good plates of representative pages from each codex. Such careful work is valuable, for manuscripts may be destroyed by fire, and in any case American libraries and private collections are not easily accessible to European scholars. The studies were published separately, beginning in 1902;

the two latest, which complete the volume, treat of the Haskell Gospels, belonging to the University of Chicago, and of a Gospel manuscript in the library of Harvard University. Apart from the Freer Gospels, the several codices represent various late types and do not offer much of special interest in the character of their text. Almost any manuscript, however, may sometime prove to have its own significance for textual history. When its contribution is added to a great mass of other evidence, in the hands of a master, that which by itself was wholly uninteresting may become full of instruction.

A work similar to Professor Goodspeed's is that of Professors Edmunds and Hatch, who treat of three Gospel manuscripts — two of the 10th century, the other written in the 10th or early 11th and with its text surrounded by a commentary. Each is fully collated, and is described in a suitable introduction, supplemented by excellent plates. The three show varying examples of "Syrian" text; the catena manuscript is closely similar to Codex Γ, which is of the same period. These two volumes thus contain collations of nine manuscripts. At least six others are known to exist in this country, and it should be someone's business to publish equally careful collations of those.

Professor Sanders in publishing his collation, with illustrations, of the manuscript of the Epistles of Paul in the Freer collection brings to a close the publication of Mr. Freer's four Biblical manuscripts. In this last of the four, out of a hopeless blackened lump of decayed parchment infinite patience has recovered some part of all the Epistles of Paul except Romans. It is all that is left of a superb copy of the Acts and Epistles written in Egypt in the sixth century. The text, as would be expected, is of the "Alexandrian" type, and is especially closely akin to α A 17. It seems to be wholly free from "Western" readings. If the manuscript were complete, it would rank with the chief ancient uncials; and this publication of it makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the history of the Alexandrian text.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES. (Louis Herbert Gray, Editor; George Foote Moore, Consulting Editor.) Vol. XII, Egyptian: W. MAX MÜLLER, Ph.D.; Indo-Chinese: Sir J. G. SCOTT, K.C.I.E. Marshall Jones Co. 1918. Pp. xiv, 540.

The two mythologies treated in the present volume are not only widely separated geographically; the sources of our knowledge of all phases of the religions of Egypt and of Indo-China are so radically

different as to necessitate in each instance a special method of approach. The study of Egyptian mythology depends on ancient texts and on ancient monumental evidence. To the interpretation of the former the student should bring a critical philological knowledge of a high order; properly to weigh the significance of the latter he ought to have had wide experience as an archæologist. Nor is it, in these days, too much to ask that he who ventures into this most difficult branch of Egyptology should have an intimate acquaintance with the results and methods of the social anthropologist. Thus equipped, a writer can to some extent cope with the formalism of the ancient texts, and can hope partially to reconstruct from the material remains some of the popular phases of Egyptian religious belief. To strike a balance between these two bodies of evidence — often divergent and at times in direct opposition — is only possible to one familiar with the laws governing primitive social expression.

Dr. Müller, it will thus be seen, has attempted no mean task in undertaking to present his readers with an account of Egyptian mythology; Sir James Scott has been confronted with one hardly less difficult in attempting an exposition of the mythology of Indo-China. In this area, despite the shadowy possibilities of its having been once entirely dominated by a single race — whether Talaing or Khmêr — almost as great a diversity now prevails in the field of mythology as in those of race and language. The literary sources, whether they deal with Burma, Cambodia, Siam, or Annam, are of no very great age; nor has a systematic study, on comparative lines, of the rich monumental sources of this important region been as yet advanced to a point where the mythologist, writing for a general audience, can derive much trustworthy information from them.

It follows that the mythology of Indo-China — being, as Sir James Scott has himself observed (p. 257), “a mixture of hero-worship and distorted history . . . with the worship of intangible natural forces” — is of a very heterogeneous character. The local divinities of the Egyptian nomes at least display, broadly speaking, so strong a tendency to conform to a few common types, and the later processes of syncretism, however complex, are so much alike when viewed in perspective, that it is in the majority of cases possible to appreciate the outstanding features of the local and of the national religions. Although the present writer is of the opinion that two religions, originally the expression of two different peoples, are to be distinguished in the ancient Nile Valley, the problems arising from their contact and partial amalgamation are hardly more difficult than those afforded by the beliefs of Indo-China. The latter region is one of great ethnic and

linguistic diversity. The nominal Buddhism of the majority of the inhabitants has to a large extent worn down the more conspicuously individual features of the different faiths, and the more primitive features that have survived too often bear to each other resemblances which are due simply to a parallelism that is significant from the general, rather than from the particular and limited, point of view. In short, whereas the author of the first part of the present volume has had before him a task to the accomplishment of which philology, archæology, and a knowledge of social anthropology could all contribute, the writer of the second section has had to depend almost wholly on the methods of the folklorist (in the serious sense) and of the ethnologist. This limitation has been offset by Sir James Scott's intimate personal knowledge of Indo-China, a knowledge which has enabled him to base many of his deductions, especially those regarding Burma, on his own observations.

Dr. Müller has acquitted himself well of his difficult task; but his share in the volume (245 pp.) will prove disappointing to those who recall the freshness and vigor of his *Asien und Europa*, which twenty-five years ago so stimulated students of early Mediterranean history. The author, faced with the impossibility of presenting our fragmentary knowledge of Egyptian mythology without first giving his reader a general account of Egyptian religion, rightly begins with an account of the local cults. This he follows with a chapter on sun-worship, and with a third on other gods connected with nature. This serves as an introduction to the creation legends and what he properly enough terms "cosmic myths" (Why the Sun-God Withdrew from the Earth, The Lost Eye of the Sun-God, etc.). There follow two chapters on "the other principal gods" and on divinities of foreign origin — chapters which cannot be said to add much to the necessary setting, or anything to our knowledge, being in the nature of a catalogue which is, of course, not exhaustive, nor as detailed even as the notices in Lanzzone's *Dizionario di mitologia egizia* (1881-86). The succeeding chapters treat of the "worship of animals and men," of "life after death," "ethics and cult," and "magic." A final chapter—to the reviewer the most interesting in the book — presents a general view of the development and decline of Egyptian religion as a whole. Notes containing many valuable references are appended at the end of the volume (pp. 362-428) — an arrangement which leaves something to be desired on the score of convenience, because of the awkwardness of having this material separated from the text by over a hundred pages of foreign matter. A bibliography which makes no pretense to completeness, and which contains some items which serious scholars would choose to ignore, has been furnished by the editor

(pp. 434-447). Both text and notes are illustrated (219 figures and 3 plates in the text, 10 figures in the notes). The illustrations are well chosen, but their scientific value is seriously impaired by the author's neglect in not giving the sources from which he has selected them. Even to the professed Egyptologist such an omission is bound to prove a source of annoyance, while the layman, interested in a particular illustration, may be in doubt as to whether it is a copy from an Old Kingdom tomb or a New Empire papyrus.

Dr. Müller has, however, laid himself open to graver charges than these: he has consciously ignored the vitally important question of totemism in Egypt; he does not recognize the probability, already referred to, that the history of Egyptian religion as we see it is the gradual fusion of two different faiths; and, finally, he has too often lost sight of the fact that his theme is not Egyptian religion as a whole, but the more limited one of Egyptian mythology.

With regard to the first of these weaknesses the author justly remarks that "the interpretation of totemism in general is at present in a state of discussion and uncertainty" (p. 362, n. 4). The truth of the observation is self-evident; it might also be added with fairness that there are at the present time far too many writers of the type of S. Reinach, to whom the word "totemism" is an alkahest in which all religious problems are soluble. But the prevalence of such extreme views does not justify Dr. Müller, or anyone else, in a refusal to consider if, as the evidence in the case so overpoweringly suggests, a belief in kinship with animals does not lie at the back of many of the most prominent and peculiar features in Egyptian religious belief. It is needless to urge this point against a writer who says of the nome signs that "their application was divine or local, never tribal like the totemistic symbols of primitive people" (*loc. cit.*). Anyone acquainted with primitive ethnogeography, ancient or modern, will recognize that "tribal" and "local" are almost interchangeable terms in such cases, and the Egyptologist would be especially ready to admit the validity of this equivalence in the ancient Nile Valley.

It is more excusable that Dr. Müller says nothing of the fact that Egyptian religion of the historic period exhibits so many marks of having resulted from the imposition of a conqueror's creed upon that of an indigenous conquered population, that one feels safe in predicting that no great advance in these studies will be made till they are approached from this angle. The theory here is a new one, and has not yet found full expression; but it is so clearly in the air at the moment that it is surprising that one could treat the solar religion — presumably that of the cattle-owning intruders — and the Osiris cycle (the

indigenous faith) without at least a reference to the possibility that the opposition between the two was due to underlying differences of race. Dr. Müller inclines to see in this profoundly significant conflict an implication of "previous millenniums of religious thought" (p. 213) before the beginning of the Dynastic Age; a suggestion which hardly meets the case.

That it was necessary for Dr. Müller in handling his subject to provide the lay reader with a good deal of general information of a non-mythological character has already been conceded. It cannot, however, be questioned but that we are here presented with a good deal of matter which is irrelevant to the central theme. Thus the chapter on magic (pp. 198-211), which might have been written by one quite unacquainted with the recent advances made by Hubert and Mauss, has little bearing on any aspect of Egyptian mythology, if we except the narrative-charm given on pages 210, 211. More spells of this character ought to have found a place in such a chapter. A similar charge of irrelevance might be sustained against the chapter on "Life after Death" and "Ethics and Cult," as well as against the major part of those which consist of little more than catalogues of deities.

Without going into details — and many will object to Dr. Müller's conception of animism, to his fondness for astral interpretations, and to his proneness to adduce Semitic, to the practical exclusion of other, parallels — it may fairly be said that whereas the author has given us a readable introduction to Egyptian religion, he has not justified his title. Many readers will find his work more serviceable than the uninspired handbook of Erman, or than the cursory survey of Weidemann, but it quite lacks that grasp of the subject displayed by Breasted's excellent little volume.

The difficulties which must have beset Sir James Scott in the accomplishment of his task have already been indicated. It is not invidious to say that at times the reader is aware of these, although the author has succeeded in giving a unity to his subject because of his well-defined views as to the normal course of mythopoeic tendencies all the world over. Fairy tales, as he remarks, are apt to "begin by being anonymous; then they are attached to famous names . . . and so we get the same stories among nations who [*sic*] have never had any connexion with one another, but have passed through the same intellectual processes" (p. 357). A recognition of this truth, differently expressed, is found at the beginning of his account (p. 256), and indeed pervades it.

A brief introduction is followed by a chapter on the creation myths, some of which are of exceptional interest. Without going so far as

those who maintain that, before their entry into Indo-China, the Karens had been in contact with either the Jews or the Nestorians of China, one will readily admit that the *Forbidden Fruit* story given by the author (pp. 269 sq.) has a remarkably close parallel in that of Genesis. In his third chapter, the author gives a good account of the myths and legends attaching to various popular festivals, and the reader who delights in startling contrasts between old and new will do well to read the account of the annual Rek Na festival in Siam (pp. 328 sq.). In this ceremonial ploughing the agitation of a Minister of Agriculture, the height of whose waist-cloth betokens droughts or floods, and who on the auspicious day has to perform arduous and unwonted duties of a magical character beneath the eyes of a sovereign who has passed through Harrow, Oxford, and Woolwich, are more easily imagined than described. The fourth (and last) chapter of Sir James's work, based to a great extent on a study by Sir R. C. Temple (*The Thirty-seven Nats of Burma*; London, 1906), deals with a group of Burmese demons on whose worship the Buddhism of the people may be said to rest. The spheres of action of these Nats — to be reckoned for practical purposes as thirty-four in number, though thirty-seven are tabulated in the *Mahâ Gîtâ Medani* (p. 340) — are defined with unusual precision, and to most of them are attached mythic accounts of their origin or deeds. Sir James's text, contained as it is within little more than a hundred pages, makes no pretense at being exhaustive. Some space, moreover, has been given to what are now either exploded views or commonplaces (e.g., pp. 254 sq. — the opinions of Grant Allen and of Herbert Spencer on the origin of religion). Yet the material here published has not before been gathered together between two covers; much of it, while innocent of the convenient rules of scholarly presentation, bears the marks of having come under the author's personal observation; and the plates (twenty-one in number), many of which are colored, are well chosen and adequately reproduced.

With regard, therefore, to this twelfth volume of the *Mythology of All Races*, it may be said that, despite the few objections mentioned above, the book is a valuable addition to the series in which it belongs. It stands, as such a publication ought, on a plane between that of the purely popular and that of scientific research. In such times as these, moreover, a welcome unusually cordial ought to be given a volume which, by its very nature, makes for a deeper humanism and a widening of horizons.

ORIC BATES.

EDUCATION FOR LIFE. THE STORY OF HAMPTON INSTITUTE. FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY. Doubleday, Page, & Co. 1918. Pp. xxiv, 394. \$2.50.

It would be difficult to imagine two more different books than *The Education of Henry Adams* and this volume by Professor Peabody of Harvard, for many years one of the trustees of Hampton Institute. Both are biographical studies rather than treatises on education, they were published almost simultaneously, and they cover very nearly the same period of American history; but there the similarity ends. In point of view and in their effect upon the reader they are poles asunder. Henry Adams, in spite of every advantage and of certain very real accomplishments, found life to have little educative value. He was morbidly introspective and might have summed up his life in the words of "the Preacher": "What profit hath a man of all his labor? Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." His memorial is the figure of intellectual resignation to the inevitable, which St. Gaudens so marvellously fashioned for him in bronze.

General Armstrong, on the other hand, born in the far-away Pacific Island of Maui only a few weeks after Adams saw the light reflected from the dome of Boston State House into the windows on Hancock Avenue, found life rich and abundant. He flung himself with joy into its battles, learned to believe in labor as a moral force, formulated a new type of education for an untrained and servile race, and left a great institution as the monument to his spiritual insight and moral power. The secret of his career is to be found in those moving memoranda which he jotted down just before his death. "A work that requires no sacrifice does not count for much in fulfilling God's plans. But what is commonly called sacrifice is the best and happiest use of one's self and one's resources — the best investment of time and strength and means. He who makes no such sacrifice is most to be pitied. . . . Few men have had the chance that I have had. I never gave up or sacrificed anything in my life." No better testimony to the power and charm of his personality could be asked than that of his most famous pupil, Booker Washington, who wrote in *Up From Slavery* that "it has been my fortune to meet personally what are called great characters, both in Europe and America; but I do not hesitate to say that I never met any man who, in my estimation, was the equal of General Armstrong. . . . One might have removed from Hampton all the buildings, class rooms, teachers, and industries, and given the men and women there the opportunity of coming into daily contact with General Armstrong, and that alone would have been a liberal education."

Professor Peabody has written with great charm and skill the story of his great work, set against the background of the dark days of the Civil War, and brought down through the administration of his honored successor to the end of the first half-century of the Institute. It is a story for all who love the tale of a gallant knight of the spirit, for all who would understand the idealism of America shining above the sordid politics and rampant commercialism of the second half of the nineteenth century. The book, indeed, belongs quite as much to the literature of missions as of education, for Armstrong was quite right when he wrote, "If the Hampton School is anything, it is a missionary work for the spread of the truths of clean Christian living among the negroes of the South and the Indians of the West." He brought to its founding and development the impulse of his father's missionary work among the Hawaiians, and that exuberance of his own adventurous spirit which had led to his youthful answer to the question of what he intended to be — "Missionary or pirate!"

With steadily increasing success the school has shown the way to train backward races for the complex life of modern civilization, until it has become a standard type which those confronted with similar problems in other lands come to study. For the vision which Armstrong saw as he voyaged to Mobile with his colored troops at the close of the war, the vision which he lived to make real, was of an institution which should train this black race just emerging from slavery to live efficiently and happily in freedom. He realized clearly enough that mental and moral education must be accompanied by manual training, since the vast majority of the negroes, as of every race, must get their living from the soil or in the workshop. The problem was to teach a people who regarded labor as a curse to find in it a blessing and a means of spiritual and intellectual enfranchisement. In his first report as principal he outlined the need of an education "which shall be at once constructive of mental and moral worth and destructive of the vices characteristic of the slave." So he planned to make "the needle, the broom, and the wash-tub, the awl, the plane, and the plow, become the allies of the globe, the blackboard, and the textbook." His purpose was not only to prepare the negro to meet the economic competition for which he was so unfitted, but to hold up a new ideal of life before his pupils. "More and more," he wrote later in life, "I believe in *labor as a moral force*. While its pecuniary return to the student is important and the acquired skill is equivalent to working capital, the outcome of it in manly and womanly quality is, in the long run, perhaps the most valuable of all." He recognized the

difficulties in the way — the reluctance of the negroes themselves to attend a school at which manual labor was required, the problem of working out a new educational system, the high cost of industrial training; but he fought his way forward, and in a decade could write, "Salvation by hard work is an understood thing." So he went forward to the end, dying in 1893, prematurely exhausted by incessant toil, but having firmly established a great principle of education.

To an exceptional degree Hampton has held fast to the ideal originally laid down for it. Armstrong's successor, the late Dr. Frissell, always felt himself to be but carrying out the founder's plan, and stood, a modest, wise, benignant figure, behind the prestige of his predecessor, and wist not that his own face shone with light. But under his gentle guiding Hampton has become a more potent influence than ever before in the working out of the negro problem, has become a standard from which many another institution in other lands than America has drawn inspiration. For it has remained first of all a spiritual power; it has embodied to a degree equaled by hardly another institution of learning in the country, a pure type of practical Christianity, training the whole man or woman for a life of honorable and self-forgetting service.

Here then is an ennobling tale, an inspiration for the teacher and the missionary, for the lover of democracy and the student of the intricate and difficult problems of racial and social adjustment. It is the story of men and women who united a brave heart and a tender conscience with practical sagacity and far-sighted vision. Of them, as of few others, might it be said, "And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

GOOD AND EVIL. A STUDY IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY. LORING W. BATTEN, Ph.D., S.T.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1918. Pp. 224. \$1.25.

This book contains the Paddock Lectures at the General Theological Seminary in New York, where its author has been Professor of the Literature and Interpretation of the Old Testament for twenty-five years. Its object is to present the various theories of the problem of good and evil contained in the Hebrew writings. Into the New Testament approach to the problem the author does not go, save for an occasional illustration.

These are popular lectures written in a popular style, and they do not pretend to present an exhaustive treatment of the subject. They are rather a convenient summary or outline of Hebrew thought upon the problem of evil. Beginning with the early and general Hebrew assumption that God is the source of both good and evil, and that He sends evil upon men as the direct result of sin, the discussion traverses in successive chapters first the Hebrew criticism of this doctrine in the face of experience, then the modifications of it to be found in the Pentateuch, the post-exilic prophets and the other writings; again in the growing tendency to dualism and to assign to evil spirits and to Satan the origin of evil, and finally the solution of the problem in the doctrine of immortality as it appears in the Apocryphal writings. The closing pages of the book describe briefly the attitude of Jesus to the problem, and emphasize its importance in the light of the sufferings caused by the War. The book is readable, far from dull, compresses a good deal of information into brief compass, gives the Bible text in constant foot-note references, and contains fresh discussion of many Old Testament passages that are both familiar and unfamiliar to the general Bible reader. Its chief value is to provide a useful and generally accurate survey of the thought of the Old Testament upon a problem which presses heavily upon the minds of all at the present time.

The chronological development of the theme invites certain difficulties which have not been met with entire success. In the discussion of the various solutions of the problem we are led from Job back to the Pentateuch and from the books of the Maccabees to a narrative in the Kings or in the Chronicles, so that the historical sequence in the Hebrew literature itself in its thought upon these different aspects of the problem is not at all clear. It would have been in the interest of clarity if in each chapter the orderly development of the Old Testament literature could have been followed. One is not at all sure, for example, whether the author places the book of the Chronicles after the book of Job, because in the Chronicles "Satan is after higher game than the individual" and acts "quite independently of Jahveh." It is unfortunate also that, by the method of treating the subject, the author's discussion of Job is split into different sections and assigned to different chapters. And his theory that the book is a sort of collection of all the different views of the problem of evil is open to grave exegetical and historical question.

The problem of vicarious suffering as presented in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is only incompletely sketched, and one misses in the entire discussion an elaboration of the idea so close to the Hebrew heart and so intelligible at the present time, of the sublimation of the

sufferings of the individual in the prosperity of the people as a whole; an explanation of evil in an individual experience as a necessary and integral part of the welfare of the nation, and of the nation as an instrument to be used by God for the establishment of His kingdom on earth.

One would have been glad also if further attempt had been made to show the value of the Old Testament solutions of the problem of evil to the thought of our own time, and of the way in which, taken together and interpreted in the light of the revelation of Jesus, they bring us as near to the solution of the greatest of mysteries as the mind and soul of man can be brought.

Within the limits that have been indicated, however, the book is a welcome addition to the literature on the problem of evil, and cannot fail to stimulate the reader to a fresh study of the Old Testament as it bears upon this problem.

RAYMOND CALKINS.

CAMBRIDGE.

EVOLUTION IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. PERCY GARDNER, Litt.D., F.B.A. (Crown Theological Library). G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1918. Pp. xiv, 241.

For the Broad Church party of the present day, Dr. Gardner prefers the term Modernist. The term, to be sure, is unsatisfactory, especially as it has been used by the Roman Curia as "a sort of clothes-horse, on which to hang any views it regards as dangerous." Nevertheless Dr. Gardner considers it on the whole the best word to designate that party which in the English Church is the direct descendant of Maurice and Kingsley and Stanley. The writer's own position is stated as follows, in his chapter entitled "Loyalty to Truth": "It seems to me so self-evident that it only needs to be stated, that the best way for the translation or re-affirmation of the beliefs and principles which lie at the roots of the Christian faith is, not to abandon the love and even the fanaticism of veracity, but to transfer our loyalty in part from scientific to symbolic or ethical truth, to transplant the fundamental assumptions of Christianity from the field of history, the realm of outward and sensuous fact, to the higher realm of ideas. . . . And here we find the very essence of the Modernist Movement" (pp. 144, 145).

Perhaps in the above quotation the phrase "in part" should be emphasized. For Dr. Gardner does not mean to evacuate the field of history for the realm of pale abstractions. He rather wishes to see in history itself the working of those eternal ideas which are of perma-

ment and essential religious value. Thus he finds two ways of regarding Christianity—the cataclysmic and the evolutional. If the latter view meant that we were to regard history as the mere result of necessitarian forces, he would accept the cataclysmic view with all its intellectual difficulties. But he rather finds that the evolutional concept itself allows room for “essentially spiritual views of God and the world.” From this point of view he reviews the chief elements of Christian faith and the result of this attitude on the problems of loyalty to truth, to the creeds, and to the Church.

There is nothing new in this general thesis. It might rather be supposed that the evolutional or historical method had become a commonplace of modern theological thinking. Yet this is by no means universally the case, and Dr. Gardner’s scholarly and yet popular treatment will be of value. Of course different persons will differ as to his specific results, and the author carefully avoids a dogmatic attitude. As to his general method, there ought to be no question.

EDWARD S. DROWN

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS. WILLIAM R. INGE. 2 vols. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 270; Vol. II, pp. xii, 253. \$9.00.

The Church of England has produced many scholars and a few theologians, but rarely indeed has a great philosopher emerged from the ranks of her ministry. Nor has the atmosphere been particularly favorable to his development. Archdeacon Paley brought northern common-sense, fostered by a Cambridge mathematical training, to bear on the justification of the Christian position, and George III said of him, “Paley’s a clever man, but he’ll never be a bishop, never be a bishop”; and what the Head of the Church as by law established said, most of its members felt. For philosophy, which leads men to abstruse speculation, is not congenial to the spirit of an institution so fundamentally English as the Church of England. It is as alien to the balancing tendency of the Elizabethan age as to the political conceptions of the Stuart, the rationality of the Georgian, the romantic revivalism of the Victorian, or the socialism of the twentieth century. The Angelican church, whether static, as a conservator of its historic tradition, or dynamic, as an energy trying to leaven the English world, has never been truly contemplative.

At the present moment, when the Anglican clergy are as obsequious to King Demos as ever their predecessors had been to their spoliator,

Henry VIII, or their betrayer, James II, it is refreshing to think that in the Dean of St. Paul's the church is represented by one at any rate who is a learned philosopher and neither a sycophant nor a simpleton. He possesses the rare gift of being entirely out of sympathy with every modern delusion. He despises the mixture of socialism and Anglo-Catholicism, almost as much as he detests the genuine articles; he sees little virtue and much danger in Labor, and the triumphs of modern progress make no appeal to him. Soon after his appearance in London he delivered a series of brilliant addresses to a small company of women, and declared that white labor with all its arrogance was quite unnecessary to the world, and during the war the frigidity of his patriotism drew him to sympathize with the defection of the Marquis of Lansdowne. It is not surprising therefore that the present volumes are dedicated to the author's friend, Viscount Haldane of Cloan.

But however profoundly one may disagree with Dr. Inge's views, his expression of them is to be welcomed as coming from a distinguished ecclesiastic, who is neither anxious to flatter public opinion nor afraid of it. During the war the pulpit repelled sensible people alike by its bloodthirsty denunciations of the foe, its semi-disloyal sentimentalities, and its fatuous predictions that the triumph of democracy would bring a millennium upon earth of high wages, short hours, and prohibition of all enjoyment. Nought of this is to be found in the Gifford Lectures, delivered at St. Andrew's during the war, which are characterized by patient study, clear thinking, and not a little vigorous hitting.

The Gifford Lectures of 1917-18 are a sequel to the Bampton Lectures of 1899, which produced no small sensation at Oxford. The subject was Christian Mysticism, in the study of which the lecturer became impressed with the value of Plotinus, the philosopher of the third century of our era, as one of the greatest mystical thinkers. Though a non-Christian philosopher and an opponent of the Gnostic forms of popular Christianity, Plotinus had a profound influence upon the thought of the Church, and he still lives in the pages of St. Augustine, who read him in a Latin translation. He is, however, little known even to scholars, owing to his deficiencies as a writer, his style being crabbed, careless, and involved. He was in fact a teacher and a lecturer rather than a literary artist, and his reputation has suffered in consequence. Dr. Inge's task is to impress the world with a due sense of the importance of Plotinus as a deeply religious thinker. He was certainly an attractive character, to judge from the biography written by Porphyry, his admirer and disciple.

Plotinus is supposed to have been born about A.D. 205 at Lycopolis in Egypt; but he would never speak of his home or family, and lived, says his biographer, "as one who seemed ashamed of having a body." He steadily refused to allow his portrait to be taken; but an artist contrived to sketch him while he was lecturing. The facts of his life are few. He was evidently well educated; he studied under Ammonius Saccas for ten years. He followed the army of Gordian into Mesopotamia, and after its defeat he escaped with difficulty to Antioch. The last twenty-six years of his life he spent at Rome as a teacher. His classes were apparently small and his method far from systematic. The world owes a debt to his pupils, Amelius and Porphyry, for the preservation of the substance of his teaching in the *Enneads*. Plotinus enjoyed the patronage of the philosophic but incompetent emperor Gallienus and his wife Sabrina. He almost succeeded in persuading them to permit him to found a city for philosophers in Campania, to be called Platonopolis; but the scheme was never allowed to mature. Porphyry tells that his master was much trusted by his friends and was often made a guardian of their children, discharging his obligations with scrupulous care. He died in his sixty-seventh year. His life covers one of the most disastrous periods in the history of the Roman Empire; but Plotinus seems to have been little affected by the calamities of his age, nor did current events leave much trace on his philosophy, though the delusions of his time evidently troubled a mind devoted to the pursuit of truth. He appears to have possessed a calm serenity of temperament, and not to have yielded to the superstition of an age which was singularly inclined to theurgy, magic, and stimulated ecstasy. Nevertheless, Plotinus is a mystic to the core, his desire being to prepare for communion with God, and for the realization of His perfect beauty.

Interesting as Plotinus' system is, the really important fact in Dr. Inge's book is the standpoint of the author, to whom Plotinus appeals chiefly because of his message to the world of today. Neoplatonism was, in fact, the philosophy of a society on the eve of dissolution. After the age of the Antonines, according to Dr. Inge's view, the Roman Empire entered upon an age of steady decay. The government became stupidly bureaucratic, liberty and initiative were discouraged, the industrious middle class were being crushed out of existence, and the revenues wrung from the taxpayers were devoted to the luxury of the court, the maintenance of a military establishment, and the provision of bread and stores for a degraded proletariat. Already even Christianity was becoming more of a superstition than a vital religion, under the influence of the influx of the monastic ideal. To a

mind naturally pessimistic the parallel between the last days of Rome and our own is too obvious to be missed, especially by those whose knowledge of philosophy is perhaps more profound than their acquaintance with the broad facts of history. Dr. Inge recognizes the analogy between the days of Plotinus and our own and presses it home with great force of language and felicity of expression. Perhaps the most striking passage in the book is in the "Concluding Reflections" (vol. II, p. 227):

"Neoplatonism differs from popular Christianity in that it offers us a religion, the truth of which is not contingent on any particular events whether past or future. It floats free of nearly all the 'religious difficulties' which have troubled the mind of believers since the age of science began. It is dependent on no miracles, on no unique revelation through any historical person, on no narratives about the beginnings of the world, on no prophecies of its end. No scientific nor historical discovery can refute it, and it requires no apologetic except spiritual experience. There is a Christian philosophy of which the same might be said."

The last sentence reveals the author's mind. He is not a Neoplatonist masquerading as a Christian, he is essentially Christian in his outlook. In some passages the Puritan element in his character is strongly in evidence. He does not agree with the comfortable doctrine of a "religion of the healthy-minded," nor does he disregard the testimony of saintly mystics that contrition is a salutary remedy for the soul. His contrast between Plotinus and the Christian is illuminated by the following quotation from Eucken:

"Plotinus is further removed from Christianity than these statements express, but he is also more akin to it than the collision between the two allows to appear. In both we find an uncompromising inwardness and a drawing of all life towards God, and in both rather by renunciation of the world than by coöperation with it. But Plotinus finds this inwardness in an impersonal spirituality, Christianity in a development of the personal life. In the former, all salvation comes from power of thought, in the latter from sincerity of heart. . . . In Plotinus we find an abandonment of the first world, a fading of time in the light of eternity, a repose in view of the whole; in Christianity we find an entrance of the eternal into time, a world-historical movement, a power working against the irrationality of the actual."

In view of the danger of civilization being submerged, Dr. Inge calls on men who have the deposit of truth committed to them from Hebrew, Greek, and Roman to live simply and conserve it. "What the Church did in the Dark Ages the combined forces of Christianity and humanism must do now." He admits that Plotinus and his school were defeated by the Church, but Christianity carried so much away from them that Plotinus himself would have been "half satisfied."

As one closes these volumes, whether he agrees with Dr. Inge or not, Plotinus compels admiration as a solitary figure prepared for the worst, but refusing to bow to the idols of the market place or to surrender his intellectual freedom "*arbitrio popularis aurae*."

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE PROBLEM OF SPACE IN JEWISH MEDÆVAL PHILOSOPHY. ISRAEL ISAAC EFROS, Ph.D. Columbia University Press, 1917. Pp. viii, 125. \$1.50.

SAADIA'S POLEMIC AGAINST HIWI AL-BALKHI. ISRAEL DAVIDSON. Published by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. A Fragment edited from a Genizah MS., with a Facsimile. New York. 1915. Pp. 104. \$1.00.

SCROLLS. ESSAYS ON JEWISH HISTORY AND LITERATURE AND KINDRED SUBJECTS. GOTTHARD DEUTSCH. 2 vols. Bloch Publishing Co. New York. 1917.

This scholarly work by Dr. Israel Isaac Efros forms volume XI of the Columbia University Oriental Studies, edited by Professor Richard Gottheil, a fact which, taken by itself, gives it a standing in the world of letters. But even without such a background it would attract the attention of the learned, for its merits are quite apparent in many ways. The study of Jewish philosophy has in recent years received more attention on the part of English-speaking Jewish scholars than ever before. But most of them, following the pathway of German Jewish scholars, regard Jewish philosophy as a mere effort from a philosophical point of view to defend Judaism or at best as efforts to adjust it to conditions of the world. Dr. Efros finds Jewish mediæval philosophy rich in original thought on problems that have no direct bearing on the Jewish religion, and endeavors to derive from it a possible solution of "a problem that has baffled human thought ever since the days of Zeno of Elea" — that of space. He shows that the Jewish mediæval philosophers not only affirmed the independent existence of space, but some even took a geometric view of things and conceived the corporeal essence in terms of space. To them space and matter were often synonymous terms. Because Jewish philosophy is so much influenced by the theories of Plato and Aristotle, Dr. Efros gives by way of introduction an excellent though brief discussion of both the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of space. The views of the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages on Empirical, Absolute, and Infinite space are then carefully presented. Dr. Efros brings

forth many suggestions advanced by the Jewish thinkers in the Middle Ages, which might lead to a new and perhaps better understanding of the problem.

Students of Hebrew philosophical texts will find Dr. Efros' *Glossary of Some Hebrew Philosophical Terms in Connexion with the Subject of Space* extremely valuable, for it embodies a good deal of philosophical matter.

It is regrettable that neither the author of the work nor the editor of the series makes mention of the fact that the work, with the exception of the glossary and index, appeared previously in the pages of vols. VI and VII of the *Jewish Quarterly Review (New Series)*, 1916.

As a whole the work of Dr. Efros will have accomplished much if it will help to stimulate a larger interest in Jewish philosophical problems among students of philosophy in general.

During the summer of 1914, while on a visit to the library of Cambridge University, Professor Israel Davidson of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America examined the Genizah collection, and was "fortunate enough to light upon so important a document as the long-lost Polemic of Saadia against Hiwi Al-Balkhi," who flourished about 850-875. Despite the fact that the latter is mentioned in Saadia's *Emunoth W'Deoth*, Ibn Ezra's *Commentary on Exodus* and Ibn Daud's *Sefer Hakabalah*, his name was almost lost to Jewish history and literature. It was not until the early part of the nineteenth century that his name was again brought to light. It was first Rapoport, and after him Luzzatto, who drew the attention of Jewish scholars to the importance of Hiwi as a rationalistic critic of the Bible. Ever since then, Hiwi and his teachings became the subject of hypothesis and vague conjectures advanced by many Jewish scholars. Hiwi was a skeptic, who, because he propounded two hundred questions relating to the Bible, Jewish philosophy and theology, was attacked by the Rabbanites and Karaites alike.

It was the refutation of these two hundred questions that caused Saadia to write in Hebrew an extensive polemical work, a fragment of which Dr. Davidson has edited from a Genizah MS., accompanied by an English translation and critical notes, and published as volume V of the *Texts and Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America*. It is not difficult to infer from this fragment, containing answers to at least forty-seven questions, that Saadia regarded Hiwi's work as destructive criticism of the Old Testament doctrines. That the Gaon Saadia had written a polemical work against Hiwi was known before, but only a single quotation in Barzilai's *Commentary*

on the *Sefer Yezirah* was accessible. Dr. Davidson's find restores to us a large part of that work, enabling us to clear up many doubtful points as to the nature and contents of Hiwi's questions. We may well agree with Dr. Davidson's inference from two passages in the fragment (sect. 37 and 61), "that Hiwi composed his Book of Questions in a tongue that was not Hebrew," and that he "wrote it in rhymed prose." That Saadia wrote his "polemic" in Hebrew was already suggested by S. D. Luzzatto in 1847, in connection with his publication of an extract from Barzilai's *Commentary on the Sefer Yezirah*. Dr. Davidson's discovery not only confirms this suggestion, but also shows that Saadia followed Hiwi in writing his refutations in the form of a rhymed prose poem with acrostics of the Hebrew alphabet as well as of his own name.

In his excellent introduction Dr. Davidson comes to the probable conclusion that, being inclined towards both Christianity and Zoroastrianism, Hiwi denied the authenticity of the Torah, and accordingly "endeavored to spread his views throughout the schools by means of a new principle of Biblical exegesis;" but he neither defines nor does he show the workings of this principle. Far fetched is Davidson's "additional testimony," that Hiwi was influenced by the teachings of Magi. This consists of a peculiar, indeed ingenious, explanation of the Hebrew term *מכשף* applied by Ibn Danan to Hiwi. Dr. Davidson thinks that this term "is to be taken as the rendering in Biblical Hebrew of the word *magician* in its etymological significance of a follower of the Magi, not in its derived sense of enchanter." Equally untenable is his contention that *בספרים ובלוחות* in Ibn Daud's description of Hiwi stand for two cities or districts in the Orient, though he admits that he is "unable to identify them."

In editing the text Dr. Davidson displays vast erudition and critical acumen, though in a number of cases he misread the text and accordingly mistranslated a few, quite important, passages. But this in no way diminishes the value of the publication as a whole. We may heartily join the editor in the hope "that the publication of this text together with the facsimile will enable others who work in the same field to discover the rest of this remarkable document."

Jewish learning in America is placed under an obligation to Professor Deutsch by the collection of his *Scrolls*. For first, the *Scrolls* though representing a reprint of articles which have appeared in various periodicals, come in a period of dearth in Jewish scholarship, at least so far as publications are concerned; and secondly, they appear at a time when historical sanity is tremendously needed, an invigoration

of the historical sense; while in the third place, the *Scrolls* are uncommonly interesting. They comprise, besides the Introduction containing reminiscences of the author's youth, surveys of the years 5663 (A.D. 1903), 5665, 5666, 5668-5676 in Jewish history; Philosophy of Jewish History; Minima Curat Historicus; De Minimis Curat Historicus; Everybody Says So; 1815 to 1915; History Repeats Itself; Isaac M. Wise; Moses Mielziner; Jacob H. Schiff; One Generation Goeth and Another Cometh; Reminiscences of the Breslau Seminary; Leyser Lazarus; Friedenthal and the Breslau Seminary; Isaac Hirsch Weiss; Isaac Loeb Perez; Shalom Alechem; Heinrich Heine and Francis Joseph.

In these *Scrolls* Dr. Deutsch exhibits a unique quality. He has a historical imagination that never flags. He sees the scene vividly before his own mind, and presents it as vividly to his readers. He has an intense human interest, not without the salt of humor. It is the personal human side of Jewish history that seems primarily to attract his interest. In a manner of his own he describes the transition from mediævalism to modernism in Jewish history, from the Ghetto community to the Reform congregation. Because Dr. Deutsch always scrupulously insists on unimpeachable truth in history, his *Scrolls* will be found indispensable to the future historian of present-day Jewry. For he has brought together a wealth of material valuable for one who desires a knowledge of the ideas that permeated Jewish life in the period that marked the transition from strict Jewish orthodoxy with its uncompromising opposition to secular culture, to the period when the acquisition of secular ideas was no longer considered deleterious to the religious life of the Jew. Indeed, what Dr. Deutsch says of his own reminiscences is equally true of his *Scrolls*. They "serve future generations as a mirror of conditions, in many instances representing a remote past, and important because they coincide with an era of transition."

Though the *Scrolls* are frequently prolix in statement, they are written with refreshing vigor and are rich in unworn phrases. Dr. Deutsch drives his facts and theories abreast rather than tandem. For this reason the reading of the *Scrolls* calls for close application, of which the rewards are ample. It is only regrettable that present conditions did not enable the learned author to give us more of his *Scrolls*; but the excuse is perhaps to be found in the Rabbinic phrase, "The Torah was given in single scrolls" (Gittin 60a), which Dr. Deutsch so aptly placed on the front pages of his *Scrolls*.

JOSHUA BLOCH.

LAKE CHARLES, LOUISIANA.

LETTERS AND CONTRACTS FROM ERECH WRITTEN IN THE NEO-BABYLONIAN PERIOD. CLARENCE ELWOOD KEISER, Ph.D. (Babylonian Inscriptions in the Collection of James B. Nies, Vol. I). Yale University Press. 1918. Pp. 42. Plates 60.

Before the great war students of the civilization of the Ancient Orient were accustomed to look to such institutions as the British Museum, the Berlin Museum, and the Louvre for publications of cuneiform texts. Since 1914 Europe has been compelled to suspend, for the time being, many of her operations along purely literary lines. But, thanks to the foresight of such institutions as the Philadelphia Museum, Yale University, and the Harvard Semitic Museum, as well as to that of such individuals as the late J. Pierpont Morgan and the Rev. Dr. J. B. Nies, America has been enabled to step in and to count it a privilege and duty to take up the task which Europe has so well done in the past, and to sow, as she did, that herself and others may reap. The volume at present before us is a sample of the thorough and efficient way in which our scholars are assuming their obligations.

Dr. Keiser's book is the first volume in a series which proposes to publish the "Babylonian Inscriptions in the Collection of James B. Nies," and Dr. Keiser himself is one of that school of young Assyriologists which Professor Clay of Yale University has founded and is developing. American scholarship expects much of these young men, and there are signs that it will not be disappointed. This work of one of Professor Clay's students contains forty-two pages of introductory matter and sixty autographed plates. It is a pity that photographs of a few of the tablets are not included, for they would serve to give the student a better idea of the tablets under consideration than much explanation could do.

In this volume one hundred and seventy-seven texts are published. They consist of letters and contracts from Erech, the ancient Uruk, written in the Neo-Babylonian period. There are ninety-four letters, thirty-six legal documents, and forty-seven temple administrative records. The letters are legible only in part, but the contracts are well preserved. The chief value of these texts is philological, but they contain in addition much material valuable for a study of the social, commercial, and administrative institutions of the Neo-Babylonian empire. There are records of debts, taxes, rents, and mortgages; of exchange, interest, leases, sales, payments, and receipts; there are records of notes promissory and of slaves, of lists of witnesses and balances of accounts, of sheep bought for sacrifice and of taxes to be paid by women. No. 67 contains a request that wine be sent to the sun-god Shamash for sacrifices; Nos. 18, 34, 62, and 93 refer to

the common oriental custom of covenanting with salt; and No. 167 has reference to the observance of a day something like the Hebrew Sabbath.

Both the letters and contracts contain much material useful in the study of the Neo-Babylonian cult. The relation and rank of the many temple officials is a subject which will derive much light from a study of these texts. This is especially true of a class of temple servants called *širaqu*. They were marked or branded with a star (MUL), similar to that placed upon animals, and may have been dedicated to a god.

The primary object of this series being to present only the texts with indices to scholars, no translations have been made, but the indices contain valuable material. First, there is an index of personal names, with more or less full references (such references should be complete, *e.g.*, there is no reference under *Na-din* to No. 18); and then a catalogue of the letters, giving the names of the addresser and addressee; and one of the contracts, giving the date and contents.

The autographed work is splendidly done, but it is a pity that so many printer's errors were allowed to remain in the brief introductory remarks, *e.g.*, "egible" for "legible," "convenanting" for "covenanting"; and in proper names the *dingir* is often omitted when the sign appears in the plates, *e.g.*, p. 37, No. 18. This is a serious error, for students of Babylonian religion are very much concerned with the use of this title. Without the original tablets or a photographed copy it is impossible to check up the accuracy of the copying, but there are some forms which appear questionable, especially in Nos. 93 and 169. But on the whole the copying seems to have been very carefully done.

Assyriologists will look with interest for the succeeding volumes of this series.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER.

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
CHICAGO.

SHORT NOTICES

THE VITAL ISSUES OF THE WAR. RICHARD W. BOYNTON. The Beacon Press. 1918. Pp. x, 134. \$1.00.

A volume of eight sermons, endeavoring to clarify the leading moral issues of the war for busy people. The titles of some of the sermons will indicate the scope of the book: "The War and the Social Revolution," "The Influence of Sea Power in War," "America's Leadership in the World of Tomorrow," "The United States of Europe."

THE PROTESTANT. BURRIS A. JENKINS. The Century Christian Press.
Pp. 203. \$1.35.

This book, with its accent on the penult, is too flippant for usefulness, too serious for a jest-book. It aims to commend itself by shocking, to make capital out of its antics. "It copies Carlyle," says the author, "and very imperfectly at that. It apes Elbert Hubbard" (p. 7). Everything that is bad in style, loose in thinking, superficial in suggestion, destructive in criticism, is here. The Church, theology, the so-called religious press, the clergy, the whole institutional side of religion, look, after the author's handling, like a French village after occupation by the Germans. Criticism is ever needful; but it is not apt to be persuasive when it casts aside intelligence, reserve, and sanity, and indulges in hysteric gestures and "a barbaric yawp." The only excuse for the book is that the author seems sincerely desirous of better things than he thinks he finds.

A STUDY OF LATIN HYMNS. ALICE K. MACGILTON. The Gorham Press.
1918. Pp. 116. \$1.25.

An interesting essay on a subject too little known. It is crudely written, with too many superlatives (pp. 30, 49), and immature judgments (p. 52), too facile quotation of the opinions of others instead of discriminating criticism (pp. 40, 60). But its chronological method of treatment is good, and its catalogue of 490 hymns with their sources and the collections in which they may be found, is excellent. One serious defect is the absence of an index to the hymns mentioned. There is no way of discovering whether a given hymn is referred to. The proof-reading is occasionally defective.

THE REVELATION OF JOHN. CHARLES L. WHITING. The Gorham Press.
1918. Pp. 259. \$1.50.


The author states his purpose as "an attempt to reach an interpretation of the Revelation of John that will be both reasonable and in accord with the best modern scholarship, and at the same time so simple that the ordinary layman will find it easily within his grasp" (p. 5). The three-fold aims of this purpose have been fairly attained. The book is not for scholars but mediates their work to the average reader. It contains an Introduction on the date, authorship, historical setting, plan, symbolism, of the Apocalypse; a detailed Exposition; and a Translation, whose slight differences from the A. V. and R. V. seem to give little justification for its presence. The historical treatment avoids the follies of those who would make the Revelation a bundle of predictions and who endeavor to find its lesson for modern times by piecing together numbers and calculating years.

THE WAR AND THE BIBLE. H. G. ENELOW, D.D. The Macmillan Co. 1918.
Pp. 115. 60 cents.

The conduct of the Jews in America in regard to the war has been admirable. Jewish regiments have been formed and marched, and Young Men's Hebrew Associations have ministered aid, and Jewish money in millions has been contributed. That this is in line with Jewish history is set forth in this little book. The author shows by felicitous quotations from the Old Testament how the Hebrews were taught and trained to fight for their existence, and how and when war is justified by the Bible. Apart from this main aim, the book is valuable as a commentary on large portions of the Old Testament, for it gives the circumstances under which these were written, and so shows them as vital and vivid. It may be commended, on the one hand, to Sunday School teachers as a text-book on the Old Testament, and, on the other, as an indication of the religious thought of Jewish leaders today.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.



BR
1
H47
v.12

The Harvard theological
review

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
